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ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses New Zealander's attitudes to and 
involvement in the Spanish Civil War, 1936 to 1939. Although 
distance muted the war's impact, three general divisions of opinion 
developed in New Zealand - pro-Republicanism, pro-Francoism and "Non-
Interventionism". 
The first Labour Government's "limited pro-Republicanism" 
illustrated its commitment to collective security and was expressed 
at the League of Nations and in communications with Britain. Its 
policy was part of a move towards more independent judgement in 
foreign affairs and caused some strain in relations with the British 
Government, but was ultimately restricted by commitment to the 
Commonwealth. Expression of sympathy with the Spanish Government was 
limited by appreciation of the potential divisiveness of the issue. 
The National Party and some newspapers objected to Labour's 
policy. These "Non-Interventionists" considered the ideological 
issues of the war irrelevant to New Zealanders and regarded the war 
largely in terms of Imperial strategic concerns. They supported 
British non-intervention policy and accused Labour of disloyalty to 
Britain. It is argued that this insular imperialist view of the war 
and of New Zealand's role in international affairs was the real 
opposite to both pro-Francoist and pro-Republican views, although 
conservatism and anti-Communism brought "Non-Interventionism" closer 
to pro-Francoism. 
Although in 
reflected 
the New 
overseas 
general pro-Francoist and pro-Republican views 
attitudes, both applied the issues of the war to 
Zealand 
Catholics, who 
and Communism. 
scene. Support for Franco was mainly confined to 
saw the war as a battle between Catholic Christianity 
Catholic newspapers objected to Labour's policy, but 
there was some ambivalence towards British non-intervention. 
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Catholics saw pro-Republicanism as anti-Catholic and also indicative 
of the presence of the Communist menace in New Zealand, but did 
little to promote Franco's cause other than through letters to 
newspapers. 
There is more extensive discussion of the more diverse group that 
constituted the pro-Republican movement. The Communist Party's 
slogan of "Democracy versus Fascism" was generally accepted on the 
Left, but it failed to create a wider Popular Front from 
pro-Republicanism. The Labour Party, mindful of Catholic voters' 
views and suspicious of Communism, was publicly cautious, although 
its newspaper was pro-Republican. Long standing divisions on the 
Left were not exacerbated by the issue, but neither were they 
entirely healed. However, intellectuals, Christians, workers and 
Labourites came together in the Communist-inspired Spanish Medical 
Aid Committee a focus for propaganda and fund-raising for aid to 
Republican Spain. Condemnation of British policy and support for 
Labour's independent stand was a significant feature of New Zealand 
pro-Republicanism. 
The motives and experiences of the few New Zealanders with the 
International Brigades and Republican medical units, as well as the 
one New Zealander who fought for Franco, are considered. There is 
some discussion of non-partisan humanitarian appeals for aid to 
Spain. 
The Spanish conflict did not have a great or lasting impact upon 
New Zealanders. However, the responses of New Zealanders were 
significant in their revelation of differing perceptions of the world 
imperialist and internationalist - and in the development of a new 
independent outlook that questioned the nature and value of New 
Zealand's relation with Britain and foreshadowed New Zealand's full 
acceptance of independent nationhood after the Second World War. 
Bringing It Home 
Here in this country where no fighting fell 
more than would make an Afghan Chieftain smile, 
our thoughts turn lightly from the game of death 
the Pyrenees have witnessed all this while. 
Here at our slippered ease we read the papers 
and switch on idle noises from the air 
and think ourselves a very peaceful people, 
and put an extra cushion on the chair. 
But what would happen if our country's leaders 
were nightly murdered, shot as being "Reds"? 
What would we say if sudden submarines 
torpedoed the Wahine off the heads? 
What would we do if Public Works men here 
were rounded up and shot for no good reason 
except that since they lived and talked and voted 
they must be guilty of the highest treason? 
Or if, suppose, Air Force and Army men 
decided that the Government of the day 
must be removed, and butchered in the streets 
in case it thought of cutting down their pay? 
How would you act if natives from the islands 
were armed and paid to massacre the people 
and run amok and murder all the children 
while priests approved the action, from a steeple? 
And if, when we appealed to Britain's navy 
and help from her (the mother of the free) 
She told us that disputes about the gravy 
would keep the League some little time at tea; 
And added she'd offend the Argentine 
if she should give us arms to fight the foe 
and shut her eyes upon our desperation 
in rushing on machine guns with a hoe? 
Denis Glover 
Tomorrow 
10 November 1937, p.1S. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Spanish Civil War began on 17 July 1936, in Spanish Morocco, 
as a pronunciamento 
Government elected 
turmoil since the 
or military revolt against the Popular Front 
in February 1936. Spanish politics had been in 
abdication of the King, Alfonso XIII, in 1931 and 
the establishment of the Second Republic. The Republican coalition 
that governed until October 1934 introduced wide-ranging reforms, 
intended to transform Spain into a modern society from its former 
practically feudal state. Secular education was expanded, Church and 
State 
the 
Its 
separated and a programme of land reform undertaken. However, 
Government faced mounting opposition from both Right and Left. 
final collapse in October 1934 was preceded by a general strike, 
a revolt in Catalonia, where the regional Government declared itself 
a Federal Republic, and a revolutionary uprising in the Asturias 
mining province. The Asturian revolt, in which armed miners occupied 
the provincial capital, Oviedo, was put down with the aid of Moorish 
troops and the Foreign Legion, under the command of General Francisco 
Franco, who was to become the leader of the rebesl in the civil 
war.1 
The suppression of the Asturian revolt was accomplished with 
great violence and brutality, especially on the part of the Moorish 
troops. The victims of the military campaign and subseQuent 
repression claimed that 5,000 had been killed, while official figures 
put the total at 1,300 dead and 3,000 wounded. 2 An estimated 
30,000 political prisoners were taken throughout Spain in the wake of 
the unrest. 
The CEDA party, a Catholic confederation led by Jose Gil Robles, 
which was the largest group in the Spanish Parliament, the Cortes, 
but had been denied a part in the Government, then took power. The 
right-wing Catholic Government proceeded to modify many of the 
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progressive reforms enacted under the Second Republic. In November 
1935 it was decided to hold another election, to take place in 
February 1936. By this time, emotions and ideologies on both sides 
had hardened. A coalition of Left Republicans, Socialists and 
Communists fought and won the election of 16 February 1936 under the 
banner of the Popular Front. The new Government promised the release 
of political prisoners and a return to the 1931 reform programme, in 
particular the hastening of land reform. 
The period between the 
marked by increasing unrest 
revolutionary committees were 
peasants; there were church 
election and the military rising was 
and political violence. In some areas 
established and land was occupied by 
burnings and political assassinations. 
The revolt, planned since the election, was sparked off prematurely 
by the murder, on 13 July, of Jose Calvo Sotelo, a former Finance 
Minister under the monarchy and leader of the monarchists. 
Within weeks of the revolt the Spanish Civil War had become a 
European problem, with the provision of Italian and German military 
and to the rebels. The Popular Front Government of France at first 
was inclined to aid the Government of Spain, but was too weak and 
divided to bear the political consequences. It was also clear that 
Britain would not support French moves to aid the Spanish 
Government. Instead, France proposed a Non-Intervention Agreement, 
which was aimed at preventing the war becoming the scene of general 
European conflict and perhaps spreading outside Spain. The British 
Government, more inclined towards the rebels and fearful of the 
consequences of intervention, endorsed the French proposal. 3 A 
Non-Intervention Committee was established to police the Agreement, 
which was eventually signed by 27 countries, including the 
intervening powers. The Non-Intervention Agreement was never 
effective and, in placing an embargo on the sale of arms to either 
side, helped to limit the Republican war effort. By October 1936, 
the Soviet Union was sending war materials, military advisers and 
food to Republican Spain, although its aid never reached the 
proportions of German and Italian involvement. The protracted course 
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of the war, from July 1936 until March 1939, was in part the result 
of foreign intervention and the policy of non-intervention. 
Outside Spain, battlelines were quickly drawn. The war had a 
powerful emotional and political impact upon many people in Europe 
and America. Fascist and Communist intervention and the propaganda 
of both forces in the war, and their outside sympathisers, combined 
to create an image of an archetypal battle between opposing 
ideological forces. For many on the Left, the war became a symbol of 
the worldwide conflict between progress and reaction, and represented 
a turning point in the class struggle that could determine the fate 
of the world. They also considered the war a foretaste of a greater 
battle against Fascism that would ensue if the expansionist appetites 
of Italy and Germany were not curbed. For the Right, and for the 
Catholic Church, the war was equally symbolic as a defence of order 
and Christian civilisation against atheistic Communism, which they 
saw as using Spain in its first step towards world domination. 
There were, of course, varying degrees of enthusiasm for the 
Republican and nationalist causes and divisions within the ranks of 
their foreign sympathisers, as studies of the American and British 
responses have shown.4 Essentially, however, most of these who 
become involved in the issue outside Spain could be grouped broadly 
into two camps those who regarded the war as one of democracy 
against Fascism and those who saw it as a battle against Communism. 
In New Zealand, as in Australia,S the impact of the war was 
by distance and local preoccupations. The domestic policies of 
first Labour Government, elected in November 1935, were the focus 
muted 
the 
of most New Zealanders' attention. Moreover, New Ze~landers, 
although interested in foreign affairs, were not noted for their 
involvement in international issues. A contemporary observer 
described New Zealanders as having a "receptive or detached interest" 
in the world beyond their shores. 6 In the absence of public 
opinion polls such as those taken in Britain and America,7 it is 
impossible to gauge the general trend of opinion in New Zealand. 
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New Zealanders certainly received considerable information about 
the conflict. The cinema-going public even had a chance to see the 
"Hollywood version" of events in Spain. In 1937 and 1938 three films 
were shown that had the war as background and, at least partially, as 
subject. 
The first to appear on New Zealand screens was "The Last Train 
from Madrid" in the final months of 1937. This Paramount film 
starred Dorothy Lamour and was essentially a "romantic drama ll with 
beleaguered Madrid as background. The Radio Record 1 s film reviewer, 
Gordan Mirams, warned that partisans of either side should not expect 
the film to provide evidence in favour of their causes, since the 
film's foreword stated that it was ltabout people, not causes", 
although the depiction of Madrid in the early days of the war 
terrorised by bombing raids might not create any sympathy to the 
rebels. 8 Conversely, the convoluted stories of aristocratic and 
Republican lovers fleeing not only the air raids, but reprisals for 
their political beliefs might not have created much sympathy for the 
Loyalists either. 
"Love under Fire lf , from Twentieth Century Fox, which arrived in 
New Zealand in mid-1938, was probably a better example of a cynical 
Hollywood using the war's topicality to draw the crowds. It was a 
comedy-drama starring Loretta Young as a suspected jewel thief and 
Con Ameche as a Scotland Yard detective in search of excitement on a 
holiday in Spain. Again, police demands for Young's jewels and an 
escape from a British ship bombed by Government warships may have 
created a rather unsympathetic image of the Loyalists. 
The third Hollywood production was a rather more serious 
statement. "Blockade", produced by Walter Wanger, had already 
aroused some interest before it arrived in New Zealand in August 
1938. There had been some publicity given to reports that the German 
and Italian Governments, as well as Franco, had objected to the film 
and had sent diplomatic representatives armed with threats to ask 
Wanger to reconsider aspects of the film. 
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"Blockade" y,as set in a coastal town easily identified \vi th any 
of the Basque ports blockaded by the rebels and starred Henry Fonda 
as a young farmer who had become an intelligence officer for the 
Loyalists. Madeleine Carroll was the daughter of a businessman 
active in fomenting rebellion, and herself a spy for the rebels until 
overcome with remorse at the tragedy of the starving population. The 
film made some compromises, in that the armies depicted in the film 
were not 
underlying 
recognisably 
the conflict 
those of either side and nor were the issues 
given much exposition. Yet, scenes of 
starving people and torpedoed foodships placed the film in the 
pro-Republican camp, 
specifically toward 
even if much of its propaganda was not directed 
the Spanish rebels. Mirams saw the real 
propaganda of the film as the more general message it conveyed, "that 
goes beyond partisanship and becomes an indictment of any kind of war 
that makes victims of the civilian population".9 Fonda's final 
speech encapsulated that message: 
Its not war - war is between soldiers - its murder. Murder 
of innocent people. There's no sense to it. The world can 
stop it - WHERE'S THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD! 
Even this more generalised message might have created more 
sympathy for the Loyalists, since by this time in 1938 a good deal of 
publicity had' been given to the bombings of civilian towns by Franco 
and his Italian and German allies, and, as Mirams pointed out, the 
Republicans 
foodships. 
were not known for blockading ports or torpedoing 
The 
reports 
film's 
audience 
film found a ready response from New Zealanders horrified by 
of bombings in Spain and China. Other reviewers praised the 
anti-war sentiment10 and Mirams reported that the preview 
in Wellington had applauded the final statement, an "almost 
unprecedented response".ll But horror at the bombing of 
civilians by the rebels and their allies did not necessarily mean 
active espousal of the pro-Republican cause. It is likely that the 
attitude towards the war of most New Zealanders was one of disgust at 
the viciousness of the war, compounded by dislike of both sides. 
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Newspapers ~ere, of course, the major source of the average New 
Zealander's vie~ of the war in Spain. For the purposes of this 
study, six daily and five weekly newspapers were consulted. They 
were the New Zealand Herald, Auckland's morning newspaper, the 
Waikato Times, an evening newspaper ~erving Hamilton and surrounding 
districts, Wellington's Evening Post, The Press, Christchurch's 
morning newspaper, the Otago Daily Times, an evening newspaper 
published in Dunedin, the Grey River Argus, a Labour daily published 
on the West Coast of the South Island, the Auckland Weekly News, the 
New Zealand Freelance and the New Zealand Observer, published in 
Wellington and Auckland respectively, the New Zealand Truth and the 
N.Z. Radio Record, which, as its name suggests, was devoted mainly to 
publication and discussion of radio programmes. 
The daily newspapers had considerable coverage of the Spanish 
Civil War in news columns, feature articles and editorials. The 
number of headlines and editorials about the war was at its highest 
in 1937; later the Sino-Japanese war and German aggression in Europe 
were to be the more immediate causes of concern about the 
international situation than the long-drawn-out conflict on the 
Iberian peninsual. Most of the news about Spain in New Zealand 
newspapers did not come from Spain itself. None of the dailies had 
their own regular foreign correspondents; their foreign news came 
from British Official Wireless in England, through Associated Press 
and United Press, or from British, American and Australian newspapers 
such as the Times, the Manchester Guardian, the Daily Mail, the News 
Chronicle, the New York Times or the Sydney Morning Herald. The most 
regular sources used were the British newspapers. Of the six daily 
newspapers studied, only the New Zealand Herald had a separate 
magazine section on Saturdays although all had extra "weekend" 
pages. These pages sometimes included feature articles on aspects of 
the Spanish Civil War, again mostly reprinted from overseas sources. 
The personalities of Franco and his wife, life in Madrid, stories of 
refugee camps and discussions of Britain's Mediterranean strategy 
with regard to Spain were among New Zealanders' Saturday reading. 
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The majority of editorial discussions of the war in New Zealand 
newspapers centred upon the international complications of the 
war. 12 Only a very few were prepared to pass judgement upon the 
opposing forces in Spain, preferring instead to confine analysis of 
events in Spain to discussions of the historical background to the 
war and of the military situation itself. The Otago Daily Times, in 
particular, 
discussing 
editorial 
demonstrated the difficulty New Zealand newspapers had in 
the complicated and potentially divisive issue. Its 
columns upon the "internal" aspects of the problem usually 
reprinted articles and editorials from overseas newspapers, and 
almost the only opinion ventured by the paper's editor was that the 
war was not as simple as many observers portrayed it. The Otago 
Daily Times' use of varying sources to describe the war and reinforce 
its emphasis on the complexities of the issue also indicated the 
dependence of New Zealand 
perhaps, the confusion that 
Spain. 
newspapers on overseas sources and, 
this might cause over an issue like 
The popular weekly papers contained considerably less coverage of 
the Spanish Civil War, particularly with regard to editorial 
comment. Most however included some photographs of the destruction 
wreaked by the war, and some news reports and articles. These papers 
concentrated upon the New Zealand scene, with little space for 
discussion of international events. However, because of this 
emphasis they did bring news to New Zealanders of the involvement of 
their compatriots in the Spanish Civil War. 
"Negative" 
little about 
considerable 
evidence 
the war 
evidence 
suggests that 
in Spain. 
to show that 
most New Zealanders 
Nevertheless, there is 
some New Zealanders 
cared 
also 
became 
strongly involved in the issue and that the propaganda and rhetoric 
of pro-Francoism and pro-Republicanism was transferred to New 
Zealand. Attitudes towards the Spanish Civil War in New Zealand and 
the response to the Labour Government's "limited pro-Republicanism" 
not only indicated the way in which New Zealanders regarded the 
"outside world" in the late 1930s, but also revealed significant 
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divisions of opinion among New Zealanders about their country's role 
in international affairs and its relation to Britain. 
The response of the Labour Government to the international crises 
of the late 1930s, including Spain, has already been the subject of 
some discussion among New Zealand historians. 13 There has also 
been some investigation of its specific attitude to the Spanish Civil 
War and the public reaction to that policy.14 This study builds 
upon earlier work to present a more detailed analysis of the impact 
of the Spanish Civil War upon New Zealanders and considers some 
aspects not previously investigated. 
The Labour Government's policy on the Spanish Civil War is seen 
to be largely based upon its commitment to collective security and 
concern for the survival of the League. However, it will be shown 
that Labour leaders also felt some identification with the Popular 
Front Government of Spain. The solutions proposed to the Spanish 
problem by New Zealand's delegate to the league, W.J. Jordan, reveal 
the degree to which the Labour Government's policy was based upon 
naive assessments of the European situation and idealistic insistence 
upon the application of the principles of the League Covenant to 
international relations. 
Labour's stand on the issue brought it into conflict with the 
British Government and reflected its moves toward more independent 
judgement on foreign policy. The question of Labour leaders' views 
on the Imperial link, and the extent to which loyalty to Britain 
limited public expression of disapproval of non-intervention is 
considered. The restrictions upon Labour's public espousal of 
pro-Republicanism at home are shown to have been caused by awareness 
of the politically divisive nature of the issue. 
The internationalism, the insistence upon reason and justice and 
the conviction of the Popular Front Government's legitimacy and 
constitutional nature found in the Labour Government's stand was 
reflected in the pro-Republican opinions of many other New 
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Zealanders. Communists, trade unionists, members of the Labour 
Party, a few Catholics and ordinary citizens came together in support 
of the Republican cause. Discussion of the pro-Republican movement 
in New Zealand has been divided into three areas: the Communist 
Party, the Labour Movement and the internationalist anti-fascist 
alliance 
attention 
promoting 
degree of 
focus in 
is upon 
creation 
of opinion formed by "progressive people". Considerable 
is paid to the major role of the Communist Party in 
pro-Republicanism in New Zealand. Where possible, the 
Communist influence in other Left groups is examined. The 
investigation of the Communist Party's views and activities 
its use of the Spanish Civil War as a vehicle for the 
of a Popular Front coalition of all Left groups, and the 
success of this policy. 
The responses 
while the image 
of the Left to the Spanish Civil War reveal that, 
of the war as a conflict between Fascism and 
democracy was widely accepted, there were varying degrees of 
commitment to the Republican cause and differing analyses of the 
situation in Spain. It is argued that the fact that a Labour 
Government was in power at the time of the war both hindered and 
helped the development of a strong pro-Republican movement in New 
Zealand. The cautious pro-Republicanism of the Labour Party is 
discussed in the light of long-standing suspicion of Communism within 
the Labour Movement and of the influence of Catholic Labour voters' 
views. 
One of the most significant aspects of pro-Republican opinion on 
the war was its condemnation of British non-intervention policy and 
consequent support of the Labour Government's independent stand at 
the League. In this respect, the impact of the Spanish Civil War is 
seen as contributing to the development of ideas about New Zealand 
nationality in the late 1930s and the questioning of the nature and 
value of relations with Britain among some New Zealanders. 
Pro-Republic3n sentiment found its active expression in the 
Communist-inspir2d Spanish Medical Aid Committee (SMAC), established 
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to raise funds to provide medical supplies for the Republican 
Government. Its organisation, membership and support reflected the 
general pattern of pro-Republicanism in New Zealand. The success of 
its propaganda and fund-raising activities provides an indication of 
how far other groups and individuals on the Left were prepared to 
co-operate with the Communist Party in supporting the Republican 
cause. The donation of money was one of the most tangible means by 
which New Zealanders could express their concern about the war. The 
Labour Movement's contributions to other pro-Republican appeals are 
discussed in the context of its responses to the war. The 
establishment of non-partisan appeals for aid to Spain is also 
examined. 
The ultimate expression of pro-Republicanism was, of course, 
personal 
in the 
involvement in the war. New Zealand was not unrepresented 
International Brigades or among medical units in Spain. One 
chapter in 
experiences 
five nurses. 
this study is devoted to investigation of the motives and 
in Spain of ten International Brigaders, one doctor and 
The involvement of the one New Zealander discovered to 
have fought for Franco is considered in this chapter. 
Support for the rebel cause in New Zealand was mainly limited to 
the Catholic Church. However, it will be shown that there was some 
acceptance 
influence 
by conservatives of pro-Francoist arguments about the 
of Communism in Spain. There was little attempt by the 
Catholic Church to promote Franco's cause outside the faith. 
The Catholic press created a mythology about the war in Spain 
that depicted it 
Catholic propaganda 
as an archetypal crusade against Communism. 
generally concentrated upon the fate of Spain 
itself rather than the international complications of the war, in 
part because of its attempts to minimise the role of italian and 
German aid to Franco. However, some ambivalence toward British 
policy was evident. Catholic pro-Francoists considered that the war 
had implications for the rest of the world, including New Zealand. 
Catholics' translation of the issues of the war to the New Zealand 
scene and 
examined. 
their response to the Labour 
There is also an assessment 
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Government's policy are 
of the degree to which 
pro-Fascist views influenced the development of pro-Francoist 
beliefs, within the Church and among other New Zealanders. 
It is argued that the most significant division of opinion in New 
Zealand about the Spanish Civil War was not between Catholic 
pro-Francoists and Leftist pro-Republicans. The Catholic Church in 
New Zealand was part of an international organisation and had the 
wider perspective on international events that this association 
entailed. Most pro-Republican organisations also had international 
links and pro-Republicanism in general grew from an internationalist 
outlook. Both pro-Republicans and pro-Francoists considered the 
outcome in Spain itself of importance not only to Spaniards and were 
convinced that the "lessons of Spain" could be applied to the New 
Zealand scene. Their assessments of the international implications 
of the war were inextricably linked with their views of the nature of 
the conflict in Spain. There was another body of opinion in New 
Zealand that revealed an essentially insular, Imperialist response to 
the Spanish Civil War, generated by an idealised view of Britain and 
by assumptions about New Zealand's role in the Empire. 
The National Party's 
the Labour Government's 
response to the war, largely a reaction to 
policy, formed a part of the assortment of 
opinions that has been labelled "Non-Interventionism". So, too, did 
the editorial attitudes of several daily and weekly newspapers, 
which, unwilling to commit themselves on the rights and wrongs of the 
war, were ready to endorse the British Government's policy. 
There were indications of some leaning towards the pro-Francoist 
view of events in Spain. However, in general, "Non-Interventionist" 
assessments of the nature of the war in Spain were based upon 
dismissal of its relevance to New Zealanders. Discussion of "Non-
Interventionalism" centres upon its support of British 
non-intervention policy and its criticisms of the Labour Government's 
attitude. "Non-Interventionist" views of the conflict and its effect 
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upon New Zealand are considered to provide the real opposition to 
both pro-Francoism and pro-Republicanism in New Zealand. 
The impact of the Spanish Civil War in New Zealand, then, may be 
seen not only in terms of New Zealanders' involvement with the 
ideological issues 
the development of 
wider world. 
of Europe. 
differing 
It also grew from and contributed to 
concepts of New Zealand's part in a 
Apart from discussion of the Labour Government's views, which are 
followed chronologically over the period of the war in Spain, this 
study generally favours a thematic rather than a chronological 
approach. Responses to the Spanish Civil War did not often comprise 
attitudes that developed over time and modified in reaction to events 
in Spain. Particularly in respect to pro-Francoism and 
pro-Republicanism, positions were adopted at the beginning of the war 
and were not altered much by subsequent events in Spain, which 
usually served only to reinforce original attitudes. 
For non-combatant partisans of either cause outside Spain, the 
war was one of words. Investigation of New Zealand opinions has 
relied heavily upon printed sources, such as the Catholic, Communist 
and Labour Party newspapers. Where possible, the records of groups 
involved have also been consulted, but in some cases this was not 
possible; for instance, Catholic archives and Labour Party Head 
Office records were not available. In other cases, investigation of 
the minutes and correspondence of interested organisations has proved 
fruitless. The records of Student Christian Movement, for instance, 
revealed no interest in the Spanish Civil War; yet, its journal, the 
Student, demonstrated definite pro-Republican views. In a sense, 
propaganda, published opinion, was the major response to the war in 
New Zealand. The Spanish Medical Aid Committee not only campaigned 
for funds to aid Republican Spain, but devoted a considerable amount 
of its activities to promoting pro-Republicanism through printed and 
spoken proPaganda. Pro-Republicans and pro-Francoists waged a war of 
words through the correspondence columns of the newspapers, 
particularly in the Otago 
allowed more space for 
newspapers. 
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Daily Times and The Press, whose editors 
the public's letters than the other 
However, propaganda has its limitations as evidence. It does not 
provide accurate information of the numbers who accepted its premises 
and divisions or variations of opinion are submerged in the 
presentation of the "standard" vieH. Submersion also occurs in other 
areas; Trades Union records, for example, provide evidence of 
resolutions of sympathy for 
discussions that preceded the 
existence of published opinions 
of interest in the subject. 
the Spanish Government, but not of the 
passing of the resolutions. The 
is not an accurate gauge of the level 
The degree to which New Zealanders 
identified themselves with the opposing forces in Spain and actually 
thought about the issue is one of the questions that, from lack of 
broad evidence in a non-poll age, is left unresolved. 
It is, indeed, possible that propaganda had some negative effect 
upon the opinions of New Zealanders. If it stimulated a response 
from many already disposed to take sides, it may also have increased 
the resistance of others who saw no value in involvement in such an 
ideologically 
convinced of 
identified battle. The New Zealand Freelance, firmly 
the veracity of stories of Chinese women helping in the 
struggle against Japanese invaders, was sceptical about tales of 
women militia in Spain on the grounds that propaganda has so obscured 
the issue that facts about Spain were difficult to 
authenticate. IS 
There is also some difficulty in placing New Zealand responses 
into the broad context of New Zealand society in the late 1930s. 
There are few biographies of leading figures of the period, such as 
the Prime Minister Michael Savage or the High Commissioner, William 
Jordan. James Thorn's biography of Peter Fraser, who succeeded 
Savage as the Labour Prime Minister, is not particularly 
objective. 16 General histories, like R.M. Burdon's The Ne\1T 
Dominion17 or Sir Keith Sinclair's A History of New Zealand18 
shed some light but are rather too general to be of great 
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assistance. There are to date no histories of the National Party or 
the Communist 
area. 19 The 
Party, 
brief 
although some work has been done in the former 
history of the Catholic Church in New Zealand 
does not really address the question of the political and social 
attitudes of the Church in relation to New Zealand society.20 
A similar difficulty is encountered in relating New Zealand 
pro-Republican activities to those overseas. Examinations of the 
roles of Communism and the Comintern in the war have tended to focus 
upon their Spanish aspects. 21 Hugh Thomas' essential work on the 
Spanish Civil \var does provide brief information on the establishment 
by the Comintern of international organisations to aid Spain. With 
the exception of Diane Menghetti's study of the Popular Front in 
North Queensland, there is little detailed examination in studies of 
overseas responses of the operation of Spanish Medical Aid Committees 
and similar organisations. 
\ 
Despite 
that this 
the limitations imposed by the sources, it is to be hoped 
on 
study contributes not only to the body of workLthe Spanish 
Civil War, but also to a better understanding of the attitudes to the 
world of New Zealanders in the late 1930s. 
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CHAPTER 1 
COMMONWEALTH AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY: 
THE NEW ZEALAND LABOUR GOVERNMENT 
AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 
17 
New Zealand's first Labour Party Government, elected in November 
1935, had definite views on foreign policy and was determined that 
New Zealand should playas full a part as possible in world affairs. 
Its attitude towards international affairs was characterised by a 
conviction that collective security provided the best means of 
ensuring peace and safeguarding small nations against aggression. 
The Labour Government's support for the League of Nations, its 
insistence that reason and morality should govern international 
relations and its consequent disapproval of appeasement soon led it 
to express views at variance with those of the British Government. 
The Government's determination to stand up for these principles even 
in the face of British disapproval signalled a departure from the 
emphasis on imperial unity that had been the mainstay of previous 
Governments' analysis of foreign affairs. This implied no less a 
commitment to the Commonwealth than shown by its predecessors, but a 
determination to assert New Zealand's right as a Dominion to make 
independent judgements on foreign policy. Although the Prime 
Minister, Michael Savage, and his colleagues did not consider that 
adherence to the principle of collective security was incompatible 
with commitment to the Commonwealth, ultimately they were forced to 
make a choice. As the threat of war grew and it became increasingly 
clear that the League would not act as an effective deterrent to 
aggression, the Labour Government became less inclined to public 
disagreement with British foreign policy. 
The Labour Government's policy on the Spanish Civil War 
illuminated the difficulties of its dual commitment to Commonwealth 
and collective security and the first hesitant steps towards an 
independent foreign policy for New Zealand. Its policy was largely 
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expressed in the speeches of its delegate to the League of Nations, 
William J. Jordan, and in private communications with Britain. The 
League speeches were the only major public statements of the New 
Zealand Government's attitude to the war. 
For the Labour Government the problem of the Spanish Civil War 
was inextricably linked with the survival of the League of Nations as 
an effective international security against war. The Labour Party 
had at first criticised the League as an instrument of the victors of 
World War One, but gradually moved toward full and even fervent 
acceptance of the League's principles. 1 As Kathryn Peters has 
pointed out, Labour's acceptance of the League was based on both 
self-interest and idealism. 2 Collective security was 
particularly attractive to small, relatively powerless nations; 
moreover it embodied the concept that aggression was morally wrong. 
The League's principles were regarded as similar to the Labour 
Party's. By the time of Labour's election in November 1935 the Party 
was firmly committed to support of the League, up to and including 
the use of force, if necessary, to punish an aggressor. 
Ironically enough, Labour came to power at the same time that 
collective security was tested and found wanting. The imposition of 
sanctions on Italy in October 1935 as a result of its invasion of 
Abyssinia earlier that month had failed. New Zealand's Government 
was nevertheless still convinced that collective security would work 
if properly applied. It demonstrated its commitment to the League 
when member nations were invited to submit proposals for reforming 
the League Covenant and improving its operations, in July 1936. 
Despite the British Government's request that Dominions refrain 
from acting on the Secretary-GeneralIs invitation until after the 
next meeting of the League Assembly, and then not without 
consultation ~ith Britain, the Labour Government sent a detailed 
memorandum aimeJ at strengthening the League. The memorandum 
recommended that the provisions of the Covenant should be "given 
Ec()no:~~ s2nctions should be automatic and complete and a 
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peacekeeping force should be established to deter aggression. The 
Government also emphasised that the peoples of the world rather than 
merely Governments ought to be consulted on the application of 
sanctions and the establishment of a League "army". This memorandum 
provided the basis for the position expressed by New Zealand's 
representative at Geneva on various issues throughout the late 
1930s. 3 In part the memorandum said: 
(6) We are prepared to take our collective share in the 
application, against any future aggressor, of the full 
economic sanctions contemplated by Article 16, and we 
are prepared, to the extent of our power, to join in 
the collective application of force against any future 
aggressor. 
(7) We believe that the sanctions contemplated by the 
present Covenant will be ineffective in the future as 
they have been in the past -
(8) 
(9) 
(1) Unless they are made immediate and automatic: 
(2) Unless economic sanctions take the form of the 
complete boycott contemplated by Article 16: 
(3) Unless any sanctions that may be applied are 
supported by the certainty that the Members of the 
League applying the sanctions are able and, if 
necessary, prepared to use force against force. 
It is our belief that the Covenant as it is, or in a 
strengthened form, would in itself be sufficient to 
prevent war if the world realised that the nations 
undertaking to apply the Covenant actually would do so 
in fact. 
We are prepared to 
international force 
to the allocation 
proportion of the 
extent, if desired, 
land, sea, and air. 
agree to the institution of an 
under the control of the League or 
to the League of a definite 
armed forces of its Members to the 
of the whole of those forces -
(10) We consider that there can be no certainty of the 
complete and automatic operation of the Covenant unless 
the Governments of all Members of the League are 
supported, in their determination to apply it, by the 
declared approval of their peoples.4 
At the League Assembly in September 1936 New Zealand's newly 
appointed High Commissioner to London and chief delegate at Geneva, 
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William J. Jordan, reaffirmed the principles in his Government's 
memorandum and criticised the "short and sorry tale" of League action 
over the invasion of Abyssinia. He voiced "the disquieting thought 
that the League's 
encouragement to those 
This was the concern 
League with regard to 
continued failures may well give a fatal 
who rely on might rather than right".5 
that underlay Jordan's later speeches at the 
the Spanish Civil War, a concern for the 
credibility of the League as much as for the situation in Spain 
itself. 
Jordan and his Government were aware of the shortcomings of the 
League, but believed that the problem stemmed not from the Covenant 
itself, but from the attitudes of member nations. Jordan's speeches 
on Spain emphasised the responsibility of member nations to another 
fellow member and were reminders of their moral duty to each other 
and to the world whose peace was threatened. His support for the 
Spanish Government was based on its elected nature rather than on its 
political views, and on a simple moral outrage at the blatant 
aggression of Italy and Germany. 
Jordan was a 
Zealand in 1904. 
former London policeman who had emigrated to New 
He had become a Member of Parliament in 1922 and 
was a close friend of Michael Savage. A Methodist lay preacher, he 
was able to speak extempore and gained a reputation for plain 
speaking at Geneva. He was not conversant with, nor did he like, the 
euphemisms and equivocations of diplomatic language. His speeches 
had a certain naivete both in the solutions he offered to the Spanish 
crisis and in his assumption that the League could be roused to 
effective action. The naivete reflected the Labour Government's 
rather simplistic convictions about morality in international 
relations and Jordan's own "simple rules of conduct" and faith in 
human decency.6 Nevertheless, Jordan revealed in his private 
communications ,vi th Savage an awareness of the complexities of 
international involvement in the Spanish Civil War that contrasted 
somewhat with the simple force of his public utterances. Principle 
was thus to be ~2ramount over political expediency, and his speeches 
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had an element of the practised preacher, aimed at imparting his 
fervour to his listeners. 
It was Jorian's speeches at the League that caused the most 
consternation for the British Government, since they were public 
expressions of opinion 
in communications from 
rather than the private criticisms contained 
the New Zealand Government. The tension 
between the t~o Governments over Spain was at its peak in 1937, the 
year in which Spain was the focus of most international attention. 
By 1938 other matters, such as the Anschluss in March, had intervened 
to relegate Spain to a more minor role and, as well, the New Zealand 
Government had realised that it could not influence British policy on 
Spain. 
It was inevitable that there should have been differences of 
opinion bet\~een the dominantly Conservative National Government in 
Britain and a Labour Government heady with massive electoral 
victory. In the first place the Labour Government's attachment to 
collective security and the League put it at odds with the British 
Government. Jill Edwards, in The British Government and the Spanish 
Civil War, 1936-1939, endorses Lord Cecil's comment that by 1936 the 
British Government avoided bringing important issues to the League 
because the absence of Germany, Italy and Japan made vigorous action 
unlikely.7 Moreover, in the case of Spain, the British 
Government was aware that the divisions of opinion that would appear 
at the League would make effective action unlikely. But, at a time 
when the British were ceasing to regard the League as even a useful 
instrument of diplomacy, the Labour Government was insisting that 
collective security was the only means to a just peace. The despatch 
of proposals for the reform of the League Covenant against the 
express wishes of Britain had already demonstrated the Labour 
Government's determination to act independently on the issue of 
collective security. Insistence on the application of the principles 
of the Covenant to the Spanish situation not only deviated from 
British policy, but also was an implicit criticism of that policy. 
At times, J ord all, Savage and cC)lleagues ::~;l\'(~ the impress ion t h:: '~. they 
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were acting as the conscience of British foreign policy, as with a 
certain proselytizing zeal they attempted to impress on British 
policy-makers the need for a moral basis to their actions. 
Secondly, the two Governments approached the Spanish problem in 
different ways. British policy was in part guided by a desire to 
remain on neutral terms with whichever side was victorious, which led 
to its commitment to the policy of non-intervention long after it was 
seen to be ineffective. After Chamberlain became Prime Minister in 
June 1937, efforts were also directed towards a rapprochement with 
Italy, which necessitated some concessions with regard to Italian 
intervention in Spain. Furthermore, there was considerable sympathy 
within the British Government for the rebels, at least at the 
beginning of the war. 8 
The New Zealand Government's sympathies lay with the Government 
of Spain, which it saw as a legitimately elected, fellow democratic 
Government. It took a stand on principle, on rather simplistic moral 
judgements that did not take into account all the complications of 
the situation. Distance and diplomatic inexperience contributed to 
this approach. However, the Labour Government was aware that if 
League action was taken on the matter the main consequences would 
fallon the major European powers, including Britain. By the end of 
1937 it was also clear that the New Zealand stance at the League 
might embarrass Britain, but criticisms there and in private 
consultation would have no appreciable influence on British policy. 
The independent stand by the Labour Government had its limits. 
It was not prepared to take any action that would create an open 
breach between the two countries; the independence of judgement it 
sought was within the framework of the Commonwealth. New Zealand was 
economically dependent on Britain, relied on the Royal Navy for 
defence, and many New Zealanders had strong ties of sentiment to the 
Mother Country. As Ritchie Ovendale has pointed out, the Dominion 
most critical of British foreign policy was also the one that was 
unequivocally prepared to stand by the leader o~ the 
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Commo rn.,re a 1 th. 9 Ultimately, then, the New Zealand Government had 
to subordinate its commitment to collective security to its prior 
commitment to the Commonwealth. Jordan's speeches at the League 
annoyed the British Government, but outside that forum the New 
Zealand Government refrained from any statement or action that would 
irrevocably align it with the Spanish Government. 
Outside the two areas of the League and communications with 
Britain, the ~abour Government's attitude to the Spanish Civil War 
was more equivocal than Jordan's speeches indicated. There appears 
to have been a clear division between the "external" response and the 
Government's response to appeals for humanitarian aid or support for 
pro-Republican activities, the "internal" response. Jordan's 
speeches at the League, his correspondence with Michael Savage and 
official reports from Geneva, and External Affairs Department records 
of communications with Britain provide evidence of the Government's 
response in terms of collective security and British policy. There 
is, however, little evidence of the "internal" considerations that 
influenced the Government's policy. There are no Cabinet minutes for 
the period and the minutes of the Parliamentary Labour Party Caucus 
meetings do not mention the Spanish Civil War. 
This omission in itself indicated one reason for the ambiguities 
in the Government's attitude. Relatively speaking, foreign policy 
was not a major concern for the Government. The interest of Cabinet 
members, particularly Savage, Walter Nash and Peter Fraser,lO in 
international affairs and their concern that collective security 
should ensure peace must be balanced against other more immediate 
intramural concerns. The Government had embarked on an ambitious 
programme of social and economic reforms; social security, state 
housing, the guaranteed price for dairy products, the 40-hour week 
and other legislation engaged most of their attention. 
The political/ideological divisions of opinion on the war no 
doubt also influenced Labour leaders' cautious public approach to the 
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Civil War was a more complex issue for the Government than the other 
international crises, Abyssinia and the Sino-Japanese war, to which 
it reacted in a similar manner at the League. F.L.W. Wood's 
contention that to many New Zealanders the Spanish Government "seemed 
to stand broadly for the humane and liberal and democratic principles 
shared by the British and New Zealand Labour Movements"ll may 
overstate the case somewhat, but certainly some in the New Zealand 
Labour Movement were of this opinion. The Labour Party's newspaper, 
the Standard, took a pro-Republican line and several Labour MPs were 
associated with the Spanish Medical Aid Committee (SMAC).12 
Pro-Republican propaganda in New Zealand frequently stressed the 
similarities between the Labour Government and the Popular Front 
Government of Spain. 
On the other hand, the Communist Party was closely involved with 
the pro-Republican movement and was using it as a focus for its 
United Front campaign. At least two members of the Labour Cabinet, 
Peter Fraser and Robert Semple, were known for their strong 
anti-Communist views. In addition, the Catholic Church supported 
Franco and regarded the Government of Spain as atheistic Communists 
bent on destroying religion, and many Catholics were Labour voters. 
By late 1937 the Government's political opponents and some newspapers 
were criticising the Government's foreign policy on general grounds 
as disloyalty to the Empire. Thus, any demonstration of sympathy 
with the Spanish Government in terms of its political ideals would 
have clearly aligned the Labour Government with the Communist Party, 
anathema not only to its political opponents and to pro-Francoists, 
but also to many within the Labour Party. Even to consider, as they 
did, that the Popular Front was a democratically elected Government 
was enough to damn Labour leaders in the eyes of the pro-Francoist 
movement. 
Therefore, the Labour Government ignored requests from groups 
sympathetic to the pro-Rebublican cause, Communist or not, to 
publicly state its solidarity with the Spanish Government. On the 
few occasions when Cabinet Members made public statements about the 
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war, the political issues were generally avoided. Nevertheless, a 
remark by Savage, in Parliament on 13 August 1936, indicated that at 
this early stage in the war he, at least, perceived some ideological 
similarities between the two Governments. While discussing New 
Zealand's financial contribution to the League of Nations in the 
course of a supply debate, Savage remarked that "In New Zealand today 
reforms were being made without knocking the hair off anyone's head, 
whereas to effect somewhat similar reforms, blood was being shed in 
Spain at the moment. lt13 Hhether Savage's opinion changed as the 
Spanish Government became more closely allied with the Communists in 
the course of the war is unknown. 
There is little evidence to indicate how much the Labour Cabinet 
knew about the situation in Spain, or how much pro-Republican or 
pro-Francoist propaganda influenced their opinions. Several files in 
the Nash Papers indicate that, while he was in England and Europe in 
late 1936 and early 1937, Nash either collected himself or was given 
a good deal of pro-Republican material on the war. 14 News and 
opinion on the war was of course available to the Government from 
local and overseas newspapers and periodicals. 
In terms of the administrative machinery of foreign policy New 
Zealand was dependent on its connection with Britain for 
information. New Zealand had only a rudimentary external affairs 
administration when the Labour Government came to power. There was 
no real 
known as 
Mandate. IS 
External Affairs or Foreign Affairs Department. What was 
External Affairs dealt specifically with the Samoan 
All other matters of external interest were handled 
by the Imperial Affairs section of the Prime Ministers Department, 
which consisted of "two or three" officials headed by C.A. 
Berendsen. 16 According to his successor, Sir Alistair McIntosh, 
Berendsen was the draftsman of New Zealand's foreign policy in this 
period, subject of course to the approval of his political masters, 
whose general world view he shared. I7 
Ne 1.'! 7.:e(1L:;'~: had only (HH:::: representative overseas, the [ligb 
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Commissioner in London. 
Dominions Office of 
The Government therefore relied on the 
the British Government for most of its 
information. 
Officer with 
the official 
In 1937 Sir Cecil Day was appointed New Zealand Liaison 
the Dominions Office. 18 His reports supplemented 
communications and provided the background and 
atmosphere lacking in official documents. The High Commissioner's 
Office also sent information, often gained in meetings between 
Commonwealth representatives and British officials. However, the 
information 
selective. 19 
given to High Commissioners was often very 
The New Zealand High Commissioner's Office in London was not 
regarded as an official channel of communication. In the period when 
New Zealand \Vas seen as the most independently minded and least 
tractable of the Dominions, it alone still retained the anachronistic 
system whereby the Governor-General functioned as the official 
channel of 
Governments. 
that official 
communication between the New Zealand and British 
It had been agreed at the Imperial Conference in 1926 
communications should be made directly between 
Governments, but New Zealand did not fully adopt this system until 
1941. 20 
The elementary nature of New Zealand's foreign policy machinery 
contributed to the ambiguities of its policy on the Spanish Civil 
War. There was neither the staff nor the means to develop and 
express a more complex policy, h~this been desired. Collective 
security was the focus of the Government's concerns in the realm of 
foreign policy; the League of Nations was also the only forum it had 
for public expression of independent opinions outside the 
Commonwealth structure. Thus, in terms of both administration and 
inclination the New Zealand Government's policy was limited and 
defined by its relationship with Britain. 
Since the Labour Government's attitude towards the Spanish Civil 
\var was mostly expressed at the League of Nations aod in 
consultations t.h(; British GU"iJ?rnfl~i:;rl~" this chapter- '.:ill 
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concentrate on these aspects of its policy. A chronological approach 
has been chosen that follows the development of the policy. The 
Labour Government's response outside the two above-mentioned areas 
did not appear to relate directly to these "external" factors. 
Therefore, the much smaller body of evidence of its attitude towards 
humanitarian and pro-Republican appeals for aid to and support for 
the Spanish Government will be discussed separately. 
With the New Zealand Labour Government's philosophical position 
established and its concern to maintain Imperial unity while acting 
more independently in supporting a legitimate left-wing Government 
identified, attention can now be given to the interplay of 
international involvement in the war and New Zealand reactions. The 
Spanish Civil War began on 17 July 1936. His Majesty's Government in 
New Zealand \vas officially informed of the rebellion in Spain on 23 
July 1936 in a telegram from the Dominions Office to the Governor 
General. 21 However, the first official expression of the Labour 
Government's attitude did not come until 11 December 1936, when 
Jordan spoke on the subject at the League of Nations. In the 
intervening period communications from the British Government had 
kept the Dominions informed of international developments and the 
trend of its own policy. A circular telegram on 5 August indicated 
the British Government's concern that the war would divide Europe 
into two ideological blocs, as well as its suspicion of the 
Republican forces: 
The struggle between the military and the government is 
becoming a struggle between Communism and Facism and there 
are signs that even if the struggle were to result in a 
victory for the moderate left parties comprlSlng the 
Government, these would be submerged by the Anarcho-
Syndicalists and the Communists to whom they would have 
largely owed their victory.22 
Later telegrams notified Dominion Governments of the British 
Government 1 s decision to support the French proposal for a 
multilateral Non-Intervention Agreement (NIA). The NIA, signed by 27 
countr~.~··:: in. .·\L~:::ust ]936, was int\=:n::lcc to prevent direct or indirect 
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interference in the war by other nations. A Non-Intervention 
Committee (NIC) was established in September to police the NIA and, 
if necessary, to take steps to prevent intervention. Neither the NIA 
nor the NIC proved effective methods to control aid to either side in 
Spain. 23 
Files in the Prime Minister's Department recorded no response 
from the New Zealand Government to either of these proposals. The 
only communication from New Zealand to the Dominions Office in 1936 
was a request for information about a New Zealand airman, Eric 
Griffiths, reported wounded while flying in the Spanish Government's 
airforce. 24 In late September and early November the British 
Government considered de facto recognition of Franco's provisional 
Government and the award of belligerent rights at sea in the event 
of the fall of Madrid to the rebels. 25 Given the New Zealand 
Government's later opposition to any form of recognition of any other 
authority in Spain but the elected Government, it is surprising that 
there was no protest recorded at this time. It is possible, however, 
that Berendsen, who was in England at the time, conveyed a verbal 
protest to the Foreign Office. 
On 27 November the Spanish Government asked the League of Nations 
Council to examine the situation in Spain in terms of Article 11 of 
the Covenant, \.;hich stated that "any war or threat of war whether 
immediately affecting any of the members of the League or not is 
hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League".26 The 
Spanish Government justified its appeal on three grounds: German and 
Italian intervention on behalf of the rebels was a violation of 
international la\v; their recognition of Franco's provisional 
Government ( on 18 November) was "virtually an act of aggression 
against the Spanish RepUblic"; and the verbal blockade of Government-
controlled ports would create international difficulties. Considered 
together, these factors contributed a threat to international peace 
or good relations between nations. 27 The League Council was 
summoned to meet on 10 December to consider the appeal. 
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On 2 December Jordan cabled Savage that he intended to attend the 
meeting and assumed he might use his own discretion "in the light of 
developments as they occur". Savage's approval of this course of 
action was sent the next day.28 Given that Jordan's speeches at 
the League were major expressions of the New Zealand attitude, this 
exchange 
would do 
was significant. There was, then, no question that Jordan 
other than reflect the views of his Government, even if he 
had not been given specific guidelines. Jordan himself was confident 
that this was the case. His private correspondence with Savage made 
frequent reference to his certainty that long and close friendship 
with Savage meant that he knew Savage's mind on most issues. 
example, on 10 November 1936 Jordan wrote, "I know 
thoughts". 29 Three years later, reflecting on his work as 
Commissioner and New Zealand delegate at Geneva, Jordan said: 
I have had the advantage, of course, of knowing full well 
what is in your mind concerning most things, as we worked 
together for many years, and I feel I know what is in the 
mind of yourself and the members of the Cabinet and having 
been together in Parliament and taken part in Party and 
private discussions on your aspirations, in matters 
national, international and social my mind runs with yours 
on all matters of importance.30 
For 
your 
High 
Therefore, his speeches at Geneva must be regarded as sincere 
expressions of what he believed to be his Government's attitude. 
Savage did not give any indication that Jordan was mistaken in this 
assumption. 
Jordan's speech on 11 December made plain his Government's 
commitment to the League of Nations. He addressed most of his 
remarks to the Spanish Government's appeal that the Council hear its 
case, and refrained from general discussion of the war. Although the 
French and British representatives had both emphasised that the 
Non-Intervention Committee was dealing with the problem of foreign 
aid, Jordan was adamant that the rebellion in Spain was "the business 
of the League".31 He urged the Council to agree to consider the 
situation and asked that the rebels also state their case to that 
body. 
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Jordan had begun by saying that he would not venture opinions on 
the situation within Spain itself because he was not in possession of 
all the facts, but it was clear that he was in sympathy with the 
Government of Spain: 
We ask then, whether it is possible to have further 
particulars of the cause of the trouble, in order to see 
whether the action taken by the rebels is justified if, 
indeed, such action can be justified. 
I ask myself as a Member of the Council, whether the cause 
of the trouble which we have power to consider is such as to 
merit the attention of the Council; I ask what was the cause 
of the revolt. We find that reference is made to 
"dissatisfaction with the Government and its action" - the 
Government that was elected on Frebruary 16th last. I 
venture to remark that if a nation constitutionally elects a 
Government, that Government must surely be acceptable to the 
nation, more especially if it allows of means for its own 
removal.32 
He reaffirmed his Government's willingness to participate in any 
League action 
the interests 
concerns that 
that might be required to bring about a settlement "in 
of humanity and 
Jordan expressed 
constitutional government".33 The 
in this speech for the role of the 
League in preserving peace and protecting legitimate Governments were 
to remain paramount in the Labour Government's assessment of the 
situation. 
Jordan's insistence that it was the duty of the League to 
investigate and then act on the situation was to no avail. The 
Council passed a resolution that did little more than acknowledge the 
efforts of the NIC and offer aid to the victims of the war. The New 
Zealand delegate was disappointed. In his official report to the 
Government he said that he felt that there had been "a striving after 
the bare minimum".34 He was, nevertheless, aware of the 
complexities of the situation that made it difficult for the League 
to act effectively. He noted that Germany and Italy were not 
represented at Geneva, but were members of the NIC and that, 
therefore, 
intervention. 
the NIC had more chance of successful control of 
In addition, Jordan emphasised the divergence of 
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opinion among League members on Spain that made it unlikely that a 
strong resolution would be passed, since resolutions were not valid 
unless passed unanimously. Yet Jordan acknowledged that an 
"emasculated" 
to confess 
resolution 
the utter 
was better than none: "The alternative is 
futility of the League as presently 
constituted."35 This was something neither he nor his Government 
was prepared to accept. The League must be preserved, even in a 
state of virtual inanition, in the hope that its members could be 
persuaded to revive it to some effectiveness. 
Thus, in December 1936 the Labour Government had taken a position 
on the Spanish Civil War that was intimately linked with its concern 
about the viability of the League. Its identification with the 
Spanish Government was as a legitimately elected fellow member of the 
League rather than as a politically left-of-centre Government. 
Jordan's understanding of the complications militating against League 
action were not to prevent him voicing these concerns even more 
forcefully in 1937. This, in turn, focussed more sharply the 
variance of opinion between the British and New Zealand Governments 
in the critical period from March to September 1937. 
For part of this time Savage and Nash and advisors, including 
Berendsen, were in England. Nash had arrived in London in December 
1936 intent on negotiating a reciprocal trade agreement with 
Britain. Savage joined him in May 1937 for the Coronation of King 
George VI and the Imperial Conference that followed. There would 
then be opportunities for the representatives of both Governments to 
promote their ideas on foreign policy personally. 
The presence of the New Zealanders in England was also a chance 
for British pro-Republicans to press their views, especially after 
the encouraging stand at Geneva by Jordan in December 1936. In 
February R.M. Campbell, 36 a member of the High Commissioner's 
staff in London, received a memorandum on the implications of the 
Spanish Civil \var and New Zealand's position from Geoffrey Bing, a 
British Labour MP,37 Campbell passed the memorandum to 
\~ash. 38 
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While it was clearly 
memorandum emphasised the 
pro-Republican in sympathy, Bing's 
international legal aspects of the 
situation. It took as its premise that German and Italian 
intervention on the side of the rebels was a violation of the Pact of 
Paris and of the League Covenant. Bing argued that New Zealand's 
position as a champion of the League and as a nation of the Empire 
meant that the Labour Government had a right and duty to protest such 
violation of international law, either at the League or directly to 
the British Government. He also considered that the New Zealand 
attitude was crucial to British policy; a forceful protest from the 
Dominion would unite British opposition to the Baldwin Government's 
policy, thus creating enough public pressure upon it to alter its 
views. 
Bing's case was supported by D.N. Pritt, a British Labour MP with 
close links with the Communist Party.39 Pritt stressed New 
Zealand's unique position . 
. . . she has endeared herself to all conservatives by her 
loyalty to the Empire, and to all Socialists by her 
commonsense Socialism. Dependent for her prosperity on 
unhampered sea communications with Britain, she has the 
right to speak firmly at Westminster and a right to be heard 
with respect when she does speak.40 
These arguments were calculated to appeal to Labour's leaders. 
Here was evidence that New Zealand's independent stand on the 
principles of international justice had support in England. Here too 
was an assurance that New Zealand was indeed speaking for a large 
body of opinion 
reinforcement of 
in 
Labour 
Britain, 
leaders' 
and perhaps 
feeling that 
elsewhere, and a 
they might act as 
Britain's conscience. The emphasis on international law and concern 
that a precedent had been established in its flouting and subsequent 
disregard by other nations went to the heart of the New Zealand 
Government's concern over the role of the League in the Spanish Civil 
War. 
However, even if the Bing memorandum influenced Nash's and 
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Savage's thinking, it failed in its main objective of eliciting a 
public protest against the British Government's policy. The New 
Zealand Government was not prepared to take the final step that would 
align it with the Spanish Government and create an open breach 
between the Dominion and the Mother Country. 
Nash made this clear in May after another attempt by prominent 
British pro-Republicans to enlist his Government's support. Wilfred 
Roberts, a British Labour HP, invited Nash to lunch with him, the 
Duchess of Athol141 and some others to discuss the Spanish 
problem, not only in terms of relief work but also "from the 
political point of view of the possible affect of the struggle upon 
the British Empire".42 Berendsen and W.B. Sutch accompanied Nash 
to the discussion on 14 May. Writing on 24 May to thank Roberts for 
the lunch Nash said: 
I am doubtful whether we can as a Government do anything to 
help but if you feel that I can personally at any time, then 
it is only necessary to get in touch with me, and if I can 
help I certainly will.43 
The delay of ten days between the meeting and the reply might 
suggest that there was some discussion of the Government's position 
before a reply was made. However, the Imperial conference had begun 
and Nash was extremely busy with several committees; his letter may 
have been delayed merely by pressure of work. 
If Labour leaders were unwilling publicly to commit themselves to 
support of the Spanish Government, they were determined to do so 
privately. Before Savage left New Zealand in March to travel to the 
Coronation and Imperial Conference he had indicated to the British 
Government his Government's objection to any form of recognition of 
Franco. The British Foreign Office had discussed the appointment of 
an official agent to the rebel authorities as early as August 1936, 
and by March the next year planning had reached an advanced stage. 
The Dominions were notified of the intention on 19 March. 44 On 
25 March Savage requested the Governor-General to inform the 
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Dominion's Office that the New Zealand Government was: 
firmly and inalterably opposed to any action which, either 
directly or indirectly, could be interpreted as a trend 
towards the recognition of any administration in Spain other 
than that of the lawful Government.45 
Thus Savage reiterated more clearly what Jordan had signalled at the 
League of ~ations; that his Government was convinced that the Popular 
Front Government was legitimately elected. 
On the same day that the New Zealand telegram was sent the 
British Cabinet decided to postpone the appointment of an agent. Was 
this, then, confirmation of Bing's and Pritt's arguments that New 
Zealand's attitude was indeed influential? Jill Edwards suggests 
that New Zealand's protest had some effect, but she also notes other 
factors behind the decision. 46 Notably, the Russian Ambassador, 
Ivan Maisky, had leaked to the press the Italian Ambassador's 
statement to the NIC that Italian "volunteers" would not be withdrawn 
until Franco had won. There was a storm of protest in the British 
press and the House of Commons. It was hardly timely to announce 
that a British agent was to be sent to Burgos, even if the 
arrangement was described as "informal". With hindsight it may be 
said that outraged public opinion in Britain counted for more than a 
private protest from one distant Dominion. At the time, however, 
Labour leaders could not be blamed if they thought that their 
representations 
decision. 
had played a part in the British Government's 
The Imperial Conference highlighted the differences between the 
two Governments on foreign policy. Savage's major speech on 21 May 
was a polite but comprehensive condemnation of the methods of British 
foreign policy. He roundly criticised the British attitude to the 
Abyssinian war and the occupation of the Rhineland. At the heart of 
the criticism were the beliefs that Britain had strayed from the 
ideals of the League Covenant and that the Dominions' views should 
hsve more weight in the formulation of foreign policy. Savage called 
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for a consultative Commonwealth foreign policy, as distinct from a 
British policy upon which Dominion Governments were informed. The 
joint policy was to have a moral basis, such as the principles 
embodied in the League Covenant. The New Zealand Prime Minister also 
urged Commonwealth Governments to take the lead in supporting the 
League of Nations. 47 
Throughout the meetings on foreign policy Savage was insistent on 
acceptance by the Commonwealth of the principle of collective 
security. But his "sermon on the immorality of British foreign 
policy,,48 was aimed at the methods rather than the objectives of 
and he was later to declare that New Zealand would aid that policy; 
Britain in war "right or wrong". Nevertheless, the British 
Government was concerned at New Zealand's intransigence on the League 
issue, and on 28 May Malcolm MacDonald, Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs, attempted to persuade Nash to modify his 
Government's positiongence. MacDonald told Nash that New Zealand was 
the only Dominion that was not in general agreement with British 
policy. Nash, on the other hand, felt that New Zealand's views were 
closer to Britain's than were the other Dominions', and assured 
MacDonald that even though his Government felt that British policy 
had not always been according to League principles, this criticism 
would never be made public. 49 
Nash's assessment of the closeness of the two Governments' views, 
under the circumstapces, was a little strange. One had rejected the 
League; the other gave it total support. Perhaps Nash meant the 
desire for peace that the two Governments shared, the "objectives" 
rather than the "methods" to which Savage had referred. His 
assurance 
to his 
same day 
and the 
some to 
subject. 
that in public loyalty came first had particular relevance 
Government's attitude towards the Spanish Civil War. On the 
at Geneva Jordan made the second of his speeches on Spain 
role of the League and an incident occurred that seemed to 
underline the differences between the two Governments on the 
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The Spanish Government had again appealed to the League Council 
to revie\v the situation and had prepared a "\.Jhi te Book" containing 
documentary evidence of the involvement in Spain of units of the 
Italian army. It was rumoured that the New Zealand delegate intended 
to invoke Article 10 of the Covenant in support of the Spanish 
Government. 50 In Article 10 League members undertook to preserve 
the territorial integrity and political independence of all members 
against external aggression. 51 
Before Jordan spoke he was approached by the British Foreign 
Secretary, Anthony Eden, who appeared to be underlining or crossing 
out parts of Jordan's speech. When Jordan addressed the Council he 
did not mention Article 10. It was assumed by observers that Eden's 
"blue-pencilling" had prevented the New Zealand delegate from making 
other than a "conventional plea" for stronger League action. 52 
The incident caused a minor sensation in the English press. Eden was 
even called upon in the House of Commons (by Conservative MP Vyvyan 
Adams) to state whether or not he had altered Jordan's speech. Eden 
denied that he had done so.s3 So too did Jordan. He at first 
told reporters that Eden had not edited his speech, but that he and 
the British Foreign Secretary were merely discussing some passages in 
the speech. 54 Later, however, he told Hugh Dalton that Eden was 
marking his olvn speech and modified some passages according to 
Jordan's suggestion. 55 Either Jordan's memory was at fault, or 
there was something to 
Significantly, although 
gloss over, for Eden had spoken before him. 
Eden had denied blue-pencilling Jordan's 
speech he avoided answering directly another question in the House of 
Commons (this time from a Labour MP, Ellen Wilkinson) as to whether 
he had 
speech. 56 
made any representations to Jordan to modify his 
W.B. Sutch, in The Quest for Security in New Zealand, 
claimed to have been sitting directly behind Jordan and to have 
observed Eden definitely editing Jordan's speech. 57 
Both Sinclair and Wood consider that there is no reason to 
believe 
speech. 58 
that Eden did insist on modifications to Jordan's 
The Savage-Jordan correspondence does not shed any 
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light on the incident; since Savage was in London Jordan had no need 
to write to him. The discrepancies between Jordan's explanations 
first to the press and then to Hugh Dalton, and Eden's evasiveness in 
Parliament, suggest that there was more to the incident than the two 
delegates were prepared to admit. 
Jordan's speech began strongly but faded into vagueness towards 
the end. 59 The first part of the speech was a strong statement 
of Jordan's (and his Government's) view of the seriousness of the 
situation for Spain itself and for the League. He reaffirmed his 
statement in December 1936 that the war in Spain was the business of 
the League: 
As it is a function of the League to safeguard the lives of 
people, to maintain peace, and to uphold lawful and 
constitutional Governments against invasion and the violence 
of outside Powers, it is now undoubtedly time that some 
decision in the Spanish situation was taken if the League is 
going to act at all in the matter. 
Jordan made it clear that he believed that the war was a case of 
foreign aggression that was a direct test of the international 
community's ability and will to secure and enforce a collective 
peace. The Spanish Government's "White Book" was "authorati ve 
evidence" that foreign powers were operating in Spain and therefore 
should be considered with the "utmost gravity" by the Council. 
Further, Jordan considered that what was happening in Spain was "one 
of the most flagrant challenges to the authority of the League which 
has occurred in 
fear that if the 
damaged, if not 
authority of the 
its history". Implicit in his statements 
League did not act, its credibility would be 
totally destroyed. Moreover, it was not 
League that was being challenged, but 
was the 
further 
only the 
the very 
principles which it was bound to uphold. A constitutional Government 
and the political independence of a nation were threatened. Thus, 
the survival of the League as a viable force for peace was intimately 
linked with the survival of the Spanish Government. 
Jordan's words were both an affirmation of his Government's 
commitment to t~e Leugue and an attem~)t to rouse League members to a 
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sense of their responsibility in the matter. Jordan was aware that 
the League was being bypassed. He wanted to know why the insurgents 
in Spain did not come forward and provide the League with their side 
of the problem: 
How can the League Council be expected to know the details 
and how can these people be respected by the Council if they 
fight and kill the citizens of one of the League Members, 
and at the same time withhold from us evidence of what they 
say is the cause of the trouble? 
The simple answer was of course that neither Franco nor his allies 
cared at all for the respect of the League or considered its actions 
as an important factor in the situation. While Jordan's demand could 
be interpreted as a measure of his own ingenuous confidence in the 
League's status, it was surely also designed to stir the 
sensibilities of other delegates. 
The tenor of these remarks suggested that Jordan was about to 
reinforce 
concrete 
his urgent 
proposal. 
demand that the League should act with a 
He was critical of the method so far adopted by 
League Members to deal with the situation, which he described as "an 
embargo which has handicapped the Government and strengthened the 
hand of its aggressors". Even without direct reference to specific 
Powers or to the NIC this statement was patently directed at British 
and French policy. Obviously, Jordan knew that those two Powers, and 
others, wanted the League Council to confine itself to an innocuous 
resolution supporting the work of the NIC: 
It has been said that the main purpose of this meeting of 
the Council is to uphold and endorse the work of the 
Non-Intervention Committee, to emphasize our wish for the 
early withdrawal of all foreign nationals from Spain, and 
ourselves to determine to do all in our power to facilitate 
the result We pray for the success of the Non-
Intervention Committee and we are determined to do all in 
our power to facilitate the result, but when we say we will 
do all in our power I ask the question what action, if any, 
is being undertaken? 
It was at this point that Jordan's speech lost its power and 
here, perhaps, was the key to the "blue-pencil ll incident. After 
39 
emphasising that the situation concerned the welfare of people, 
Jordan said n\ve would fain ask that a committee of the Council be set 
up to act forthwith, but we have been assured that the 
Non-Intervention Committee will go beyond the matter of intervention 
" Had Jordan intended to ask that a committee be established to 
oversee the work of the NIC? If so, Eden may have heard of his 
intention and dissuaded him from making such a request. 
Whether or not this is what happened, the rest of the speech 
indicated that Jordan, having accepted that the problem of Spain 
would be left to the NIC, was still committed to a peaceful solution 
that might involve the League. He made a rather vague request that 
the NIC extend its powers "to restore peace and good order, and then 
have again a democratic expression of opinion by the Spanish 
people". Once hostilities had ceased could not the League Council 
or through the NIC ensure that the wishes of the 
be consulted? What Jordan appeared to be suggesting 
either directly 
Spanish people 
was a League mandate of some form. His reference to League 
assistance so that peace could be restored more quickly also 
suggested that he had in mind some kind of peace-keeping force. This 
solution followed with 
international relations, 
his 
since 
Government's general policy on 
the memorandum on reform of the 
Covenant had favoured the establishment of such a force. Under the 
circumstances, however, it was patently unworkable. Perhaps the 
vagueness of Jordan's request was the result of its last minute 
substitution for another solution that he had been prevented from 
proposing. 
The suggestion was an indication of the naivete of New Zealand's 
delegate in assuming that all parties desired an immediate, peaceful 
solution to the war. It was also a sincere expression of the beliefs 
that were at the heart of the Labour Government's foreign policy: 
Surely we 
by reason 
can peace 
danger of 
S3 tisfae tor \. 
all agree that this matter 
than by guns ... only by 
be maintained. The earth 
an attempt to govern 
form of Government - is 
could be better settled 
reason and not by force 
is being menaced by the 
by force. The only 
a Government elected by 
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the people when a Government occupies its position at the 
request of the governed. 
Here again was an indication of th~ urgency with which the New 
Zealand Government regarded the situation. If one such attempt to 
rule by force was not opposed and a constitutional government was 
abandoned, what would follow? Jordan's suggestion of a mandate and 
supervised elections would at once assure that democratic government 
was safeguarded and confidence in the League restored, not least to 
its members. As Jordan said in conclusion: "If we cannot do this, 
we cannot do something bigger." 
His proposal received no support from other members of the 
Council. The resolution adopted regretted that the Non-Intervention 
policy had not yet had full effect, welcomed the scheme of 
supervision adopted by NIC members and condemned the bombing of open 
towns. 
It was the rumour that Jordan intended to invoke Article 10 that 
caused the "blue-pencil" incident to attract so much attention from 
the press at Geneva. The rumour may also have been the cause of 
Eden's move to check Jordan's speech. It did have a basis in fact. 
There exists in the Nash Papers a copy of a draft speech apparently 
intended to be delivered by Jordan at the Council meeting on 28 May 
1937 that did ask for Article 10 to be invoked. It is not suggested 
that it was this speech that Eden "censored", for it differed so 
markedly from Jordan's delivered speech that it seems unlikely that 
even an accomplished extempore speaker could have replaced one for 
the other at short notice. However, the speech did illuminate the 
extent of the New Zealand Government's concern over the Spanish Civil 
War. 
The "Nash Papers Speech" was dated 28 May, referred to the 
Spanish Government's note to the Council of 20 May and to the IlWhite 
Paper" on Italian intervention, and noted "my own country's 
responsibility as a Member of the League ... and as a member of the 
Bri tish Common h"eal th" . 60 It therefore seems certain that it was 
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a draft for Jordan's speech to the Council. Its mention of "the 
crowning horror and infamy of the destruction of Guernica" indicates 
that it was written sometime after 24 April. 61 
The speech was a strong condemnation of the actions of Italy and 
Germany in Spain and of the policy of Non-Intervention. It assessed 
the situation in Spain as not only an attack on a constitutional 
Government and an attempt "to break democracytl, but also a war of 
invasion by foreign powers: "From the day of its outbreak on July 18 
until the present day the struggle in Spain has not been merely or 
even primarily a Spanish Civil War. 6211 Further, it was 
considered that such a situation would, if allowed to drift and in 
the present state of international relations, "constitute as 
accessories to another world war."63 
The policy of non-intervention was described as contrary to the 
Covenant of the League. The Committee established to oversee the 
policy was 
secret and 
a "uniform and disastrous 
without representation from 
failure lt ,64 
the country 
meeting in 
most vitally 
concerned, but admitting representatives from the countries 
responsible for the invasion of Spain. The speech also implied that 
the Committee was not only unable to enforce Non-Intervention but 
also unwilling to try. It was in "a state of coma"65 only broken 
when the Spanish Government appealed to the League and there was the 
possibility of its efforts coming under the scrutiny of League 
members. The criticism went even further than this: 
this policy, which with partial impartiality known as 
"non-intervention", constituted disregard of the plain duty 
of all the Members of the League the moment it became clear 
that the Spanish rebels were receiving military assistance 
from foreign powers. Since the invasion of Spain by a 
foreign army it seems to me impossible even to pretend that 
the policy of so-called "non-intervention" is anything, or 
ever has been anything else than conniving at a Fascist war 
of aggression for the purpose of destroying Spanish 
democracy and reducing Spain to the status of a Fascist 
province.66 
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These opinions provided justification for the League to apply the 
provisions of Article 10 to the situation in Spain. Under this 
Article the League would ackno\vledge that Spain had been invaded and 
that the invasion was a threat to peace, and would act to protect the 
political and territorial integrity of Spain. The speech contained a 
draft resolution for the invoking of Article 10. The League was to 
recognise that the situation constituted contravention of Article 10 
and, if after two months the Non-Intervention Committee had not been 
able to effect withdrawal of foreign troops, was to meet again to 
consider "the advice it should give to the Members of the league 
under Article 10 of the Covenant".67 That advice ought to state 
that the duty of League Members was to help the Spanish Government 
preserve its political independence and territorial integrity by 
allowing it to purchase arms. 
The two months' period of grace allowed to the NIC might have 
been an acknowledgement of the difficulties involved in invoking 
Article 10 in the case of Spain. Divisions between League Members on 
the issue were acute and there would have been difficulty in 
obtaining 
binding. 
the unanimity necessary for a resolution to have been 
Alternatively, the presentation of the resolution may have 
been intended as an ultimatum for the NIC members who also belonged 
to the League, in the hope that the threat of League action, or even 
the fear of League collapse if Article 10 were invoked, would spur 
them to positive action to prevent foreign intervention. 
Certainly the speech was designed as an ultimatum to the League 
Council. The concluding remarks made that clear: 
while the details of my resolution are not perhaps of 
primary importance my Government cannot be satisfied with 
any text that does not give effect in some form to the 
principles which I feel it is essential to uphold, and that 
(sic) it will be my reluctant duty to vote against any 
resolution that does not embody those principles. It is 
better that the, Council should fail to reach unanimity on a 
resolution and that public opinion in my own country, in the 
United Kingdom and in the other democracies should be 
aroused to the issues at stake, than that another sham 
resolution should deceive public opinion into believing that 
anything effective was being done to stop the war of 
aggression against the Spanish Republic, while that war 
continued and the world went on drifting to disaster.68 
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The speech was intended to have maximum impact. It is possible 
that its real purpose was to voice what hitherto had remained 
unspoken and to employ public opinion as an influence on the policies 
of League members. The Labour Government's memorandum on reform of 
the Covenant had emphasised that peoples should be consulted on 
decisions of collective security; the speech had objected to the NIC 
on the 
scrutiny. 
grounds that its proceedings were not open to public 
This speech was therefore another expression of the Labour 
Government's opinion that governments had a responsibility to consult 
their electors on matters of peace and war. It was also perhaps an 
echo of the assertion in the Bing memorandum that the New Zealand 
Government could represent the views of a large number of people in 
Britain on the Spanish Civil War and thereby provide a focus for the 
pro-Republican campaign. Thus, in presenting this speech the Labour 
Government would be acting as the democratic conscience of not only 
Britain but other League members as well. 
There were also other indications that Bing's memorandum had 
influenced New Zealand's policy-makers. The speech had acknowledged 
the primary responsibility of the Great Powers, but defended New 
Zealand's right to voice its opinions not only because it was 
Member of the League but because of Spain's strategic importance: 
Nor can my country as a member of the British Commonwealth 
fail to declare that an independent and democratic SQain, 
bound by the ties of friendship and the obligations of the 
collective system to the British Commonwealth, is for us a 
vital interest and that it would be intolerable for us that 
Spain should become the vassal of a Fascist power.69 
a 
This expression of New Zealand's own interest in the outcome of 
the war in Spain did not occur anywhere else but in this undelivered 
speech. There was also evidence of an obviously pro-Republican 
analysis of the war that was also missing from the Government's 
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public expressions of its attitude both before and after the time of 
this speech. The statement that the war was one of Fascist 
aggression against a democracy was a much stronger assertion than 
cautious remarks about constitutional governments. While it did not 
necessarily indicate sympathy with the Spanish Government's political 
aims, it nevertheless placed the New Zealand Government firmly in the 
pro-Republican camp. 
In other respects the speech merely expressed the Labour 
Government's convictions about international relations in stronger 
form. The 
betrayal of 
war. The 
League's vacillations over Spain were clearly seen as a 
the principles of collective security that would hasten 
issue at stake was not only Spain itself but the survival 
of a collective system to ensure peace. The same concept was 
conveyed in the speech that Jordan eventually gave to the Council on 
28 May, albeit in milder terms. This conviction of the need for 
nations to work together to protect democracy and peace was still the 
central theme in the undelivered speech, although it gave more 
emphasis to the specific problem in Spain. 
The content of this speech was significant in that it revealed 
the Labour Government's deep concern over the Spanish Civil War. The 
League's attitude to the foreign invasion of Spain was clearly seen 
as crucial to its continued functioning as a vital force for peace 
and just relations between nations. In addition, the New Zealand 
Government's concern for the survival of democracy in Spain was also 
given clearer and stronger expression than elsewhere. 
Unfortunately the speech stands alone. There is no indication of 
exactly when it was written between 24 April and 28 May and no 
evidence of any discussion of it by members of the New Zealand 
cabinet. It is possible that the speech was written either by 
Berendsen or Jordan, or by both. (According to Sinclair, Berendsen 
wrote Savage's speech for the Imperial Conference. 70 ) It seems 
unlikely that the speech was the subject of Eden's "blue-pencilling", 
and more probably that the draft was discussed by Savage, Nash, 
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Jordan and Berendsen earlier and discarded as too strong. It would 
certainly have constituted the public criticism of British policy 
that, on 28 May, Nash promised McDonald would never be made. 
Undoubtedly the reason for its suppression was the acute 
embarrassment it would cause the British Government. Britain was, 
after all, a member of the NrC that was accused of conniving at a war 
of Fascist aggression in Spain. Such a dissociation from and 
repudiation of the British Government's policy could only exacerbate 
the tension between the two Commonwealth Governments in the area of 
foreign policy. Nor would such a stand have been welcomed by other 
members of the Commonwealth or the many electors at home in New 
Zealand who felt a sentimental attachment to the "Mother Country". 
Commonwealth, then, was ultimately more important than collective 
security. 
Yet, even if this speech was not the cause of the "blue-penc.il" 
inc.ident, it provides some clues as to what actually happened at 
Geneva. On the back of the copy in the Nash Papers are several 
handwritten notes in writing that appears to be Nash's. The notes 
read: 
1. Withdrawal from Spain of army of occupation and all 
foreign volunteers. 
2. Effectively prevent war materials reaching the rebels* 
3. Ask that a Committee of the Council be set up (With the 
NIC*) and ensure the wishes of the Council being 
carried out. 
4. 
Intelligence operating. 
Make arrangements for the people of the ... Spain 
.to be ... consulted+. 
Provide 
period. 
for meeting: again within specified 
5. Committee with President to call Council.7l 
* crossed out 
+ elipses indicate indecipherable words 
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These notes may indicate that, having decided that the draft 
speech was 
planned to 
too strong, the New 
ask for a committee 
Zealand representatives in London 
of the League to supervise the 
activities of the NIC and to find some means for a democratic choice 
of government by the people of Spain. If so, then Jordan's remark 
that he would "fain ask" that a committee be established is explained 
and it seems likely that Eden did prevail upon him to remove the 
request from his speech. Further evidence for this supposition comes 
from Hugh Dalton's remark that Jordan was "furious with the New 
Statesman", which had 
what Jordan's speech 
published a remarkably detailed summation of 
was supposed to contain. 72 Citing an 
"independent eye-witness" the New Statesman said that Jordan had 
drafted notes for a speech in which he intended to: 
expose frankly the short-comings of non-intervention and to 
urge the Council to appoint a Committee with instructions to 
remain in permanent session, to watch the doings of the 
London Non-Intervention Committee and if withdrawal of 
non-Spanish combatants were not secured within a month to 
report back to the Council with a view to more forceful 
action under Article X.73 
Of course Jordan may merely have objected to the New Statesman's 
statement that after his conversation with Eden he was "flustered", 
and "floundered" among his notes. Nevertheless, the accumulated 
evidence, slight though it is, does suggest that the New Zealand 
Government was prevented from making a specific proposal for stronger 
League action at Geneva in May 1937, whether or not it included any 
reference to Article 10. 
Even if they were prevented by their own commitment to the 
Commonwealth, and by pressure from Eden, from bringing the matter to 
a head at Geneva, Labour leaders were still committed to a peaceful 
solution to the Spanish problem that could involve the League. From 
the time of Jordan's speech the idea of a League mandate was promoted 
by the Labour Government. 
On 21 June Nash spoke at a "Stop the Spanish War" meeting of the 
League of Nations Union in London and gave clearer expression to 
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Jordan's suggestion at the League Council. The speech was one of the 
few examples of a public statement about Spain made by a New Zealand 
representative outside the League. Nash said he was amplifying the 
suggestion made by Jordan at the League and proposed that the League, 
"with the encouragement of the British Commonwealth of Nations", 
should ensure the withdrawal of foreign troops and thereafter 
exercise a mandate over Spain for two years. Two independent 
countries could be selected to supervise elections after that time. 
Nash also made comments that echoed the sentiments in the undelivered 
League speech. He considered that the integrity of Spain had been 
threatened, and pointed out that the Covenant of the League specified 
"certain things" in such a case. He went on to say that the NIC 
comprised nations that were involved in the war, while Spain was not 
represented on the Committee. 
It was as if, having decided to avoid making such comments at the 
League, the New Zealand Government was determined to air its concern 
elsewhere. Nash stopped short of saying that he thought Article 10 
should be invoked, but the inference was there to be made. The 
speech also demonstrated that Nash's promise that there would be no 
public criticism of British policy only meant direct criticism, since 
an attack on the composition of the NrC was implied criticism of 
Britain's support of that body. 
Nash also 
constitutional 
expanded 
Governments 
upon 
in 
statements Jordan had made about 
December 1936 and May 1937. He said 
that the suggestion of supervised elections did not necessarily mean 
that he thought that the elections in February 1936 had been unfair. 
Although still cautious, this statement was an advance on the 
generalisations about constitutional Governments Jordan had made, and 
the more significant because it was made in a prepared public speech. 
As always, however, the major emphasis was on the League. Nash 
stressed the idea of a Commonwealth untied behind the concept of 
peace through collective security and concluded that unless the "road 
of the League" was taken war and disaster would follow. 74 
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There had, then, been some justification for Malcolm MacDonald's 
pessimistic remark, after the meeting with Nash, that Eden would not 
be able to make an impression on Savage and Nash. 75 Nash's 
speech revealed that whatever had happened at Geneva, or in 
conversations with British officials, the New Zealand Government's 
commitment to the League was unchanged. Neither had its attitude 
towards the Spanish Civil War been substantially altered. However, 
the limits to the expression of this attitude had been more clearly 
defined. 
Yet, while Jordan's 
censorship, may have 
and Nash's 
endeared the 
speeches, and Eden's reported 
New Zealand Government to 
pro-Republicans in England, at home an incident had occurred that 
enraged New Zealand pro-Republicans. The police "interrogation" of 
three New Zealand nurses about to depart for Spain under the auspices 
of the New Zealand SMAC illustrated the caution, even suspicion, with 
which some members of the Government regarded local 
pro-Republicanism. The nurses were taken from a farewell meeting to 
the Auckland Central Police Station, ostensibly to check their 
passports. They were held for three hours and subjected to intensive 
questioning about their reasons for going to Spain. Some of the 
questions related to their involvement with Communist organisations 
and known Communists. 76 
The police claimed that they had been requested by the Department 
of Internal Affairs to ensure that the nurses' passports were in 
order, since under British regulations only those travelling under 
the auspices of named humanitarian organisations were allowed to 
enter Spain. The official explanation from the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, W.E. Parry, was that his Department had only learned of the 
nurses' departure shortly before that time (the interviews took place 
only hours before the nurses' boat was due to sail). Parry justified 
the questioning on the grounds of the British regulations and of 
ensuring that the nurses understood that the Government could not 
accept responsibility for them. 77 Minister of Police, Peter 
Fraser, claimed that he had no knowledge of the incident until Parry 
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had passed complaints to him. 78 However, in his capacity as 
Acting Prime Minister, Fraser had known the date of the nurses' 
departure several days in advance. The SMAC had asked him to attend 
a farewell functiOn for the nurses, but he had been "unable" to do 
so. Fraser had effected a neat compromise by speaking to the nurses 
by radio telephone once they were aboard the ship,79 a much less 
public method of expressing "official" good wishes and one that could 
be justified, if necessary, by his friendship with Nurse Dodd's 
family.80 
Fraser later admitted that the police interviewer had exceeded 
his instructions with regard to the questions put to the nurses. 
Still, 
that 
he 
they 
said, 
were 
"they had been put in good faith and in the belief 
in the interests of the ladies concerned."SI 
Whether or not Cabinet Ministers had known of the planned 
"interrogation", it seems that the sudden prominence of the SMAC led 
Fraser to take some interest in the organisation. In July 1937 he 
asked the Internal Affairs Department to provide him with any 
information it might have on the SMAC, its organisation, membership 
and methods 
enquiries" the 
of distributing 
Commissioner of 
The reply suggested that the 
relatively harmless. Fraser 
funds, to assist 
Police had been 
Department viewed 
was advised that the 
with "discreet 
asked to make. S2 
the Committee as 
organisation was 
fairly loose, with different titles for different branches. The 
Undersecretary noted that the Acting Prime Minister might possibly 
obtain more information from his colleagues, since some Labour MPs 
had connections with the SMAC. 83 Fraser's interest was possibly 
less an indication of Cabinet concern than it was a reflection of his 
own marked anti-communism, and early evidence of the concern about 
dissident groups he was to display after he became Prime Minister. 
Savage and other Ministers had previously received correspondence 
from the SMAC and had apparently not bothered to find out more about 
the organisation. 
The police interrogation of the nurses, Fraser's (and other 
Ministers) avoidance of invitations to appear at SMAC functions and 
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Fraser's interest in the organisation illuminated the difficulties of 
supporting the Spanish Government, yet avoiding association with 
domestic pro-Republicanism. Yet on the diplomatic front the new 
Zealand Government, in the later months of 1937, was still prepared 
to defend the Spanish Government. 
The strain between the New Zealand and British Governments over 
the latter's policy continued. In July the question of belligerent 
rights for both sides was raised again. The New Zealand Government 
demonstrated its opposition to any form of recognition of Franco, but 
was met with the British Government's equal determination to pursue 
its Spanish policy regardless of the attitudes of the Dominions. On 
13 July Jordan attended a meeting of Dominions' representatives and 
British officials that had been called to discuss the "British Plan" 
for withdrawal of "volunteers" shortly to be presented to the NIC. 
He reported with some resentment that at the conclusion of the 
meeting the representatives of the Dominions were told that they were 
not being consulted but informed. 84 The proposals were to be put 
to the NIC the next day, "so that whatever we said would not have any 
effect on the policy that was being put forward fl • Such a dismissal 
must have been galling to Jordan and his colleagues, determined that 
New Zealand's opinion should count, more especially so since they 
considered that British policy was not a reflection of their attitude 
to foreign affairs. 
Jordan had presented lengthy objections to the "British Plan" at 
the meeting. The British proposal linked the granting of belligerent 
rights at sea (which Germany and Italy favoured) with the withdrawal 
of foreign combatants. Both sides in the war would be accorded 
belligerent rights once the NrC had been satisfied that arrangements 
for the withdrawal of "volunteers" were satisfactory and that 
substantial withdrawals had been made. Jordan considered that the 
grant of belligerent rights would be recognising the two sides as of 
equal status and was thus a contravention of the Covenant of the 
League. He further objected to the granting of belligerent rights 
under the conditions of the proposal, since the withdrawal of foreign 
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combatants depended on the decision of powers outside Spain. He was 
not sanguine about the success of the proposed withdrawal, pointing 
out that "Mr Mussolini had declared that under no circumstances will 
he allow a Bolshevik government to dominate in Spain." Nor did he 
think the word "withdrawal" should be used if the "volunteers" were 
to be discharged by the two Spanish forces. "Dismissal" could be 
effected without the approval of foreign powers, while "withdrawal" 
could operate without the decision of the belligerent parties in 
Spain. Jordan was obviously concerned that a token withdrawal might 
occur, after which Franco would be granted belligerent status and 
would continue to fight with aid from the Fascist powers, or that 
even if Franco agreed to dismiss his foreign troops, the Italians and 
Germans would not withdraw them. 
The other part of the "British Plan" was a scheme for the 
re-establishment of supervision of points of entry into Spain to 
prevent the passage of troops or war materials. Jordan was disturbed 
that the naval part of the supervision was to be discontinued while 
control of land frontiers was restored: "It is agreed that the 
support for the Government is reaching Spain across the land frontier 
while the support for Franco has been by the sea." 
If this proposal made Jordan suspicious of the direction of 
British policy he did not say so. He was certainly aware that the 
British Plan represented in part a delaying tactic. 
It is very evident that we are sparring for time during 
which Britain may complete her defence program, and it is 
really not expected that these proposals will get us 
anywhere. 
An understanding of the need for appeasement until British 
armaments were improved did not prevent Jordan or his Government from 
promoting a peaceful and immediate solution to the war in Spain. At 
the meeting Jordan again urged consideration of his proposal of 
mediation and supervised elections, only to be informed that it was 
unlikely that either side would agree to it. Later events were to 
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show that this rebuff did not shake Jordan's wish that a better 
solution than the NIC could be found, nor his Government's 
determination to disagree with, and alter if possible, British policy 
on Spain. 
Nevertheless, at this stage the disagreement remained a private 
matter. And, in August, Savage's negative response to a request for 
a unilateral gesture of support for the Spanish Government seemed to 
indicate that the New Zealand Government was not prepared to stand 
apart publicly from the "Mother Country". On 25 August Savage 
received a telegram from the Duchess of Atholl, on behalf of the 
British National Joint Council for Spanish Relief, asking that the 
New Zealand Government appeal to General Franco to give a personal 
guarantee for the safety of non-combatants at Santander and allow the 
presence of neutral observers. 8s Savage requested th~ Governor 
General to inform the Dominions Office of the Duchess' request and to 
state that: 
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand would be glad to be 
associated with any representations which His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom may find it practicable to 
make in this connection.86 
The Duchess of Atholl was informed of the Labour Government's 
sympathy in the matter and of its advice to the British 
Government. 87 No doubt this answer was not quite what the 
Duchess had envisaged! 
Nevertheless, the strain between the two Governments remained and 
peaked in September when Savage was reproved and, at the League, 
Jordan received a reprimand from the Dominions Secretary. September 
was a point of high strain over the Spanish Civil War in European as 
well as New Zealand-British relations. In August attacks on British 
(and other nations') shipping had increased and so had the 
indignation of the British public. It was more or less an open 
secret that Italian submarines were behind many of the attacks. 
Furthermore, the French Government was becoming more and more 
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unwilling to co-operate in the "propping-up" of the NrC and had 
suggested a conference of Mediterranean powers, excluding Italy, to 
discuss piracy. France was also threatening to make a public 
condemnation of Italian intervention in Spain at the NIC.88 
By this time Neville Chamberlain had succeeded Stanley Baldwin as 
Prime Minister of Britain. Chamberlain had become convinced of the 
necessity 
Germany. 
of an Anglo-Italian agreement in order to detach Italy from 
Informal preparatory talks had begun in July. Thus, the 
British Government wished to forestall any French action that might 
cause the demise of the NIC or cause Italy to break off negotiations 
with Britain. From this situation grew the proposal for a conference 
of European Powers, including Italy, Germany and Russia, to discuss 
attacks on Mediterranean shipping, to be held at Nyon in Switzerland 
on 10 September. A Russian note formally accusing Italy of "piracy" 
led to the withdrawal of Italy from the conference, which thwarted 
British hopes that negotiations for an Anglo Italian agreement might 
have begun at Nyon. 
Against this background New Zealand's intransigence over the 
issue took on a greater significance. On 4 September a circular 
telegram was sent to the Dominions advising them of the possibility 
of a conference. 89 The telegram also asked for opinions on a 
proposal to allow both parties in the war the right to examine ships 
to verify their nationality. (Ships supplying the Spanish Government 
were often disguised as British ships to avoid attack; this was used 
as justification for attacks on British ships by the rebels.) The 
New Zealand Government objected to the proposal with some vigour, and 
a high moral tone. It regarded the proposal as a limited extension 
of belligerent rights which would be to the advantage of the rebels 
and of equal disadvantage to the Spanish Government. It further 
considered that the grant would inevitably extend beyond its 
limitation to a situation tantamount to the granting of belligerent 
rights. 
The New Zealand Government politely acknowledged that Britain was 
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more directly affected and in a better position to judge the 
situation, but then went on to remind the British Government of its 
past policy and to reprove it for this change. The British telegram 
had likened the possible grant of rights of search to a similar move 
with regard to the Sino-Japanese conflict. The New Zealand 
Government objected to the comparison, since the Spanish situation 
"has by international consent been treated on distinct and individual 
lines", a subtle condemnation of the whole Non-Intervention policy. 
Although New Zealand had disagreed with the proposal to link 
belligerent rights with the withdrawal of "volunteers", it now asked 
why the British Government had apparently abandoned the condition it 
had formerly attached to granting belligerent rights. No doubt the 
irony of the situation was not lost on the British. Given Jordan's 
assessment of the "British Plan" as more or less a delaying tactic, 
it is likely 
cynicism. The 
that this complaint was made with a certain amount of 
telegram ended on a note of moral righteousness 
directed at the British Government and indicative of the Labour 
Government's attitude towards the parties in Spain: 
"If these recent attacks are the sale reason for the 
proposal to alter the policy with reference to belligerent 
rights ... then His Majesty's Government in new Zealand feel 
bound to say that in their oplnlon such a reason was 
inadequate, that it would enable the parties responsible for 
the outrages to profit by their own wrongdoing and it might 
be deplorable in its future effects.90 
It would appear that the Labour Government was concerned with the 
precedent that could be set by recognition of a rival authority to an 
elected Government. Such recognition rewarded rebellion and 
therefore 
everywhere. 
proposal. 
undermined the 
It refused 
position of 
to associate 
legitimate 
itself with 
Governments 
the British 
A somewhat exasperated reply from the Dominions Office on 11 
September made it clear that the British Government saw the proposal 
in an entirely different light. It merely meant, the telegram said, 
that there would be no objection if genuine British ships were 
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boarded by mistake, where it was suspected that they were only 
disguised as British. Thus, it was very different from a grant of 
belligerent 
question of 
rights and would, in fact, defer a situation in which the 
belligerent rights would arise. The telegram ended with 
as reproving a tone as that of the New Zealand Government: 
In the event of the proposal being put into effect it would 
seem unlikely that in practice any British ship registered 
in New Zealand would be affected but if any case involving 
such a ship should arise, we very much hope that in the 
light of the above explanation His Majesty's Government in 
New Zealand would not object to the application of the 
procedure to such a ship.9l 
It was implied that the proposal should not greatly concern the 
New Zealand Government. That a full explanation of the proposal was 
not forthcoming until after New Zealand's objections had been voiced 
can scarcely have escaped Berendsen or his political masters. The 
initial telegram on 4 September had said that the proposal was to go 
before a Cabinet meeting on 8 September. The explanatory telegram 
was sent after the Cabinet meeting. It would not have been difficult 
for Labour leaders to interpret this as another instance when full 
information was not forthcoming and the Dominions' opinions were 
requested as a matter of form rather than with any intention of 
taking them into account. 
By the time of the second British telegram the Nyon Conference 
had begun, but without Italy or Germany. Despite, or perhaps because 
of, their absence the conference came to a workable agreement with 
surprising speed. Sufficient leeway had been left in the proposals 
for naval patrol of the Mediterranean by France and Britain for Italy 
to take part and subsequently, on 30 October, agreement for Italian 
participation was reached between the three powers. 
In the meantime, however, the events surrounding the Conference 
had been a setback for the Anglo-Italian talks desired by 
Chamberlain. In preliminary discussions it had been established that 
Mussolini wanted de jure recognition of the conquest of Abyssinia. 
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Formal recognition would necessitate a declaration by the League that 
Abyssinia was no longer a State. At a Cabinet meeting on 8 September 
Malcolm MacDonald had pointed out that there would be difficulties 
with some of the Dominions over such action, but if the Nyon 
Conference were successful even New Zealand might be persuaded to 
countenance de jure recognition. 92 
Thus, at the opening of the League Assembly on 13 September 
Anglo-Italian relations were in a delicate state, and there was some 
concern in British circles about New Zealand's attitude. The Spanish 
Government had again appealed to the League Council, this time solely 
in terms of Medi terranean "piracy". The appeal had first been made 
on 24 August, but in view of the Nyon Conference the Council meeting 
had been postponed. A Dominions Office observer checked Jordan's 
room before the meeting and was "pleased to find" that Jordan was not 
even aware that Spain was on the agenda. 93 In fact, Jordan may 
not have known that the appeal was to come up that day, but he was 
certainly aware that the Council would be discussing the Spanish 
situation. He had mentioned it to Savage in a letter on 8 
September. Jordan asked if he was correct in assuming that "our 
previous attitude should be maintained in favour of the legitimate 
Spanish Government subject to any modifying factors emerging from the 
conclusion of the proposed Conference of Mediterranean 
powers".94 Savage replied in the affirmative. 9S 
The Spanish Prime Minister, Juan Negrin, presented the appeal. 
He attacked Italy for acts of piracy in the Mediterranean, objected 
to his country's exclusion from the Nyon Conference and criticised 
the Nyon Agreement because it did not provide for protection of 
Spanish ships. The French delegate then spoke, and after him Jordan 
delivered an impromptu speech. He later explained to Savage that 
usually speeches were made in the Assembly and were well prepared and 
rehearsed, but on this occasion "knowing your mind and my own feeling 
I hopped in early", using a few notes made during the previous 
speeches. 96 
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Jordan told the Council that he did not want to sit quiet, but 
wanted to express the opinion of his Government as he knew it. 
Because the speech was extempore and made with some passion (it was 
described as fiery and moving)97 it perhaps revealed more of 
Jordan's feelings than had his other speeches. His decision to speak 
was undoubtedly a result of humanitarian outrage at the death of 
innocent victims of the war, fueled in this instance by the report of 
attacks on shipping. 
The speech was a plea for humanity, democracy and collective 
responsibility. He considered that the problem had become 
"increasingly terrible" because of the killing of c.ivilians, and 
quoted a passage from the Spanish Government's report on shipping 
losses that accused the Italians of attacking the SS Campeador, an 
oil tanker, and of firing on the crew in the water. Jordan said he 
hoped that the Nyon Conference would bring definite results and 
expressed confidence in the signatories of the Nyon Agreement. 
However, he expressed rather less confidence in the League. He 
pointed out that Ethiopia, Spain and China had appealed to the League 
without success, and asked who would be next: "I ask myself whether 
the League will exert itself? Have we confidence in each other? Can 
I feel that other nations will stand by my nation in time of 
trouble?"98 
Here Jordan 
with Spain as 
clearly expressed 
a small (that 
his Government's identification 
is, less powerful) state whose 
vulnerability to attack should be protected by collective sec.urity. 
His remarks did not betoken complete disillusionment with the League, 
for in his next sentence he pledged his Government's continuing 
support for the policy of collective security. Rather, as he told 
Savage later, he had little confidence in the League as presently 
constituted. 99 Jordan asked, as he had in May, if the Spanish 
people could be consulted and so decide their own destiny. He 
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proposed that Spain should be classed as a territory under an "A 
Mandate"lOO and after a ltsettling down" period supervised 
elections should be held. This would ensure that Spain's Government 
would be one that had the permission of the governed. 
Jordan also made it clear, more so than in earlier speeches, that 
he did not believe that the 1936 elections had been corrupt. He 
pointed out that elections were controlled by the party in power, 
which must therefore be responsible for any corruption, and that the 
Popular Front Government had not been in power at the time of the 
elections. His abrupt end to these comments, that it was not his 
business, indicated that he was loath to go further into discussion 
of the internal political complications of the war. Debate about the 
elections would obscure the real point, which was that the League had 
a responsibility to member nations. Jordan and his Government were 
generally reluctant to be drawn into arguments that might lead to a 
political identification with the Spanish Government, even though the 
mere assertion that it had been legitimately elected could be 
regarded as a political statement. 
In general the sentiments expressed in Jordan's speech were 
similar to those in his two previous speeches. It was another urgent 
reminder to League Members of their responsibilities to one another, 
but this time Jordan expressed less confidence in the League's 
willingness to protect legitimate governments. Nor did he remind the 
Council that its purpose was to protect lawful government, but said 
that it was "to protect humanity and to oppose unwarranted attacks 
upon innocent people".lOl 
What alarmed British officials so much was not this further 
indication of a lack of unanimity among the Commonwealth, but 
Jordan's 
Campeador. 
reference to the alleged Italian attack on the SS 
D. Cockram, the Dominions Office observer, noted that 
Jordan's reference was "fortunately by hearsay" and was rather 
contemptuous of the mandate suggestion: "By the end the Spanish Prime 
Minister must have been longing to be saved from his friends."102 
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The next day Malcolm MacDonald delivered a warning to Jordan. He 
said that Jordan's outspoken remarks were tantamount to a charge 
against Italy of deliberately killing civilians. International 
relations were in such a delicate state that even a candid remark 
from a Dominions' representative might "bring a note" to the British 
Government that could cause embarrassment. Obviously, there was 
concern that Mussolini might seize on Jordan's remark as an excuse 
for postponing the Anglo-Italian talks or for demanding further 
concessions. 103 
Although MacDonald softened his remarks by saying that he would 
have been pleased to say himself what Jordan had said under other 
circumstances, it was clearly a reprimand. In his private report to 
Savage, Jordan was at pains to assure Savage that he was "candidly of 
the belief that everything I said would have been said by you had you 
been here".104 He pointed out that the French Foreign Minister, 
the Spanish Prime Minister and others had congratulated him on the 
speech. But British disapproval counted more than these compliments. 
Jordan also told Savage in his private report that he was 
disturbed by evidence that the Empire was not "looking all one way". 
He had heard remarks that indicated that Britain and some of the 
Dominions would not regret it if "the left Government of Spain" were 
defeated. The tone of his report was both defensive and 
downhearted. He obviously felt that he was battling for a lost cause 
with little support. He said that the League was "absolutely 
depressing" because of the attitude of Member States, and was 
concerned that even "the countries we would expect to be reasonable" 
would not exert themselves to help the Government of Spain. Despite 
his reference to the "left" Government, Jordan's main concern was 
still with the League's obligations to member states. He remarked 
that, while the Government of Spain might have "objectionable 
features", "You and I are not so much interested in the policy of 
the Government as in the fact that it was elected, and, further, that 
it is a Member of the League of Nations. n10S 
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It is difficult to say how much effect Malcolm MacDonald's 
warning had on Jordan or his Government. The League Assembly 
considered a more general appeal by Spain in September, which called 
for Italian and German aggression in Spain to be recognised as such 
and asked that steps be taken to halt such aggression and to allow 
the Republicans to buy war materials. Jordan might have been 
expected to address the issue when the draft resolution proposed by 
the Sixth Committee on Political Questions was referred to the 
plenary session of the Assembly. He did not. Either he might have 
felt that he had made his Government's attitude plain in his speech 
to the Councilor MacDonald's reprimand may have imposed a certain 
restraint upon him. 
The resolution was the strongest pronouncement made by the League 
on the Spanish situation. It regretted that the NrC had failed to 
secure the withdrawal of foreign combatants, recognised that there 
were foreign army troops fighting in Spain, appealed to Governments 
to make non-intervention effective and noted that if this did not 
occur in the near future 
ending non-intervention. 
Assembly Jordan registered 
the Members of the League would consider 
In his official report on the League 
his satisfaction with the substantial 
unanimity obtained on the resolution, considering the "fundamental 
differences in approach and sympathy" that had bedevilled the Spanish 
question at the League, and made agreement on anything "beyond the 
most innocuous platitudes seem well nigh impossible".106 Thus, 
at the point when Jordan seemed almost to despair at any possibility 
of the League's acting effectively over Spain, members demonstrated 
at least some willingness to acknowledge the urgency of the 
situation, even if only in the short-term. 
Meanwhile, Jordan's remarks to the Council had raised ripples at 
home. There was Press criticism of his suggestion of a mandate for 
Spain and some concern that New Zealand was not following Britain's 
lead in foreign policy. The opposition National Party was beginning 
to object to New Zealand's attitude at Geneva as damaging to the 
unity of the Empire. Jordan's speech provided an opportunity for a 
specific attack on Parliament. 
K.J. Holyoake, National MP for 
speech. 107 Had the British 
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On 29 September during question time 
Motueka, asked Savage about the 
Government and other Commonwealth 
representatives been consulted about the speech and had they approved 
of the mandate suggestion? Savage's reply carefully skirted the 
question. He avoided any mention of the political issues of the war 
and merely said that Jordan's statement was in line with the 
Government's view that the problem should be resolved by reference to 
the "unfettered decision of the Spanish people themselves", His 
Government deplored the situation in Spain and "warmly deprecates" 
any attempt to rule by force. He said that Jordan took every 
opportunity 
while no 
to consult with other Commonwealth representatives "and 
definite information on this point is available the 
Government has no reason to believe that this custom was departed 
from in this instance".108 
Later the same day, in the debate on the Imperial Conference, 
Walter Nash was not quite so circumspect about his personal attitude 
to the war in Spain. Both he and Savage had indicated their 
disappointment that the Imperial Conference had not produced an 
affirmation of the principle of collective security from the 
Commonwealth. Nash even went so far as to say that he did not agree 
with the policy and procedure adopted by British representatives at 
Geneva. He then said that he felt that more could have been done to 
maintain the sovereignty of the elected Government of Spain. When 
Gordon Coates interjected to ask if the Government of Spain had 
really been elected Nash replied that the Government had been "freely 
and completely elected by the people of Spain in 1935". He was about 
to say that the election was of the "same type" as, presumably, the 
one that had resulted in victory for the New Zealand Labour Party, 
when the Speaker asked him to return to the subject of the 
debate. I09 Obviously, the Speaker did not want a free-ranging 
discussion on the nature of the Spanish Government. 
Ironically enough, Savage had touched on the dangers of talking 
out of turn and thereby making difficulties for the British 
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Commonwealth, during his remarks on the Imperial Conference. Even 
without the juxtaposition of these remarks and Jordan's recent 
experience at Geneva, Savage's comment was particularly applicable to 
" his Government's situation with regard to the Spanish Civil War. He 
reminded "all,sections of the community" that it was easy to talk and 
pass resolutions, but they "should recognise that we cannot playa 
part just as New Zealand".110 It could have been a special 
message to New Zealand pro-Republicans: the Government would not 
move outside the bounds of the Commonwealth; its independence of 
outlook had restrictions. 
Even so, privately the Government was still determined to 
maintain as far as possible the attitude it had adopted since the 
beginning of the war. On the same day that Savage made this comment 
in Parliament a message had been sent to London objecting to the 
despatch of a British agent to Franco's Government. The British 
Government had sent a circular telegram to the Dominions on 21 
September advising that it was again considering the appointment of 
an "unofficial" agent because it regarded its present methods of 
contact with Franco as inadequate. III Despite the assurance that 
the appointment of an agent would not constitute recognition of 
Francots administration, the New Zealand Prime Minister's response 
was to refer the British Government to his reply in March to a 
similar suggestion .112 New Zealand was still "firmly and 
inalterably opposed" to any action that might be interpreted as 
recognition of any authority other than that of the Government of 
Spain. 
If New Zealand's opposition had been at all influential in the 
decision in March to postpone an exchange of agents, it was not in 
September. On 7 October the British Government replied that it was 
going to proceed with its proposal and tartly invited the attention 
of Ministers to the statement in its previous telegram that the 
arrangement was purely administrative. II3 The appointment of Sir 
Robert Hodgson as Commercial Agent to the Nationalists was not 
announced officially until 16 November, by which time Jordan had 
reported 
British 
Italian 
to Savage 
prestige was 
influence. 114 
63 
that the move had caused concern in Italy that 
developing with Franco to the disadvantage of 
This news was probably cold comfort to a 
Government that had consistently favoured the legitimate Government 
and a solution to the Spanish problem that did not include rewarding 
rebellion. The despatch of Hodgson to Salamanca had made it plain 
that New Zealand's opinion would make little difference to British 
policy. 
Thus, at the end of 1937, the New Zealand Government was faced 
with a situation in which it had fewer and fewer opportunities to 
express its attitude on the Spanish Civil War. Its options in terms 
of proposing solutions had been narrowing since May, although the 
policy itself had not changed. In part, the limits on expression of 
New Zealand's attitude had been self imposed; the commitment to 
Commonwealth had prevented full promotion of its views. On the other 
hand, it had been demonstrated that neither the British Government 
nor other Dominions shared its views on Spain or collective 
security. Without such support Jordan at the League was a voice in 
Further, although the New Zealand Government's the wilderness. 
commitment to collective security was not waning it was increasingly 
aware that its general attitude to the League was not shared by many 
members. By January 1938 Jordan felt that circumstances were against 
the League and that "it would be a disservice to the League to press 
unduly at the moment proposals which would receive little or no 
support".llS Jordan's comment related to discussion about reform 
of the Covenant, but could equally have applied to the Spanish 
situation. 
In May 1938 Jordan made his last substantial statement to the 
League of his Government's policy on the Spanish Civil War. His 
remarks lacked the vehemence of his previous speeches. The Spanish 
Government had again appealed to the League Council to consider the 
problem of intervention in Spain. When the Spanish representative 
presented his appeal on 11 May Jordan gave a brief speech in 
support. He emphasised that Spain was a member state of the League 
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and said that, in the face of the facts that seemed so "tragically 
plain", the Spanish Government's request was amazingly moderate. He 
reiterated his Government's opinion that the people of Spain should 
be allowed to decide their own destinies and by "methods other than 
those now being adopted".116 
On 13 May, the Spanish Government introduced a resolution calling 
for an end to the policy of non-intervention in terms of the League 
resolution of 29 May 1937 and the resolution presented to the 
Assembly in September 1937. Jordan was one of nine who abstained 
from voting. He told the Council that even though non-intervention 
was to a large extent disregarded already, resolving to end it would 
be dangerous because it would make it "free for all". Jordan said 
that his Government would have preferred enforcing Non-Intervention 
and reiterated his Government's commitment to participation in 
collective action by the League: 
We look forward to the day when we shall do something to 
stop the spread of war rather than pass resolutions to 
withdraw from action that is being attempted, even though it 
may only be partially effective.117 
The main point of the resolution, as far as the Spanish 
Government was concerned, was to give it the right to purchase arms 
and other war materials. In that case, Jordan's abstention might be 
seen to betoken a sudden lack of sympathy for the Spanish 
Government. Yet, as Jordan later said, it was really in accordance 
with the policy his Government had pursued from the start. Jordan 
regarded 
question 
foreign 
operated 
Spanish 
the object of non-intervention as ensuring that "the Spanish 
will be solved by the Spanish themselves without the aid of 
elements" 118 , 
in that way. 
even if in practice it had not so far 
His Government had always advocated that the 
people should be allowed to decide their own destinies. 
Jordan's unwillingness to vote for the end of non-intervention was 
also a testament of his Government's belief in collective 
responsibility. The League had failed utterly in this respect; the 
NIC had not proved much more effective but at least it was, in 
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principle, an organisation of powers established to enforce some kind 
of collective restraint on aggression. 
On the other hand, Jordan's refusal to vote against the 
resolution was also significant. As he pointed out in his official 
report to the Government, nine abstentions were hardly proof of the 
success of non-intervention, since they were evidence of as much 
unwillingness to endorse as condemn the policy.119 The British 
Government had naturally voted against the resolution, and P.A.M. van 
der Esch considers that the abstentions of China and New Zealand were 
particularly damaging for British prestige, since both usually voted 
with the British. 120 
At the same League meeting the question of de jure recognition of 
the Italian conquest of Abyssinia was raised. Again the New Zealand 
delegate abstained from voting and, moreover, supported the Russian 
delegate's arguments against de jure recognition, in opposition to 
the British representative's case. Abstentions were, in a sense, a 
compromise solution to the dilemma of the New Zealand Government. 
They stopped short of open opposition to British policy yet conveyed 
the New Zealand Government's disapproval of it. Jordan's stand in 
May 1938 was, then, an affirmation of his Government's determination 
to make independent judgements on foreign policy according to the 
principles it espoused, but also an indication that it would do so 
with due regard to the bonds of Empire. Jordan's lack of vehemence 
on the Spanish question was the result of the consideration that the 
unity of Empire was becoming more important as the international 
situation worsened. 
For some members of the National Party even abstentions were 
signs of disloyalty to Britain. Jordan's remarks about Spain drew 
criticism from F.W. Doidge, National Party candidate for the Tauranga 
seat in the coming elections. Doidge accused Jordan of denouncing 
British policy and of wanting intervention in Spain. Correspondence 
between Savage and Tauranga MP; C.H. Burnett, about Doidge's claims 
is interesting for what it reveals of the importance of foreign 
66 
policy issues to the Labour Government in an election year. In 
response to a request from Burnett for comment, Savage sent a lengthy 
memorandum refuting DOidge's statements. In essence Savage repeated 
Jordan's arguments that cessation of non-interventation would leave 
the way open for international involvement and that New Zealand would 
rather see the non-intervention policy better applied, to the point 
of offering assistance in any action designed to stop the war. This, 
Savage said, was not a denouncement of British policy since Britain 
supported non-intervention. 12l 
Savage refused a later request from Burnett to publish his 
letter, which, he said, was only intended to supply information for a 
rebuttal: "I do not wish to become involved in a personal 
controversy with Doidge who is not a serious problem to the 
Government".122 While this may have revealed that foreign policy 
was not a priority in the pre-election debates with the Opposition, 
it also indicated a desire to keep it that way. Had Savage entered 
into the debate, more attention would have focussed on foreign 
policy. Further, the point of focus would have been on an issue on 
which opinion was sharply divided among those New Zealanders who took 
an interest in foreign affairs. If foreign policy were to be 
discussed, the question of the civil war in Spain was hardly the 
safest subject with which to begin. The Opposition's election 
campaign emphasised the menace of Socialism; thus, it would not do to 
associate the Government too closely with a Government regarded in 
some quarters as the epitome of atheistic Communism. 
Foreign policy was not commonly an election issue in new Zealand, 
but there was growing criticism of a policy that appeared to deviate 
from that of the "Mother Country". For a time it seemed that for 
once foreign affairs were to feature in the election campaign. When 
Parliament opened the Opposition introduced a "Want of Confidence" 
motion in July that included an indictment of the Government's 
foreign policy on the grounds that it was a threat to the solidarity 
of the Empire, and Opposition MPs had sharp words to say about 
Jordan's attitude at Geneva. 
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However, it was not the Spanish question, but Jordan's action in 
not only disagreeing with Britain over Abyssinia, but also siding 
with Russia that came in for the most criticism. It was hardly 
surprising, then, that Savage had earlier been loath to become 
involved 
inevitably 
wrongs of 
in a debate on the Government's Spanish policy, which would 
have extended into the political and religious rights and 
the situation. Peter Fraser's defence of Jordan in 
Parliament on the occasion of the "\.Jant of Confidence" motion was a 
cogent expression of the principles behind his Government's policy, 
but, Significantly, omitted specific reference to Spain: 
It does not make any difference as far as the essential 
rightness and justice of New Zealand's attitude is concerned 
what nations do or do not stand in line with us and express 
their agreement or disagreement ... the moral righteousness 
of New Zealand's attitude is not affected in the least ... 
though we work in the closest cooperation with the British 
Government that does not mean to say that we must be 
prepared to swallow everything the British Government puts 
forward. It is our duty to the country to interpret the 
situation in the light of the principles on which we were 
elected, and loyalty to the League of Nations was a 
principle put forward by all three parties prior to the 
general election. Therefore even when the League of Nations 
is in retreat from dictatorship commencing at Manchukuo, if 
we are asked to acquiesce in the recognition of what was 
nothing more or less than international crimes such as the 
invasion of China, and Abyssinia, and other places where 
dictatorships have struck at national liberty, and if we 
have to choose between siding with those dictatorships or 
remaining true to democracy, then I hope the High 
Commissioner for New Zealand will never retreat from the 
position he took up and most certainly this Government never 
will.123 
The central point of the Opposition's argument was that the 
Labour Government's attitude was weakening the unity of the Empire 
and was disloyal to Britain. Jordan was concerned enough about this 
criticism of his speeches on Spain to send Savage evidence that this 
was not so. In July 1938, he noted that press reports had stated 
that Chamberlain was attempting to arrange a truce in Spain and that 
the British Air Minister, Kingsley Wood, had expressed the hope that 
the Spanish people could settle their differences by methods other 
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than force. Jordan considered that, since he had suggested the same 
things, New Zealand was not out of step with Britain, but had its 
policy endorsed by members of the British Cabinet. 124 
It would seem, then, that the Labour Government regarded the 
Spanish issue as sufficiently complex to want to avoid public debate 
on its policy. However, this avoidance also indicated that Spain was 
not so central a matter for the Government to take electoral chances 
on its policy. This was probably true of any foreign policy issue, 
since policy at the League on reform of the Covenant, Spain, China 
and Abyssinia were all interrelated. But Spain had an added 
ideological element that made it doubly dangerous to discuss. 
Ultimately, foreign policy was not an issue in the 1938 election 
campaign. Domestic policy was of far more direct and immediate 
concern to the contending parties and the electorate. 
After the despatch of Hodgson to Franco's Provisional Government 
in November 1937 and the League Meeting in May 1938, there was little 
more the New Zealand Government could do in support of the Spanish 
Government on the 
the opportunity 
humanitarian aid 
international scene. There was, of course, still 
to express concern through the provision of 
to either Republican Spain or to any victims of the 
war. The Labour Government had, indeed, had such opportunities since 
the beginning of the war, but although it gave sympathetic 
consideration to appeals from New Zealand and overseas organisations, 
there was little positive action taken. 
The first request for aid to Spain carne from the Red Cross 
Society in November 1936. The Society asked that the Government 
waive the exchange on a remittance of £25 to the League of Red Cross 
Societies in Paris, which was for . the aid of victims of the war 
irrespective of their political affiliations. Savage, who was acting 
Minister of Finance while Nash was in England, replied on 14 November 
that transfer of money without exchange "would be tantamount to a 
special grant thus creating a precedent which would be taken 
advantage of by others making a similar request". Actually the money 
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could not be remitted without exchange, so really the Red Cross was 
asking the Government to pay the cost of exchange. 125 In the 
same month Savage received a request from John Fisher on behalf of 
the British Spanish Medical Aid Committee for funds or food for 
victims of the war. No reply was recorded. 126 
Several 
England. 
behalf of 
appeals for food were considered by Nash while he was in 
In January 1937 Lady Austen Chamberlain wrote to Jordan on 
the "(Entirely Neutral) General Relief Fund for Distressed 
Women and Children in Spain". She asked for a gift of butter or 
alternatively a favourable price for butter. The London Manager of 
the Dairy Sales Division of the Primary Produce Marketing Board 
passed the request to Nash, noting that he had no authority to 
authorise a gift of butter and could not sell butter at a lower than 
market price. Nash, as Minister of Finance, had the power to 
authorise a gift or a lower price for the butter. 127 There is no 
evidence that either option was exercised. 
Yet, Nash was concerned to help the Spanish Government - if he 
could. On 9 March, he sent a recommendation to Savage that the 
Government approve a gift of 100 tons of cheese to the Spanish 
Government: 
The gesture would be appreciated both for its material value 
and on morale of people. Evidence supplied by recent League 
of Nations report that Government administration even in 
besieged Madrid is competent and effective. Note that New 
Zealand was in negotiation with Spanish Government for some 
months up to the outbreak of rebellion and although gift 
would not be related to this it would be appropriate.128 
This demonstration of Nash's goodwill towards the Republican side 
was not accompanied by any evidence of his suggestion being put into 
effect. Later, in April, R.M. Campbell discussed with the Spanish 
Embassy's Commercial Attache the possibility of the sale of New 
Zealand meat to the Spanish Government. Again, there was no record 
of further action. 
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It appears, then, that the provision of food aid was viewed 
sympathetically by the High Commissioner's Office and the Minister of 
Finance. Humanitarian motives may have been outweighed by financial 
considerations. The Government would have had to pay for food 
offered at no cost or a lowered price. Moreover, any gift offered 
specifically to the Spanish Government would be interpreted in some 
quarters as a definite gesture of support for the Republican cause. 
The one exception to the Government's otherwise negative response 
to appeals for aid was made in an area where there could not be 
claims of political fa vouri tism . A grant of t. 2,000 ster ling to the 
International Commission for Child Refugees in Spain was approved in 
February 1938 and confirmed in May. The appeal had come through the 
High Commissioner's Office in London and significantly, was endorsed 
by Lord Cranborne of the British Foreign Office. The Commission 
proposed to establish a fund contributed to by Governments and the 
Bri tish Government initially agreed to give .t 25,000, one sixth of 
the total the Commission hoped to raise. In April the British 
reduced the amount to -£ 10,000 when it was found that other 
Governments would not match its original offer, but the New Zealand 
Government stood by its original offer. 129 The Government 
subsequently used evidence of its support for refugees in this 
donation when refusing requests for funds from the New Zealand SMAC 
and the National Relief Fund for Spanish Refugee Children (NRFSRC). 
In 1938, financial problems were undoubtedly a major influence on 
the Government's consideration of appeals for aid. New Zealand's 
reserves of sterling in London had been falling since 1936 and by the 
end of 1938 were dangerously low. It was not the time for gifts of 
sterling, ho\vever humanitarian the objective. Thus, Treasury refused 
the NRFSRC's request for a donation to cover the cost of exchange on 
a donation to the Internatial Commission for Child Refugees. 130 
An appeal from Ernst Toller, the German Expressionist playwright, for 
"surplus butter" in October 1938 was refused on the grounds that 
there was no "surplus" and that a donation would be the equivalent of 
a gift of money, since the Government purchased all the butter for 
export,131 Spanish appeals 
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Children's Relief Fund and 
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were not a special case, for similar 
waiving of exchange from the Chinese 
the Oriental Missions Society were also 
As Minister of Finance, Nash had the most to do with requests for 
aid, since his Department dealt with such appeals. In 1938 and 1939, 
there was further evidence of his personal conviction that New 
Zealand should provide assistance to victims of the war. When an 
appeal for skimmed milk was passed to him by Jordan in November 1938 
Nash minuted "Can we find a way to help, if so - we should".133 
Later, in April 1939, in connection with a SMAC appeal for aid to 
Spanish refugees in France, Nash suggested that the Government 
consider a grant of mutton, "which may be in quantities in excess of 
the quota to the U.K. and which could be purchased at comparatively 
low prices".134 But neither skimmed milk nor mutton reached the 
refugees. The SMAC appeal had taken the form of a delegation which 
met with the Minister of Justice, H.G.R. Mason. The Minister had 
given no definite assurances, but said that he felt that New Zealand 
was under an obligation to the Spanish people because they had "taken 
upon themselves a suffering that would have fallen on some other 
nation". If this statement was more than a vague platitude chosen in 
order to strike the right note, the Government could find no way to 
fulfil the obligation. 
In the view of New Zealand pro-Republicans, by 1939 the best 
method of recognising that obligation was by admission of refugees to 
New Zealand. Even before Franco's victory, the SMAC had begun to 
petition 
Zealand. 
victims 
the Government to allow skilled workers to emigrate to New 
By this time, the problem of refugees was not confined to 
of the war in Spain; Hitler's territorial acquisitions in 
Eastern and Central Europe had also produced large numbers of 
refugees. There is no evidence that any noticeable numbers of 
refugees from anywhere were admitted to New Zealand before the war, 
and none at all of any Spaniards. 
It would 
disinclination 
general policy 
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seem, therefore, that it was not out of any 
to help the people of Spain, but rather as a matter of 
that no Spanish refugees or displaced International 
instance, Germans and Italians) were allowed to 
Zealand. In August 1939, a memorandum from Berendsen 
of the French Government's plans to send Spanish 
to Spain indicated that neither admission of refugees 
nor financial aid was contemplated. The International Commission for 
Child Refugees had asked the Government to protest to France but 
Berendsen noted: "It would not be desirable for us to protest to 
France unless we were prepared to contribute financially or to 
provide emigration facilities for the refugees." However, Jordan was 
asked to associate himself with any action the League might take to 
assist the refugees, and to investigate any steps "that it might be 
proper and possible for us to consider".135 
By this time the war was over, the Spanish Government was 
defeated and Britain and France had recognised Franco's new regime. 
None of the New Zealand Government's diplomatic efforts on behalf of 
what it saw as the legitimate Government of Spain had been to any 
avail. One last gesture demonstrated the Labour Government's 
disapproval of a party that had won authority by force. New Zealand 
did not recognise Franco's Government. 136 It was an action 
consistent with the attitude the Government had maintained since 
1936. 
Although some Labour leaders obviously felt a sense of 
identification \vith the Spanish Government in terms of its political 
outlook, the Government's policy was based more on an identification 
with that Government as a fellow democracy and a member of the League 
of Nations. Its concern for the survival of democracy in Spain was, 
moreover, inextricably linked with its concern that the League should 
remain a vital force in international relations. Spain was a test of 
member nations' commitment to the concept of collective security, and 
in its attitude at Geneva the Labour Government demonstrated its 
belief in that system. 
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R.F. Holland has dismissed New Zealand's cleaving to collective 
security in the period before the war as a result of "New Zealand's 
identity as a small and vulnerable state". He sees Jordan's anguish 
over Guernica as "in large part a premonition of General Tojo riding 
into Wellington".137 There is no doubt that self-interest played 
some part in the Labour Government's commitment to collective 
security. But Holland has ignored the part principle played in the 
New Zealand Government's assessment of international affairs. 
Jordan's pleas to the League to act to help the Spanish Government 
were also a result of his (and his Government's) belief in 
constitutional Government and democracy, that reason was better than 
guns and that those who attempted to rule by force should not be 
allowed to profit by their actions. The Government's commitment to 
these ideas can be seen in Jordan's speeches at Geneva. As it became 
obvious that there would be no attempt to help the Government of 
Spain, that is, to protect a legitimate Government, the New Zealand 
Government then turned its attention to urging the League to act in 
aid of democracy in Spain, in the form of the mandate suggestion. If 
the Popular Front Government could not be saved, this at least would 
ensure some kind of constitutional Government. The naivete of the 
suggestion and, indeed, of the Government's assumption that the 
League was still capable of any firm action against aggression 
stemmed mostly from a rather simplistic moral assessment of 
international problems. Jordan was well aware of the complexities of 
international involvement in the Spanish situation and of the 
ideological divisions 
considerations were 
justice. 
militating against League 
subordinated to a belief 
action, but these 
in principle and 
Nicholas Mansergh has said that New Zealand's policy was: 
In a sense the protest of the common man. It symbolised for 
him his aversion to the calculating inhumanity of 
Realpolitik and his instictive belief that righteousness and 
the moral order should govern relations between states as 
between men.138 
There were cer~ainly indications that Jordan and his colleagues felt 
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that they did represent the common man, the people whose views were 
not represented by Governments. There was also a sense that they 
were acting as 
attitudes within 
in the 
the 
the 
of "corridors 
voice of Britain's conscience and representing 
Commonwealth that were otherwise unrepresented 
power". Yet, the British Government largely 
ignored New Zealand's protests, except when, almost by chance, they 
threatened to upset another line of policy. 
The New Zealand Government's policy on the Spanish Civil War, as 
well as demonstrating its commitment to collective security, revealed 
the ultimate commitment to Commonwealth. It demonstrated the 
difficulties of developing an independent policy in a period when New 
Zealand was still economically and emotionally dependent on Britain. 
Although the Government's attitude towards the Spanish Civil War 
remained consistent, the expression of its attitude was modified so 
as not to jeopardise the unity of Empire. Far from being disloyal to 
Britain, as Labour's opponents claimed, its actions revealed its 
loyalty to the Commonwealth. 
Other 
expressions 
too close 
considerations also placed limits on the Government's 
of sympathy with the Spanish Government. It had to avoid 
a connection with the pro-Republican movement, because of 
its Communist connections. Therefore, the Government avoided making 
its stand at the League a matter of domestic politics. And, although 
there was concern enough for the victims of the war, financial 
considerations precluded positive expressions of that concern. 
Some pro-Republicans found the Labour Government's policy on 
Spain wanting, since they felt that it did not go far enough. 
Nevertheless, the "limited pro-Republicanism" espoused by Labour 
leaders reflected the opinions of many within the pro-Republican 
movement. In its policy, then, the New Zealand Government 
represented the views of at least some of its electors, within the 
limitations imposed by Imperial and domestic politics. 
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CHAPTER 2 
"NON INTERVENTIONISM:" 
THE IMPERIALIST RESPONSE 
The Labour Government's policy on the Spanish Civil War was most 
criticised not for its partiality towards the Republican forces, but 
because it differed from the British Government's policy. Not all 
New Zealanders shared their Government's desire for independence of 
judgement in foreign affairs, nor its faith in the League of 
Nations. Rather, they felt that a strong united Empire was New 
Zealand's best defence and regarded any deviation from the British 
view as divisive, dangerous and disloyal. Their criticisms of 
Jordan's stand at Geneva were one expression of those several 
opinions on the war in Spain that collectively might be called the 
"Non-Interventionist" response. Other opinions which came into this 
category were those that, in a variety of ways, held that the 
political issues of the war were not, and should not be, of any 
concern to New Zealanders, and those which voiced complete support 
for Britain's non-intervention policy. 
"Non-Interventionist" opinions essentially presented an 
imperialist, "pro-British" view of the Spanish Civil War. In this 
view, the war was only of significance to New Zealanders because of 
its effect on the balance of power in Europe and on British 
strategic interests, particularly the Mediterranean route that 
connected Britain with its Pacific dominions. It is possible that 
"Non-Interventionist" opinions in some form or another were held by 
most New Zealanders, the "silent majority" that did not subscribe to 
either pro-Francoism or pro-Republicanism and regarded the war as 
either a conflict of alien ideologies, or the product of foreign 
political traditions and national characteristics that had no echo 
in New Zealand. In a country where Britain was still referred to as 
"Home" and "the Mother Country", and \vhere there was a traditional 
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reliance 
surprising 
on Britain in matters of defence, it was also not 
that some, perhaps many, should consider the war 
primarily from the point of view of its implications for the 
Empire. Ultimately, "Non-Interventionist" opinions reflected a view 
of the world and New Zealand's place in it that was insular, 
imperialist and Ang1ocentric. At one and the same time they 
stressed New Zealanders' superiority and subordinance in the scheme 
of things. On one hand, they implied that New Zealanders were above 
the excesses of Communism and Fascism, and the complex political 
passions of Europe, because of their British democratic traditions. 
On the other hand, they emphasised New Zealand's dependence on 
Britain and its junior position in the Empire. 
"Non-Interventionist" support for British policy and attacks on 
the Labour Government's stand illustrated the contention of a 
contemporary observer that New Zealanders retained an "infantile 
relation to the "mother country"" that other members of the Empire 
had outgrown. J.N. Findlay was a Briton who had spent some time in 
South Africa and was at the time Professor of Philosophy at Otago 
University. In 1937 he con tri buted an article on t'The Imperial 
Factor in New Zealand" to the radical periodical Tomorrow. Findlay 
considered that New Zealanders had "made fairy vows and are the 
victims of ghostly loyalties" to "a visionary and idealised England, 
which absorbs the emotional energies of New Zealand, and keeps it 
permanently in a state of feeble-mindedness and infantility", which 
prevented the country from fulfilling its individual destiny.l 
"Non-Interventionist" views were given public expression by the 
National Party and some daily and weekly newspapers. In a sense, 
the National Party's attitude was as much a response to the Labour 
Government's policy as it was to the war itself. The Spanish Civil 
War was not a major concern for the party, which had been formed in 
May 1936 from the coalition of the United and Reform Parties that 
had governed from 1931 until 1935 and had fought the last election 
under the banner of the National Political Federation. 2 The 
National Party aimed to unite all anti-Labour groups in one force to 
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present a strong opposition to the Government. The Labour 
Government's stand on the Spanish Civil War and other international 
issues was used as another example of Labour's intention to bring 
the country to ruin, in this case by creating difficulties with its 
protector, Britain. Many of the comments made by the National Party 
Parliamentarians on foreign policy were not specifically concerned 
with the war in Spain, but with the general direction of the 
Government's policy. However, Jordan's speeches on Spain were 
mentioned several times and were more often an unspoken but obvious 
referent. 
For the National Party the war in Spain was of concern because 
Labour's policy brought into consideration the wider issue of where 
New Zealand stood in relation to the Empire. National Party 
politicians made fe,v comments on the war that were not related to 
New Zealand policy; those few placed the civil war firmly in the 
context of Imperial strategy. The only public statements about the 
parties in Spain and National's view of the nature of the war 
appeared in National News, first published in May 1937. These 
comments were also few and were matched by as many articles that 
discussed Spain and other international issues in terms of Imperial 
policy, invariably written by "A Military Correspondent". 
The New Zealand Herald, Waikato Times, Evening Post and Otago 
Daily Times, the Freelance, New Zealand Observer, Auckland Weekly 
News and New Zealand Truth all presented an image of the war in 
Spain that served to distance its political and internal issues from 
New Zealanders. In discussing the international complications of 
the war, they placed emphasis on considerations of British policy. 
Over the 32 months from the beginning of the rebellion until 
Franco's victory march, the daily newspapers devoted considerable 
editorial space to discussion of the war. Most of these editorials 
dealt with the international aspects of the war, although the 
political and social background to the war was investigated and some 
analysis of the two forces attempted. It is not surprising that, 
confronted with the wealth of often conflicting overseas 
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interpretations of the war and, thus, aware of its complexities, 
most of the daily newspapers (excluding the Herald) should choose to 
remain neutral in discussions of the conflicting forces in the war. 
Their "Non-Interventionism" was more evident in appraisals of the 
international aspects of the Spanish situation and in their approval 
of British policy. Nevertheless, editorials about events in Spain 
itself contributed to the "Non-Interventionist" image of a \",ar of 
alien values. The involvement of New Zealanders or their Government 
barely rated a mention in some newspapers and none at all in 
others. In 
Interventionist" 
pro-Republicanism 
a sense, these omissions reinforced "Non-
opinions. To ignore New Zealand manifestations of 
or pro-Francoism was to indicate that they were of 
little or no significance. 
The weekly newspapers gave only limited coverage to the Spanish 
Civil War and made only intermittent editorial comments that were, 
in the main, "Non-Interventionist". However, these weekly papers 
may have reached more homes than the daily newspapers. Their 
comments may have influenced the attitudes of some New Zealanders. 
Equally, the weekly papers' comments may have echoed what their 
editors considered to be the views of most of their readership. 
The Freelance and the Observer shared the same publishers, but 
the former originated in Wellington and the latter in Auckland. 
Most of their articles dealt with the personal experiences of New 
Zealanders involved in some way in the war. As befitted 
publications whose concern was with the local scene, what little 
editorial comment that appeared was also directed towards local 
opinions on the war. The Auckland Weekly News also provided news of 
New Zealanders caught up in the war, but its editorials placed the 
Spanish Civil War firmly in the context of international relations 
and, more specifically, of British foreign policy. It was published 
by Wilson and Horton, the proprietors of the New Zealand Herald and 
its editorials on Spain were often reprints of those in the Herald. 
The 
War of 
paper's 
Zealand's 
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New Zealand Truth had the most coverage of the Spanish Civil 
any of the weekly newspapers. Then, as now, much of the 
pages were devoted to details of murder cases (including New 
own "suitcase murder") and salacious stories of sex and 
scandal. Yet, Truth was also known for its trenchant comments on 
the local political scene, and some New Zealand activities related 
to the Spanish Civil War did not escape the editor's pen. As well 
as editorials, there were also some long articles on various aspects 
of the war received from the British United Press. 
It should be noted that the holding of "Non-Interventionist", or 
"pro-Bri tish", vie\vs in terms of international and New Zealand 
involvement with the war did not preclude the expression of 
preference for one side or the other in Spain. For example, the 
Herald and 
in Spain 
the National News both presented analyses of the parties 
and the causes of the war that owed something to 
pro-Francoist views and Truth also demonstrated that its opinion on 
the war was influenced by anti-Communism. On the other hand, the 
Waikato Times displayed some sympathy for the Government of Spain. 
However, these opinions appeared not to influence evaluations of the 
international problems created by the war, whereas, for 
pro-Francoists and pro-RepUblicans, commitment to one side or the 
other coloured their perceptions of international involvement. 
"Non-Interventionists", then, made distinctions between what the 
Evening Post called the "Spanish" values and the "European" values 
of the war,3 distinctions that could only be made by dismissing 
what was happening in Spain itself as of secondary importance. 
"Non-Interventionist" opinion on the nature of the war and its 
significance for New Zealanders will first be considered. These, of 
course, influenced responses to the Labour Government's policy on 
the Spanish Civil War. However, perceptions of British actions had 
as great, if not greater, influence and, therefore, discussion of 
"Non-Interventionist" assessments of the international situation and 
reasons for supporting British policy will precede their criticisms 
of the New Zealand Government's views. 
86 
It was in consideration of the causes and character of the 
Spanish Civil vlar that "Non-Interventionist" opinions displayed the 
most variety; yet, all either contained or helped contribute to the 
assumption that the war had no relevance to the New Zealand 
experience. More than that, these views were often a specific 
rejection of the notion that the issues of the war could be 
relevant. 
Council, 
The Hon. Fred Waite, DSO; member of the Legislative 
gave succinct expression to one form of "Non-
Interventionist" opinion in a speech in the Address in Reply debate, 
on 10 September 1937. Discussing the involvement of foreign powers, 
he said: 
I do not think it is possible for us to say who is to 
blame. There are Communists on one side and Fascists and 
Nazis on the other, and we dislike all their gospels. To us 
they are equally abhorrent.4 
Waite's views were echoed by a correspondent to the Observer, who 
also saw the war as one between Communism and Fascism, which "the 
British democracy" would do well to keep away from. In his view, the 
real conflict would be between democracy and the two tyrannies of 
Communism and Fascism. S 
Foreign intervention played some part in creating the image of a 
war of rival ideologies, as the Herald pointed out when it said that, 
in a civil war "so lacking in clear cut antagonisms of principle", 
foreign intervention had turned internecine strife into "a war in 
Spain between two irreconciliable tendencies, Communism and Fascism, 
competing in 
world".6 The 
the political 
involved. Its 
equal infatuation for ideals imperilling the 
Herald had presented several detailed analyses of 
and social background to the war and of the two forces 
comment demonstrated that such a simplification could 
be made even with some understanding of the factionalism and 
complexity of the Spanish situation. 
The National News, while admitting the influence of foreign 
powers on the war, and on perceptions of the war, had rather a 
S7 
different vie\". In its first issue, published in May 1937, was a 
long article discussing the Spanish Civil War. This article rejected 
the view that the war in Spain was a microcosm of European 
ideological differences, at the same time indicating that this 
opinion was popularly held: 
It is customary to say that this is a struggle between 
Fascism and Communism. That is what Russia, on the one 
hand, and Italy and Germany, on the other, would like to 
make it. But primarily it is a civil war. And when it is 
over, if any side has a decisive win, Spain will have a 
Spanish Government - possibly, a dictatorship of either the 
Right or Left.7 
Even though the article rejected Waite's premise, it echoed his 
conviction that the war had nothing to do with "us". It was also a 
tacit admission of the influence of pro-Republican and pro-Francoist 
propaganda and of the appeal of the image of ideological conflict to 
New Zealanders. Clearly, the National News was concerned to promote 
the image of a local war that was purely the business of the nation 
involved. 
A passage in a later article about New Zealand's role in world 
affairs indicated the National News' conviction that it was not in 
the New Zealand tradition to interfere in the concerns of other 
nations. It also revealed that the National News, although it 
advocated non-interference, was not entirely neutral on the issue. 
Headed "Neither Facsist nor Communist", the passage said: 
Our people in Great Britain and in New Zealand do not 
subscribe to either of these two ideologies. At the same 
time we have no right to interfere with - nor should we have 
any desire to alter - any nation's internal politics. 
It was Soviet Russia's attempt to impose Communism on other 
nations that caused Fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany and 
the civil war in Spain. 
We New Zealanders deplore the excesses perpetrated in 
Russia, Italy, Germany and Spain alike. But these excesses 
seem to be inseparable from political, religious and racial 
struggles.S 
The National News was, of course, faithfully following declarations 
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by members of the British Government in its insistence that there 
should be no interference in the political differences of other 
nations. 
heart of 
Communism 
conception 
political 
part. 
But it was also expressing convictions that were at the 
"Non-Interventionist" views the belief that neither 
or Fascism had a place in New Zealand life and the 
of the fairmindedness and superiority of the British 
system, of which New Zealand was seen to be an integral 
Part of the reason for rejection of any identification with the 
war in Spain was simply the inability of New Zealanders, brought up 
under the British Parliamentary system, to understand other forms of 
Government and other political and social systems. It was easy to 
dismiss the Spanish Civil War as the product of uncivilised, 
undemocratic, unBritish, political traditions, in conjunction with a 
Violent, individualistic national temperament. New Zealanders were 
not accustomed to settling party political differences in pitched 
battle; that other nations did so was evidence of their lack of 
advancement, their "foreignness". Discussions of the war that 
emphasised the role of "the Spanish character" in the war served to 
reinforce this particular attitude. Truth, for example, published an 
article in May 1937 that warned that whatever the outcome "[the] hand 
of every Spaniard will be against every other Spaniard". The 
article, which originated from the British United Press, suggested 
that the best scheme might be to split the country into its old 
provincial automonies: "A mediaevil country and a mediaevil people, 
they live in a mediaevil atmosphere and might just as well have 
mediaevil systems of government. 9 The writer expressed disgust 
at the atrocities committed by the rebels and commented that the 
Spanish character had been thoroughly illustrated in Merry de Val's 
justification of Franco. The former Spanish Ambassador to London 
had said that Franco had behaved no worse than the "Reds" and even if 
he had, it would be unfair to consider him as morally only equal to 
his adversaries. 
Reports of atrocities and the general image received of the 
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violence and bitterness of the war were also an alienating factor. 
The Evening Post, which had at first been sympathetic to the Popular 
Front Government, soon suffered a revulsion of feeling largely as a 
result of atrocity stories. The Wellington newspaper had initially 
strongly criticised Franco for an attack on "a legally constituted 
authority, in this case a popularly elected Government" and evinced 
deep suspicion of the "civilisation" Franco claimed to be serving. 
The Evening Post acknowledged that the "Rightists'" fear of extremist 
domination of the Government could not be entirely ignored, but was 
of the opinion that the rebellion itself might have opened the way to 
consolidation of the Left and "the very revolution feared by the 
supporters of the old regime".IO 
The Post's sympathy for the Republican cause was based on a 
perception of the Popular Front Government as moderate, dedicated to 
social reform through constitutional methods and elected "just as the 
present New Zealand Government was, by the free vote of the people at 
the polls".ll Once an apparently more Leftist Government was 
formed under the leadership of Francisco Largo Caballero12 , "the 
Spanish Lenin", the Post did not tender its sympathy so freely. An 
editorial on 7 September 1936 noted that Largo Caballero was 
"recorded just as clearly in favour of dictatorship of the 
proletariat as Franco is recorded for Fascist dictatorship" and hoped 
that the new Prime Minister would abandon any attempt to win Spain 
for his "ruthless programme" in favour of compromise with Franco for 
the sake of peace and humanity.J3 
By 10 September, with no sign of a compromise peace, the Post was 
reconsidering its initial response to the war. Its editorial on that 
date pointed out that the two forces were composed of such 
heterogenous elements that to label the war as a struggle between 
Communism and Fascism was to over-simplify. The paper considered 
that on the Republican side there was no real solidarity on questions 
of principle and was of the opinion that: 
the struggle in Spain bears an unfortunate resemblance to 
the many sanguinary chaotic revolutions for over a century 
in Spanish America, where there has been no prinCiple at 
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stake, nothing but the sordid conflict of rival chieftains 
for power, with the shocking atrocities on both sides, 
characteristic of the present civil war in Spain.14 
No doubt the Evening Post was among those, who, it said, !Thad hoped 
for an era of progress and reform from the advent of the Spanish 
Republic" and whose sympathies had now been alienated by the 
increasing viciousness of the war. This new image of the war as one 
between rival would-be dictators was in its own as over-simplified as 
the Communism versus Fascism image that the Post had criticised. The 
"era of progress and reform" the Post had envisioned was doubtless on 
the Westminster model; when these hopes were dashed the Post was then 
convinced that what was happening in Spain was something alien, far 
less commendable and, in a sense, inexplicable to the New Zealand 
mind. 
Atrocity stories, then, not only fueled the commitment of 
pro-Republicans and pro-Francoists to their respective causes, but 
also played some part in the creation of "Non-Interventionist" 
opinions. The Observer was influenced by atrocity stories to condemn 
both sides and to warn New Zealanders from becoming involved. On 24 
March 1938, the paper reacted with concern to news reports that more 
than 20 New Plymouth men, inspired by Tom Spiller's appeals on behalf 
of the Loyalists, were about to volunteer for service in the 
International Brigades. In the Observer's opinion the men were 
misguided and ill-informed about the situation, for neither side had 
much to commend it: 
without in any way espousing the cause of General Franco, 
whose methods of waging war on civilians must fill everyone 
with horror and repulsion, it is only right in the interests 
of accuracy to point out that the present Loyalist 
Government is the successor to a Republican regime whose 
ruthless methods of governing by terrorism, cruelty, and 
murder, on a scale unsurpassed even in Nazi Germany and 
Soviet Russia, helped to precipitate the present civil 
war. IS 
This variation on the "Non-Interventionist" theme of "a plague on 
both your houses" also indicated the influence of anti-Republican 
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propaganda on some "Non-Interventionist" assessments of the war. 
Truth, which also favoured a "Non-Interventionist" editorial line, 
demonstrated some anti-Communist sentiment as well. In January 1937, 
Truth expressed 
Prime Minister, 
volunteers to 
its disapproval of a Communist Party message to the 
which urged him to make facilities available for 
go to Spain, to send aid to Spain immediately and to 
attempt to persuade the British Government to change its policy. Its 
editorial expressed the hope that if volunteers went to Spain "our 
Reds would be the first to enlist" and questioned Communist's 
portrayal of the Republicans as the defenders of democracy in Spain. 
Was the Bolshevik revolution in Russia constitutional? it asked, and 
did Communism possess a democratic tolerance for individual 
beliefs?16 This editorial provided evidence of the association 
of the Spanish Government's cause with Communism and a consequent 
lack of sympathy with the Loyalist cause. 
However, Truth was not in favour of New Zealanders' espousing 
Franco's cause. An editorial in March 1937, headed "Meddlesome 
Matties", began: 
A good policy in this Spanish business is to watch it from a 
distance, and the sensible person would wish that the 
distance could be much greater. Certainly he or she would 
wish that there was no occasion for sectarian strife. 
However, sundry busybodies in New Zealand have not been 
able to refrain from meddling with something that is not 
their affair, whether they think the Nationalists under 
General Franco are in the right, or the Reds of Madrid and 
Barcelona are pleasant and gentle. 
Although the editorial condemned New Zealand adherents of both sides 
in its opening statement, its subject was the publication in daily 
newspapers in Dunedin and Christchurch of material that might arouse 
ugly "sectarian" controversy by attacking a "respectable religious 
organisation". Obviously, the paper was referring to pro-Republican 
letters about the role of the Catholic Church in Spain. Truth 
considered, in a tone of great moral indignation, that the times of 
sectarian strife were over in New Zealand and that good citizens of 
New Zealand who were adherents of that religion should be protected 
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from people who used the Spanish war as a pretext for "untrue 
attacks" and "cheap and senseless abuse".17 
The editorial was as much an attack on the editors of the two 
daily newspapers as it was 
perhaps, partly an example 
on the letters they printed. It was, 
of Truth's sensational ising an issue to 
score points against other newspapers and gain praise for its defence 
of a religious minority, which, to 
regarded 
typical 
with suspicion and dislike. 
be sure, was in some quarters 
It was also evidence of Truth's 
style of stirring up a "storm in a teacup". The war in Spain 
itself was secondary to the matter, and, indeed, Truth's attitude was 
one of avoidance of the issue in order not to create dissent and 
disturbance in New Zealand. 
"Non-Interventionist" attitudes to the international 
ramifications of the war were less insular, but still limited. In 
the view of "Non-Interventionists", New Zealanders' sale concern over 
the war should be its effect upon Imperial strategy and defence. 
Thus, Fred Waite, having eschewed involvement with the ideological 
issues of the war, went on to say that whatever happened in the 
Mediterranean 
"frontier of 
was important 
defence" for 
to New Zealand because it was the 
New Zealand and Australia. 18 The 
National News, in an article entitled "The Mediterranean Problem -
Its Interest to New Zealanders" said that events in Spain had 
emphasised the 
other power got 
imperilled".19 
involvement in 
need for a strong Britain and warned that "if any 
control of Spain our hold on Gibraltar might be 
The Herald's first editorial on international 
the war was a discussion of the importance of 
Gibraltar to Britain and the necessity of keeping the peninsular 
"inviolate".20 
Given that New Zealand was reliant on Britain for defence and 
that, therefore, New Zealand's first line of defence was in Europe, 
it was not surprising that New Zealanders should pay especial 
attention to this particular aspect of the war's international 
complications. Nor was it unexpected that comment on the 
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international aspects of the Spanish situation should concentrate 
upon British policy. In any case, Britain's major role in the 
international imbroglio surrounding the war made such emphasis, at 
times, unavoidable. It was the nature of the emphasis that 
distinguished "Non-Interventionist" opinions. Discussions of 
international involvement in the war - speculations as to the motives 
for foreign intervention, assessments of Spain's effect on the 
European situation and of the value of the Non-Intervention Agreement 
were based almost entirely upon assumptions about British interests 
and British policy 
"Non-Interventionists" 
and were viewed from that perspective. 
were also distinguished by their faith in the 
of British policy towards the Spanish conflict. wisdom and justice 
Indeed, readers of the Weekly News and the Herald may have found the 
self-congratulatory tone of British superiority a little too much. 
"Non-Interventionists" saw the threat to Britain's (and, by 
definition, New Zealand's) strategic interests in the Mediterranean 
posed by the Spanish Civil War largely in terms of Italian and German 
involvement in the war. William Perry, president of the New Zealand 
Defence League, voiced this fear in the Address in Reply Debate in 
the Legislative Council, on 24 September 1937: 
And if, with the assistance of Italy and Germany Franco and 
his men win the civil war in Spain then we will find a 
Spain, if not Fascist, at any rate under the domination of 
Italy and Germany and then, so far as the British Empire is 
concerned, we will have to consider what will be the 
position of Gibraltar, through which we control the western 
entrance to the Mediterranean.2l 
Daily and weekly newspapers echoed Perry's concern. 22 In the 
first months of the war the primary fear was that Italy or Germany, 
or both, would gain territorial concessions from Franco in return for 
their aid, particularly 
Islands. This concern 
in the strategically important Batearic 
was allayed somewhat by the Anglo-Italian 
"gentlemans agreement", signed in January 1937, in which Mussolini 
pledged that he had no intention of challenging the sovereignty of 
any of the independent Mediterranean states. 23 However, the 
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daily newspapers, in their analyses of the developments in 
international involvement during the course of the war, continued to 
place steady emphasis on Italian (and less often German) desires for 
strategic ascendancy in the Mediterranean. The concept underlying 
much of the newspapers' discussion of this theme, that the civil war 
was but background and excuse for an Italian attempt to challenge 
British naval dominance in the Mediterranean, was enunciated most 
clearly by a correspondent to the National News: 
In your own article you strike the nail on the head when you 
say "If any other power got control of Spain our hold on 
Gibraltar would be imperilled." That is just what Italy is 
out to do to cripple Gibraltar and thereby get a 
stranglehold on Britain's vital trade routes ... unless 
Italy's machinations in Spain can be frustrated she will 
certainly dominate Gibraltar ... 24 
Although the strategic threat received the greatest emphasis in 
daily and weekly newspapers, the dailies with more detailed coverage, 
offered other speculations on foreign powers' motives for involvement 
in the Spanish Civil War. Again, the focus was mainly upon Italian 
and German intervention. There was relatively little comment upon 
Russian aid to the Republican effort. The Herald, in the early 
months of the war, placed an equal emphasis on Russian, German, and 
Italian involvement; its strong anti-Communist sentiment perhaps 
explains this. 25 Other newspapers mentioned Russian involvement 
but did not dwell on it. There was little attempt, therefore, to 
provide detailed analyses of Russian motives. The concept of the war 
as representing an ideological battle between Communism and Fascism, 
voiced at several times by all the newspapers, may have appeared an 
adequate explanation for Russian motives. 
Intervention on the side of Franco was greater, more open and 
more obvious, and, possibly, considered the more dangerous. To begin 
with German, aid to Franco was emphasised as much as Italian 
involvement. The Waikato Times and the Herald noted that German 
involvement was partly based on German industry's need for Spanish 
minerals. 26 The Evening Post offered another possible motive, 
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once it was clear that, although Germany and Italy were acting in 
concert in the NIC, the latter was providing the bulk of the foreign 
manpower in Spain. The Post speculated that Germany was encouraging 
Italy to embroil the western democracies in the Spanish conflict so 
that attention would be diverted away from Germany's expansion into 
Eastern Europe. 27 The Evening Post unravelled more of the 
tangled skein of international affairs for its readers than the other 
newspapers. In October 1937 the paper suggested that Mussolini might 
be hoping by involvement in Spain to aid the Japanese attack on 
China, by averting French and British action. 28 
The Waikato Times expressed disgust that Germany and Italy were 
using the Spanish Civil War as a testing ground for new weapons and 
techniques of warfare. 29 The Times, whose view of the war and 
intervention was infused with a deep concern for human suffering and 
a profound dislike for totalitarian rule, combined the two in its 
bitter contempt for Mussolini's sending his fellow countrymen to die 
in Spain for the sake of national prestige. 30 
Reasons of prestige, diversion, economics, and experiment were, 
however, rather like counterpoints to the two major themes of 
ideology and expansion. The two were, of course, connected. 
Explanations of intervention in terms of ideology did not encompass 
only the view that the hapless Spaniards had been chosen by their 
respective foreign backers as representatives of the forces of 
Communism and Fascism. The ideological explanation also included, 
although often implied rather than stated, the concept of Fascist 
expansionism. Discussions of Italian and German territorial 
ambitions in Spain were necessarily informed by the idea that German 
or Italian 
Fascism, a 
and peace. 
encroachment on Spanish territory was an extension of 
doctrine seen by all the papers as inimical to democracy 
The Waikato Times saw in the German and Italian recognition of 
Franco "the alignment of authoritarian states against the democratic 
nations; the further restriction of those bounds within which the 
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will of the people is the authority for governance"3l; the 
Herald, in March 1937, spoke of Mussolini's "obsession to spread the 
Fascist doctrine" .32 Yet, neither the Herald nor the Waikato 
Times clearly placed intervention in Spain in a wider context of 
Fascist aggression. However, on two occasions, the Evening Post, 
otherwise a champion of Britain's non-intervention policy, presented 
an analysis of foreign intervention in aid of Franco that came closer 
to the pro-Republican perspective than it did to "Non-
Interventionism". 
In July 1937, the Post "-larned that a precedent had been set in 
Spain; the transformation of a civil war into an ideological battle 
by foreign powers might happen elsewhere. 33 And in March 1938 
the Post expressed its conviction that something should be done to 
stop the "new technique" of interference in the internal affairs of 
independent countries or more would fall to Nazi-Fascism; tina longer 
does anyone suppose 
of war 
the same 
that the process of acquisition without 
declaration 
Nevertheless, 
will end 
editorial 
in Spain, Austria or China". 
also asserted that Spain was more 
important to Britain and the Empire than Austria or Czechoslovakia 
because it was situated on the line of British communications, an 
example of the narrow focus with which the Post and other 
"Non-Interventionists" generally regarded the war in Spain. 34 
For "Non-Interventionists", the belief that Fascist expansionism 
posed a threat to British interests and to peace did not lead, as it 
did in the case of pro-Republicanism, to the view that the British 
Government should support the cause of the Spanish Government. 
Rather, it was used to justify Britain's non-intervention policy and, 
indeed, appeasement in general. 
contradictions in such an attitude. 
There were some apparent 
The National News' assertion 
that the war in Spain was essentially a civil war and its great 
confidence in Franco's claims that no other power would hold sway in 
Spain35 contrasted with its concern that Italy was using the 
civil war to encroach upon Britain's Mediterranean interests. In 
"Non-Interventionist" terms, however, this was not a contradiction, 
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but simply adherence to the British point of view. In its article on 
"The Mediterranean Problem", the National News pointed out that it 
was elementary British policy to desire the friendship of whoever was 
in control in Spain, and quoted Anthony Eden's statement that 
disinterestedness in Spain's form of Government should not be taken 
to mean disinterestedness where British interests around Spain were 
concerned. 36 
The "Non-Interventionist" ability to make distinctions between 
the "internal", Spanish, values of the \var and the "European", 
international, values was most evident in their support of the policy 
of non-intervention. In this area, most of the comments came from 
the daily newspapers, and a few from weekly papers. The National 
News did not provide its readers with any analysis or defence of 
non-intervention. Its only reference specifically to the NIA was a 
small item in July 1938, which quoted some remarks made by Anthony 
Eden in defence of non-intervention to the effect that intervention 
merely prolonged the conflict and might encourage the spread of the 
war from Spain into the rest of Europe. 37 
Eden's arguments were also the basis for support of non-
intervention by the newspapers. On 4 August 1936, the Evening Post 
opined that British and French neutrality was correct in terms of 
both international law and "fair play" to a nation attempting to 
settle its fate,38 and later that same month the Waikato Times 
asserted that Non-Intervention was the "only reasonable 
course".39 The WeekJy News, also in August, congratulated the 
British Government on its "straightforward decisive pronouncement" 
that the sale of war materials to either side would be prohibited, 
but regretted that Italy and Germany appeared reluctant to take the 
same step.40 September saw the Otago Daily Times and the New 
Zealand Herald contending that even a partially effective agreement 
on non-intervention would help prevent a general war growing from the 
Spanish situation. 41 
It was 
partially 
soon obvious 
effective. By 
that non-intervention was only going to be 
December 1936, the newspapers were agreed 
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that the NIC was powerless to prevent intervention in Spain. 42 
Over the period of the war, frequent reference was made to the 
insincerity of some powers' commitment to non-intervention, their 
stonewalling of proposals that might be effective and, eventually, 
the hopelessness 
of good faith. 
of preventing intervention in the face of this lack 
By January 1939 the Otago Daily Times was using the 
term "farce" to describe non-intervention, which was a favourite 
epithet of pro-Republicans. 43 
The newspapers also acknowledged the one-sided operation of the 
agreement signed by the European powers. The Herald, in February 
1937 even went so far as to point out the irony that the Government 
could have won in the early months of the war, had it not been for 
aid to the rebels and the prevention of the Government's purchasing 
war materials under the NIA.44 The Waikato Times said, as the 
war drew to a close, that there had been "a large measure of 
injustice in the whole situation"45 and the Evening Post 
admitted, in June 1938, that the policy of non-intervention had 
"worked out one-sidedly for Spain".46 
Nevertheless, the newspapers still defended non-intervention as 
an expedient solution that had prevented the war in Spain from 
involving the rest of Europe in armed conflict. This view was best 
expressed by the Evening Post, in July 1937, in the editorial that 
discussed the 
non-intervention 
difference between the 
and the "European values". 
"Spanish values" of 
It declared that, while 
the former were hotly debated, 
factions in Spain gain or lose 
gains by an expedient designed 
door".47 The Herald even said 
the latter were simpler: "Whether 
by non-intervention policy Europe 
to keep the war wolf from Europe's 
that "the underlying principle of 
non-intervention is the localising of the conflict"; thus, implying 
that as long as the warfare was confined to Spain, it did not matter 
what happened there. 48 The paper later noted that the NrC might 
have served as a valuable means by which nations' spokesmen could 
"let off steam", evidently suggesting that, otherwise, the acrimony 
would have taken form as further intervention or even general 
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war. 49 Given the sense of impending or barely avoided war that 
informed many newspaper editorials on the Spanish Civil War (and 
other international crises), it was possibly not surprising that 
these newspapers should place such emphasis on the international 
implications of the war. Their view might be called the "peace at 
any price" assessment of the NIC. 
Defence of non-intervention was, in effect, defence of British 
policy. The Herald's comment, in November 1936, on German and 
Italian recognition of Franco indicated this assumption of the 
primacy of British influence in European affairs. The paper 
considered the two powers' recognition of Franco a "grave step", 
which constituted "moral intervention", in that it implied an 
insurgent victory and might herald more active and open intervention 
on their behalf. The editorial placed as much significance on the 
fact that Italy and Germany had pledged non-intervention to "powers 
other than Spain" (presumably Britain and France) as it did on the 
Spanish Government's legitimate right to protest to the League of 
in October, the Herald had said that British Nations. 48 Earlier, 
Foreign Office efforts were "at the moment almost the only hope of 
preventing Spain from becoming a general area of Fascist and 
Communist antagonisms".49 
It must be pointed out that generally the Spanish policies of the 
two Western democracies, Britain and France were treated as one 
policy, with Britain being regarded as the pre-eminent partner. This 
was particularly true of discussions of non-intervention, where 
France and Britain were seen as acting in concert, as were Germany 
and Italy, The assumption of Britain's dominance in the partnership 
was not entirely the result of Anglocentrism on the part of the 
newspapers, but rested in a large part on the facts of the 
situation. However, often the newspapers' expression of Britain's 
status as the major democratic power, and the tone of these comments, 
was influenced by their allegiance to the "Mother Country". There 
was some acknowledgement of France's particular interest in Franco's 
defeat so that there would not be another Fascist state on French 
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borders, and its strategic needs in the Mediterranean, but these 
concerns took second place to those of Britain. The Herald, which 
displayed the strongest identification with British policy, also 
demonstrated most clearly its conception that France was a junior and 
somewhat unreliable partner in the western democratic alliance. On 
two occasions when the unequal observation of non-intervention had 
led the French Government to threaten to relax control over its 
Pyrenean borders with Spain, the Herald commented that only Britain's 
influence had prevented such a step.50 
No blame was attached to Britain for the failure of the NIC to 
prevent intervention, and Britain's continued support of the NIC was 
defended as the course of wisdom and justice. Britain was seen to 
be, in the words of the Otago Daily Times," strong against the 
enemies of peace tl .51 The Waikato Times celebrated the British 
Government's "steady adherence to principle"52 and the Evening 
Post made it clear that it regarded the NIC as merely another arm of 
British diplomacy when it praised the Committee for refusing to 
become involved in the "fascist-communist holy war" being waged in 
Spain. 53 
One assumption behind this support of non-intervention was that 
the alternative was for Britain and France to take up arms, not only 
to prevent interference in Spain by Germany and Italy, but also in 
defence of the Spanish Government. The newspapers assumed that 
British policy-makers shared their distaste for Franco's politics, 
methods of warfare, and allies. Curiously enough, it was the Herald, 
whose dislike of the Spanish Government was obviously greater than 
its dislike of Franco, which gave the clearest expression of this 
view. In November 1936, the paper pointed out that Britain could 
find both political and strategic reasons to support the Spanish 
Government. The Herald said that a victory for the Government that 
began as a Liberal Left coalition, "before the Marxists had their way 
with it", may have seemed to democratic people the only chance of 
averting Fascist domination of Spain. Britain's Mediterranean 
interests might be threatened if Italian aid played a large part in a 
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victory for Franco. But, it added, Britain was neutral because it 
cared so much about the fate of Europe. 54 
The implication was, then, that Britain was acting with great 
restraint in the interests of peace. The image of Britain as the 
peacemaker of Europe carried with it a certain measure of moral 
superiority, contrasting as it did with the headlong aggression of 
the dictatorships. Britain's response to the blockade of Bilbao was 
used as an example of this self-restraint. All the newspapers 
pointed out that Britain had foregone its right to protect its 
shipping because to 
precipitate war. 55 
supply ships at 
do so would be to breach the NIA and perhaps 
The Herald's insistence that, by leaving 
the three-mile limit, Britain was not only 
maintaining the non-intervention pact but still "succouring the 
needy" was rather stretching a point. 56 
There were, however, indications that the newspapers were not 
entirely comfortable with the expedient methods used by the British 
Government in its championship of peace. In July 1937, Truth 
hastened to reassure readers about the British Government's attitude 
towards Franco. The paper claimed that, although the British 
Government appeared to be handling Franco with "kid gloves", there 
was no loss of prestige in this. Franco, it said, was a comparative 
nonentity on the international scene and British prestige would be 
more damaged by taking his provocations seriously (with specific 
reference to the blockade of Bilbao).57 
In 1937, the daily newspapers were circumspect, but an air of 
gloom pervaded discussions of the prospect of the Non-Intervention 
Pact's receiving the full cooperation of all signatory nations. The 
Nyon Conference on submarine attacks on shipping in the Mediterranean 
was greeted with unmistakeable relief. The newspapers' comments 
revealed their previous unease at the direction of European affairs. 
The conference and the Nyon Agreement seemed to the Herald a 
"refreshing departure" by Britain and France in "refusing to be held 
back by Italian arguments any longer",58 the Waikato Times felt 
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that it denoted a "marked change" in the attitude of the Western 
democracies59 
chance for 
and the 
Britain 
Evening Post greeted the conference as a 
to pick up lost leadership in Europe. 60 
Comments by the Post indicated some of the uncertainty the paper had 
felt about British policy over Spain, a concern undoubtedly shared by 
other newspapers. The Post felt that the defeat of the League over 
Italy's Abyssinian adventure and the frustration of the proper 
operation of non-intervention had reflected on Britain and France and 
damaged their prestige. Smaller powers had developed a feeling that 
the democracies could do nothing against the dictatorships and were 
lImagnetised" away from the democracies and to\vard the dictatorships. 
The Nyon Agreement, however, would be an effective counter to "the 
Italo-German threatening policy".6l 
Yet, the Nyon Agreement ultimately had relatively little to do 
with foreign intervention in Spain, except that Italian "piracy" in 
the Mediterranean had arisen from such intervention. The agreement 
dealt solely with the threat to British and French Mediterranean 
interests, in isolation from the central issue of foreign involvement 
in Spain. The Otago Daily Times indicated its awareness of this 
distinction when it said of the Nyon Agreement, that, "unlike the 
efforts to secure non-intervention in Spain, this Mediterranean 
patrol promises to be effective". 62 Perhaps the Evening Post I s 
leader writer was lightheaded with relief when he wrote that while 
the Nyon Agreement: 
makes international history and perhaps international law 
the United States [policy on the Japanese attack on China] 
is confined to a barren plan of embargo, the lash of which 
may fallon the wrong shoulders.63 
This description could equally well have applied to Britain's 
non-intervention policy, but the Evening Post did not seem to see the 
irony of its statement. It clearly regarded the halting of 
intervention in Spain as less important than the maintenance of 
British interests in the Mediterranean. The Post considered 
Chamberlain's approach to Italy in late 1937, with the view to 
reaching 
pointed 
of the 
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an accord, "the most important event of 1937".64 It 
out that criticism of a British alliance with Italy because 
latter's conquest of Abyssinia and involvement in Spain did 
not take into account the danger of having "a permanent enemy in the 
Mediterranean".65 
Britain's concern for peace and need to maintain her strategic 
position was, then, justification for the expedient methods upon 
which a good deal of Britain's policy was seen to be based. Comments 
on Anthony Eden's resignation clearly expressed the newspapers' views 
on the direction of British foreign policy. By January 1938, Eden 
was convinced that negotiations with Italy should be delayed until 
there was some evidence of the sincerity of Italian intentions with 
regard to the withdrawal of volunteers from Spain. Chamberlain, on 
the other hand, was determined that Anglo-Italian negotiations should 
begin without delay, even without assurances about Italian 
involvement in Spain as a quid pro quo for British de jure 
recognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia. Eden resigned on 
20 February. The Herald, the Evening Post and the Otago Daily Times 
were 
while 
felt 
all of the opinion 
Chamberlain's stand 
that Eden's views, 
that Eden's position was one of idealism, 
was realistic. 66 The Otago Daily Tjmes 
while expressing the average Briton's 
distaste for the dubious diplomacy of some European states, were not 
statesmanlike. 67 The Herald even blamed upon Eden's 
"uncompromising" attitude the element of uncertainty that was causing 
international leadership to "slip from Britain's hands".68 Here, 
again, was demonstrated the "Non-Interventionist" conviction that 
Spain could be sacrificed to a greater cause, either peace or 
Imperial defence strategies. 
Even after the Nyon Agreement had proved to be an ineffective 
deterrent to Italian and German encroachments in Spain and elsewhere, 
the qualms the newspapers may have felt about appeasement over Spain 
did not harden into criticism. Loyalty to the "Mother Country" was 
still paramount. When, to the injury of submarine attacks in 1937, 
was added the insult of aerial bombing of shipping, in 1938, the 
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newspapers rushed to the defence of Chamberlain's policy. Only the 
Waikato Times counselled retaliation in the form of shooting down a 
plane or sinking a submarine as an object lesson to "those who will 
adopt these illegal courses".69 The Times was outraged that 
British ships were being destroyed by foreign airmen whose 
Governments had agreed to observe non-intervention. Specific 
indignation at an attack on British ships rather, than a more general 
desire for firmer British policy towards the dictators seemed to 
motivate the Times' outburst. The incidents gave the Evening Post 
another chance to reiterate its view that British policy so far had 
managed to avert war although it admitted that the policy had 
"landed" the British Government with inconsistencies. 70 The 
Herald felt that it was understandable that British Members of 
Parliament should be calling for retaliation against the "barefacedH 
attacks on shipping but considered that a policy of patience was the 
only way to keep the NIC from collapsing completely. So eager was 
the Herald to defend the British Government's policy that it 
introduced a line of argument more common to pro-Francoist 
propaganda. The paper stated that Lloyds Shipping register provided 
prima facie evidence in support of Franco's claim that many of the 
ships attacked were only nominally British.71 Indeed the tone of 
the editorial was such to suggest that "profiteers" had registered 
their ships as British deserved to have them sunk, because the ship's 
registration had caused the British Government so much embarassment 
and trouble. 
In defending the British Government's "inaction" in response to 
the bombing of shipping, the Herald also voiced another view of the 
British Government's policy that was often implied in the newspaper's 
comments. The Herald pointed out that "every fresh demonstration of 
patience adds weight to the justification of forcible action when it 
finally happens".72 The Evening Post had earlier expressed the 
view that: 
the peace has been kept only because the Nazi-Fascist hammer 
was striking on an anvil of democratic rubber - the rubber 
of democratic patience, meeting the hammer of Nazi-Fascist 
aggression. The rubber is now hardening ... 73 
105 
Yet, the newspapers also revealed their awareness of another 
reason for the policies of expediency that rather belied their 
confidence in Britain's willingness to act against the dictators if 
necessary. The pace of British rearmament had lagged behind that of 
the dictatorships and the newspapers were only too aware of this 
fact. However, it was also used in defence of Britain's policies, 
usually in the form of attacks on British Labour Party critics. 
Those who were calling for firmness against the dictators, said the 
Herald, were the same people who had earlier called for a pacifist 
policy and for disarmament, thus creating the need for an appeasement 
policy.74 The problem of British military strength vis a vis 
that of the dictators did not receive as much attention as other more 
passive methods of averting war, possibly because too close an 
appraisal of the situation would have raised unwelcome fears as to 
the outcome of a war and also because of the fervent hope that 
Britain's diplomatic methods and its international standing would 
stave off the approaching conflict. 
Defence of Britain's Spanish policy sometimes led to 
inconsistencies, much as the policy itself did. An example of this 
was the Herald's opinion on the ratification of the Anglo-Italian 
Agreement. The Herald, in three editorials, expressed its conviction 
that Britain should not and would not break down on the "settlement 
of the Spanish question" that was a prerequisi te of 
ratification. 75 To agree to ratify the pact without an Italian 
withdrawal from Spain, would be an "abject surrender" by Britain to 
Italy and it would be "equally weak and wrong" to endorse a 
subterfuge by 
When Britain 
which Italian troops were only nominally withdrawn. 
did ratify the pact after the withdrawal of only 10,000 
Italian troops due for leave the Herald was left in a rather 
uncomfortable position. Its editorial on the ratification of the 
pact made no mention of the circumstances of the ratification; it 
merely commented that criticism in the British Parliament was on the 
grounds of Italy's sincerity rather than to do with the spirit of the 
agreement, which was "a pillar of peace". The bulk of the editorial 
merely discussed the provisions of the agreement rather than the 
Spanish question. 76 
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The Herald's misconception of what the British Government would 
or would not do undoubtedly stemmed from an "ideal" view of the 
British Government, partly expressed in the image of Britain as the 
champion of peace. The Britain that many New Zealanders were 
familiar with was not Britain the appeaser, but Britain the defender 
of the weak and upholder of the rule of law. Thus, the discomfort 
with the policies of expediency. "Non-Interventionist" newspapers' 
support of British policy was, in a sense, a mixture of idealism and 
realism. Their concern for British prestige was based not only on a 
conviction of British superiority per se, but also on the 
understanding that British strength was New Zealand's safety against 
war. Defence of British non-intervention policy on the grounds of 
its abandoment of self-interest and great care for the peace of 
Europe \vas matched, if not complemented, by comments that clearly 
showed that the fate of Britain and its particular spheres of 
influence were the major concern. It was in New Zealand's interest 
that Britain did not go to war over Spain, since such a war would 
jeopardise its Dominions at the end of the Mediterranean route. 
The Herald, as might be expected, gave strongest expression to 
the view that Spain was not important enough for Britain to go to war 
over. In March 1938, discussing the Anschluss, the paper noted that 
the real reason for agitation in Europe was Franco's latest 
offensive, not the invasion of Austria, but that there was no reason 
for Britain to go to war in Europe. France, the paper suggested, was 
concerned at being surrounded by Fascist powers, but the fact that 
France and Russia might prove to have "backed the wrong horse" in 
Spain was no reason for Britain to "plunge her lion's paw into the 
flames to pullout French chestnuts".77 
This view was echoed by the National News in November 1938, in an 
article defending Britain's appeasement policy: 
Why do some people suggest that Great Britain be the 
policeman of the world and actively interfere in every fight 
that takes place? 
Why should the men of Great Britain and of Australia 
and New Zealand be expected to go and lay down their lives 
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because some Englishmen or New Zealanders are strongly 
sympathetic with Communism or Fascism?78 
Both loyalty to Britain and self interest, then, influenced 
"Non-Interventionist" assessments of international involvement in 
Spain and British policy towards Spain. Not surprisingly, British 
and French recognition of Franco at the end of the war was greeted 
with approval on the grounds of strategic interests and 
realism. 79 
"Realism" \-ms also one of the grounds upon which were based 
"Non-Interventionist" criticisms of the New Zealand Labour 
Government's policy towards the Spanish Civil War. In this instance, 
"realism" referred not only to support of British non-intervention 
policy as opposed to the "idealism" of the Labour Government's 
commitment to collective security and the League. The term was also 
used by "Non-Interventionists" to describe their view of New 
Zealand's role in the Empire and world affairs. Most of the 
criticisms of the New Zealand Labour Government's attitude came from 
the National Party in Parliament, sometimes with specific reference 
to the Government's Spanish policy and sometimes in more general 
discussions of its foreign policy. The National Party's views were 
echoed intermittently by the daily and weekly newspapers and by some 
correspondents to newspapers. Indeed, discussion of Labour's policy 
with regard to Spain was almost the only instance when newspaper 
correspondence columns featured letters about Spain that were not 
part of the ongoing pro-Francoist - pro-Republican debate. 
Support of non-intervention presupposed disapproval of Labour's 
attitude to the Spanish crisis. As the British Government did not 
share Labour's confidence 
"Non-Interventionists". The 
United and Reform parties, 
in collective security, neither did 
National Party's predecessors, the 
had been dubious about the value of the 
League80 and, by the time of the Parliamentary debate on the 
League 
little 
of Nations 
faith in 
Sanctions in May 1936, Opposition members evinced 
the League. The imposition of sanctions against 
Italy had failed to prevent the conquest of Abyssinia; therefore, 
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they said, the League could not be relied upon as an effective check 
to aggression. Former Coalition Prime Minister, George Forbes, made 
a forceful statement that indicated National's dissatisfaction with 
the League: 
Not one nation is prepared to rely upon the League under 
existing conditions. It has been tried as a peacemaker and 
as a preserver of the peace and it has been found wanting. 
It has been proved to be a delusion and a snare. It has 
been condemned as a farce. The time has come to make that 
candid admission and to seek to devise a better and a more 
effective way of preventing bloodthirsty wars of 
aggression.81 
The Herald considered that the Spanish Government's appeal to the 
League in September 1936 would be "as effective as whistling in the 
dark"; the Otago Daily Times shared its view. 82 "Non-
Interventionists" used the Spanish Civil War as another example of 
evidence of Labour's "futile 
as the Observer put it. 83 In 
June 1937, the Evening Post commented that New Zealand Labour leaders 
should take a warning from the German shelling of Almeria in 
retaliation for the alleged bombing of the German ship the 
the failure of the League and as 
devotion to an impractical ideal", 
"Deutschland". The incident, said the Post, showed the breakdown of 
a "collective policing system" and, thereby, "the difference between 
police work in a democracy and international police work".84 The 
Otago Daily Times was not impressed by Jordan's suggestion that Spain 
should be placed under a League mandate, for, it said, in the 
unlikely event of the Spanish combatants agreeing to such a measure, 
the League would be incapable of enforcing it. 8S 
In the view of "Non-Interventionists", the British Empire and not 
the League was "the strongest force for peace in the world".86 
National Member of Parliament for Waitomo, Walter Broadfoot, said 
during the debate on the Imperial Conference, in September 1937: 
The League of Nations did not save Abyssinia, it has not 
saved Spain and it is not saving China. It would not save 
us from a major conflagration here if it were not for the 
strength of British arms. We in this country exist entirely 
by the goodwill and protection of Britain and that is a 
point we should never forget in our negotiations with her.S7 
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"Non-Interventionists" considered that Labour Government's 
advocacy of League action over Spain was not only unrealistic, but 
disloyal. A dependent had no right to question the policy of a 
protector. Such an attitude was also dangerous. Since "Non-
Interventionists" saw the British Government's policy of 
non-intervention (and appeasement in general) as the best method of 
preserving 
aggression 
Observer 
peace, Labour's insistence on firm action against 
was regarded as a 
fulminated against 
policy that would lead to war. 
"the persistence of Mr Jordan 
The 
in 
expressing at Geneva a viewpoint out of sympathy with the general 
British policy" and went on to say: 
the policy has been adopted with only one end in view, the 
preservation of peace. Peace at any price is something, 
which in other days, long before there was ever any prospect 
of their becoming Cabinet Ministers; some of the present 
Cabinet advocated with considerable enthusiawsm. Yet Mr 
Jordan at Geneva is made the mouthpiece of an attitude 
which, if taken seriously, might lead to war ... New Zealand 
seeks to ignore realities and shriek defiance at the 
dictators, but if the dictators responded with menaces New 
Zealand 8&ould have to run for protection to the Mother 
Country. 
A similar attitude was expressed by F.W. Doidge, later to become 
the National Party's spokesman on foreign affairs, when he accused 
Jordan of wanting to involve Britain in a European war, after 
Jordan's abstention from voting on the League resolution to abandon 
non-intervention. 89 
"Non-Interventionists" pointed out that New Zealand's distance 
made it easy, and, therefore, more disloyal, to advocate a policy for 
which Britain would bear the brunt and New Zealand escape 
"comparatively free".90 However, concern that Britain should not 
become involved in a European war was not entirely based on 
solicitude for the sufferings of the "Mother Country". New 
Zealanders were aware that, if Britain went to war in Europe, its 
ability to defend its Pacific Dominions would be weakened. Thus, the 
Weekly News approved a resolution passed at the Imperial Conference 
in 1937 that "Britain and the Empire should not be embroiled in 
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quarrels arising from the bombing of the Deutschland and the shelling 
of Almeria", The Weekly News felt that it was desirable that the 
Dominions support "to the limits of their influence, Britain's 
service to peace".9l The Evening Post considered that the 
Empire's strength was New Zealand's safety and that New Zealand 
should play its part in maintaining that strength. 92 
"Non-Interventionists" argued that in such a volatile European 
situation the Empire must show itself to be united because potential 
aggressors would be ready to exploit any weakness, in much the same 
manner as Malcolm MacDonald's warning to Jordan,93 Labour's 
stand was seen as an embarrassment to Britain and a threat to the 
security of the Empire. 94 K.J. Holyoake's question in 
Parliament, in September 1937, about Jordan's suggestion of a League 
mandate for 
belief that 
Empire. 95 
Spain, was aimed at demonstrating the National Party's 
New Zealand was out of step with the rest of the 
It was on the grounds of Empire unity that the Opposition 
indicted the Government's handling of foreign affairs, in the Want of 
Confidence Amendment to the Address in Reply at the opening of 
Parliament in July 1938. Clause 6 of the Want of Confidence 
Amendment stated that the Government's direction of external policy 
was tla direct threat to the solidarity of the Empire at a time when a 
united stand for world peace on a basis of strength and security is 
more necessary than ever."96 The leader of the Opposition, Adam 
Hamilton, later said that the unity of the Empire was "never really 
in question until this Government came into office".97 
Accusations of disloyalty to the Empire and to Britain were, of 
course, convenient sticks with which to beat a Socialist Government, 
especially in 1938, an election year. The National News, in June 
1938, said that 
The spectacle 
Geneva, taking 
and France, is 
sick.98 
of Mr Jordan, as New Zealand's spokesman at 
sides with Russia as against Great Britain 
calculated to make New Zealanders feel 
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The Otago Dailv Times agreed. 99 Much earlier, after Jordan's 
first speech at the League on Spain in December 1936, Truth had made 
insinuations about Labour's policy. The paper said that it was 
itself satisfied that Jordan's remarks had stemmed from his 
conviction (born of Labour views) that the Spanish Government was 
constitutionally 
remarks would 
elected. However, it was concerned that Jordan's 
be misconstrued and that he would be accused of having 
Communist sentiments. lOO 
"Non-Interventionist" views, nevertheless, revealed the way some 
New Zealanders regarded New Zealand's place in world affairs. Their 
concern for New Zealand's "disloyalty" to the Empire went much deeper 
than the practical repercussions of such action. At the heart of 
"Non-Interventionist" objections to the Labour Government's foreign 
policy 
in the 
was an image of New Zealand as a dependent and junior partner 
Empire, its place in the world defined by its relations with 
Britain and the rest of the Empire. It was a view that, as Keith 
Sinclair has put it, "seemed not to appreciate that, within the 
British Commonwealth, loyalty to the Crown was not incompatible with 
an independent outlook in world affairs".101 Sinclair was 
speaking of the 1920s but his remarks could equally have applied to 
"Non-Interventionists" in the late 1930s. 
The National News considered that New Zealand had a part to play 
in the world, but solely as a member of the British Empire, for it 
saw membership of the Empire as the reason that New Zealand was 
affected by world events. 102 New Zealand's role did not include 
making foreign policy decisions. In June 1938, an article on foreign 
policy and defence asserted: 
the defence of New Zealand is really the defence of the 
British Empire ... As we have decided upon a defence policy 
for the British Empire, it follows that the Empire should 
have one foreign policy.103 
A month later, another article entitled "New Zealand's foreign 
policy" said, "It is no use talking about a foreign policy unless a 
ll2 
nation has some offensive and defensive strength to implement that 
foreign policy. ,,104 The article went on to discuss British 
foreign policy. 
"Non-Interventionists", then, saw no need for an independent 
foreign policy for New Zealand and, indeed, felt it was presumptuous 
of the Labour Government to challenge British views. The Otago Daily 
Times objected to what it saw as Jordan's support for the abandonment 
of non-intervention, in May 1938, on the grounds of New Zealand's 
status as a weaker, junior partner in the Empire. It found "little 
satisfaction to be derived from this illustration of New Zealand's 
determination to make its small voice heard in the Council of 
nations tl • 105 The Observer thought it "almost comical that New 
Zealand, like a small and insignificant puppy, should be trying to 
assert herself in this fashion".106 
The National Party reiterated this theme in Parliament. Mr 
Broadfoot considered that New Zealand was "too far from the vortex to 
have any great 
National Party 
foreign affairs 
knowledge of 
have any faith 
of the Labour 
the situation. 11108 Nor did 
in the experience or knowledge 
Cabinet or its representative 
London. F.W. Doidge gave his opinion of Jordan in early 1939 
May I suggest to the Prime Minister that it really is time 
he asked Mr Jordan to stay away from Geneva. On more than 
one occasion Mr Jordan has dropped a brick at Geneva. He 
was the catspaw of Russia when the door of the League was 
slammed in the face of Italy. We all remember the famous 
incident when Mr Jordan caused Mr Anthony Eden so much 
anxiety Mr Jordan knows nothing about foreign politics; 
Mr Jordan has not been trained in diplomacy; Mr Jordan knows 
nothing about the intrigues and feuds of Europe ... My 
contention is that to send Mr Jordan to Geneva, to that 
centre of intrigue and doubledealings and doublecrossings is 
just like throwing cat's meat to a tiger. 109 
the 
of 
in 
The British Government on the other hand were wise men, experienced 
in diplomacy and the ways of Europe. 110 The Opposition Member 
for Patea, H.G. Dickie, thought that New Zealand need not have its 
own seat at the League; having to go "very largely the way Britain 
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could be adequately represented by the British went", it 
delegates. III 
Statute of 
The Herald, in a similar vein, considered that the 
Westminster was not relevant at Geneva, where continued 
collaboration was 
representative, W. 
desirable. 112 
Endean, who 
The National Party's Parnell 
believed that if Britain was 
"maintained in a position of strength and might ... the whole world 
can look forward to the dawn of peace and civilisation", went even 
further: 
it may be, I think that we are too early in New Zealand 
in obtaining true national status. In the Government of 
Britain at the present time we have a body of men of 
experience, character, justice and determination, and they 
would be able to bring to bear such a wise guidance as a 
young country like New Zealand is unable to obtain from its 
advisors. A real veto on our legislation reposed in the 
hands of the Governor-General would be all to the good.113 
Of course, had his own party been in power, Mr Endean may not have 
been so eager to advocate total legislative subordinance to the 
British Government. Nevertheless, Endean's opinion was only a more 
extreme statement of the attitude that informed "Non-Interventionist" 
thinking, that New Zealand was but an adjunct of Britain, totally 
defined by its part in the Empire. The Weekly News perhaps expressed 
this feeling best when, in 1939, it applauded Michael Savage's 
assertion that New Zealand would be found at Britain's side if 
Britain were in trouble. The Weekly News regarded this statement as 
expressing the feelings of most New Zealanders, born out of "deep 
sentiment and enlightened self-interest". The paper felt that New 
Zealand could well give the lead to other Dominions in this matter, 
by stating what it was prepared to do in support of Britain. It took 
pride in the fact that New Zealand could take such an unequivocal 
stand, unlike Canada or South Africa, compelled by racial differences 
to qualify their declarations, and whose leaders "might be glad to 
define their attitude as downrightly as Mr Savage can do."114 
In their criticism of the Labour Government's independent stand, 
their insistence that New Zealand should not weaken the Empire, and 
their conviction that Britain knew best, "Non-Interventionists" 
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illustrated J.~. Findaly's contention that New Zealanders were bound 
by ghostly loyalties to an idealised image of Britain. "Non-
Interventionists" were convinced that in considering New Zealanders 
as Britons first they were speaking for the "consensus of opinion of 
a great many ~ew Zealanders". 11S The Herald was sure that the 
Labour Government's memorandum on reform of the League Covenant and 
Jordan's independent stand at Geneva could not be regarded "as in all 
respects representative of general opinion in this country" .1 16 
If this were indeed so, then the influence of "Non-Interventionist" 
opinions provides one explanation for the lack of interest in the 
Spanish Civil War displayed by the majority of New Zealanders. What 
connection had they with a war in a country they knew little about, 
fought by a people with whom they had nothing in common and 
complicated by ideological passions with which they wanted nothing to 
do? And, therefore, why should their Government become involved in 
the issue? 
Yet "Non-Interventionists" were not advocating an isolationist 
view, but Imperial insularity. Their view of the world outside, and 
of New Zealand's role in it was bounded by the bonds of Empire. 
Belief in the superiority of the British democratic system influenced 
their assessment of events in Spain, and, together with loyalty to 
the "Mother Country" and implicit faith in the wisdom of British 
leaders led them to support of Britain's non-intervention policy. 
The strength of this faith in Britain was demonstrated by the fact 
that even the Grey River Argus, a Labour daily newspaper, was 
convinced (at least until Eden's resignation) that British policy was 
correct;117 and even within the League of Nations Union there 
were those who considered that Britain's non-intervention policy 
should not be criticised. 118 
In some 
pro-Francoism. 
pro-Francoist 
Interventionist" 
respects, 
The 
view of 
"Non-Interventionism" came close to 
Herald 
the 
combined a gradually developing 
forces in Spain with a "Non-
attitude to the international aspects of the 
war. 119 The National News' contention that the war in Spain was 
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primarily a civil war, and that Franco would never allow the Italians 
or Germans to dominate Spain, was also a favourite argument of 
pro-Francoists. 
criticisms of 
Catholic pro-Francoists sometimes used similar 
the Labour Government's policy. The major difference 
lay in assessments of the international ramifications of the war and 
in the strong support or Britain's policy, displayed by "Non-
Interventionists". 
In a sense, "Non-Interventionism" was the true opposite of both 
pro-Francoism and pro-Republicanism, in its rejection of partisanship 
over the war. Both pro-Francoists and pro-Republicans saw the fate 
of Spain itself and events in Spain as significant for New 
Zealanders; "Non-Interventionists" dismissed this view in favour of 
a narro\" focus on Empire concerns. For "Non-Interventionists", the 
war was not a paradigm, but a symbol of the dangers and disarray of a 
world outside the Imperial network. Nevertheless, the most obvious 
and major differences were between "Non-Interventionists" and 
pro-Republicans. "Non-Interventionists" rejected the 
internationalism of the Labour Government and of pro-Republicans in 
favour of a policy of limited Imperialist self-interest; in so doing 
they also 
Zealand as 
affairs 
rejected New Zealand nationalism the concept of New 
an independent nation with its own judgement in world 
and advocated a national attitude of dependence on, and 
identification with, Britain. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ANTI-COMMUNIST CRUSADE: 
PRO-FRANCOIST OPINIONS IN NEW ZEALAND 
Support in New Zealand for the Spanish rebels was largely 
confined 
as a 
to the Catholic Church, which regarded the Spanish Civil War 
battle between the forces of Christian, or Catholic, 
civilisation and those of atheistic Communist barbarism. There is 
little evidence that many outside the Church espoused Franco's 
cause. In a few cases, anti-Communism led to an acceptance of some 
pro-Francoist views. Notably, the New Zealand Herald presented 
editorial analyses of the causes of the war that coincided with the 
Catholic "Communist plot" version. The National News also published 
some small items and comments that indicated a certain degree of 
sympathy with the rebels' anti-Communist propaganda. However, 
neither publication wholeheartedly embraced pro-Francoism and the 
National Party itself generally refrained from comment on the two 
forces in the war. As Chapter Two has shown, the National Party was 
more concerned with the Spanish Civil War from the perspective of 
Imperial interests and the Labour Government's foreign policy. The 
Herald, too, whatever its editorial views on the origins of the war, 
displayed none of the ambivalence towards Britain's role in the war 
that coloured Catholic pro-Francoists' attitudes towards 
international involvement. 
If there were other New Zealanders whose dislike and fear of 
Communism led them to view the rebellion sympathetically, they did 
not make public their opinions. Nor is there evidence that any more 
than a few New Zealanders supported Franco on the basis of an 
identification of his political aims with those of Mussolini or 
Hitler. Doubtless, New Zealand's small Nazi Party fell into this 
category, but its records are not available to the researcher and 
nor, apparently, did it seek to publicise its opinion in the 
newspapers of the day. An examination of the correspondence columns 
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of the six daily newspapers chosen for this study revealed only two 
examples of apparently non-Catholic pro-Fascist support of Franco. 
The Catholic Church was the only organisation to publicly 
demonstrate its support for Franco and Catholic newspapers were the 
main promoters of pro-Francoist propaganda in New Zealand. 
Discussion of New Zealand pro-Francoism will therefore concentrate 
upon the Catholic response, and compare and contrast other 
pro-Francoist attitudes where appropriate. 
At the time this study was undertaken, Catholic archives were not 
open to outside researchers. The Catholic newspapers Zealandia and 
the Tablet have been used as the major sources for Catholic opinion 
on the war. The Auckland University student newspaper, Craccum, 
whose staff included members of the Catholic Students Guild, also 
took a pro-Francoist line, and individual Catholics made their views 
known in correspondence to daily and weekly newspapers. The Tablet, 
based in Dunedin, was independent of the hierarchy, but Zealandia was 
owned by the Bishop of Auckland, in this period Bishop james Michael 
Liston, and there is no reason to suppose that the two newspapers did 
not represent official views. 
Although their attitudes towards the Spanish Civil War were 
basically the same, the content and sometimes the tone of the two 
publications were different. Zealandia had a newspaper format and 
tended to publish cable news. The Tablet was a magazine-style 
publication and its coverage of the Spanish Civil War was generally 
in the form of articles discussing various aspects of the war. Both 
commented editorially; over the period of the war the Tablet devoted 
23 editorials to the subject and Zealandia 18. In a sense, the two 
publications were complementary. Catholics who read both would 
receive the latest cable ne\vS from Zealandia, plus the occasional 
longer report from an overseas newspaper's correspondent in Spain; 
turning to the Tablet, they would find articles discussing in more 
depth specific issues arising from the war. The Tablet's tone was in 
general more considered, partly as a result of its format, but 
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perhaps also because Zealandia's owner and co-editor, Bishop Liston, 
was, in the words of a Church historian, "implacably and almost 
unreasonably opposed to Communism".l 
In common with secular daily and weekly newspapers and 
pro-Republican publications, the Catholic newspapers were dependent 
upon overseas sources for most of their material on the Spanish Civil 
War. Both Zealandia and the Tablet were connected with the National 
Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC), an American Catholic 
organisation, and received much of their news from that source. A 
study of American responses to the war in Spain, The Wound in the 
Heart, by A. Guttman, has shown that the news department of the NCWC 
was sympathetic to the Nationalist cause and used its own 
correspondents in Spain, who made "little attempt to report 
objectively".2 New Zealand Catholic newspapers also relied 
heavily upon Osservatore Romano, the official Vatican newspaper, and 
English and French Catholic papers, such as La Croix, the Universe 
and the London Tablet. Very few news items or articles came from 
non-Catholic sources. 
For 
Spain 
Catholic pro-Francoists, as for pro-Republicans, the war in 
was a paradigm, an archetypal battle between good and evil. 
The war was regarded as first and foremost an attack on religion in 
the Catholic press, Spain became a symbol of the threat Spain. 
that 
with 
In 
the Church was facing in Europe and elsewhere. Uneasy relations 
Mussolini's Italy, attacks on the power of the Church and 
attempts to create a new paganism in Nazi Germany, and the blatant 
atheism of Russian Communism, all contributed to a sense of danger to 
the faith. Coupled with this was the feeling that the Church was 
losing members, especially among the working class, as a result of 
the spirit of materialism that was increaSing in the modern world, as 
well as the attractions of other systems of belief, such as 
Socialism, Communism, Fascism and Nazism. Long before the Nazi 
challenge to the Church, Communism had been regarded as the major 
enemy of the Catholic faith and, even after attention had been turned 
to the Nazi menace, many Catholics still considered that Communism 
posed a wider threat. 
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For all this, the sense of threat, the loss of the faithful and 
opposition to Communism, Spain was the paradigm - a once staunchly 
Catholic country where now the Church and its people suffered under 
the persecution of atheistic Communism. Spain had a special place in 
Catholic history. It was the nation that had remained the bastion of 
the true faith despite the threat of Islamic conquest and the rise of 
Protestantism. It was the home of Ignatius Loyola, the founder of 
the Jesuits, and it was the country that had encouraged the spread of 
Catholicism as far as the New World. This Catholic past made events 
in Spain all the more shocking. It also enabled a Catholic mythology 
to be built up around the war. 
The Catholic press depicted the conflict as a new crusade, with 
Franco and his Nationalists the modern counterparts of El Cid and his 
crusaders, leading a national spiritual revival and rebellion against 
the barbaric hordes of atheistic Communism. The rebellion was 
justified on the grounds that Communism had infected national life 
and was bent on destroying the Church in Spain. In common with 
pro-Republicans, pro-Francoists saw the fate of Europe inextricably 
linked with the outcome of the war in Spain. Franco was not only 
fighting "for God and Spain", but for Christian (or Catholic) 
civilisation everywhere. A defeat for Communism in Spain would be a 
setback for its plans for worldwide domination an encouragement to 
the forces of anti-Communism elsewhere. In the service of this 
mythology of national martyrdom and redemption, the role of Italian 
and German aid to Franco was minimised in Catholic discussions of the 
war. 
If the war in Spain was seen as the latest in a line of religious 
wars for the glory of God and the Catholic Church, it was also 
considered to be yet another instance of specific persecution of the 
Church. The stories of atrocities committed by the Republican forces 
upon priests and nuns naturally contributed to this belief. There 
was a tone of defensiveness in some Catholic pro-Francoist propaganda 
and critics of Franco and the Church's support of his cause were 
generally labelled anti-Catholic, in much the same way as 
pro-Republicans labelled Franco's sympathisers as pro-Fascist. 
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Although the Church denied that in supporting Franco it was 
pro-Fascist, there was evidence of some pro-Fascist sentiment among 
Catholic correspondents to newspapers. Outside the Church's own 
newspapers, Catholic letters to daily and weekly newspapers were the 
main method by which Franco's cause was promoted in New Zealand. 
Catholics also engaged in debate with the Communist newspaper the 
Workers' Weekly and the radical periodical Tomorrow. There was no 
pro-Francoist counterpart to the mass meetings and rallies organised 
by pro-Republican groups, but groups of Catholics, mainly students, 
disrupted SMAC meetings and rallies. Nor did officials of the Church 
make many public pronouncements about their position on the war. The 
exceptions were an article about the war by Bishop Liston that was 
published in 
in September 
several 
1936,3 
parts in the Herald and the Otago Daily Times, 
and public criticism of the SMAC by the 
Bishop of Christchurch, Matthew Brodie, in early December 1936. 4 
For Catholics, events in Spain were relevant to New Zealanders. 
The Spanish Civil War, they considered, revealed the dangers of 
Communism and the trap of Catholic complacency. The establishment of 
a local branch of the SMAC and the dissemination of pro-Republican 
propaganda in New Zealand was, for the Catholic press and many of its 
readers, evidence of both anti-Catholicism and Communist subversion 
in New Zealand society. Catholic pro-Francoists attacked the Labour 
Government's "limited pro-Republican" stand on the grounds of 
pro-Communism and, similarly to "Non-Interventionists", because it 
was disloyalty to Britain. However, the Catholic press' attitude to 
British involvement was, at best, equivocal. In general, Catholic 
pro-Francoists did not become involved in the debate over the Labour 
Government's foreign policy to any great extent; their focus was on 
the fate of the Church in Spain and the ramifications of this for 
Catholics everywhere, rather than on other international aspects of 
the war. Nevertheless, in insisting that what happened in Spain was 
a matter of importance for New Zealanders, they were in opposition to 
the "Non-Interventionist", "insular imperialist" view. 
12S 
It 
became 
is impossible to estimate how 
deeply involved in the issue 
many New Zealand Catholics 
of the war, particularly as 
Catholic archives could not be consulted. Histories of particular 
dioceses and the one brief history of the Church in New Zealand are 
more concerned with the development of the Church in New Zealand, 
rather than detailing Catholic attitudes to complex political and 
social issues. Given that many Catholics were Labour voters and 
Trades Unionists, there is surprisingly little evidence of Catholic 
objections to pro-Republicanism within the Labour Party or the Trades 
Unions. There was, of course, some protest, but not on the scale 
experienced in Australia, particularly in the Victorian Labour Party, 
where Catholic pressure caused the adoption of a non-intervention 
policy.S On the other hand, although a few Catholics indicated 
of Franco's cause and some even espoused their disapproval 
pro-Republicanism, 6 there is no evidence that, as in France or 
had reservations about America, significant numbers of Catholics 
their Church's support of the rebels. 
The apparent conformity of the New Zealand Catholic response to 
the official attitude of pro-Francoism was possibly, in part, a 
result of the nature of New Zealand Catholicism. As a minority in a 
non-Catholic country, presented with an issue couched in terms of 
defence of the faith, Catholics could be expected to draw together 
and follow the official line. Violent anti-clericalism was not a 
feature of New Zealand Catholic life, as it was in Spain. Thus, the 
reports of atrocities and church burnings would have had great effect 
in encouraging support of the Nationalist forces depicted as saving 
religion in Spain. Distance also played a part, as E.M. Andrews has 
noted of their Australian counterparts, New Zealand Catholics were "a 
long way from events, and had only their own preconceptions and the 
official channels to guide them."7 One correspondent to the 
Tablet put the matter succinctly: "If a Catholic is to believe 
anyone, he should above all believe his own papers, which in a matter 
as serious as this would not deceive him."8 
Before the discussion of pro-Francoist attitudes and activities 
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related specifically to the New Zealand scene, an analysis must be 
made of what image the Catholic press (and other pro-Francoist 
sources) presented of the Spanish Civil War. 
First reports in Zealandia and the Tablet clearly indicated that 
the outbreak of hostilities was considered to be a battle between 
Catholics and Communists. In the Tablet, an editorial bearing the 
headline "Chaos in Spain", on 29 July 1936, gave an analysis of the 
events leading up to the outbreak of the war. It said: 
That Spain is in the grip of civil war is not altogether 
surprising; it is a natural consequence of her recent 
unhappy history. Communism is in charge there and where 
Communism is there is strife ... With a Government of the 
extreme Left in power ... [the] prolonged campaign against 
religious orders and Catholic institutions was intensified, 
and harsh and illogical education regulations were imposed, 
resulting in whole communities of nuns being turned out into 
the streets.9 
Readers of Zealandia had a rather more sensationalist introduction to 
the war. On 27 August, Zealandia published on the front page a 
report 
report, 
from the 
headed 
Barcelona correspondent of the London Tablet. The 
"Chaos in Spain - Red Militia Seize Control", told of 
"a battle between the military defending Catholics and the Red 
Militia (an armed Communist mob)". A "ravening mob of Anarchists" 
had opened graves and destroyed churches and convents, despite the 
pleas of the Government over the radio. They were "inflamed against 
the nuns - and the priests - by the foul lies spread about the lives 
of the religious by Communist and Anarchist agents".10 
By 2 September, the Tablet was convinced that the conflict was 
"one between the Christian and the anti-Christian forces".11 
However, in the early stages of the war, the Catholic press did not 
commit itself completely to Francots cause. Indeed, the Tablet, in 
its second editorial on the war on 5 August 1936, considered that 
"The parties of the Right apparently aspire to dictatorship",12 
an analysis that later would be dismissed as "Red propaganda". In 
the beginning, the Church's stance was that it was not identified 
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with either of the contending parties, but was above the battle, an 
innocent victim of the Communists. Bishop Liston, in his article on 
the conflict published in some daily newspapers, quoted Osservatore 
Romano on the Church's role in the war: 
Neither the Catholic Action nor the political organisations 
of Catholics are engaged. Authoritative declarations and 
undeniable facts prove that assertion. The Communistic 
volcano is boiling over. And its implacable hatred is 
vented on the eternal victim - the Catholic Church. That is 
the root plan of Communism, which must emerge at every 
opportunity. Yet, though the Church suffers in the 
conflict, she has no part in it.13 
While this image of the Catholic Church martyred in Spain was to 
continue as part of the Catholic response throughout the war, 
initially there was some acknowledgement that Catholicism had been in 
some way lacking in Spain. On 5 August 1936, in an editorial 
examining the political and social background to the war, the Tablet 
said: 
Communism has come to Spain as a reaction against the 
progressive subordination of the working classes to poor 
economic conditions. Prolonged social misery has bred a 
sense of injustice in the hearts of many of the Spanish 
people, and the authorities of the past must bear their 
share of responsibility for this condition.14 
Two weeks later, the Tablet made an even more specific criticism of 
the Spanish Church, one of the "authorities of the past": 
We have been criticised for stating that the persecution of 
the Church in Spain is partly due to the indifference of the 
Catholic people themselves to the needs of the lower classes 
and to the constant violation of the principles of social 
justice. For those, who, in their ignorance, think we are 
too hard on the Spanish Catholics we will quote the words of 
the Primate of Spain, Cardinal Goma ... he sounded a grave 
warning to his priests that "One generation more and the 
present indifference of our people will turn to irreligion", 
and urgently called his priests to intensify their preaching 
of the word of God. Priestly preaching, he said, is the 
support of the Church and the Christian people.1S 
The article, in the editorial "Notes and Comments" section of the 
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paper, went on to quote Cardinal Goma, Archbishop of Toledo, as 
saying that the people were turning away from the Church because of 
the Spirit of Materialism in the Modern World. The Tablet also 
quoted the London Catholic Times' view that: "The Church has been 
dead asleep 
has arrived 
been done."16 
for years on the social welfare side and Catholic Action 
a century too late to counteract the mischief that has 
Zealandia attached no blame to the hierarchy of the Church or to 
priestly teaching, but considered that the fault was in the attitude 
of the laity of the Spanish Church: 
If the Spanish people had been Catholics in fact as well as 
in name the present situation could never have arisen ... if 
they had translated their relevant obligations into the 
practical terms of Catholic action, Communism could never 
have 1~stab1ished its so powerful grip on the national 
life. 
These, however, were sins of omission rather than commission, and 
little mention was made of this aspect of Catholicism in Spain after 
the first few months of the war. Any suggestion that the Church's 
role and power within the State might have contributed to the unrest 
and politically volatile conditions in Spain before the outbreak of 
war were hotly denied. Particularly irritating to Catholics were the 
accusations that the Church had great wealth. The Tablet published 
an article from the NCWC refuting such claims: 
The Church in Spain owned properties, the income from which 
provided adequately for life. Far from receiving aid from 
the State, the Church contributed liberally to the support 
of the State, doing this of her own initiative or at the 
suggestion of the Holy See ... Under pretext of liquidating 
property held in mortmain, to raise funds with which to meet 
its own extravagance and defray the cost of political 
turbulence, the property of the Church was confiscated and 
no compensation made.18 
This explanation, apart from exposing the unjust treatment of the 
Church by Republican Governments, was also used to answer critics who 
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claimed that the Church's support of Franco was based on a desire to 
protect its wealth. 
There was little discussion in either publication of the 
constitutional relationship between the Church and the State under 
the Republic, nor any detailing of specific measures enacted about 
Church property or the Church's role in education. The Tablet's view 
of the Church's relations with various Republican Governments gave 
the image of a Church more sinned against than sinning, culminating 
in the iniquities of the Popular Front Government: 
the Church has been the chief target of successive 
governments over a number of years. Religious strife and 
disputes upon education are to some extent at the root of 
the current trouble, and the Church is vitally concerned in 
this The present authorities, who represent a Communist 
victory from Moscow, have given no quarter in their 
suppression of Catholic churches and institutions '" New 
legislation has been enacted in the past few months 
intensifying the severity of these attacks The 
secularisation of the school system was a thin smoke screen 
hiding an anti-Catholic attack.19 
Despite the admission of social injustices in Spain and 
consequent political and social unrest, the Catholic press was 
convinced that the real, underlying cause of the war was a Communist 
plot to seize control and "Sovietise" Spain. The Communist plot was 
a constant theme in both Zealandia and the Tablet and in Catholic 
correspondence to secular newspapers. The Tablet said: 
The revolt of the Spanish army under General Franco was a 
counter-revolution which forestalled a revolution. Plans 
for Red revolution had been prepared by Moscow agents 
working in Spain since May.20 
According to Zealandia: 
Since 1931 Communists have been at work in Spain, inflaming 
public opinion and creating internal chaos Lenin 
prophesied that Spain would become the second Soviet in 
Europe.21 
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Much was made of the reported presence of Bela Kun, a Hungarian 
Communist, in 
Spaniards". 22 
confusion of 
Spain 
(One 
names and 
in May 1936, with "2000 Moscow trained 
correspondent to Craccum, in an obvious 
political beliefs, claimed it was "the 
notorious Bakunin", who 
also fond of repeating 
had appeared in Spain. 23 ) Zealandia was 
the statement attributed to Largo Caballero 
that Miguel Azana would be "Kerensky to my Lenin".24 The 
Catholic press claimed that this "proof by association" was 
compounded by documentary evidence of Communist plans discovered by 
Nationalist troops.25 The National News also indicated its 
interest in the "Communist plot" theory when, in October 1937, it 
reprinted from the London Observer an article by Arthur Bryant that 
claimed that Russia had been intervening in Spanish affairs long 
before the Civil War began. 26 
There were several variations on the theme of Communist plotting 
and influence in Spain in Catholic discussions of the Popular Front 
Government. Pro-Francoist propagandists recognised that there were 
other political 
but 
groupings 
asserted 
within the Popular Front, apart from the 
that "the moving spirit behind the Communists, 
Government 
nothing".27 
is the vicious anti-God Communist who stops at 
According to 
few in number, but they 
several political groups 
Bishop 
are the 
of the 
Liston, "Communists are probably 
guiding and driving force of the 
Popular Front in Spain".28 In 
Liston's version of events, the Popular Front had won the elections 
in February 1936 by "better grouping and strategical trading"29 
and, once it was in power, the more extremist groups took control and 
began to "tear down the existing order and to set up a dictatorship 
of the proletariat".30 
The Spanish elections that brought the Popular Front to power 
were a key point in pro-Francoist justifications of Franco's armed 
rebellion against the State. A more popular version of events than 
Liston's explanation of better political strategy, was the claim that 
the elections had been "cleverly engineered in Moscow"31 and 
that thousands of voters had been prevented from exercising their 
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rights by Communist and Anarchist terrorism. 32 The Tablet had 
promoted this view in its first editorial on the war, on 29 july 
1936, but by October had a slightly different explanation: 
It is true that the Spanish Government had a majority of 60 
seats in a Parliament of 470 after the election;s and to 
that extent possessed the confidence of the Cortes. But to 
say that the Government had the confidence of the electors 
of Spain was incorrect, for the majority of the Spanish 
people had not declared for the regime. On the contrary, 
the elections showed a slight majority of votes in favour of 
the Right, and by one of those accidents of voting with 
which we in New Zealand are familiar a majority of seats in 
Parliament went to the Popular Front ... The Popular Front 
was a dangerous amalgamation, for it joined together a set 
of opposing political factions whose only band of unity was 
their anti-clericalism.33 
But, whatever the means by which the Popular Front had come to 
power, it was agreed that, once in control, it had relinquished 
authority to its Communist and Anarchist supporters, either unable or 
unwilling to restrain the excesses of the "Red revolutionaries". 
Thus, Franco's rebellion was justified on the grounds of law and 
order as well as of political subversion, both, of course, the result 
of Communist machinations. Catholic correspondents to the newspapers 
dwelt heavily upon the "law and order" argument, possibly because 
pro-Republican claims that the rebellion was a resort to force 
against a constitutional authority was seen to be a strong propaganda 
weapon in 
Governments. 
a country unused to military methods of changing 
It was, said one writer, "an axiom that any Government 
which surrenders control also surrenders the right to 
obedience".34 A Catholic priest, writing in The Press, argued 
that the resort to force was lawful in a just cause, to defend the 
weak and overthrow tyranny.35 Another correspondent ingeniously 
used a parallel with the New Zealand political scene: 
If the New Zealand Government were voted into office and 
then joined with the Communists, who had not been voted in, 
then that would be in opposition to the voters and the end 
of democracy. 36 
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The New Zealand Herald produced another version of the "Communist 
plot" theory, which developed gradually over the course of the war. 
In its second editorial on the war, on 30 July 1936, the paper 
detected a "conspicuously red" element in the crisis. The Herald 
noted that the parties of the Left had been drawing closer together 
but that their cause had lacked "convenient opportunity". The nature 
of the cause and the opportunity's purpose was not stated. The paper 
continued that the opportunity had been provided by "the sympathetic 
attitude 
consequent 
rebellion, 
of the present Government toward the working classes and the 
angering of the anti-Soviet elements. These, in their 
have 
resistance".37 
given 
Thus, in a 
occasion for a violent Communist 
curious backhanded manner, the war was 
made to appear almost a case of Communist revolution and the 
Government to blame for it. 
Indeed, four days later, the Herald explained the causes of the 
war in terms that resembled closely a pro-Francoist justification of 
the rebellion. The explanation for the war Ilin all that matters 
most" was to be found in "the Government's increasing acceptance of 
principles espoused by sundry parties favouring Communism and a 
consequent opposition roused to belligerent fury on the part of all 
in dread of this "red" development".38 
In October 1936, the Herald went even further and suggested that 
the Government of Spain did not have constitutional authority: 
In strict accordance with Spain's constitution the President 
of the Republic appointed a moderate man, Martinez Barrio, 
as Premier when Cesares Quiroga resigned in July; but the 
new Cabinet was torpedoed immediately by the Marxist groups, 
and by their veto the present administration was established 
regardless of the constitution.39 
At the time this editorial was written, Largo Caballero was Premier; 
presumably it was his administration to which the Herald referred, 
and which it had earlier noted retained a solid body of Socialist 
ministers. 40 The Herald's brief summary of changes in the 
Spanish Government failed to mention that Martinez Barrio was 
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succeeded by Jose Giral, whose cabinet was, according to Hugh Thomas, 
largely composed of middle-class liberal Republicans, supported by 
the Anarchists Socialists and Communists. 41 Moreover, it was 
Largo Caballero himself who refused to form a Cabinet unless the 
Communists were included, and the Spanish Communist party was at 
first disinclined to join the Government. 42 
Whether this distortion was deliberate or merely the result of 
misinformation, it certainly promoted a view of the Government akin to 
that in Catholic pro-Francoist propaganda. By the end of the war 
this distortion appeared to have become established fact to the 
Herald. At the end of January 1939, the Herald noted that the war 
had involved a conflict of political ideologies: "the challenge of 
Communism 
Fascism".43 
inspired 
On 7 
by Russia 
February 1939, 
had been taken up by Italian 
the paper produced an overview 
of the prelude to the rebellion that, as Willis Airey and Arthur 
Sewell pointed out in several (unpublished) letters to the editor, 
was a subtle distortion of the known facts. 44 The editorial said 
that in May 1936 Azana retired to the Presidency, after which: 
the way was cleared for the Socialists Anarchists, 
Syndicalists and Communists, egged on by agents from Moscow, 
to pursue their revolutionary policy. In due time Senor 
Azana was succeeded as Prime Minister by Senor Caballero a 
Communist, who was reported to have admitted the Russian 
ambassador to Cabinet meetings. Rebelling against the 
threatened Bolshevisation of Spain, the conservatives and 
moderates resorted to armed resistance on July 18 1936 and 
the war was joined.4S 
Thus, the subtle inference, in 1936 that the Government might 
have been responsible for the war had become, by 1939, accepted 
"truth" in a twisted version of Spanish political events that would 
not have been out of place in the Tablet or Zealandia. Either the 
paper's leader writer was utterly convinced of the truth of his 
analysis or very cynical, for, later that month, an editorial stated 
"so much has happened since [the beginning of the war] that this 
seizure of power has been generally forgotten". The editorial went 
on to point out that, in declaring the Government unconstitutional, 
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it had not "the slightest intention of justifying either General 
Franco's campaigning methods or the attitude he is adopting as 
victory appears to be within his grasp".46 Like other daily 
newspapers, the Herald had voiced, on many occasions, its strong 
disapproval 
methods of 
of the atrocities committed by both sides and of Franco's 
waging war on civilians. However, its disclaimer begged 
concerning Franco's politics. By the end of the war, 
(or "revolutionaries", as the Herald preferred to call 
the question 
the rebels 
them) had become "conservatives and moderates" rather than "Fascists" 
or a mixed bag of political beliefs united by the slogan "Arriba 
Espana" as depicted in earlier editorials. Clearly, disapproval of 
the Government and of Socialism or Communism, by 1939 had outweighed 
the Herald's dislike of Franco's "Fascism". 
The Herald's acceptance of pro-Francoist arguments, on the basis 
of anti-Communism, lacked the sense of specific threat that was one 
of the central features of Catholic pro-Francoist propaganda. 
Catholics considered that the chief target of the Communist plot was 
the Catholic church in Spain. This was not only because Communism, 
as Zealandia put it, had the "avowed aim of eliminating from the 
human mind the conception of God".47 It was also because the 
Catholic Church was seen as the major threat to Communist plans for 
domination of Spain, and, ultimately, of the world. Bishop Liston 
said: 
The Catholic Church in Spain as elsewhere stands for what, 
outside the faith, is crumbling marriage, the family, 
property, authority, honour to parents, right reason. If 
her power remains intact these things will remain, and with 
them Christian civilisation and the main institutions of 
European society. If her power is weakened or destroyed, at 
this moment of revolution and transition, civilisation will 
decline and the way will be opened to the new paganism and 
the enslavement of mankind.48 
A Catholic priest informed readers of The Press that the Communists 
were attacking the Catholic Church in Spain because they knew that it 
was the only bul\vark of Christianity, since Protestantism was "timid, 
weak and hesitating".49 
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If the central theme of Catholic pro-Francoism was Communism 
versus Catholicism, the essential and most powerful corroborating 
image of the concept was that of the atrocities against Catholics, 
lay and religious, and against church buildings. The atrocities were 
the prism through which all events of the civil war were seen, and 
elicited an emotional response that overwhelmed any attempt at 
objective discussion of the causes and other issues of the war. 
Tales of atrocity and desecration appeared constantly in both 
Zea1andia and the Tablet, and were repeated in Catholic letters to 
secular newspapers. Torture, both mental and physical, performed on 
priests and nuns; priests crucified or shot for refusing to 
blaspheme, nuns stripped and forced to walk through the streets; 
graves opened and bodies displayed in obscene positions; churches 
looted and holy images and sacred relics destroyed or defiled - these 
were the type of stories that appeared. Often the "appalling 
savagery and horror" of the atrocities would not be described in more 
than those terms, because a closer description was unfit to print in 
a Christian newspaper, thus allowing readers to supply their own 
imaginative details. 
In September and October 1936, the Tablet published several pages 
of eyewitness descriptions of atrocities. Some examples were: 
The report of an American woman tourist: "I saw a church burned by 
the Reds, who killed a priest, cut off his arms and legs, ripped open 
his body, and hung the corpse from a Statue of the Virgin. usa 
The experience of an Irishman in Valencia: 
nuns were driven out from their convent in Valencia and 
stripped naked. The superior was a woman of 70. She fell 
to the ground, and a young captain of the Government forces, 
touched by the scene ran forward and covered her body with 
his cloak. He was accused of infidelity to the cause of 
Spain, and some of his men held him against the wall while 
another walked up with a revolver in each hand and 
discharged both guns into his eyes.51 
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An account from another Irishman in Jaen: 
Monks had been beheaded, and I counted eight heads hanging 
from railings. There were other bodies in the street. 
The mob stripped 12 nuns and paraded them through the 
streets to the market-place with their hands tied behind 
them. Petrol was poured over them and they were burned 
a1ive.52 
Such personal atrocities, often involving sexual elements in the case 
of the nuns, were the most common form of atrocity stories. There 
were more inventive atrocity stories as well. One of the most 
curious was a report in Zealandia, in September 1937, of a Communist 
plot 
by 
to spread disease in Nationalist Spain. Two Frenchmen, captured 
"White Guards", claimed to have been contacted by Communist agent, 
working for the Government of Spain, and to have been taken to a 
laboratory where they were injected with smallpox virus. However, 
the Communists' "dastardly act" was foiled by the laboratory workers, 
who had injected the men with ordinary soap and water. 53 Besides 
fulfilling the usual function of atrocity stories, that is, to show 
that the "Reds" would stoop to any infamy, this peculiar tale also 
enabled readers to have the last laugh on the Government of Spain. 
Atrocity 
"mythologising" 
stories played 
of the war. 
a major part in the Catholic 
In the context of the archetypal battle 
being waged in Spain between the forces of God and the hordes of 
Satan, the atrocities became evidence of the martyrdom that the 
Church in Spain, and the Spanish people, had to undergo to emerge 
purified and revitalised. Thus, in a sense, there was an ambivalence 
in the Catholic press' reaction to atrocities. They were abhorred, 
of course, but Catholic grief and horror at the fate of their 
co-religionists in Spain was assuaged by the thought that such 
martyrdom was 
would not go 
the beginning 
to the greater glory of the Church and of God, and 
unrewarded. This attitude was stated very clearly at 
of the war in the women's page of the Tablet. At the 
end of a small item on the women of Spain, the women's editor said: 
"This purging, however, is not a matter for despair. Persecution is 
purification. "54 
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Indeed, along with the atrocity stories appeared items which 
showed that God was protecting his own in Spain. There were numerous 
tales of divine retribution for atrocities and desecration; for 
example, this report from the French newspaper La Croix, reprinted in 
Zealandia: 
A Communist named Balbino of Esterri, Spain, boasting that 
he would provide the new commune's first funeral, murdered 
the parish priest. He also destroyed the village's famous 
crucifix he cut the figure of our Lord almost in two 
pieces. On the following day Balbina was killed in a car 
smash The car hit a rock. He5§as thrown out. His body 
was picked up in almost two pieces. 
Guttman, in The Wound in the Heart, identifies "martyrdom and 
conversion" as the two common conventions in Catholic literature 
about the war. 56 These conventions applied not only to the 
fiction inspired by the war, but also to most of the reports about 
Republican treatment of Catholics. (Some of these, of course, were 
also fiction, but were not presented as such.) As the Communist 
Party newspaper 
Republican cause 
Catholic press 
had tales of Nationalist soldiers converted to the 
while convalescing in Republican hospitals, so the 
had stories of "Red" militia-men so touched by the 
bravery of priests facing martyrdom that they renounced their 
allegiance to Communism. 
Perhaps the best example of the convention of conversion was a 
short story published in the Tablet (which had a short story in each 
issue it published two with Civil War settings). The story 
concerned a priest, who, in disguise, had become a member of the 
"Red" militia and was much admired for his bravery. While holding a 
secret mass, the priest, known as "Esteban", was captured by a 
notorious Communist, tiEl Matador", famed for his inventive methods of 
killing his vicitms. HEI Matador" led the priest into the woods, 
but, instead of shooting him, fell on his knees and begged I1Esteban" 
to hear his confession. The Communist's father had been shot while 
trying to prevent a church burning and this had opened "El Matador's" 
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eyes to the viciousness of Communism and the error of his own ways. 
When the repentant killer's men became suspicious and began shooting 
at the pair, "EI Matador" held them off while the priest escaped "to 
Franco and safety". "EI Matador", of course, was killed in the 
process. 57 The convention of martyrdom appeared throughout 
atrocity stories, which always depicted nuns and priests going to 
their death with dignity and rejoicing in the glory of God. 
The mythologising of the war in Spain inevitably evoked images of 
past Catholic persecution and created a rationale for the Nationalist 
rebellion based on the concept of a new crusade. In the words of a 
New Zealander, resident in Britain, whose business took him to Spain 
frequently: "General Franco was trying to uphold the Catholic 
church, the only church in the land, and trying to keep the country 
from being atheist as well as Bolshevist."S8 
Occasionally, comparisons were drawn between the present conflict 
and the French Revolution, with the Communists representing the cold 
rationalism of the Enlightenment: 
I began to realise that I was in a new vendee and that what 
was going on was really a religious war - a new crusade 
against the destructive influences of Moscow, a desperate 
reaction of the Catholic Spirit against the soulless powers 
of modern materia1ism.59 
One correspondent to the Otago Daily Times, writing of the attempt to 
trample religion, not only used the example of the French Revolution 
but also exhorted readers to "remember Titus Oates!"60 
But the most obvious comparison was between the civil war and the 
struggle against Moslem domination in the 15th century. The history 
of Spain was invoked by Catholic writers, and Spain was depicted as, 
once again, "one of the lights of Christian civilisation and 
culture",61 beleaguered by' its enemies, but committed to saving 
Europe from barbarism through the faith and self-sacrifice of its 
people: 
Twice has Spain saved Europe. The fall of Granada in 1492 
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marked the end of the epic contest against Mohammedan 
domination of Europe after 8 centuries of heroic 
resistance. In 1572 the victory of Lepanto broke the power 
of Islam for good. 
In 1936 the old country of saints and warriors, of explorers 
and navigators, in spite of long suffering, in spite of 
treason and calumny has still the vitality to challenge the 
sacreligious violence of Moscow.62 
The mythologising of the war as a new crusade was most evident in 
the image of the Nationalist forces in the Catholic press. The 
deeply-rooted Catholicism of the Nationalist troops was constantly 
emphasised; all wore medals of the Sacred Heart into battle, went to 
mass and confession regularly and saw their struggle as one for God 
as well as Spain: 
On the feast of the Assumption, thousands of young men 
rushed into the battle to the cry of "Viva Maria!" (long 
Ii ve tv1ary) This and the rallying cries "Vi va Cristo 
Rey!" (long live Christ the King) are Spain's challenge to 
Bolshevism.63 
The "mystic religious fervour which inspired the saints of Spain and 
the spiritual conquistadores who followed in the footsteps of 
Cortes",64 
shared by 
described by one writer as again present in Spain, was 
some Catholic writers when speaking of Franco's army. In 
articles ecstatic in tone, the Nationalist troops were described 
kneeling before the grave of El Cid (the legendary scourge of the 
Moors), swearing to fight to the death for the glory of Spain and of 
God. 
O'Brien 
Spanish 
The Navarrese 
as the epitome 
courage and 
were depicted in glowing terms by one Aileen 
of militant Spanish Catholicism, and of fierce 
pride in themselves, their nation and their 
cause: "I was seeing the most arrogant race on earth on its knees 
humbly before him who died a criminal's death."65 
Together with the descriptions of the faith of the Nationalist 
soldiers, went items describing the revival of religion in Spain. 
Thus, even before the Nationalists had won, the spirit of Catholicism 
was portrayed as triumphing over great odds. As early as November 
1936, the Tablet printed on article from the Irish Monthly entitled 
"Religion Is Alive In Spain". In the mythologising of the war such a 
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revival of religious feeling was the ultimate image of redemption: 
That this religious revival in Spain is not merely a passing 
fit of religious exhaltation caused by a natural reaction to 
the attack of the Reds against all that is most sacred to 
the heart of the genuine Spanish nation, but something that 
derives its orlgln from higher causes, is amply proved by 
numerous facts that are reported almost daily from many 
parts of the country.65 
In other words, God was answering the call of his people in 
Spain; their martyrdom was not to be in vain. Over the period of the 
war, numerous accounts were published of religious ceremonies in 
Nationalist Spain, revealing the faith and dedication of Franco's 
army. One of the best examples of the great faith and self sacrifice 
of Nationalist soldiers was the tale of Colonel Moscardo, leader of 
the defenders in the siege of the Alcazar, in Toledo, at the 
beginning of the war. Moscardo, with a small force of rebel troops 
and a number of civilians, had been driven by the militia back into 
the Alcazar. After several days, Moscardo still refused to surrender 
and was told by the Toledo militia leader that, if he did not 
surrender, his son, who had been taken hostage, would be shot. 
Moscardo spoke to his son over the telephone and told him to commend 
his soul to God and shout "Viva Espana!" According to the story in 
the Tablet, Moscardo's son was shot immediately after his father's 
refusal to surrender. (Hugh Thomas, however, notes that the younger 
Moscardo was 
air-raid. 67 ) 
shot over a month later in reprisal for an 
The account in the Tablet stressed the epic heroic quality of the 
story: 
Chivalry and romance, loyalty and devotion, valour and 
bravery are not dead. They are still among us. 
History has been repeating itself in these latter days. 
From the smoke and fire, from the wreck and ruin, from the 
horrors of despair and desolation of that 72 day siege of 
the Alcazar in Toledo, Spain, now comes the thrilling story 
of Colonel Jose Moscardo, who courageously declined to yield 
the Alcazar to the reds who held his son as a hostage. 
Colonel Moscardo's loyalty and devotion to duty seemingly 
outrivals the courage and valour of that master-man and man 
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of mettle of legendary Spain, the celebrated Alonzo P. de 
Guzman, who resolutely refused to surrender the city of 
Tariza to the enemies of his king and of his country even 
under threat of losing his dearly beloved son.68 
This story and others about the siege of the Alcazar, collected in a 
book called The Epic of the Alcazar, were recommended for Catholic 
school children by the Tablet's education columnist. 69 
Given this exalted vision of the Nationalist forces, it was not 
surprising that reports of Nationalist atrocities were dismissed as 
"Red" propaganda. One correspondent to the Otago Daily Times said: 
That anyone can believe 
homeland, their natural 
Heaven and earth could 
beyond comprehension.70 
men who are fighting for their 
rights and all they hold dear in 
be guilty of such inhumanity is 
In the Catholic press, the most common method of explaining away 
reports of Nationalist atrocities was to claim that the Republican 
forces had been responsible. The best known example of this 
transferring of blame was the explanation for the bombing of 
Guernica. Pro-Francoist propaganda claimed that there had not been 
any bombing. An article in the Tablet, in June 1937, said: "Every 
day it is beocming clearer that the ancient Basque capital was 
destroyed by dynamiters and incendiaries before the Nationalists 
entered the town."7l According to this view, Guernica was 
destroyed by 
prevent the 
Anarchists retreating from the Nationalists, partly to 
victors from making any real gains by taking the city, 
and partly to provide evidence for propaganda about Nationalist 
bombings. 
The justification for aerial bombing, when it could not be denied 
as propaganda, 
illustrated the 
go to support 
was a remarkable example of evasion of the issue and 
lengths to which the Catholic press was prepared to 
and defend the Nationalist cause. Zealandia's 
response, in particular, is deserving of rather lengthy quotation. 
Several points were made in the jusification: 
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1. Everybody is doing it: 
aerial attack on objectives outside the actual war zones 
is now an accepted military practice. The idea is wholly 
repellent to the normal civilised mind, but, as with the 
British use of poison gas in the Great War, it seems that 
particular forms and weapons of warfare can only be 
countered by employing methods of the same type.72 
2. Franco was being unfairly attacked by countries whose 
humanitarian record in war time was no beter than his: 
aerial bombing took place in the Great War ... 
of civilian life caught in air attacks on 
objectives was low in the Great War ... Why should 
called upon to have a higher regard for human 
Britain did in the Great War?73 
the value 
military 
Franco be 
life than 
3. Franco was scrupulous about not attacking anything other than 
military objectives: 
The whole practice of aerial warfare is a shocking 
reflection on the mentality of our times, and the Popes have 
continually urged its abolition. But even if it be employed 
care can be taken to make the bombings as strictly military 
as possible. It is to Franco's credit that he has done his 
best to limit and segregate the effects of Nationalist 
bombing. It is to the everlasting infamy of the Reds that 
they have handled their weapons in precisely the same way 
that they have used other armed units, namely as instruments 
of wanton and senseless savagery.74 
Furthermore, Catholics claimed that the whole outcry over aerial 
bombing was being used by the Communists in a cynical propaganda 
campaign 
strongly 
against the Nationalists. Those, they said, who objected so 
to aerial bombing had been strangely silent about the murder 
and torture of Catholics in Spain, and about other "Red" atrocities. 
At the end of an article entitled "The Ethics of Bombing", the Tablet 
mused: "It is surely significant that the outcry against bombing has 
arisen only when the Christian forces appear likely to win."7S 
A minor controversy began between Zealandia and the Communist 
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party 
Weekly 
newspaper, the Workers Weekly, in April 1937, when the Workers 
published pictures purporting to be child victims of 
Nationalist bombings. Zealandia retorted by reprinting an article 
from a French Catholic newspaper exposing the photographs. The 
photographs, it said, were actually taken from a French book entitled 
Temoignanges et Images Secretes de la Guerre, published after World 
\~ar One, 
1918. 76 
discussion 
showing the victims of German bombings in Paris, in March 
The Workers Weekly replied to this with an indignant 
of their impeccable sources. 77 (An interesting point 
about the controversy is that both newspapers were, in fact, 
importing a controversy begun in Britain and France, since both were 
reprinting from overseas sources.) At the end of 1937, the Weekly 
renewed the controversy by publishing a photo of Generals Franco and 
Mola before welcoming crowds at the gates of a captured city. The 
Weekly called it "a real faked photograph", and challenged Zealandia 
to respond. 78 Zealandia remained silent, but the Tablet was 
provoked to a rather evasive editorial comment; it was obvious, said 
the editor, that this was a composite photograph: 
It is hardly likely that General Franco and his staff would 
be walking in a different direction from the troops as they 
entered the city ... But all this is beside the point. The 
question at issue is the relative importance of this picture 
and those which were faked by the Reds imputing atrocities 
to General Franco. The Worker's Weekly must have scant 
faith in the intelligence of its readers.79 
Naturally, the Nationalist leader himself was discussed at length 
in the Catholic press. He was generally portrayed as the perfect 
Christian gentleman, who, as befitted his role as saviour of the 
Church, was deeply religious. Zealandia published an interview with 
an Englishwoman who had taught Franco English in Tenerife. She spoke 
of him as a devoted family man, not ambitious, but with a great sense 
of duty, and love for his country: 
I got the impression that he had that superior courage of 
being able to walk on his own heart (and there was no doubt 
that that heart was a sensitive one) if it became necessary 
when duty called.80 
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Franco, the "Marshal Foch of Spain"Sl was also a merciful and 
humanitarian man: "General Franco could take Madrid; he has the key 
to the water supply, but he is too humane to use it, for this method 
would cause a terrible epidemic."S2 Of all the aspects of 
Franco's personality that were discussed, the emphasis was on his 
modesty and lack of ambition. In an interview published in the 
Tablet, in late 1937, he was quoted as saying: 
I did not 
ambitious. 
the supreme 
thoughts. 
have raised 
start this movement because I was politically 
Politics have never interested me. To become 
power of my native country is far from my 
I am a soldier, and as such, I, with my comrades 
the flag of Nationalism. Spain was in the hands 
Someone had to move and save her from the of anarchy 
final disaster 
civilisation.83 
and, in saving her, save the whole of Western 
Catholic letters to newspapers also hotly denied that Franco aspired 
to dictatorship, asserting that, rather, he was merely a patriot and 
a devout Catholic. 84 
Discussion of the future under Franco in the Catholic press was 
generally 
rightful 
in vague terms, and dealt to a considerable extent with the 
role of the Church. Often, reports on the Nationalist 
Government's planned policies came directly from news services in 
Burgos, the seat of Nationalist Government, and there was little 
discussion of their application or implications. According to the 
Tablet, Franco would model the new Spain on Portugal: "And even the 
astute advanced thinkers of the left will find it difficult to bring 
sound criticism against Dr Salazar and his dictatorship in the 
prosperous state of Portugal."SS Jose Gil Robles, the leader of 
the conservative Catholic CEDA party before the war, was often quoted 
in the Catholic press about Spain's future once the Nationalists had 
won. Gil Robles was the perfect spokesman for the Nationalists as 
far as Catholics were concerned: "No surer guide could be found than 
this sterling Catholic and patriot".87 Zealandia and the Tablet 
were either unaware, or unwilling to mention, that there were certain 
political differences between Gil Robles and the leaders of the 
Nationalists, and that he was at some distance from the 
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decision-makers of 
Lisbon since the 
the Burgos 
beginning of 
Government, 
the war. 88 
having been in exile in 
Franco himself was also 
quoted on his own vision of Spain's future: 
We want Spain one and undivided under the rule of a new 
strong State, a State which will watch social justice so 
closely that there will not be a single Spanish home without 
a hea8~h and not a single Spanish labourer without his 
bread. 
The term "social justice" was one often used in discussions of 
the future under Franco, as were phrases and terms like "the true 
spirit of Spain", "self sacrifice", and "a spirit of unityfl. Despite 
Franco's statement about a strong state, one point about the future 
Government of Spain that Catholic pro-Francoist propagandists were 
quick to make, was that it would not be a totalitarian Fascist 
nature. The Tablet quoted Gil Robles on the subject: 
Yet, without admitting even remotely, the unjust detrimental 
meaning that Communist propaganda attaches to the term 
Fascism, no one in good faith will be able to maintain the 
theory that Spain will be organised as a government of that 
order. For the present we must not forget that Mussolini 
himself has declared on many occasions that Fascism is 
typically Italian product, suited to the needs and 
characteristics of Italy, and impossible of application in 
other countries. In agreement with this fundamental 
statement is that of General Franco, the chief of the 
Spanish State, who affirms on his part that the present 
movement in Spain is not of that order.90 
For Catholics, Fascism was not the issue in Spain. The 
accusation that Franco's forces were Fascist was seen as a "Red" 
herring, used by Franco's opponents to obscure the real meaning of 
the war: 
To style the insurgent parties as Fascists is misleading and 
a confusion of the true issue. It suits the purpose of 
certain interests to describe the present uprising as a 
Fascist plot, because the name of Fascism in its generally 
accepted sense is calculated to arouse suspicion and class 
hatred; but actually the Fascists in Spain are so few as to 
be hardly worth mentioning.91 
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Accusations that the Church was pro-Fascist because it supported 
Franco were simply seen as evidence of anti-Catholic bias. Zealandia 
pointed out that it did not follow that Catholicism and Fascism were 
linked, merely because both were anti-Communist: 
The menace of Communism brought Fascism into being but it is 
wrong to assume that Fascism is the right or the only answer 
to Communism There is in fact only one true and 
sufficient answer to atheist Communism and that is 
Catholicism. Neither the success nor failure of Fascism 
could alter that.92 
Nevertheless there were Catholics who felt more sympathy towards 
the Fascist type of government than towards perhaps more democratic 
forms of government. According to Father E.R. Simmons, historian of 
the Catholic Church in New Zealand, there was "a very divided mind" 
among New Zealand Catholics on the subject of Fascism, "a feeling 
among some that Mussolini was doing good things for Italy". The 
attraction for Mussolini's Italy and for the type of strong corporate 
State that news items claimed was Franco's plan for Spain, was 
perhaps due to the fact that this type of corporate structure had 
been suggested by the Pope in his 1931 encyclical "Quadragesimo Anno" 
(although without the interference of the State itself to the extent 
that Fascism 
director of 
and Nazism allowed). 
the Catholic Social 
Reverend J.A. Higgins S.M.; 
Guild in the Archdiocese of 
Wellington, and much in demand on the Catholic lecture circuit, 
provided a justification for accommodation with Fascism, while 
denying that the Catholic Church was pro-Fascist. Writing in 
Tomorrow, in answer to editorial claims about the Church's role in 
the war, he said: 
ObViously under Fascism the Catholic Church can at least 
live and in some way carryon her work, while under 
Communism the Catholic Church is not even allowed to exist. 
But that does not prove that the Catholic Church either 
approves of Fascism or buys arms for Fascists.94 
Father Simmons considered that the question of Fascism in Spain was 
subordinated to the major issue of saving Spain for Christianity, or 
Catholicism: 
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one would have expected a degree of hostility to the 
Falangists [because they were Fascist], if not to Franco, 
among Catholics; in fact it didn't happen. It was a case of 
turning a blind eye to the chief supporters of Franco in the 
hope that this Communist menace would be overthrown in 
Spain.95 
The Tablet promoted a similar view when it said: 
Catholics as such have no interest in the form of government 
Spaniards set up for themselves, so long as religious 
freedom is provided As a matter of fact ... the only 
champion of religious freedom that has appeared in Spain in 
the present crisis is General Franco.96 
A few of Franco's defenders in the daily newspapers went a little 
further than this denial of interest. Notable among these was a 
Catholic priest in Christchurch. On 2 December 1936 he justified the 
armed revolt in the correspondence columns of The Press: 
Italy, Germany, Portugal, Hungary and now Spain have 
achieved freedom from the "Red menace" only by armed force. 
There is no other way. There may be a hundred conceivable 
ways of combatting the "Red menace" but there is only one 
method already organised and in the field and that is 
Fascism, which many of us do not like but which is by far 
the lesser of the two evils.97 
Later in December, the priest claimed that Fascism had only been 
created as a reaction to Communism and used the same brute force that 
Communism used. 98 Other letters voiced opinions that smacked of 
Fascist beliefs; for instance "Another Catholic Priest" asserted that 
Karl Marx was !fa renegade Jew Mordechai".99 A Dunedin writer 
asserted that Franco's victory represented not only the defeat of 
Russia's attempt to "Sovietise" Spain but also "the deathblow to that 
"liberal" Masonic regime which brought Spain into poverty and 
ignorance". 100 
Letters to the daily newspapers also provided some instances of 
support for Franco out of an identification of his cause as Fascist. 
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ItNino di Somma", in Christchurch, considered that the countries in 
Europe with the most stable Governments were the dictatorships, and 
that it would be best for the world if Mussolini should undertake the 
"pacification" of Spain and establish a Fascist Government like the 
one so successful in Italy.10l The Otago Daily Times' columns 
often featured letters from "Patriotic New Zealander", of Balclutha, 
who evidently supported Franco from more political than religious 
motives. This writer opened the Times' correspondence on the Spanish 
Civil War with a letter praising the "Fascists of Spain" whose sole 
aim he said, was to "scrap the rabid proletarianism" in Spain, which 
resembled that which ruled in Russia. The writer considered that a 
victory for Franco would mean the regeneration of 
uplifting of the national spirit, as had occurred 
Spain and an 
in Italy and 
Germany. This first letter also contained the curious claim that 
Spain's domination 
Communism. 102 It 
Zealander's" later 
by the priesthood had 
to note 
paved 
that 
the way 
"Patriotic 
for 
New is interesting 
letters voiced an attitude more in keeping with 
the general 
references 
impiety. 104 
trend of pro-Francoist sentiment in New Zealand, with 
to attacks on religion in Spain103 and Communist 
References to the regeneration and new virility of 
the Italian and German nations under Fascism, as well as a defence of 
Japan's activities in China, clearly revealed "Patriotic New 
Zealander's" political leanings. Apart from these sentiments, his 
letters provided little new in the area of pro-Francoist propaganda. 
Naturally enough, he placed great emphasis on the menace of Communism 
in Spain. It was obvious that the writer regarded a pro-Fascist 
attitude 
Britain, 
Zealand, 
only for 
Flag .105 
as compatible with a patriotic attachment to New Zealand and 
for he warned of the dangers of the "red element" in New 
in the form of the SMAC, and proclaimed that there was room 
the Union Jack in New Zealand, and not for the Red 
The information Catholics were given about the Nationalists 
tended to deal less with their political aims and to focus upon how 
well the Nationalist forces were fighting, and on conditions in 
Nationalist Spain, in comparison with those in Republican Spain. 
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Much of the material, especially in Zealandia, was concerned with 
contrasting the two Spains, in order to show how Franco's rule would 
benefit the country. Those Catholics who read the Tablet had the 
added bonus of receiving a picture of Nationalist Spain from one of 
their own. Father Ardagh, the parish priest of Queenstown,106 
was in Europe at the outbreak of the war, and visited Spain to learn 
for himself what the situation was. The Tablet printed his diary of 
the visit in three parts on 31 August and 7 and 14 September 1938. 
The priest's diary was, in places, an almost ecstatic account of the 
physical and spiritual condition of Nationalist Spain, as well as 
containing most of the Catholic (and Nationalist) arguments of the 
causes of the war and details of the sites of atrocities and 
desecrations he was taken to see. A major point of emphasis in his 
observations was the normality of life in nationalist Spain, where 
everything was running smoothly despite the war: "The wonderful 
peace everywhere we go. No sign of soldiers anywhere ... People are 
happy, joyous. Business going on as usual ... No sign of worry or 
strain.,,107 
The Catholic press was most anxious to dispel any ideas that 
Nationalist Spain was suffering under the restrictions of harsh 
military rule. Thus, an article in Zealandia said: "Nationalist 
Spain is only authoritarian because there is a war on."108 And, 
according to Father Ardagh: "Nowhere is there any idea of a military 
rule over the country" .109 The working class, in the view of 
Catholic writers, was not suffering under Franco, and economic 
conditions in Nationalist Spain were always pictured as stable. 
Father Ardagh recorded in his diary: "Prices very low. Things 
cheap. We find that wages, etc., have not been reduced, and prices 
have not been raised. That should speak volumes."110 
While items in Zealandia claimed that there was no food shortage 
in Franco's Spain, Father Ardagh did note that: 
In Spain poverty and charity are virtues. One day each week 
is a "one plate" day, i.e. a one plate meal ... In private 
houses the people declare (freely) that they thus save and 
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collected by girls who call at the homes. 
is a no meat day so that there will be no 
people of the towns Franco liberates. It 
the people in Spain rejoice in the 
that amount is 
One day a week 
scarcity for the 
is wonderful and 
sacrifice. III 
Thus, the impression was given that while food was not in abundance, 
Nationalist Spain was so well organised that no one went without, 
unlike the unfair distribution and profiteering reported as being the 
norm in Republican territory. Father Ardagh and other writers in 
both the Tablet and Zealandia eulogised the work of the "Auxilio 
Regular", a social organisation established by the Burgos Government 
to co-ordinate relief work. 
Another aspect of Nationalist Spain that was often contrasted 
with Republican Spain was the treatment of prisoners and of captured 
areas. Father Ardagh's account summed up the basic points in the 
Catholic view of Franco's justice: 
The prisoners from the Reds are divided into three classes 
(1) Those forced by the Reds to fight. Immediately forgiven 
many of them join the Nationalists. (2) Those who fought 
voluntarily but not guilty of any rotten crime. Put into 
concentration camps; used in working gangs, repairing 
bridges etc. and cleaning up the wreckage of the Reds. (3) 
Those guilty of great crimes. If proved they pay the 
penalty. Re No 2 good behaviour will get reprieve and many 
join Franco.112 
This was, 
Republican 
of course, markedly different from the picture of 
Spain, where, besides the atrocities against Catholics and 
suspected Nationalist supporters, there were also disputes between 
rival groups, denouncements and summary executions. 113 
The image of the war as a "national" rebellion of the Spanish 
Catholic spirit against Moscow's "degrading soulless thought and its 
poli tical sla very over the people of Spain" ,114 and the 
mythologising of the war in terms of Spain's history of Catholic 
defiance of Islam, was somewhat marred by Franco's use of Moorish 
troops and the fact that Catholic Basques were among the Republican 
forces. One method of dealing with these potentially embarassing 
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flaws in the Catholic argument appears to have been to ignore them. 
There was very little mention of either the Moors or the Basques in 
Zealandia. The Tablet, however, did confront the issues, although 
there were no articles, as such, devoted to the question of the 
Moors. 
Catholic justifications of Franco's use of Moorish troops 
displayed considerable ingenuity, as well as avoidance of some of the 
main points at issue. Nowhere were allegations of the ferocity and 
cruelty of the Moors discussed or even mentioned. Nor was the 
suggestion that Spaniards might not welcome the idea of having their 
once-hated oppressors invited back on to Spanish soil to kill fellow 
Spaniards, Communist or not. Instead, those who criticised Franco 
for calling in the Moors were accused of "colour prejudice". One 
correspondent to Truth indicated that the major issue in the use of 
the Moors was that they were ftnatives", rather than foreign troops, 
when he asserted that "Moors are certainly not of the black race, but 
are white although tanned by the burning sun and sands".11S 
Catholics also argued that the Moors, at least, shared with 
Nationalist troops a conception of God: "The Moors are Moslems, 
yes. But Moslems are believers in God. They are better than the 
atheist mob that with hellish fury destroys every emblem of 
Christianity."116 The most common justification used was the 
precedent set by Britain and France in World War One in using Indian 
and Senegalese troops respectively: 
What was the religion of these Indians? They were Hindoos 
and Moslems. What was their colour? Black. But they were 
British subjects from British India. So the Moors are 
Spanish subjects from Spanish Morocco. If it be right for 
England to make use of Moslems from India or the Western 
Front against Germany, why is it wrong for Spanish leaders 
to make use of Moslems from Spanish Morocco in the service 
of Spain? Even if a man disagrees with the cause, he must 
admit that the principle is as valid for Spain as for 
England. I am merely asking for reason rather than 
prejudice.117 
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A slightly different version of this argument was used by a 
speaker in a debate at Victoria University, on the subject, "That 
this house lends its support to General Franco and his cause", The 
speaker cited New 
equivalent use 
employment of the 
heat of debate, 
Zealand's participation in the Boer War as an 
of "foreign" troops and as a "precedent" for 
Moors in Spain. 118 Possibly conceived in the 
this particular justification would hardly have 
appealed to the many New Zealanders who considered themselves as 
Britons and their country as an integral part of the British Empire. 
The problem of the Basques fighting for the Republic was an even 
greater flaw in the myth of Catholic Spain throwing off the yoke of 
Communism. Again, it was the Tablet that contained more discussion 
of the problem, including the text of a letter from the Primate of 
Spain, Cardinal Goma, to the Basque President, Jose Aguirre, begging 
him to break his alliance with the Government and join 
Franco. 119 The Catholic explanation for the "tragic error" of 
the Basques120 was perhaps best articulated in an editorial in 
the Tablet in April 1937: 
The position of the Basques is one of the most interesting 
features of the Spanish conflict, and from the viewpoint of 
Catholics one of the most tragic; it is used freely by the 
opponents of the Church as proof that Catholics are fighting 
on both sides thus removing the civil war beyond the scope 
of a religious struggle. The Basques, however are not 
fighting unitedly on either side. There are 20,000 of them 
fighting with Franco because only two provinces of 
Vascongada ever wanted autonomy very much ... Eliminate the 
autonomy for which some Basques are still fighting in Bilbao 
and Santander, and they would certainly fight against the 
anti-God programme of the Madrid government. 
Many of the Basques threw their weight behind the Madrid 
government not because they were supporters of Caballero's 
Bolshevism but because they were caught by their keenness 
for local rule and by the pledges of the government. To the 
Basque way of thinking the military movement which held the 
support of the Carlists and Phalangists, was not merely a 
movement directed against Communists but was directed also 
against the ardent aspirations for autonomy of the Basque 
country; and the defence of religion in this instance, 
seemed to them to be only a pretext invoked by the 
Nationalists to cloak political designs.112 
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The Basques had put their politics before their religion and, in 
the view of the Catholic press, would suffer for it, both spiritually 
and politically, for the Communists would not honour their 
agreement. It was emphasised that this desire for autonomy was the 
only reason that the Basques supported the Communists, and it did not 
imply in any way that the Basques supported atheist Communism. In 
the same editorial, the Tablet pointed out that, in Basque territory 
Catholics were not persecuted and religious worship went on as usual. 
There was a great deal of excitement in the pages of Zealandia, 
although not in the Tablet, about the Basque refugee children in 
England. Zealandia saw the children as being used as a "Red" 
propaganda weapon. This appeared to be proved by the alleged 
discovery, by a Nationalist Salvage Squad in Bilbao, of a secret 
propaganda report detailing methods to be used by Spanish and English 
Communist propagandists to stir up support in Britain for the 
Republicans. What angered the Catholic press most about this, was 
the purported attempt to show British Catholic Archbishop, Arthur 
Hinsley, as supporting the Basque separatist movement, when his 
agreement to work with the English National Joint Committee on Spain 
was merely because the Basque children were in need of both physical 
and spiritual care. 122 While the Catholic press objected to what 
it saw as the manipulative use of the Basque children for Communist 
propaganda purposes, it, in fact, did the same thing. In October 
1937, there were several items in Zea1andia describing the 
"lawlessness" and hooligan behaviour of those Basque children who had 
claimed not to be Catholic. In one reported incident, "Camarthen 
villagers were terrorised by children with knives, and the police 
were called in".123 This misbehaviour was ascribed to the 
pernicious influence of the Communists and Anarchists, under whose 
sway the children had been in Spain. 
Besides the embarassing issues of the Moors and the Basques, 
there was another aspect of the civil war to which the Catholic press 
paid little 
the war it 
attention, because it also did not fit with the ,image of 
had created. The whole vexed question of Italian and 
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German intervention on behalf of Franco received very little mention 
in the pages of either the Tablet or Zealandia. The issue, was, 
again, seen as exaggerated by Leftists to arouse anti-Nationalist 
feelings, and, also, to blacken the Church by claiming that it 
supported Fascism. However, German and Italian intervention could 
not be ignored completely. The usual argument was that the extent of 
Italian and German intervention had been grossly exaggerated by "Red" 
propagandists. This claim was necessary in order to uphold the image 
of the Nationalist rebellion as a "national" movement, "of Spain and 
for Spain", fostered both by Nationalist propagandists and by the 
Catholic press. Thus, Father Ardagh said: 
Different people tell us there are really no foreigners on 
Franco's side; about 2000 Italians at the front, far less 
than that of Germans who are only technical advisers. 
And Spain does not want outsiders. It is her war, defending 
her home and religion ... Spain is going~ be for Spain -
no foreign domination here.124 
Of all the excuses made about Italian and German intervention, an 
item in Zealandia contained the most remarkable: 
The general public is unaware of the fact that when German 
and Italian airplanes are spoken of in the Spanish war, the 
reference is to the make of the machine and not to the 
nationality of the pilots.125 
The minimal amount of German and Italian intervention that was 
acknowledged was generally justified by the argument that it was 
necessary to counteract the massive aid given to the Government by 
the Russians, 
Brigades. 126 
and the fighting strength of the International 
Readers of 
entitled "Franco, Germany, 
the Tablet, 
Italy: 
encountering 
A Query for 
the article 
Near Left 
Sympathisers", might have expected to find a discussion of the 
involvement of foreign troops. Instead, the article dealt mainly 
with Franco's restructuring of the economy in order to keep foreign 
debts at a minimum level; wheat went to Germany and olive oil to 
Italy, in exchange for war materials, but that was a fair exchange, 
for where would these countries have been if these important sources 
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had been cut off by the "Reds"? The article ended by emphasising the 
indebtedness of Italy and Germany to Franco, in contrast to Leftist 
arguments that Franco was under the sway of Mussolini and Hitler: 
The French Popular Front came into being on the wave of 
Leftist enthusiasm engendered by the Popular Front victory 
in Spain. Had Largo Caballero's dream of an Iberian Union 
of Soviets materialised France would have followed 
inevitably. Then both Germany and Italy would have been 
sandwiched between a Franco-Spanish Soviet block on one side 
and a Russian Soviet block on the other. In view of this, 
have Germany and Italy saved Spain, or has Spain saved Italy 
and Germany?127 
The concomittant to this argument was that Mussolini and Hitler had 
given aid to Franco only once they had become aware of the numbers of 
Russians and Frenchmen fighting on the side of the Government and 
because they, too, were aware of the "Red menace" in Spain. 128 
The minimising of foreign aid to Franco was accompanied by 
frequent references to the massive aid the Republicans were receiving 
from Russia; particularly in the way of war materials. This 
argument, of course, fulfilled two functions; it reinforced the idea 
that the people of Spain were on Franco's side and also contributed 
to the "Communist plot" theory. Naturally, if Russia had plotted to 
"Sovietise" Spain, the utmost support would be given to its puppets 
to ensure a Communist victory. 
According to Catholic sources, the Republican war effort was only 
kept going by the massive influx of International Brigade troops and 
Russian war materials. An alleged deserter from the International 
Brigades was quoted as saying "They have more arms than men to use 
them."129 The International Brigaders themselves were described 
variously 
moti ves, 
Spain in 
claimed 
as 
but 
an 
that 
"Europe's undesirables, although some had honest 
misguided ones",130 or "radicals who have flocked to 
attempt to win that nation for Communism" ,131 It was 
even the International Brigades had lost confidence in 
the Republican Government and its cause. The Tablet reported that "A 
continuous stream of deserters from the International Brigades calls 
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at the London office of our London contemporary, the 
Universe. 132 
Fascist and 
One 
who 
such deserter, who 
joined the Brigades 
had been told Franco was a 
to fight for his Church, 
described his disillusion and claimed that Spaniards did not want to 
fight for the Government: 
The only Spaniards now joining the army are young and quite 
unwilling conscripts. He has been one of an armed party 
with fixed bayonets sent to drag boys of 17 and 18 from 
their homes.133 
There was little discussion of the NIC in the Catholic press. 
Since the NIC could be seen to be operating mostly in the favour of 
Germany and Italy, and therefore, Franco, perhaps no comment was 
deemed necessary. Both the issue of German and Italian intervention, 
and that of the NIC, were treated merely as sidelines to the major 
issue of Communist plotting and intervention in Spain. Zealandia, in 
an editorial (one of only two major items on the NIC in the three 
years of the war), used recent events in the NIC as a starting point 
for a discussion of Communist plans for world domination. Russian 
protests at German and Italian intervention only came about, it said, 
because of Nationalist victories. Zealandia condemned the "priceless 
effrontery that unctuously upbraids the intervention of other States 
in the Spanish situation a situation which was engineered by 
Russia's own agents and in which Russia herself has been supplying 
military and financial aid to one of the combatant parties".134 
Zealandia also viewed the non-intervention agreement as a creation of 
the Russians for their own purposes, instigated by Moscow's puppet, 
Leon Blum, to draw attention away from Russian activities in 
Spain. 135 
There was also little discussion of Britain's role in the Spanish 
conflict; however, what little there was displayed some ambivalence 
towards Britain. In part, the ambivalence may be explained by the 
New Zealand Catholic press' use of Nationalist propaganda; for 
instance, in the rather sullen references to British precedents in 
the use of foreign troops and questionable methods of 
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warfare. 136 Some New Zealand Catholics shared Franco's 
resentment that Britain had not gone to Franco's aid. In letters to 
daily newspapers there was criticism of Britain for what Catholics 
saw as its refusal 
accused Britain of 
Pro-Italian sentiment 
to grant Franco beligerent rights,137 and some 
aiding the Republicans by default. 138 
among New Zealand Catholics may have also 
accounted for ambivalence towards British policy. G.F. Seward, one 
of the more prolific correspondents to The Press in defence of the 
Catholic view of the Spanish Civil War, exemplified this attitude: 
we Britons, so far as our press represents us, have been 
taking a priggish, hypocritical and unjust attitude towards 
Italy. British foreign policy has certainly not been more 
consistent, trustworthy, and straightforward than Italian 
Great Britain has adopted a highly moral attitude to 
hide a good deal of secret manoeuvring for her own ends ... 
Britain does not want a speedy decision in Spain. She wants 
a compromise, to keep Spain weak and divided. Italy, for 
her own ends and for the good of Europe and Christian 
civilisation wants to see Franco victorious, and says so 
plainly.139 
Reverend J.A. Higgins blamed England and France for 
indifference of Spanish Catholics, which had allowed the growth 
Communism in Spain. England and France, he said, were regarded 
the progressive nations of Europe, because of the development 
the 
of 
as 
of 
capitalism in those two countries; Spain was regarded as backward. 
When Spain tried to emulate France and England, it was then that the 
social abuses began that led to the acceptance of the teachings of 
Communism by some Spaniards: 
the Spanish capitalists did not learn usury from the 
Catholic Church but from the example of nations held up as 
an example to the world ... from the new found friend of 
France and England [Russia] came Communism, and its 
attendant horrors, to Spain ... A very plain truth is that 
Spaniards were debauched from the orbit of Catholic 
influence by the wealth offered by the capitalist 
nations. 140 
Conversely, at least one Catholic argued that anyone who supported 
the Spanish Government was a Communist and, therefore, disloyal to 
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Britain,141 and the Catholic press complained that the Labour 
Government's policy was disloyal to Britain. 142 
Catholic interests undoubtedly took precedence over those of 
Empire. There was little mention of Spain's strategic value to 
Britain, although Bishop Liston had said in his article at the 
beginning of the war that '\Jere the re bels to triumph, aided by Italy 
and Germany [England's] interests in the Mediterranean would be 
threatened". 143 Once the Church had allied itself with Franco's 
cause, there was no longer 
national character of the 
Spain should be free of 
reassurance enough for 
talk of "rebels", and the emphasis on the 
rebellion and Franco's determination that 
foreign domination possibly counted as 
those who were \"orried about the 
Mediterranean. The Tablet did print one item that quoted Franco's 
denial that a "Latin bloc" - Spain, Portugal, Italy - would dominate 
the Mediterranean. 
"But does England prefer the ports of Spain to become 
Russian ports?" said General Franco. "We Latins are 
renewing our ties of friendship that bind us together 
economically and culturally ... How can such a rapprochement 
be held to threaten anyone? ... We Spaniards have always 
regarded a good understanding with England as the first 
article of our political programme."144 
Readers of Zealandia during the period of the war might have 
gained the impression that, while the Catholic press was agitated 
about the issue, New Zealand Catholics were not. There was little 
indication in Zealandia's pages of any activity by Catholics in New 
Zealand about the civil war. However, the Tablet, with its more 
comprehensive coverage of diocesan news, gave a clearer picture. 
There were days of prayer for Spain "in reparation to our Divine Lord 
in the Blessed Sacrament for the sacrileges suffered by His 
Church",102 and novenas said for Spain. In January 1937 an 
appeal by the Bishop of Wellington, Thomas O'Shea, for money to 
assist in the rebuilding of schools, churches and convents in Spain, 
was read in all Wellington churches. This raised £1,011.10.0. 145 
Another appeal in the Dunedin diocese in August 1937 raised a total 
of £ 458 . 6 . 8 . 
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An indication that the issue was alive in the minds of Catholics 
was also given in reports of Catholic debating societies using 
various aspects of the civil war as topics for debates, for example, 
"That Britain 
Spain",146 
should 
Holy Name 
be prepared to support the insurgents in 
Societies and Catholic Students' Guilds were 
recipients of lectures on the subject of the war. One of the most 
interesting must have been the one given to the Wellington Students 
Guild by Phillip Cross, who fought for General Franco for 8 months in 
Spain ,147 Surprisingly, this was the only mention in either 
paper of a New Zealander whose personal involvement in the war must 
have been of great interest to Catholics. 
It sometimes appeared that the editor of Zealandia was more 
concerned with attitudes overseas than in New Zealand - based in a 
city in which operated one of the most active branches of the Spanish 
Medical Aid Committee, Zealandia did not have one editorial dealing 
with the activities of the SMAC. But i~ one respect Zealandia's 
editorials gave a very clear exposition of an element in the New 
Zealand Catholic response. This was perhaps a response that came 
initially more from the hierarchy than the laity, concerned as it was 
with the lesson of the civil war for Catholics. In three editorials 
at the beginning of the war, Zealandia compared the fanatical 
dedication of the Communists with the "nominal Catholicism" of the 
Catholic people of Spain. While this argument that the people of 
Spain had failed in their obligations to their faith was a part of 
the Catholic press' defence of the role of the Church in the Spanish 
Civil War, it was also the basis for a call to Catholic Action in New 
Zealand. Catholic Action was just beginning in New Zealand at this 
time, and the Spanish Civil War was the perfect image upon which to 
draw to convince Catholics of the need for "unity in action", as 
Zealandia called it, in an editorial in September 1936. Instead of 
many church societies, all acting in their own areas without 
co-ordinating with each other: 
would it not be wiser that we profit by the experience of 
Spain and, as our Church develops here direct all our 
activities in such a manner as to preserve unity in action 
as well as faith?148 
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Catholics must be militant in their faith and have a deep inner 
commitment to it, in order to combat successfully the enemies of the 
Church: 
No Catholic can properly stand aside from the battle that is 
now being waged throughout the world between the Kingdom of 
Christ and the powers of darkness. As events have shown, 
the greatest danger to the Church is in the false sense of 
security that presumes one's local community to be immune 
from peril.149 
Although both publications identified the peril in New Zealand aE 
Communism, especially in view of the attempt by the New Zealanc 
Communist party to affiliate with the Labour Party in 1937, the 
Tablet did more than Zealandia to relate the potential threat in New 
Zealand to the present danger facing the Church in Spain. Unlike 
Zealandia, the Tablet launched editorial attacks on the SMAC from its 
very beginnings in Dunedin, with three editorials on the subject. 
After the inaugural meeting of the Dunedin SMAC in November 1936, the 
Tablet expressed its dismay that "various societies of a social, 
medical and 
the Spanish 
Ambulance had 
religious character 
Reds",lSO for a 
have been ensnared into support of 
representative of the St John 
The leaders of the movement were been at the meeting. 
condemned as: 
The intelligentsia of the Left - those smart intellectuals 
who become Communists not because they have any sympathy 
with the oppressed poor but because it's jolly to wear a red 
tie and cultivate a radical outlook. lSI 
The voice of 
SMAC. The Bishop 
the involvement of 
the Catholic hierarchy was also raised against the 
of Christchurch, Matthew Brodie, protested about 
the St John Ambulance Association, at a public 
meeting to organise a SMAC branch in Christchurch. Bishop Brodie 
objected to the involvement of the St John's Ambulance and the Red 
Cross on the grounds that the SMAC was a partisan organisation, 
supporting a Government in Spain that was "simply a disgrace to 
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civilisation marching over democracy and over the religious 
liberties of a nation".lS2 
Bishop Brodie's protest aroused a flurry of controversy in the 
correspondence columns of both The Press and the Otago Daily Times. 
Letters to both newspapers placed most emphasis on the traditionally 
neutral stand of the Red Cross and St John's Amublance and protested 
about their 
sympathies .153 
association 
The SMAC, 
with a group that had 
said one writer, was a prime example of 
the Popular Front tactic of "tranquillising minds and attracting 
large numbers of the non-Communist masses into a united 
movement".154 Local pro-Republican activities were regarded as 
another facet of Communism's plan for world domination, which had 
caused the war in Spain: 
Let not the 
Communists. 
which they 
here is just 
New Zealand workers or public be fooled by the 
They talk of a "Popular Front" by means of 
hope to get into the Labour Party and their aim 
the same as it is in Spain. ISS 
The controversy about the SMAC also provided the Tablet with an 
opportunity to attack the supposed anti-Catholicism of the Protestant 
Churches in New Zealand. The Tablet congratulated Bishop Brodie on 
his "courageous" stand and added: "We regret that the leaders of 
thought in other sections of the Christian community are noticeably 
lacking in similar courage.,,156 The Tablet poured scorn on the 
"anti-Fascism" of Protestant ministers who supported the Government 
of Spain, implying that this was merely a cloak for anti-Catholicism: 
Heads of Protestant Churches too, are associating themselves 
in this move to help along the Communist cause of law and 
order in Spain they see - or think they see - in this 
effort an opportunity of striking a blow, however feeble, at 
the big bad wolf of Fascism, which they quite erroneously 
associate with the Catholic Church. 157 
None of the Protestant Churches in New Zealand gave official 
endorsement to the SMAC; thus, the Catholic view of Protestant 
involvement said more about Catholic fears at the time than it did 
about the attitudes of Protestantism. 
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Related to the Tablet's response to the SMAC, and a significant 
part of the specifically New Zealand Catholic response, was the 
Church's attitude to the stance of the Labour Party, and Government, 
towards the war. The relationship between the Catholic Church and 
the Labour Party in this period was somewhat ambivalent, at least ont 
the part of the Church. The attitude of the Universal Church towards 
Socialism was very clear - Catholics were to have no association with 
Socialism at all. Yet, in New Zealand, many Catholics, especially 
Catholic workers, had voted for the Labour Party, despite the 
obviously Socialist tendencies of some of the party's policies. In 
addition, some Labour MPs, including the Prime Minister himself, were 
Catholics, albeit lapsed. Father Simmons has noted the "unlikely 
friendship" between the Bishop of Auckland, James Liston, and Michael 
Savage .158 However, the hierarchy did have some hesitations 
about aspects of Labour's programme. 
The issue of the Spanish Civil War could only increase the unease 
of the Church. What angered Catholics the most was the fact that 
some Labour MPs openly supported the SMAC, which was sending medical 
aid funds to the Government of Spain. Catholic letters to the Otago 
Daily Times objected to the involvement with the SMAC of Dunedin 
Labour MPs; Dr D.G. McMilland and Peter Nielsen, and of Dunedin 
Mayor, Reverend E.T. Cox, and Councillor Mark Silverstone. There 
were demands that these gentlemen state whether they were Communists 
or not,159 and complaints that £5 of ratepayers' money had been 
given by the City Council to the SMAC fund. 160 Some voiced 
doubts that the medical aid unit would ever be sent and questioned 
the eventual use of funds raised; the implication was, of course, 
that the monies would go to the Communist Party.16l One 
correspondent suggested that Dr McMillan should lead the proposed 
medical unit and "take some of his colleagues with him", presumably 
with reference to the Labour Government. 162 
The 
benefit 
Tablet, 
of the 
at first, was inclined to give the Labour Party the 
doubt. In its third editorial on the SMAC, entitled 
"Dunedin-Spain-Moscow", it criticised Dr McMillan, who was President 
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of the SMAC, for his statements about the purpose of the SMAC, but 
conceded that he might be unaware of the real facts of the situation 
in Spain. The editorial went on to say: 
The Dunedin organisers of Spanish relief have, perhaps 
unwittingly, identified the Labour Party with a combination 
of forces the Spanish government which embrace 
everything repulsive to Catholics.163 
It concluded with the solemn warning that: 
[the organisers of Spanish relief] have introduced factors 
which are liable to be mentally pigeonholed for guidance 
when sane and thoughtful administrators are needed in 
municipal and general politics in the future.164 
Subtle references to the loss of Catholic electoral support were 
evident in the Catholic press' discussion of the Labour Government's 
policy. Later in the war suggestions that Labour MPs had been misled 
by "Red" propaganda would be replaced by claims that the Labour Party 
was infiltrated by Communists. Again, over the issue of Labour MPs 
support for the SMAC, Zealandia asked if there were two voices in the 
party, the official voice supporting British policy and that of MPs 
who were "personally, actively and publicly supporting" the SMAC: 
Does that indicate that the party is not only tainted with 
Communism, but is compromising with it? The plain facts of 
actual events are there to lead the public mind to form its 
own conclusions of the matter.165 
Two months later Zealandia answered its own question in response to 
an article in the Auckland Star by Labour MP; E.J. Howard supporting 
the pro-Republican interpretation of the war. (This article was 
answered by an unnamed contributor to Zealandia who gave the standard 
Catholic analysis of the issues of the war. 166 ) Editorially, 
Zealandia accused those members of the Labour Party who supported the 
Republic of having Communist sympathies; after all had not Mr Nash 
been to Russia? Zealandia suggested that the Labour Government had 
to appear to support the Spanish Reds: 
It 
164 
to placate the Reds in the ranks of the Labour Party, but 
how far are red tendencies allowed to colour the public 
statements of Labour Party M.P.'s ... the intelligence and 
integrity of the party is at stake ... 167 
warned that "the intelligence of the electorate is not 
dulled".168 
There was surprisingly little comment on the stance taken by the 
New Zealand High Commissioner, W. Jordan, at the League of Nations, 
an obvious target for opponents of the Government. The Tablet merely 
suggested that, while it was obvious that Mr Jordan had been taken in 
by Red propaganda about Italian "piracy" in the Mediterranean, it was 
curious that his humanitarian concern did not extend to the Catholics 
murdered by the "Reds" in Spain: 
It seems to us that the League has little chance of success 
when it has delegates as unbalanced as Mr Jordan, discussing 
international affairs in a spirit of violent 
partisanship.169 
Only on one occasion did editorial attitudes in the Catholic 
press coincide with that of Labour's political opponents; namely, 
that the Labour Government, in its stance on the war, was out of step 
with Britain and was betraying the leader of the Commonwealth and the 
Commonwealth itself. In an editorial on radio broadcasts by one of 
the three nurses sent to Spain by the SMAC, Zealandia said: 
It is one thing to crusade and denounce in Hyde Park: it is 
quite another thing to use a government censored radio 
service in support of a European movement which in its 
inseparable extensions holds grave political possibilities 
for the empire. It is a movement to which the British Prime 
Minister has, in the face of violent criticism, refused to 
commit his country. The New Zealand government broadcasting 
authorities cannot possibly be unaware of this. Why then 
are the implications ignored? That is a question of more 
than passing concern to the citizens of the Dominion ... 170 
Catholic Pro-Francoist letters to the newspapers also made this 
point. 171 However, the claim of disloyalty was not made on 
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entirely the same grounds as "Non-Interventionist" charges. Catholic 
pro-Francoists displayed little of the concern for the unity of the 
Empire 
policy 
thought. 
and the confidence in motives and methods of British foreign 
that was so strong a feature of "Non-Interventionist" 
Dislike of Communism was common to both, of course, but the 
use of this particular argument by Catholics was rather less sincere 
in its Imperialism, given their equivocal response to Britain's role 
in the crisis. 
Some Catholics felt so strongly about the attitudes of the Labour 
Party MPs that a public 
Catholic members of the 
"prominent member of the 
meeting was organised at Upper Hutt by 
party to protest at a lecture given by a 
same party".172 The Tablet printed the 
text of the address given at this meeting. Like the answer to E.J. 
Howard published in Zealandia, it gave a Catholic interpretation of 
the issues, repeating most of the claims made by the Catholic press. 
It contained no reference to the Labour Party or to the Catholic 
response to its policy. However, a letter to the editor of the 
Tablet congratulating the organisers of the meeting perhaps summed up 
the attitudes of these Catholics. 
Now what is the foreign policy of the Labour Government. 
Democracy? Indeed, members prefer the name of Socialist to 
that of Communist, but where and when have any of them 
denounced the fiendish work of COMMUNISM? ... unless the 
present Government plainly declares a settled reversed 
foreign policy it cannot expect any Catholic support in 
November. 
Mr Jordan's attitudes at Geneva have been criticised all 
round, except by the Rationalists and we all know what they 
are ... Workers wake up, open your eyes!173 
A few Catholic Labour voters also wrote to the Labour Party 
newspaper, the Standard, complaining of Labour and Trades Union 
support for the Republicans. One said: 
I think it is necessary to advise the Labour Party in New 
Zealand that an overwhelming majority of Catholics are 
Labour Supporters, and if they are to remain so, the members 
of the party would be well advised to make sure of their 
facts before terming a herd comparable to the supporters of 
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Barbarossa a movement for social reform and the good of the 
people.174 
There appears to have been little other protest by Catholics within 
the Labour Party, or attempts to change Labour's attitude towards the 
war in Spain. Nevertheless, Catholic complaints to the Standard were 
undoubtedly part of the reason the paper closed its correspondence 
columns to discussion of the war. 175 
There was not much attempt to convert any other New Zealanders to 
Franco's cause. The main method of promoting pro-Francoism outside 
the Church appears to have peen through the medium of the daily and 
weekly press. There were frequent claims in the Catholic press and 
in Catholic 
displaying an 
letters to newspapers that 
anti-Franco and, therefore, 
the secular press was 
anti-Catholic bias. 176 
Catholics wrote letters to ne\vspaper editors, not only in answer to 
pro-Republican letters, but also in complaint about editorials on the 
subject of the war. In the view of Catholics, the New Zealand press 
and its overseas sources were either biased in favour of the "Reds tt , 
or the dupes of a massive and unscrupulous Communist propaganda 
campaign. In 1939, the Tablet printed two letters from G.F. Seward, 
of Christchurch, complaining about his local papers' treatment of the 
Spanish Civil War: 
It seems that both the Christchurch daily papers continue to 
publish news items, articles and editorial comments about 
Spain, which I and many others believe to be absolutely 
false, and both papers refuse me (and presumably anyone 
else) the right to criticise them on the subject.177 
Since Seward's lengthy expositions of the pro-Francoist position 
appeared frequently in The Press, at least, one can only consider 
that the basis of his complaint was that the newspapers refused to 
alter their views to suit his. Much of this Catholic protest in the 
newspapers centred on news about, and editorials discussing, foreign 
involvement in the war, as well as Franco's methods of warfare. 
Catholics also complained about the use of the terms "loyalist" and 
lire bel" , since in their vie 1,,,,, Franco's forces were the true loyalists 
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and "misapplication" of the terms only perpetuated "misinformation" 
about the war. 
An interesting example of pro-Francoist objections to press bias 
was the controversy between Auckland University's student newspaper, 
Craccum, and its Wellington counterpart, Salient. The latter was the 
most pro-Republican of all four student newspapers and, in 1937, 
produced a "Spanish number", which included an interview with 
returned International Brigader Tom Spiller, an editorial on the war 
and sundry other articles with a pro-Republican bias ,178 
Craccum, on the other hand, demonstrated a subtly pro-Francoist bias 
and, in general, as one of its critics complained, conducted Ita 
systematic campaign against anything that can be regarded as faintly 
liberal", 
"confusion 
achieved by 
of comment 
reporting techniques that utilised the 
unsupported comment with fact".179 
Craccum objected to Salient's "Spanish number" with an editorial 
entitled "Subversive Propaganda", which condemned Salient for the 
publication of "the flagrant propaganda" of a "decided 
minority".180 Both the editorial and two letters in the same 
issue demonstrated a pro-Francoist version of the "Non-
Interventionist" view that the ideological issues of the war in Spain 
were no business of New Zealanders. One of Craccum's correspondents 
said: 
these two "isms" we have been hearing so much about 
lately have no particular interest for me, but, frankly, I 
am just a little puzzled why "Salient" should feature 
something that in my honest oplnlon has absolutely no 
interest for the majority of sane-minded readers.18l 
The other letter accused Salient of descending to the level of a 
"communistic" rag and emphasised the necessity for impartiality, and 
informed and intelligent comment, in a student newspaper. The 
correspondent's view of what was informed and intelligent appeared 
not to include anything of a Leftist nature.182 
The attitude of Craccum's editor and its correspondents differed 
from "Non-Interventionism", in that it was not a dismissal of the war 
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as irrelevant to New Zealanders, but a protest at pro-Republican 
propaganda, thinly disguised as a concern for the impartiality of 
student newspapers. One correspondent complained of Salient's 
"flagrant disregard for the facts" of the situation in Spain;183 
another, who had called for impartiality, presented a "dispassionate" 
survey of "the facts" about Spain that was in essence a pro-Francoist 
view of the war. Craccum's own claim of impartiality was made 
somewhat farcical by the inclusion, in the same issue, of an item 
recommending Arnold Lunn's Spanish Rehearsal in terms that could 
hardly be called unbiased: "An eminent English philosopher exposes 
the Communist plot in Spain.1!184 
Craccum's attitude was indicative of the defensive nature of 
pro-Francoism in New Zealand. Editorially, Craccum refrained from 
open comment in support of Franco, preferring to leave more overt 
bias to its always pseudonymous correspondents. Indeed, Craccum's 
editorial about Salient was a masterpiece of circumlocution, no doubt 
intended to reinforce the paper's claim that it had "no violent 
tendencies in any direction", but also intriguing in its avoidance of 
mentioning the specific issue that had caused the difference of 
opinion with Salient. In the same manner, the Catholic Church only 
propagandised for Franco in its own newspapers and did not take the 
issue to the New Zealand public, leaving "outside!1 promotion of 
Franco's cause to individual members of its flock, who frequently 
responded to alternative views of the war with charges of 
anti-Catholicism. The sense gained from many Catholic pro-Francoist 
letters, that they were, in the words of one, "persistently opposing 
the popular view of the war" ,185 suggests that Catholic 
pro-Francoism had little appeal to non-Catholic New Zealanders. 
While the Catholic arguments that Spain was in danger of a 
Communist "take-over" obviously gained support from other sources, 
the image of the war as a crusade for Christianity or Catholicism, 
and of Franco and his army as perfect Christian crusaders, did not. 
Reports of the bombing of civilians by the Nationalist forces and the 
evidence of Italian and German involvement, despite Catholic denials, 
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militated against the adoption of a pro-Francoist view by 
non-Catholics. Most of the secular press revealed as much distaste 
for Franco and his allies as they did for the Republicans and theirs. 
Because Catholic archives were not available and Church histories 
do not discuss such matters, it is difficult to determine either the 
immediate impact, or any long-term effect of the Spanish Civil War 
upon the New Zealand Catholic Church. According to Father Simmons, 
the 1930s were a time of intellectual growth and vitality within the 
Church and this, perhaps, encouraged a greater interest in affairs 
outside the narrow New Zealand Church community. The threat to the 
faith, not only in Spain, but in other parts of Europe as well meant 
that Catholics had a particular interest in international affairs. 
The fact that they belonged to an international Church organisation, 
in any case, gave New Zealand Catholics a wider perspective on the 
outside world. On the other hand, the threat to the Church and the 
assumption that 
anti-Catholicism may 
Catholics and, thus, 
Zealand society. 
pro-Republican sentiment corresponded to 
have encouraged a "closing of ranks" among 
increased the insularity of the Church in New 
Atrocity stories and the image of an assault on the Church in 
Catholic Spain jolted the complacency of Catholics, or should have, 
according to the Catholic press. The Spanish Civil War was certainly 
used by the Church in New Zealand to illustrate the necessity for 
Catholic Action, a movement of apostolic and social action by lay 
people first begun in France in the 1920s. Although the overwhelming 
concern in the Catholic press was for the survival of the Church in 
Spain and the defeat of Communism there, it was concerned to bring 
the issue home to New Zealand Catholics. However, there is little 
evidence that New Zealand Catholics felt moved to choose between 
their political and religious allegiances, on the grounds of what was 
regarded as the Labour Government's support of Communism in Spain. 
Nevertheless, the central message for New Zealand Catholics about 
the war was "it could happen here": 
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It is unthinkable that the Spanish War of Deliverance should 
be brought to an end without a salutary effect on other 
countries including our own the defeat of Spanish 
Communism is a warning especially to Catholics of this 
country: a solemn reminder of their duty not only of 
combatting a system which brought chaos to Spain, but of 
working in season and out of season to remove the causes 
upon which the success of Communism depends.186 
171 
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CHAPTER 4 
SPAIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE UNITED FRONT: 
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF NEW ZEALAND 
AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 
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Pro-Republican opinions in New Zealand were more broadly based 
than pro-Francoist sentiments. Individuals, organisations and 
publications with varying political and social views supported the 
Government of Spain. But, if anyone organisation was in the 
vanguard of the pro-Republican movement, encouraging and attempting 
to dominate and co-ordinate pro-Republican feeling in New Zealand, it 
was the Communist Party. 
For Communists, as much as Catholics, the war in Spain became a 
holy war, a crusade against the forces of evil, in this case, 
Fascism. In Communist propaganda, Spain became a paradigm: the 
Republican Government represented democracy everywhere; the attack 
upon it by Franco and his Italian and German allies was the very 
embodiment of Fascist aggression and of the Fascist plan to destroy 
democracy everywhere. 
The defence of democracy by a party not noted for its own 
preference for the methods of parliamentary democracy was part of the 
Communist Party's campaign for a United or Popular Front1 against 
Fascism, in which the Spanish Civil War and the concern it aroused 
played a major part. The Seventh World Congress of the Communist 
International (Comintern), held in July and August 1935, had adopted 
the policy of the Popular Front and Collective Security. Instead of 
eschewing contact with, and even working against, other Left groups -
Socialists, social-democrats, Fabians, Syndicalists and such like -
Communists were to work with all other social-democratic 
working-class and middle-class groups against Fascism. The 
preservation of bourgeois parliamentary democracy from Fascism was 
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promoted as a necessary preliminary to the establishment of 
"proletarian 
recognition 
especially 
democracy". Behind the United Front policy, was a 
threat to the Soviet Union posed by Fascism, 
Germany, and of the need for an alliance with 
of the 
Hitler's 
bourgeois democratic countries against Fascism. 2 
The nature of the war in Spain made it an ideal issue with which 
to form the basis of a United Front policy that would continue once 
the war had been won for democracy, and that could be carried over 
into other 
Spain was, 
policy and 
issues even while the war was in progress. The war in 
at one and the same time, a focus for the United Front 
an example of the necessity for such a coalition of 
"progressive" groups. The Popular Front Government of Spain and its 
army were depicted as the epitome of the United Front, fighting to 
save not only their own, but world democracy from Fascism. 
There were, however, some contradictions in Communist propaganda 
about the war that revealed the "hidden agenda" of the United Front 
policy; that is, the protection of Soviet Russia and the ultimate aim 
of proletarian revolution. Despite the promotion of the United 
Front, there were attacks on other groups, inside Spain and 
elsewhere, for "Trotskyism", "sectarianism", or failure to follow the 
Communist Party in creating the United Front. The Communist Party 
was promoted as the most anti-Fascist, and the most pro-Republican 
organisation in the United Front. 
There are few sources available that illuminate the inner 
workings of the Communist Party in New Zealand. Only a small number 
of Communist Party records are available to the researcher. An 
important collection of the records of the Christchurch branch of the 
Communist Party is held in the Canterbury University Library. 
Unfortunately, at the time this study was undertaken, some 
significant 
be found. 3 
items in this collection had been misplaced and could not 
The McAra Papers at Auckland University Library also 
contain some Communist Party material. 4 Neither collection 
contains any evidence of directives to the New Zealand Party from its 
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overseas governing body, the Comintern, although, obviously, an 
international and highly centralised organisation like the Communist 
Party would have received a good deal of its direction from this 
source. There is also little record of directives from the central 
party apparatus in New Zealand to its various sections regarding 
pro-Republican activity. Therefore, most of the evidence of the 
Communist Party's attitude towards the war in Spain and its use of 
the issue to create a United Front has been taken from its published 
propaganda. 
The main source of Communist pro-Republican propaganda was the 
Party's newspaper, the Workers Weekly, which gave a clear indication 
of the news and views received from overseas sources, and of the 
application of the Communist view of the war to the New Zealand 
scene. Like the Catholic newspapers, the Workers Weekly received a 
good deal of its articles and items on the war in Spain from overseas 
sources. The paper relied heavily upon material from International 
Press Correspondence (Imprecor), the official organ of the Comin~ern, 
and from English Communist publications, such as the Daily Worker. 
The Weekly also published articles and items from Izvestia, the 
official Soviet newspaper. Such "received" news included articles by 
Communist reporters in Spain, including Hugh Slater and Claud 
Cockburn (writing under the pseudonum of Frank Pitcairn). One of the 
most important articles about the Spanish Civil War, in terms of its 
expression of the Communist stance, was by Georgi Dimitrov, head of 
the Comintern. Entitled "Two Years Heroic Struggle of the Spanish 
People", it was published in the Weekly in five parts between 9 
September and 7 October 1938. 5 
Communist propaganda also appeared in the Grey River Argus, a 
published on the West Coast of New Zealand, 
stronghold. The Argus was not an official 
Party, although many prominent Labour MPs had 
Labour daily newspaper 
traditionally a Labour 
organ of the Labour 
been associated 
that might not 
with it; thus, it had more latitude to express views 
conform to the official Labour Party viewpoint. 
However, the Argus' editorial position on the war was one of cautious 
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pro-Republicanism, akin to the the Labour Party's attitude. 6 
"International Notes" by "Left Wing", a weekly column, on the other 
hand, presented 
consisted mainly 
a Communist view of the war. "International Notes" 
of news items and articles culled from other 
sources, mainly the Workers Weekly, but sometimes overseas Communist 
publications. Generally, material from the Weekly appeared a week 
later in the Argus. 
Woman Today was also a source of Communist propaganda on the 
Spanish Civil \~ar. The "progressive" women's magazine first began 
publication in April 1937, dedicated to the ideals of "peace, freedom 
and progress" and "the advancement of women in all spheres of 
thought".7 Its editorial committee comprised women holding a 
variety of Left and Left-liberal philosophies. Many were active in 
other "progressive" or "feminist" organisations - the Howard League 
for Penal Reform, the Women's Co-operative Guilds, the National 
Council of Women, the International League for Peace and Freedom, the 
Workers Educational Association (WEA), the Left Book Club and the No 
More War Movement. S 
The Communist 
undoubtedly formed 
Front. Mrs Elsie 
Party was also represented, for Woman Today 
part of the Party's drive to create the United 
Freeman (now Elsie Locke) was prominent on the 
editorial committee. Mrs Freeman was a Party member and editor of 
the Workers Weekly's Women's Page. She had been editor of the 
Party's own short-lived women's magazine, Working Woman, published in 
1935 and 1936. Woman Today might be called Working Woman's successor 
under the Comintern's new dispensation. This is not to cast doubt 
upon Mrs Freeman's sincere belief in the principles for which Woman 
Today stood, nor to suggest that Woman Today was solely a Communist 
front organisation, for that was not the case. However, Mrs 
Freeman's involvement clearly denoted the Communist Party's interest 
in using Woman Today to promote the United Front. Although the 
magazine's editorial policy was claimed to be "non-sectarian, 
non-political and non-commercial",9 its papers were dominated by 
a Leftist tone. Its coverage of the Spanish Civil War generally 
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followed the Communist Party "line", although the themes were those 
that women could most easily relate to. Woman Today' s "feminist 
internationalism" was clearly another facet in the promotion of the 
United Front. \voman Today and tflnternational Notes" in the Argus 
provided more intermittent coverage of the war than the Workers 
Weekly, 
Naturally, in pursuit of the United Front, the Communist Party 
also promoted pro-Republicanism through its membership in other 
organisations Trades Unions, the Left Book Club, the Spanish 
Medical Aid Committee and other groups. While the Party's tactics in 
this area will be considered in discussion of its application of the 
United Front over Spain to the New Zealand scene, the influence of 
the Communist Party and its propaganda will be discussed, where it 
can be determined, in the chapters dealing with other pro-Republican 
groups .10 
Leo Sim, a founding member of the Communist Party of New Zealand, 
Comintern Congress in 1935. 11 His was a delegate at the Seventh 
election as General Secretary, 
adoption of the United Front 
in December 1935, signalled the 
policy. However, some prominent and 
influential members of the Central Committee did not agree with the 
policy, and it was not until the Party's annual conference in 
December 1936 that 
practice. 12 As the 
the United 
Party's main 
Front was 
tactic in 
fully adopted in 
the United Front 
policy was affiliation with the Labour Party, so its emphasis in 
terms of the pro-Republican movement was joint action with the Labour 
Party. It was possibly more than merely a happy coincidence that the 
Weekly's first story about the war, on 25 July 1936, appeared on the 
first page, together with news of the Central Committee's decision to 
apply for affiliation with the Labour Party.13 But the Party's 
previous "Social-Fascist" policy, which had caused it to urge voters 
in the 1935 elections either to vote against Labour or to invalidate 
their ballot papers, had left a legacy of distrust that was to prove 
a major difficulty in the forging of the United Front after 1936. 
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Most of the propaganda about the Spanish Civil War specifically 
aimed at New Zealanders appeared in the first six or seven months of 
the war and again in late 1938 and in 1939 in the war's dying 
stages. It was all, of course, designed to help create the United 
Front. The similarities between New Zealand's Government and the 
Popular Front Government of Spain were emphasised, as was the special 
part New Zealand could play in the international pro-Republican 
movement because of its Labour Government. Much of the propaganda 
was also aimed at Trades Unions, calling for them to demonstrate 
solidarity with the "workers' Government" of Spain and to influence 
the Labour Government's policy, The Workers Weekly also promoted the 
Spanish Medical Aid Committee in its pages and published news of 
other pro-Republican activities in New Zealand, designed not only to 
bolster the movement, but to demonstrate its broad United Front 
basis. 
Having 
appeal to 
Communist 
sketched the outlines of the Communist Party's specific 
New Zealanders, a survey will be made of general themes of 
propaganda about the Spanish Civil War, before detailed 
discussion of their specific application to the New Zealand scene. 
Generally, the Communist view of the nature of the war was that 
it was a war of Fascist invasion, aided by a small number of 
Spaniards, against the mass of the Spanish people. However, in the 
first month of the war, before the adoption of the more widely based 
appeal of "democracy versus Fascism", the war was depicted as a class 
war. The Weekly's first article on the war said that the Spanish 
workers 
plunged 
1936, 
Labour 
"world 
were fighting Fascist reaction and that Army officers had 
the country into civil war. 14 An editorial, on 8 August 
called the conflict "the greatest struggle between Capital and 
since the Russian Revolution", although it did also note that 
reaction" was terrified and was "plotting 
intervention".lS Of course, the notion of class war was always 
implicit in the Communist analysis of the war, since Fascism was 
regarded as "the hangman of big capital".16 The more narrow view 
of a war between Capital and Labour was possibly a hangover from the 
Party's previous "Social-Fascist" policy. 
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Some pro-Republican correspondents to the daily newspapers who 
either identified themselves, or can be identified, as Communists 
revealed more adherence to this former policy, which held that 
Fascism was the final stage of capitalism, preliminary to its final 
collapse and the victory of "proletarian democracy". One 
correspondent called Fascism "capitalism in delirium tremens"·17 , 
another, in The Press, in December 1936, argued that events in Spain 
provided a glaring example of the weakness of 
social-democracy. 18 A 
that workers were not 
but had been misled in 
tool of the exploiters to 
correspondent to the Grey River Argus said 
misled in supporting their fellows in Spain, 
having faith in democracy, which had been a 
keep the workers in submission. The war in 
Spain showed that democracy had outlived its usefulness to the 
exploiters. 19 Obviously, some among the rank-and-file of the 
Party had not yet adjusted to the United Front policy. 
Although the Weekly's reaction to the war was, from the first, to 
call for international solidarity behind the Government of Spain in 
the cause of peace and democracy, to begin with it did not present a 
totally complimentary picture of the Popular Front Government. Two 
articles by Paul Nizan, Spanish correspondent for L'Hurnanite, a 
French Communist newspaper, written before the rebellion, and 
criticising the Government of Spain, were published in the Weekly and 
in "International Notes" in August 1936. 
Nizan's first article stressed that the vacillations of the 
Government were creating unrest among the "masses of the people and 
that such hesitation created 
Government's uncertainty was 
composition, and Nizan was 
made to the Government by 
opportunities for reaction".20 The 
attributed to its bourgeois, liberal 
quick to point out that the concessions 
the "proletarian parties", and their 
defence of the Popular Front, must be repaid with immediate action on 
reforms. Nizan's next article continued his criticisms of the 
Government, this time focussing on the military.21 The army, 
navy, and airforce, he said, were hotbeds of reaction and Fascist 
plotting. Instead of the Government's slow weeding out of opposition 
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he urged the Spanish Communist Party's solution of immediate creation 
of a People's Army. 
Both articles had been written in early July 1936. It is 
possible that they only arrived in New Zealand after the war had 
begun. Their publication was perhaps designed to give readers more 
background to the situation in Spain and, of course, to show the 
foresight and commitment to reform of the Communist Party of Spain, 
but the articles certainly did not fit with the Weekly's later image 
of the Spanish Government as the perfect example of the United 
Front. They also demonstrated less than total support for the 
Popular Front Government from the Communist Party, in direct 
contradiction to the calls for solidarity about the cause of Spain. 
These initial uncertainties in the Communist stand on the war 
were few and were soon buried under the mass of material that 
revealed the conflict to be an archetypal battle between Fascism and 
democracy. 
exposure of 
By late August 1936, the Weekly had produced the first" 
Nazi aid for the Spanish Fascists. 22 German and 
Italian aid to the rebels was evidence of the Fascist plan to destroy 
democracy everywhere. 
Just as Catholics attributed the outbreak of the war to a 
Communist plot, so Communist propaganda promoted the idea that 
official circles in Germany and Italy had laid the groundwork for the 
rebellion long before July 1936. In January 1937, "International 
Notes tl provided readers with Imprecor's revelation of the Nazi plan 
to colonise Spain. 23 The information apparently came from a 
French newspaper L'Oeuvre. It told of Nazi plans to claim the most 
important of 
reconstruction 
Spanish minerals, 
after Franco had 
work, and, then, settlement in 
to involve German industry in 
won, including provision of first, 
Spain for unemployed Germans, and 
finally to place Spain on a total war footing once it had become a 
German vassal state. The article claimed that Phalange 
Espagnola24 groups were springing up in Germany and recruiting 
young men just out of military training, so that when Franco had won 
184 
Hitler could send these men in to strengthen the Spanish Fascists and 
complete the transformation of Spain into a German colony. 
In this Fascist conspiracy to dismember Spain, Germany played the 
leading role, according to Communist propaganda. This emphasis no 
doubt reflected the Soviet Union's and the Comintern's concern that 
Germany posed 
were published 
July 1938, an 
the greatest threat to Russia and to Communism. Items 
about German economic interests in Spain25 and, in 
article, headed "A Spanish Dossier How Hitler 
Organised 
from the 
the Rebellion in Spain", reported that documents seized 
German Landesgruppe office in Barcelona revealed the 
machinations of German policy in Spain: 
in every branch of public life - politics, army, industry 
and press there had been set up a full espionage 
organisation and there had been a concerted Hitler attempt 
to seize control.26 
The documents alleged to have been seized were not quoted. (It is 
interesting to note the similarities between this claim and the, pro 
Francoist allegations that documentary evidence of a Communist plot 
had been discovered by Nationalist troops.) 
Part One of Dimitrov's article also gave a clear enunciation of 
the "Fascist conspiracy" theory: 
German Fascism developed espionage and disruptive work 
in Spain on an extensive scale. During the existence of the 
Government of the Spanish reactionary Gil Robles, the German 
Fascists, with complete liberty, set up dozens of bases of 
the so-called "Landesgruppe" and established firm contacts 
with the Spanish army generals and systematically recruited 
their agents from among the officers.27 
Dimitrov stated that "Italian Fascism took no less active a part in 
preparing the rebellion",28 but the Italian role was presented as 
less one of initiating conspiracy, than of providing the wherewithal 
to put the conspiracy into action. Italian pre-war negotiations with 
Spanish generals were reported to have concerned the provision of men 
and equipment. 29 
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In general statements about the nature of the war, there was 
little attempt to differentiate between the two intervening powers. 
Both were Fascist, both aimed at territorial aggrandisement and the 
capture of Spanish resources. In fact, Italian aid to Franco in the 
form of men and equipment was far greater than that of Germany, but 
although there were more headlines in the Weekly concerning the 
numbers of Italian troops,30 the impression created by the paper 
was of massive intervention by both Fascist states. The numbers of 
Italian troops could be had from the daily newspapers as well; the 
Weekly's report of 30,000 stormtroopers in Spain was more fabrication 
than fact. 31 
The apparently indigenous nature of the rebellion in the first 
months of the war, which would seem to have belied the Communist 
assessment of the nature of the war, was explained by the Weekly in 
terms of that very Fascist plot. The Fascists naturally did not want 
to appear to have caused the rebellion; therefore, aid was covert to 
begin with. But they were overconfident; they had expected an early 
victory by their Spanish co-conspirators. Once it was clear that the 
rebels were faced with "the resolute resistance of the Spanish 
people", the Fascist powers hastened to secure their conquest by 
dispatching their own armed forces. 32 
The involvement of Spaniards in Franco's rebellion and 
particularly, in the actual fighting of the war was played down, in 
order to reinforce both the argument that the war was one of Fascist 
aggression, rather than a civil conflict, and the contention that 
Franco was opposed by the majority of Spaniards. The claim that the 
Spanish people were almost entirely supporting the Republican 
Government further "legitimised tl the Republican Government and its 
war effort in the eyes of the world. Franco's army was usually 
depicted as a cabal of reactionary Generals leading troops composed 
of foreign legionaires, Moors, Germans and Italians. In April 1937, 
the Weekly declared: 
The Spaniards on the insurgent side are negligible. drunken 
sots such as General de Llano, unprincipled adventurers such 
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as General Franco, these tools of international finance 
would have been off the field - nay, would never have been 
on it but for their foreign pay-masters. Moors from Africa 
paid with German gold regular troops from Italy and 
Germany, these are the foes the Spanish people have had to 
fight.33 
Unlike the Catholic newspapers, which made some attempt to discuss 
the political and organisational composition of the Republican 
forces, the Weekly made little effort to outline the various 
political groupings led by General Franco. A discussion of the 
political differences between the Carlists34 and the Falangists, 
for example, would not have contributed to the impression of a 
Fascist horde, and a mainly foreign one at that. 
The major role of foreign intervention was also emphasised in the 
atrocity stories carried by the Weekly. Communist propaganda about 
atrocities tended to focus on the bombing of cities and towns by 
German and Italian planes. There was a notable difference between 
the 
and 
atrocity 
Zealandia. 
propaganda in the Workers Weekly and that in the Tablet 
Catholic reports of atrocities dealt more with 
"personal" atrocities: the crucifixion of priests, the murder of 
nuns. The image of atrocity in Communist propaganda was the menacing 
impersonal bomber, wreaking death and destruction from the skies upon 
the civilian pqpulations of open towns. It is only to be expected 
that this was the focus for pro-Republican atrocity propaganda, for 
the bombings 
Spain. The 
incidents as 
were the greatest atrocities perpetrated on Republican 
horror of many people everywhere was aroused by such 
the bombing of Guernica and the shelling of 
Almeria. 35 In 
which civilians 
a sense, they were the image of modern warfare, in 
and non-military targets could be expected to suffer 
as much as the military. 
Communist propaganda made use of the fact that this image was 
what had indeed caught the horrified imagination of the world (in 
much the same way as one would expect the imagination of a devout 
Catholic to be most stirred by the image of cruelty to and defilement 
of nuns). It also added force to the Communist assessment of the 
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nature of the war. The nationality of the planes used revealed the 
real perpetrators of, and participants in, the war, as well as the 
ruthlessness and inhumanity of the Fascist war machine. Eyewitness 
accounts of bombings were common in the pages of the Weekly, as were 
headlines like I1How Fascism Makes War" and "Death from the 
Sky".36 The following description of the bombing of Guernica was 
typical of the emphasis of Communist atrocity stories: 
The system of attack was always the same. First they would 
machine gun the people, then they dropped explosive, and, 
finally, incendiary bombs. 
The planes flew very low, their machine guns rattled 
furiously, machine-gunning woods, fields and roadside 
ditches full of praying women, children and aged people.37 
The Weekly, in an editorial written about the bombing of Guernica, 
accused Anthony Eden of deliberately refusing to identify "Franco and 
his allies as the instigators of the dreadful massacre at Guernica" 
and went on to say: 
Instead, a subtle attempt is made to infer that both sides 
are guilty of outrages. This is to suggest that the Spanish 
people would be guilty of self-murder. It is not for 
nothing that German aeroplanes were used for the work of 
massacre. We do not believe that the most depraved Spanish 
Fascists, with the exception of a few Generals, could be 
found to do this dastardly deed.38 
And yet, despite this focus on the nature of Fascist aggression 
in atrocity stories, the Communists were also concerned to show the 
depravity of the Spanish rebels. This created a difficulty 
reconciling the 
Fascist troops, 
depraved Spanish 
"encourag[ing] 
publication of 
image of the rebel war effort as being fueled 
and opposed by most Spaniards, with the image 
Fascists murdering their fellow countrymen 
the violation 
comments by 
of "Marxist" 
Mr T.E. Taylor, 
women".39 
president of 
in 
by 
of 
and 
The 
the 
Anglo-American Press Association, gave some clue to the way in which 
the two somewhat contradictory propaganda lines were synthesised. 
Taylor claimed that the Spanish Fascists: "playa minor part in the 
battles properly so-called, but that they voluntarily take up the 
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duties of police and executioners behind the lines".40 However, 
this fitted somewhat uneasily with Communist claims that the number 
of Spaniards on the rebel side was "negligible". The desire to 
detail atrocities per se, to reveal the inhumanity of the war being 
waged on the Spanish people, and to paint the rebel side as black as 
possible was confused by the desire to apportion blame, and to 
underscore arguments about the nature of the war. 
Another kind of atrocity much discussed, and without hesitation 
attributed to Franco, was the rebels' treatment of priests and of 
Catholic Basques who were fighting for the Government forces. This 
reflected another aspect of Communist arguments about the essence of 
the war raging in Spain. Communist propaganda was at pains to point 
out the fallacy of the view that the war in Spain was based on 
religion, that Franco was fighting for Christianity against a tide of 
atheism initiated by the Communists. 41 
The place of the Basques in this particular area of Communist 
propaganda cannot be underestimated. The very fact of their presence 
among the forces of the Government undermined Catholic arguments 
about the anti-religious features of the Republican regime. The 
Weekly printed a photograph of troops receiving mass before battle, 
with the caption "Church and People United in Defence of Democracy: 
Mass in the Field before these Basques went into Battle".42 It 
also published the statements of a "distinguished Catholic writer", 
M. Jacques Maritain: 
It is generally recognised that the Basque population is the 
most Catholic of Spain; a profound faith animates their 
daily existence even those who think they have made a 
mistake and who condemn their political conduct must surely 
see, faced with the sacrifice of this good and great people, 
that is the recourse to civil war which must be condemned 
above all, that war, which with armies invoking the defence 
of Christianity, has pitilessly struck the most Christian 
district of Spain.43 
The Weekly's evidence of Franco's treatment of the Basques, and 
of Catholic priests in particular, assured its readers of the truth 
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of its claim that Franco was merely an adventurer and not a Christian 
crusader at all. 
was reported that: 
In the Basque territories conquered by Franco it 
prominent Basque leaders have been transported to North 
Africa for slave labour. This must blast once and for all 
the fearful lies that the war in Spain was a religious war 
with Franco on the side of Christianity. The Mohammedan 
Moors have been brought to Spain by Franco and the Catholic 
Basques sent to Africa to work as slaves. No Catholic 
knowing these facts could feel for one moment support for 
Franco.44 
Several items about the execution of priests further reinforced this 
argument. According to the Weekly, priests were being executed for 
the "crime" of having said mass for Government soldiers. One item 
about the execution of priests could equally have come from a 
Catholic newspaper's discussion of Republican atrocities: 
They were not allowed Mass or time for contemplation, but 
given two minutes, after they had been informed of the 
execution, for confession. There was no burial ceremony. 
The bodies were thrown into a trench.45 
The presence of Moors in Franco's army was also used to undermine 
the Catholic image of Franco as a Christian crusader, and as well, 
served as an additional reminder that Franco's army was not composed 
primarily of Spaniards fighting, however mistakenly, for a cause in 
which they believed. Again, the opinion of the Catholic writer, 
Jacques Maritain, encapsulated the Communist argument: 
It is yet 
Mohammedan 
that they 
fashion.46 
another 
soldiers 
may kill 
sacrilege - religious in form - to deck 
with pictures of the Sacred heart so 
the children of Christians in a holy 
That Catholics like Maritain opposed Franco was another valuable 
factor in Communist propaganda about the nature of the war. 
Further evidence to confirm that the war was not a war of 
religion was found in the religious freedom purportedly allowed by 
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the Republican Government, which was contrasted with Franco's 
treatment of pro-Republican priests. The Weekly printed several 
items that vouched for the religious tolerance of the Republican 
Government. However, it was unfortunate that most of these items 
were about the tolerance of the Protestantism in Republican Spain. 
The Manifesto of the Protestant Youth,47 a report from the 
Jehovahs Witness Yearbook for 193748 and news of 52 evangelical 
churches operating in the Republican war zone,49 may have imparted 
an impression of tolerance for minority religions by the Government, 
but they would have done little to assuage the fears of Catholics. 
The report from the Jehovah's Witnesses was a particularly 
unfortunate choice. The anti-clerical sentiment expressed by the 
Jehovah's Witness Yearbook was surely inappropriate in the context of 
the Catholic claims the Weekly was attempting to refute. 
Another pro-Francoist claim that the Weekly was eager to prove 
false was the claim that the war was inspired by a Communist plot. 
The Weekly took great pains to point out that Communist influence in 
Spanish political life, prior to the rebellion, was minimal. The 
Weekly published a statement by Izvestia in April 1937 which said, in 
part: "When General Franco raised the military Fascist rebellion 
against the Spanish Government there was not a single Communist or 
Socialist in the council of ministers."sO The same item quoted 
the President of the Council of Ministers, Largo Caballero: "We 
shall never permit that Bolshevism and Anarchism be forced upon us 
Besides, no one thinks of forcing Bolshevism or Anarchism upon 
us. "51 
However much reliance the Weekly and members of the Communist 
Party placed in Izvestia's veracity, the use of an official Soviet 
newspaper to deny the existence of a Communist plot in Spain was 
hardly likely to dispel suspicion among non-Communists. 
In the same vein, the Weekly emphasised that the elections that 
brought the Popular Front Government to power in February 1936, were 
completely in order and quite legal, as a counter to claims of 
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electorial manipulation from Catholics and other anti-
Republicans. 52 
The nature of the Spanish Government itself was used to reinforce 
the image of a war against democracy. The Spanish Government was 
depicted as moderate, democratic and reformist. For this alone, even 
without the wider implications of the war for world democracy, 
workers and democrats were urged to support the cause of the 
Government of Spain. 
The policies and social and political ideals of the Spanish 
Government did not play a large part in the Communist propaganda 
campaign. The main focus of the Weekly's coverage was the war effort 
and the achievements of the United Front policy in that area. 53 
Nevertheless, enough was said to enable the Weekly's readers to 
understand the enlightened nature of Republican rule and the great 
future in 
determination 
the Spanish 
taking place 
the midst of 
store for Spain once Franco was defeated. The 
of the Popular Front Government to improve the life of 
people was indicated by claims that reforms were still 
and social policies were continuing to be effected in 
war. Thus, it was obvious that the Republican 
Government was dedicated in its pursuit of social reform. It also 
showed the tireless spirit of both the Government and the Spanish 
people, and the well organised governmental structure that must 
exist, if reforms were to corne into operation at a time when the 
major focus of Government attention was the prosecution of the war. 
Education and health care was most often mentioned, as well as 
the provisions for 
children. Letters 
the care of war refugees, particularly the 
from the New Zealand nurses in Spain, from Mary 
Lawson, a member of the Australian nursing unit in Spain, who visited 
New Zealand in 1938, and from Winifred Bates, an Englishwoman 
attached to the British medical units in Spain, were all used as 
evidence of the Republic's health, education and child and refugee 
care programmes. 54 The letters bore witness to the establishment 
of children's homes and the provision of educational facilities for 
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both the children and the wounded Republican soldiers in the 
hospitals. These kind of reforms and social policies were shown to 
be in the same spirit as the war effort, the fight against 
reactionary policies in all facets of Spanish life. Mary Lowson 
said: "The Education Department, the people and the youth of Spain 
are fighting illiteracy in the same spirit as they are fighting 
Fascism."S5 
Woman Today also published Mary Lawson's 1etters,56 and much 
of its coverage of the Spanish Civil War dealt with women under the 
Republican Government. "Women of Spain", by I1ya Ehrenburg, a Soviet 
writer and correspondent for Izvestia in Spain, discussed the 
emancipation of women under the Repub1ic. 57 "Spanish ABC" 
(reprinted from Sight and Sound) told of an American film company's 
astonishment that the Government's education programme was continuing 
despite the war, even, it said, in the army and among munitions 
workers. 58 
Claims about the smooth functioning of life in Republican Spain, 
despite bombings, shortages of food and in some cases an influx of 
refugees, were also 
organised nature of 
for the admiration 
used as evidence of the progressive and well 
the Republican Government and as further cause 
of the international Labour Movement. 59 This 
admiration should, of course, express itself in support for the war 
effort of the Republic against Fascism, that this new and dedicated 
democracy might not founder. 
Thus, the nature of the war in Spain was made clear in Communist 
propaganda: it was a Fascist war of aggression waged mercilessly 
against the majority of the people of Spain and against their 
workers' Government. More than that, it was a war in which the fate 
of the world might be decided. The reasoning behind this argument 
constituted a major part of Communist propaganda about the Spanish 
War, for, only if it could be shown that Fascist aggression in Spain 
threatened all democracy, would there be any reason for the constant 
emphasis on the need for a United Front in aid of Spanish and, 
ultimately, world 
Spanish situation 
193 
democracy. The reasoning for the analysis of the 
as a microcosm of the world situation, a drama in 
which the audience would soon be participants, began from the basic 
point that the war was, indeed, one of Fascist aggression in order to 
seize Spanish territory. From that point, there followed what could 
be called the "domino theory" of Fascist aggression. In April 1937 
the Weekly's editor Sid Scott wrote: 
Fascism is proceeding on the principle of attacking her 
enemies piecemeal, of committing one act of aggression after 
another, of consolidating itself and of then going on to 
fresh victories.60 
If the Fascist attempt to add Spain to its list of conquests were not 
opposed, then Fascism would go on to new conquests, and eventually 
destroy democracy everywhere. It was "iterated and reiterated" 
throughout the pages of the Weekly that "Spain is fighting the battle 
for world democracy".6l 
A logical consequence of this "domino theory" of Fascist 
aggression was that the two Western democracies, Britain and France 
were endangering themselves by not taking a firm stand on Fascist 
intervention in Spain. Moreover, Communist propaganda accused 
Britain and France of betraying not only democracy in Spain itself, 
but their own democratic institutions, by not supporting the 
Republican Government of Spain. If Spain were conquered by the 
then Germany and Italy, emboldened by British and French Fascists, 
inaction, would go on to further conquests, presumably also 
unhindered 
fall to 
by the 
Fascism 
two democratic 
and Britain 
Fascist-dominated Europe alone. 
Powers. Eventually, France would 
would then have to face a 
In the first month of the war, the Workers Weekly had supported 
the idea of non-intervention. On 22 August 1936, the Weekly quoted 
Fred Freeman, a member of the Central Committee of the Party, at a 
"Solidarity with Spain" meeti~g at the Trades Hall in Wellington: 
"We in New Zealand could at least support the action of the French 
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Government in calling for a neutrality pact, which would cut foreign 
Fascist aid for the rebels."62 By October 1936, the Weekly was 
condemning the Non-Intervention Agreement, and in particular the 
embargo on arms sales to either side in Spain, as a fake. It was 
described as "a blockade on the Spanish Government [that] in reality 
favours the rebe1s":63 
Why have the Fascists been able to advance so far in spite 
of the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Spanish 
people back their Government. Because they have been armed 
by the Fascist powers of Germany and Italy. Because France 
and Britain have refused to sell arms to the Spanish 
Government, thereby breaking all international laws. 
Sanctions were not fully applied against Italy when it 
launched its war of aggression against Abyssinia. Yet the 
democratic countries are effectively applying sanctions 
against the Spanish Government, guilty of no aggression, 
which is defending democracy against Fascism.64 
For Communists the Non-Intervention Committee epitomised the 
pro-Fascist stance of the "Tory" British Government. In February 
1937, the Weekly said: 
bitter experience has 
Great Britain by its 
Spain and betraying 
enemies.65 
shown that the Tory Government of 
whole policy is assisting Fascism in 
democracy into the hands of its 
Communist propaganda held the British Government to be the major 
culprit of the NIC. France, in the first two years of the war, at 
least, was merely a less than willing accomplice forced by 
circumstances to concur with British policy. No doubt the existence 
of a Popular Front Government in France, led by Leon Blum, did much 
to influence the Communists' more sympathetic treatment of France's 
role in the "farce" of non-intervention. The equal culpability 
suddenly thrust upon the French Government in the last months of the 
war possibly 
France. In 
had something to do with a change of leadership in 
October 1937, France was described as being dragged in 
the wake 
stated, 
of British policy66 and, in March 1938, the Weekly 
"The responsibility for [the arms embargo] rests largely 
with the pro-Fascist Chamberlain Government. France will not act at 
present unless she can depend on British support".67 
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Attacks on the British Government's policy over Spain in part 
expressed the Soviet Union's fear that Germany and Britain would ally 
to attack Russia. An item in "International Notes", condemning Lloyd 
George's statement that Britain should cultivate Germany's 
friendship, said: 
Hitler cannot make war without the support or, at least, the 
neutrality of Britain The need for an alliance with 
Britain and Italy in order to carry forward war against 
France and the Soviet Union is stated quite openly in 
Hitler's book "Mein Kampf" and in all Nazi propaganda.68 
For the Communist Party the reasons for fTpro-Fascist" policy were 
clear: "They have too much in common with the Fascist Powers to wish 
to see them decisively defeated by a People's Front Govern-
ment". 69 At first it was Anthony Eden, the "super-sartorial 
mouth-piece of non-intervention", 70 who was the personification 
of British policy, but once Neville Chamberlain became Prime 
Minister, he became the target of most of the vilification directed 
at the policy of the British Government. 
The whole thrust of the Communist argument about Spain, that it 
was a battle for democracy, meant that most of the propaganda about 
British policy was aimed at showing just how anti-democratic and 
pro-Fascist were the "Tory-capitalist" leaders of Britain. The 
injustice of Britain's attitude towards the legitimately elected 
Government of Spain, and Chamberlain's partiality towards the 
dictators, was considered to be revealed most clearly at the meetings 
of the NIC: 
In the discussions that take place the moral and lawful 
rights of the Spanish Government are totally ignored and 
every reference to them and to the terrible policy of 
aggression and massacre carried out by the Fascists is 
condemned by the British Tories as being "provocative". Not 
a word must be said against the culprits themselves.7l 
In an article in "International Notes", in July 1937, the "London 
financiers' Government" was accused of attempting to aid Franco with 
its latest NIC "control plan ll , which would grant belligerent rights 
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to "the puppet" General Franco. The British Government's motives 
were interpreted as, firstly, a desire to weaken the "People's 
Government" of Spain by granting Franco more prestige and, secondly, 
the need to stifle criticism in Parliament about inaction over 
attacks on British ships, since, if Franco were granted belligerent 
rights, he would be able under international law to seize ships 
aiding the Spanish Government. 72 
Even the Nyon Conference on Mediterranean piracy in September 
1937, when Britain, France and other powers reached an agreement on 
measures to control piracy without Italy being present, was regarded 
by the Communist Party as evidence of British partiality for Franco. 
"Hhy was Spain not invited?", demanded the Weekly.73 The Weekly 
could only conclude that tIthe British Tory Government is determined 
to placate Italy at the expense of the Spanish People's 
Government".74 Another article in "International Notes", in June 
1938, suggested that the Anglo-Italian Agreement and Britain's lack 
of reaction to attacks on shipping meant that Britain might not only 
acquiesce in Italian intervention in Spain, but actively collaborate 
in it. 75 
A major point of the Weekly's propaganda was that Britain's 
Government would placate the Fascists at the expense of its own real 
interests as well. This argument, already inherent in the "domino 
theory", was compounded by reports of the sinking of British ships in 
the Mediterranean, and the absence of British protests to the 
culprit, Italy: 
Gone is the day when the British flag was a citizen's 
protection against tyranny. Today a British citizen is 
allowed to suffer any indignity - providing it is inflicted 
by a Fascist.76 
The Weekly carried several items about the Mediterranean piracy, all 
designed to show that, in their frantic desire to come to an 
accomodation with Italy, British leaders were willing to sacrifice 
British ships, British lives and British status as a seapower. 77 
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The fundamentally anti-democratic nature of the "Tory" Government 
in Britain was also revealed by this inaction, according to the 
Weekly. In August 1938, the paper published an account, by an 
American seaman working on the "Thorpehaven", a British merchant 
vessel bombed at Alicante. The article began with the statement that 
"the British Government is encouraging Franco to murder British 
seamen and to sink British ships". Evidence for this claim was 
produced in the American's claim that British naval vessels stood by 
while British ships were bombed. The article concluded with the 
opinion, voiced by the seaman, that the British Government's policy 
"was completely destroying the average British seaman's faith in the 
British Government".78 
Not only was the Government acting in an undemocratic manner in 
its "Tory capitalist" disregard for the lives of British workers, it 
was also misusing the power given to it by British democracy: 
British warships, paid for with the sweat of the British 
people, are also stopping any British vessels in the 
Mediterranean which are suspected of carrying supplies to 
the People's Government.79 
With anti-democratic sentiments naturally went inhumanity, another 
indication that British leaders had more in common with Fascism than 
with the "Spanish People's Government". It was bad enough that 
Chamberlain and his colleagues preventing the legitimate Government 
of Spain from defending itself by their arms embargo, but, worse, 
they were abetting the Fascist interventionists' war on women and 
children by preventing foodstuffs and other merchandise from reaching 
Republican Spain. 
From December 1938, as the war drew to a close, the Communists 
made a great deal of "Chamberlain's blockade" of the Spanish 
Government, claiming that it was to be extended to cover all supplies 
to the now chronically short of food Republican territory.SO 
Britain's inhumanity, and 
allies, was epitomised for 
its partiality for Franco and his Fascist 
the Weekly in the British Government's 
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returning to Spain the Basque children evacuated from Bilbao earlier 
in the war. Under the heading "British Government supports Franco", 
the Weekly said: 
of all crimes committed by British Imperialism in the 
last few years, none have been more callous and mean than 
the sending back, to death or worse than death, of the 
little Basque refugee children who fled from the Fascist 
terror prior to the taking of Bilbao.81 
The defeat of the Republican Government by Franco was seen by the 
Communists as resulting as much from British and, later, French 
policy, particularly the arms embargo, as from the massive aid 
received from Germany and Italy. In addition, the coup by the Casado 
"junta" in March 1939, which wrested power from Juan Negrin's 
Government,82 was claimed by the Weekly to have been masterminded 
by Britain and France again, in order to secure a Fascist victory in 
Spain. By this time the Republican Government was irrevocably split 
over whether to continue resistance to Franco. Negrin and the 
Communists wished to continue resistance. Colonel Casado, General 
Miaja and other non-Communist members of the Committee of National 
Defence that seized power considered not only that the Republican 
Army could not fight on, but also that they could negotiate better 
terms of surrender with Franco than a Communist-dominated Government 
could. 83 Thus, Communist criticisms of the Casado regime were 
really based on its political stand and the fact that it was ready to 
concede defeat. However, somehow, the Casado coup became linked to 
British and French recognition of Franco. In March 1939, the Weekly 
reported: 
The revolt of Casado and his colleagues was prepared in 
part of the policy of the 
The junta formed around Casados 
had already been selected in Paris 
London and Paris. It is 
recognition of Burgos 
consisted of names which 
and London by the same 
recognition of Franco.84 
persons as had decided upon the 
Although the Weekly claimed that the British Consul in Madrid had 
been in touch with Casado, it provided no other evidence that the 
coup had been planned in Paris and London. The Weekly labelled the 
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alleged plot "the most shameful of all betrayals", the final step in 
a policy of betrayal of Spanish and world democracy by the 
"so-called" Western democracies, which began with "the tragic farce 
of non-intervention" and ended with the recognition of the Burgos 
Government. Short-sighted British capitalists had put their own 
self-interest before that of their country and of the rest of the 
world, because they were more ideologically inclined towards both 
Franco's Government and German and Italian Fascism. Because first 
Britain and, later, France, after the fall of the Blum Government, 
did not favour a Popular Front Government in Spain, it was easy for 
them to sacrifice Spain to the appetites of Hitler and MusBolini. In 
so doing, said the Communists, the Western democracies had brought 
Europe closer to war and democracy closer to destruction. 8S In 
February 1939, the Weekly had said: 
Barcelona has fallen, Spain is encircled with a ring of 
steel and drenched in the blood of its bravest and best ... 
The peace of Munich is with us and Fascism advances with 
seven-leagued boots across the face of democratic Europe.86 
As the Communists saw the war in Spain as a battle for democracy 
everywhere, against the menace of Fascism, so they saw the answer to 
that menace in the United Front of democratic people the world over. 
Communist use of the Spanish Civil War, and events and opinions 
related to it, as paradigms cannot be overemphasised. Spain was a 
mirror of world trends, one particularly salient aspect of the 
multi-faceted workings of both Fascist and Communist policy. At one 
and the same time, Spain was but part of a greater whole, and, yet, 
the microcosm of that macrocosm. The Communist Party saw Spain as 
only one part of Fascism's expansionist aims, but also as the leading 
example of those aims and the tactics, that were to be employed. In 
the same way, the Communists' answer to Fascism, the United Front, 
went further than merely a movement in support of the Republican 
Government of Spain, and yet was epitomised by that international 
pro-RepUblican movement. 
The role of the Spanish people as the frontline fighters in a 
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world-wide battle for democracy was a major theme of Communist 
propaganda about the war in Spain. From this premise, it logically 
followed that democrats everywhere must support the cause of the 
Spanish people; it was their fight as much as it was the Spaniards'. 
The Weekly's first editorial on the war made this clear: 
Liberal journalists and Catholic intellectuals, Labour, 
Socialist and Communist writers, democrats of no particular 
party affiliation, who have visited Spain, declare with one 
voice that the fight of the Spanish Government is a fight 
for democracy and peace ... and that so-called "neutrality" 
is a crime against the Spanish people and against the ideals 
of peace and freedom throughout the world.87 
The editorial also indicated the basis for the United Front, in 
its enumeration of the various types of people who supported the 
cause of the Spanish Government. The majority of material on Spain 
in the Weekly and in "International Notes" mentioned in some way the 
United Front over Spain, and encouraged its growth. The only way to 
save Spain would be by a campaign of international solidarity with 
the Government of Spain, to send aid and to put pressure on 
Governments, especially those of Britain and France, to do the same. 
This campaign could force Britain and France to end non-intervention 
and to lift the arms embargo, which had considerable influence upon 
the Republican Government's war effort. 
It was only infrequently that Communist propaganda indicated 
exactly how the international pro-Republican movement was going to 
act to change the policy of the Western democracies. The impression 
given was that a major expression of public opinion in support of the 
Republicans would achieve this aim. It is likely that the vague 
calls for action were intended to promote actions such as strikes. 
Only in one article, towards the end of the war, when the calls for 
international 
openly stated 
Governments. 
solidarity with Spain were becoming more urgent, was it 
that direct action might be used to influence 
In December 1938, an article on Chamberlain's reported 
intensification of the "blockade" of Spain and the imminent granting 
of belligerent rights to Franco concluded: 
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if necessary, as Jose Diaz said in his article on the 2nd 
anniversary of the defence of Madrid, the workers will use 
all their weapons of struggle, including strike action, to 
enforce the demands on their governments.88 
The very vagueness of the calls for international solidarity with 
Spain gives the impression that Communist propaganda had as much in 
mind the wider purpose of the creation of a United Front against 
Fascism, as it did the development of a campaign to aid the Spanish 
war effort: 
He who really desires to see the end of the destruction of 
peaceful towns in Spain, of the murder of women and 
children, who desires to have the Fascist violators driven 
out of Spain and to see the establishment of a firm barrier 
against the outbreak of a new world imperialist war must 
take action. It is not difficult to find the organisation 
and form of this action; life itself, the experience of the 
Labour Movement prompts them.89 
This statement by 
article illustrates 
George Dimitrov 
better the 
in 
type 
the 
of 
concluding part of his 
oblique comment about 
democratic action than does the report of Diaz' words. 
The growing strength of the pro-Republican movement and, 
therefore, the United Front against Fascism, was indicated by items 
about pro-Republican resolutions and activities in various 
countries. In May, June and July 1938, the Weekly published a spate 
of articles about American pro-Republicanism; for example, the 
growing support for 
screen stage and 
pro-Republican 
and the YWCA92 
Spanish 
like 
democracy in Hollywood, among stars of 
Clara Bow and Paul Robeson. gO The 
stance of 
helped 
groups everywhere were 
against Fascism. 
the New England Methodist Conference9l 
to show 
behind 
that enlightened and influential 
the Spanish Government in its fight 
The Weekly also made an effort to show how the workers of Fascist 
countries opposed the aggression of Germany and Italy in Spain; a 
further indication of the solidarity of the pro-Republican movement 
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and the growth of the United Front, even if in a covert manner. In 
December 1936, the Weekly reported that Japanese workers, prevented 
by their Government from forming groups in support of the Government 
in Spain, were writing anxious letters to Labour magazines to 
discover the truth of the situation in Spain. 93 Later in the 
same month, an item with the headline "German Workers Make Dud Shells 
For Franco", reported that most rebel artillery shells failed to 
explode and explained that there was: 
sabotage within the Nationalist ranks. A bit of paper 
found in the nose of one of these shells said: "While I am 
an artilleryman, not a single shell fired by me wi~l 
explode." 
Other duds were found to be filled with sawdust, despite 
their apparent German origin.94 
(There was no explanation of how a Nationalist soldier could open a 
shell in order to place a note in it.) 
The United Front would triumph, said the Weekly in an editorial 
in April 1937, because of the justice of its cause, which was felt by 
workers and democrats everywhere, since it was the cause of the 
people. Even those within the enemy forces knew their true interests 
lay with the United Front, or, in the case of Spain, with the 
Republican forces: 
The desertions from the Italian forces to the Spaniards do 
not mean that the Italian soldier is a coward; they mean 
that he is a peasant or worker dragged from his cottage door 
to do the bidding of that imitation Caesar, Benito 
Mussolini.95 
The opinions and pro-Republican activities of the British Labour 
Movement were much emphasised, particularly the pronouncements of 
Harry Pollitt, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Great 
Britain. The emphasis on pro-Republican activities in Great Britain 
was related, in part, to the role of the British Government in the 
Spanish issue. These activities were another indication that the 
British Government did not have the sanction of a good number of its 
people for its non-intervention policy. 
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It may be also that the Weekly was catering to the Anglocentrism 
of New Zealanders, in its emphasis on British activities. 
Internationalists the Communists may have been, but they were still 
New Zealanders, often with close emotional associations with England, 
as were the members of the New Zealand labour Movement to whom the 
Weekly was appealing. In January 1938, the Weekly published the 
views of Clement Atlee on his return from a visit to Spain,96 and 
in April 
situation 
1938 the Emergency Labour Conference on the Spanish 
was applauded for its decision to pressure the Chamberlain 
Government to change its Spanish policy.97 
The role of Spain as a paradigm of the world situation was used 
constantly in Communist appeals to form a United Front around the 
Spanish issue. Spain was a lesson to the proletariat of the world, 
said Georgi Dimitrov: 
There also can be no doubt that the splendid example of the 
heroic struggle of the Spanish people has exerted 
irresistible influence over other nations threatened with 
Fascist aggression ... 
Fascism must be opportunely countered by the forces of a 
united working class of the widest masses standing solid in 
an anti-Fascist People's Front.98 
Dimitrov's article went on to detail how the example of the Spanish 
people's struggle had influenced the discovery of the Cagoulard plot 
in France, the crushing of the Cedillo coup in Mexico and the 
determination of the Chinese people against the Japanese invaders. 
The International Brigades were seen as an outstanding example of 
the international solidarity movement with Spain. Surprisingly, in 
discussions of the war effort of Republican Spain, the International 
Brigades were only infrequently mentioned. Perhaps the Weekly, and 
the Communist propaganda machine in general, were content to let the 
exploits of the International Brigades speak for themselves. The 
Weekly ran a series of articles by "Taffy" Patterson, a Welsh 
International Brigader who came to New Zealand from Spain,99 as 
well as letters from New Zealand International Brigaders "Tom" 
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Spiller,100 Bert Bryan101 and Charlie Riley,102 all 
giving accounts of the battles involving the International Brigades 
and of the stalwart internationalist and democratic spirit of these 
foreign volunteers for the cause of Spanish democracy. 
The value of the war in Spain as a lesson to the working-class of 
the world was not only in the general outlines of the struggle of 
democracy against 
model upon which 
Fascism; the Spanish People's Front itself was the 
the international United Front against Fascism 
should base itself. The solidarity and determination of the Spanish 
forces against overwhelming odds, in the form of German and Italian 
aid to Franco, and the arms embargo, was to be an inspiration to 
workers everywhere. 
The achievements of the Spanish army were lauded; it was the 
United Front incarnate. The Army was more to be commended because it 
had risen above severe difficulties, in the way of equipment and 
training, at the beginning of the war. The Spanish People's Army was 
the subject of an article by Hugh Slater published in December 1936. 
It grew, he said, from a disorganised and very poorly equipped 
workers' militia into a disciplined and skilled fighting force which 
was, by the time of the article's publishing, ready and willing to be 
formed into a regular army. Slater stressed that the Popular Militia 
was the only force at the command of the Spanish Government at the 
outbreak of the rebellion: 
It must be remembered that when the Fascist rebellion 
started eight out of the nine divisions of the Spanish army 
mutinied against the Government. The only possible thing to 
do was to ARM THE PEOPLE.103 
A significant feature of Slater's article was his emphasis on the 
willingness of worker organisations to put aside their political 
differences for the sake of the cause. Inevitably, it was the 
Anarchists' willingness to do so, which he used as the most telling 
evidence of the solidarity of the Spanish United Front: "In my 
opinion it is a great tribute to the honesty and commonsense of the 
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famous Spanish anarchists that they have accepted the necessity 
for discipline in war-time.,,104 
Another significant point made by Slater was echoed by the 
\veekly, in an editorial entitled "Invincible", in April 1937. The 
Spanish Government forces were "the people armed". This was their 
major strength: that they were fighting for a cause in which they 
believed, the cause of their own democratic institutions. The Weekly 
said: 
The glorious successes of the People's Army in Spain 
demonstrate the historical truth that a people in arms is 
invincible Spain today has shown the world that now, as 
much as ever before, morale is the deciding factor in 
warfare. 105 
Republican 
September106 
advances, 
and at 
for example, on the 
Teruel in early 1938,107 
Aragon front in 
were attributed 
to this factor of morale and were used as an example of the power 
that a United Front of all democratic people could wield, even in the 
face of overwhelming odds. They were a demonstration of the 
correctness of the United Front policy. Defeats, of course, were not 
due to the failure of purpose by the Spanish people, but to the great 
advantage in men and equipment held by Franco and, as well, to 
traitors within the ranks of the Government forces. 108 The 
concept of the people armed linked also to the Communist assertion 
that there were few Spaniards in the Nationalist ranks, and to the 
defections from Franco's side of both Spaniards and Italians. 
It was emphasised that all the Spanish people were involved in 
the war effort, even women and children. Much was made of the 
participation of women in the militia, fighting alongside the men for 
the future of their country. Even those people not directly engaged 
in the war effort were still a part of the People's Army, for they 
were suffering privations and shortages willingly in the cause of the 
war. Letters from Mory Lawson, the Australian nurse, and from the 
New Zealand nurses in Spain, already noted for their use as evidence 
of the progressive nature of the Republican Government109 also 
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usually contained references to the morale and "spirit of resistance" 
of the Spanish people under war conditions. 
Their ensuring that daily life went on, that services ran 
smoothly, that 
these were the 
discomfort and danger were endured without complaint, 
contributions of non-combatants to the United Front. 
In a letter published in July 1938 Mary Lawson said: It •• • the morale 
of the Catalonians has never been so high. They show a courageous 
determination a people willing to face any privation or difficulty 
to send aid to the front, to give food and assistance to the sick, 
wounded and refugees."110 
Yet, despite the congratulatory tone that often coloured 
descriptions of acts of solidarity with Spain, and of the various 
"broadly-based" national pro-Republican movements, there was more 
than a hint of factionalism still to be found in the Communist Party 
attitude towards other Left organisations. From the Communist point 
of view, of course, the factionalism came from the other groups. It 
was the Communist Party that was aiming for the establishment of a 
United Front against Fascism, and in aid of Spanish democracy; 
therefore, it was the fault of other Left organisations and not the 
Communist Party if this call were not answered. As early as December 
1936, the Comintern was complaining: 
Under the pressure of the workers the leaders of the Labour 
and Socialist International and the International Federation 
of Trade Unions declare their readiness to support 
Republican Spain. But why, then, do they reject the 
proposal of the Communist Party of France to call an 
international conference of all working class organisations 
in defence of the Spanish people?lll 
However, at this early stage in the war, it was still possible to 
claim that the United Front was ever growing and that "the will of 
the working class for unity" was breaking down these obstacles.112 
As the war drew out, the Communist Party repeated this claim, but the 
urgency of its appeals for working class unity around the cause of 
Spain was also growing. The tone of the appeals countered somewhat 
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the claims of vast numbers behind the Communist-inspired United 
Front. 
Undoubtedly, there was a large body of opinion throughout the 
world in support of the Spanish Government, and many of the arguments 
put forward by the Communists, particularly about the role of German 
and Italian aid and the ineffectiveness of the NIC, were based on 
fact. The problem lay in the Communists' use of the Spanish cause 
for its wider aims of a United Front, and in its manipulation of the 
facts to aid this cause. The single-minded unity and the setting 
aside of political differences which the Communists attempted both to 
ascribe to and to impose upon the pro-Republican movement, in the 
cause of the United Front, and, many suspected, in the cause of 
Communist domination of a united international working-class 
movement, did not really exist. 
When the war was drawing to a close, in late 1938 and early 1939, 
and it had become obvious that the Republicans were weakening and 
that Britain and France would make no last minute decision to aid the 
Government of Spain, factionalism· again surfaced in Communist 
propaganda: 
The drawing out of the struggle in Spain, like the 
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, has only been possible 
through the lack of unity among the international 
proletariat. As a result of this the isolated efforts have 
not been sufficient to impose the fulfillment of their duty 
on the Democratic Governments in defence of Republican Spain 
and in preserving the territorial integrity of 
Czechoslovakia.II3 
Even at this late stage it was claimed that real working class unity 
could save Spain. If only opinion were mobilised to persuade Britain 
and France to allow the Spanish Government to purchase arms, the 
struggle for democracy would be won. In March 1939, the Weekly 
said: tiThe fight is not yet lost. Republican Spain can still win if 
the necessary support is rendered by the people of the whole 
world."114 
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The ambivalence of the Communist attitude to the development of 
the United Front, on one hand encouraging the formation of such a 
movement and, on the other, attacking Left groups that did not behave 
as the Communist Party wished them to, was most noticeable in the 
Weekly's attitude towards the pro-Republican activities of the 
British Labour movement. These activities were, at one and the same 
time, used to show the growing strength and, when necessary, the 
weaknesses and undemocratic nature of British socialism. 
In the concluding part of his article on the Spanish Civil War, 
Georgi Dimitrov made a strong condemnation of the response of the 
Socialist International and the International Federation of Trade 
Unions to the Communist calls for a United Front, and laid much of 
the blame on the British Labour Party: 
But on every occasion when the Communist International has 
addressed its proposal for joint action to the Second 
International and the International Federation of Trade 
Unions the representatives of these organisations have ... 
stubbornly refused, under the influence of reactionary 
British Labour Party and trade union leaders and their 
myrmidons in other countries, to agree to organise the 
united action of the world proletariat that alone can 
produce the necessary practical results.llS 
In March 1939, the British Labour Party was accused of hindering 
a call from the Labour and Socialist International for (unspecified) 
action to break the arms embargo to Republican Spain. Worse, it was 
also accused of considering action against "those of its members who 
want to unite the democratic movement to save Spanish democracy and 
the future of 
discussed this 
[Britain]".116 It 
lack of solidarity 
seems that the Communist Party 
only when it suited. At other 
times, the statements of British Labour politicians were published to 
add their weight to the image of an international united movement to 
aid the Spanish Republic. 117 
It is likely that attacks on the international Labour Movement 
and, more specifically, on its British component, had as much to do 
with the Communist International's wider aims as they did with the 
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Spanish situation itself. They were a response to the Labour 
Movement's refusal to let the Communists call the tune, as well as 
expressions of disapproval of the qualified support given by British 
Labour to the Spanish Republican cause. 
The weaknesses and factionalism in the United International Front 
were also apparent within the Spanish People's Army. Although little 
was said about the internecine squabbles within the Republican 
forces, in order to promote the image of the successful application 
of the United Front concept, the existence of "traitors" was not 
denied. Again, as with the international United Front, only news of 
that factionalism and disunity that it suited the Communists to 
comment upon surfaced in the pages of the Worker's Weekly. Any 
weakness in the Spanish People's Army was due to the presence of 
"Trotskyists" in the ranks, "traitors" to the people's cause. 
The differences of opinion between the PODM (Partido Obrero de 
Unificacion Marxista), a non-Stalinist Communist Party, and the 
Spanish Communist Party (Partido Socialista Unificado de Cataluna, or 
PSUC) over the prosecution and ultimate aim of the war were the most 
obvious crack in the facade of the United Front in Spain. The FODM 
(which had semi-Trotskyist beliefs) considered that the final aim of 
the war should be the establishment of "proletarian democracy" in 
Spain; the Communists, on the other hand, in pursuit of the 
international United Front and in order to woo the middle class in 
Spain, followed a policy of suppression of revolution and promoted 
the war as solely aimed at saving liberal democracy in Spain. The 
split between the proponents of "revolution in the midst of warn and 
those who argued for victory against Fascism above all culminated in 
the Barcelona "May Days" in 1937, when fighting broke out between the 
two groups. The "May Days" resulted in Communist leadership of the 
Government of Spain becoming more firmly entrenched and, eventually, 
in the dissolution of the FOUM and the imprisonment and trial for 
treason of its leaders. The purging of non-Stalinists and 
"Trotskyists" in Spain reflected the purges in the Soviet 
Union. 118 
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Communist propaganda in New Zealand, not surprisingly, did not 
attempt any discussion of the issues behind the Communist 
"persecution" of the PODM. Mrs Elsie Locke admits that there was a 
"cover-up" in the Workers Weekly about the PODM - "never would we 
have admitted what was really happening about the POUM" .119 
Instead, the Weekly concentrated on the revelations of treachery by 
the PODM. The PODM was accused of having plotted with Franco in an 
article published in the Weekly in August 1937. The article reported 
that leaders of the PODM had communicated by radio and personally, 
with Franco's high command, in order to co-ordinate their sabotage 
with the movement of Franco's forces, so as to successfully undermine 
the Republican war effort. The Weekly called this "the ugliest 
revelation of Trotskyist treachery to date"; in fact, it was the 
first such revelation with regard to Spain to appear in the New 
Zealand Communist newspaper. 120 
The unmasking of these "traitors" could, of course, only serve to 
strengthen the People's Army, as an article describing Republican 
victories on the Aragon front pointed out: "The unification of 
command in the army and the crushing of the Trotskyists have paved 
the way for the building of a strong and efficient army. 11121 
Not until November 1938, did the Weekly mention the Trotskyists 
again, this time in connection with the trial of the POUM, being held 
in Barcelona. Significantly, it was only at this point that the "May 
Days" in Barcelona were mentioned. The image of a strong Republican 
war effort may have been marred by an account of the riots at the 
time they occurred. In 1938, it was opportune to mention then as 
having been inspired by the Trotskyists. 122 
At the end of the war, too, the capitulation of the Spanish 
Government to Franco was seen as a betrayal of the Spanish people by 
their new, and not entirely welcome, leaders, Casado and Miaja. 
(General Miaja had earlier been lauded as a great military leader of 
the People's Army.) This did not mean, said the Workers Weekly, 
that the anti-Fascist spirit of the Spanish people had lessened at 
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all, but that their new leaders were crypto-Fascists, defeatists and 
traitors. As well as attributing the victory of the Casado coup to 
British and French plotting, the Communists claimed some connection 
between Casado and his confreres and Russian "Trotskyists lt , in 
particular the Tukhachevsky-led "rebels" (whose "rebellion", 
incidentally, had also been instigated by Britain and France).123 
In no way was the defeat of the Republican forces to be seen as 
the failure of the Popular Front and the People's Army of Spain, nor 
of the concept of the United Front itself. In a curious way, the 
"traitors" and the "betrayals" in Spain were more potent reasons for 
Franco's victory than the most obvious reason: the military 
superiority of Franco and his allies. Above all, the failure of 
elements within Spain's Popular Front to heed the direction of the 
Communists was seen as betrayal of Spanish democracy. In March 1939, 
the Weekly said: 
It is worthy to note that Spain's "Red-baiters" of 
yesterday, the elements who hampered the conduct of the war 
against Franco at every stage by their disruptive policy and 
their sectarian hatred of the Communists, the followers of 
Caballero and Prieto are today joining hands with Franco to 
defeat the Spanish people, and are responsible for the 
butchering of the workers in the streets. For "Red-baiting" 
is the first step on the path to treachery to the working 
class.124 
Although the United Front policy was one of co-operation on a 
broad basis with other "Left" groups, Communist sectionalism never 
ceased to operate. The denunciations of the actions of the Socialist 
International and the British Labour Party, the attacks on the PODM 
in Spain, the hysterical claims that Britain and France and/or 
Russian Trotskyists were behind the Casado junta's seizure of power, 
all spoke of the Communist International's will to dominate the 
United Front and to attack any elements within it that would not 
accept that Communist domination, or the Communist interpretation of 
events. They also revealed the Communist response to the failure of 
the United Front in, and about, Spain: blame was apportioned 
elsewhere. 
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It is interesting to note the treatment in Communist propaganda 
of the role of Communism in Spain and the attitude of the Soviet 
Union to the Spanish crisis. The deeper purpose of the United Front 
to aid Spanish democracy was 
inevitable attack by Fascism. 
to protect Russian democracy from an 
This fear for the safety of the Soviet 
Union was most clearly articulated in an item "contributed by a 
medical man who is a keen anti-Fascist and an admirer of the USSR": 
Sooner or later as world crises intensify, what remains of 
the capitalist imperialist system will need a convenient 
excuse for flying at the throats at the mighty builders of 
Socialism in the USSR.12S 
One such convenient excuse would be the role played by the USSR in 
the Spanish drama. There were several references in the pages of the 
Weekly to the possibility that the Powers would turn on the Soviet 
Union because of its aid to the Spanish Government, not least because 
it was the only great power, and the only country involved with the 
NIC, that had "dared to lift the veil of pretence which so thinly 
masks Fascist aggression in Spain".126 
Great pains were taken to emphasise that the USSR had no interest 
in Spain other than the defence of democracy, both in Spain and the 
rest of the world, and the support of a People's Front Government 
against the forces of reaction. In April 1937, the Weekly published 
a statement by Izvestia, which concluded: 
The Soviet Government and Soviet public opinion do not 
pursue any interests of their own in Spain. The Soviet 
Government and the public are interested in Spanish affairs 
neither more nor less than the whole of advanced and 
progressive mankind, which knows that victory of the Fascist 
interventionists over Republican Spain would be a victory of 
reaction over progress.127 
An article in "International Notes" (reprinted from The Soviets 
of Today, published by the Friends of the Soviet Union) explained why 
the Red Army had not marched to the assistance of Spain. The reason, 
according to the article, was that the Soviet Union stood for the 
right of self determination of all nations, as witnessed by its 
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non-aggression pacts with other countries, and, thus, to intervene in 
Spain would be a "complete abnegation of Soviet foreign policy since 
1917". It was also an example of the Soviet Union's "genuine effort 
towards the maintenance of peace", in contrast with other powers, 
which had intervened in Russia in 1917 and were now interfering, or 
allowing interference, in Spain. 
Lest anyone should think that Russia did not intervene because it 
was unable to do so, the article also noted that it was only through 
forebearance and a desire to preserve peace that retaliatory measures 
had not been taken for the sinking of a Russian merchant-man. It 
warned that in the event of a world war spreading from Spain "the 
Fascist nations will feel the heavy hand of 153,000,000 people who 
are prepared to defend democracy with the resources of one sixth of 
the earth" .128 
In 1938, "International Notes" published a long article by Maxim 
Litvinov, the Russian Foreign Minister, showing how "the Soviet Union 
has fought consistently to preserve peace and safeguard the right of 
small nations". The Soviet Union was depicted as committed to 
international collaboration and peace through the League of Nations 
and regional mutual assistance pacts. A tone of injured idealism 
permeated Litvinov's listing of the betrayals of the ideal of 
international collaboration; the implication was that the Soviet 
Union, although feared by, and under threat from, capitalist nations, 
had done its best for world peace only to find the cause betrayed by 
those very powers it had sought to help (that is, the Western 
democracies) : 
it must be stated that the Soviet Government has 
demanded nothing for itself. It has not offered itself to 
anyone as a partner or ally; it consented to participate in 
the collective collaboration only because the situation was 
particularly dangerous not for itself, but, in the first 
place for the small countries, and in the second place for 
the states responsible for the post-war international 
order.129 
The article justified the Soviet Union's participation in the 
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Non-Intervention Committee. Although Russia had no faith that 
general war would have resulted if non-intervention had not been 
instituted, it had consented to sign the NIA in the interests of 
international solidarity and in the belief that intervention would be 
prohibited. Once the committee had proved not only conciliatory to 
the aggressors but inclined toward Franco, the Soviet Union had 
remained only in order to attempt to salvage the situation and 
prevent further concessions that would aid Franco. 
The article concluded with an analysis of the reasons for this 
betrayal of international co-operation for peace and capitulation to 
aggression. Ultimately, according to Litvinov, the reasons were fear 
of Russia and of class upheaval, which resulted in a false conception 
of Fascism as a bastion against the rising working-class movement. 
Litvinov appealed to patriotism and/or nationalism when he contrasted 
the progressive groups in the democracies with the "circles who 
prefer to sacrifice their national interests and endanger or even 
lose the existence of the states for the sake of protecting them from 
social and class opposition". In this manner Communist propaganda 
justified the Soviet Union's participation in the diplomatic 
creations of imperialist nations, emphasised its commitment to 
democracy, collective security and peace, and its deep opposition to 
Fascism, and warned potential aggressors. 
Very 
Comintern, 
early in 
published 
the war, in December 1936, an appeal from the 
the United Front in 
in the Weekly, called for all democrats to join 
aid of Spain and emphasised equally that the 
United Front should "rally round the Soviet Union". It concluded 
with the stirring call: "LONG LIVE SOVIET POWER THROUGHOUT THE 
WORLD", a sentiment hardly calculated to bolster claims of the 
Soviet's disinterested defence of democracy in Spain. 130 
Even the Spanish People's Front, in the midst of a war of 
self-defence against Fascist aggression, apparently had as its deeper 
and greater purpose the defence of Soviet democracy. Frank Pitcairn 
(Claud Cockburn) reported on the plenum of the Central Committee of 
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the Communist Party of Spain, and quoted the words of Dolores 
Ibarruri (La Pasionaria), a well-known Spanish Communist and heroine 
of the Republican war effort: "The defence of the Soviet Union 
against its enemies and its calumniators must be a point of honour 
with every militant in the working class party."131 
Yet, there was something rather contradictory about the Communist 
treatment of the role of the Soviet Union and of the Communist Party 
in Spain. At one and the same time, the parts played by the Soviet 
Union and the Communist Party of Spain in aiding the Spanish people 
were lauded and used to emphasise the major influence of both in the 
struggle against Fascism everywhere; however, any hint that the 
Soviet Union or the Communist Party of Spain had deeper purposes in 
Spain was denied vehemently. 
It has been shown that the Weekly's propaganda made sure that its 
readers understood how slight was the power or influence of 
Communists 
war. 132 
in 
But 
Spanish politics prior to the outbreak of the 
the Communist Party was given most of the credit for 
the establishment of the Popular Front coalition having 
that 
been 
became 
behind 
the Government in February 1936. It was claimed that 
for the United Front of all working class only the Communist drive 
organisations made possible the united electoral action that gave the 
Popular Front victory at the polls. Georgi Dimitrov, in the third 
part of "Two Years Heroic Struggle of the Spanish People", described 
the co-ordination of the forces of the Labour Movement beginning in 
1935 and extending into the period of the war. He prefaced his 
description with a statement attributing the Popular Front's success 
to the policy of the United Front: 
For a number of years the Communist Party of Spain - the 
initiator of the Popular Front - has conducted a consistent 
and persistent struggle for the unity of the Spanish people, 
for rallying all the forces of the people against reaction 
and Fascism.133 
The responsibility for the creation of the People's Army and its 
smooth functioning against the far-better equipped Fascist war 
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machine was primarily that of the Communist Party as well. Its 
success resulted partly from the Communists' well developed pre-war 
United Front policy, and also because it not only continued this 
policy into the war, but also succeeded in routing out the traitors, 
such as the PODM and the "Caballero clique".134 
This emphasis on the role of the Communist Party in Spain went to 
reinforce the arguments for the creation of the United Front. Again, 
the wider aim appeared to be the focus of attention rather than the 
war in Spain itself. Although the Workers Weekly was in a sense 
"preaching to the converted", its appeals went beyond that of the 
small group of Communists in New Zealand. One wonders how the 
self-congratulatory tone of Communist propaganda and the sectionalism 
that appeared now and again appealed to the less ideological of its 
readers, those non-Communist members of the Labour Movement, whom the 
Communist Party wished to unite in its United Front. The Communists' 
demurrals of sectional interest in Spain and the emphasis on the 
Soviet Union's altruistic defence of democracy in Spain sat uneasily 
with the obviously slanted praise of the United Front policy. 
This discussion of Communist propaganda about the war in Spain 
has so far been in terms of the general trend of that propaganda, 
rather than its specific application to the New Zealand scene. 
Indeed, much of the propaganda directed toward the building of a 
united pro-Republican Movement, and for a United Front to grow from 
it, was not directed specifically at New Zealanders. Calls aimed at 
the New Zealand Labour Movement often varied little from calls to the 
international movement. Statements such as: 
We of the Labour Movement would be traitors, indeed, if we 
lessened our efforts for one moment to aid these heroic 
people in winning the fight which they are waging for our 
sake and theirs.135 
or: 
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The United Front of workers, allied with the farmers, 
professional people and small trades-people on a common 
platform of opposition to Fascism and war, and for the 
achievement of the most necessary demands of the toiling 
people - this is the People's Front, the only force which is 
capable of saving civilisation from barbarism and 
reaction. 136 
had a universal application. They were reinforced by more specific 
calls to the Labour Movement and to all New Zealand democrats to form 
a United Front in support of Spain: "If we do not take what action 
is possible to aid Spain in her present agony, then the reputation of 
New Zealand Labour will be forever stained."137 said the Weekly, 
in an editorial on the bombing of Guernica in May 1937. 
The Communist Party's Spanish campaign in New Zealand began with 
a call for "Hands off Spain!", aimed at joint action with the Labour 
Party to create a movement of solidarity with the Spanish 
Government. The Weekly's first article on the Spanish Civil War 
called for meetings of solidarity to be held and for motions to be 
sent to the Labour Government urging it to express support for the 
Popular Front Government of Spain. 138 The campaign to involve 
the Labour Party was to continue for some months at an intensive 
level and, thereafter, intermittently throughout the war. The 
Communist Party's tactics in this area were to emphasise the leading 
influence of the Labour Party in the New Zealand Labour Movement, and 
to encourage the rank-and-file to influence it to support the Popular 
Front Government of Spain. 
On 1 August 1936, the Weekly reported that Leo Sim, General 
Secretary of the Communist Party, had sent a note to the National 
Secretary of the Labour Party urging joint action over Spain. 
"Political differences", said the Weekly, somewhat sententiously, 
"cannot be allowed to stand in the way of joint action".190 On 8 
August, the Weekly said: 
A victory of the workers in Spain would strengthen the 
forces of the New Zealand Labour Movement. We know that New 
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Zealand workers would welcome joint action of the Labour and 
Communist forces for the defence of the Spanish people 
around the slogan of "Hands off Spain". Back our call for 
joint action.140 
The Non-Intervention Agreement in August and the establishment of 
the Non-Intervention Committee in September brought an end to the 
"Hands off Spain!" campaign. It was replaced by calls for the Labour 
Movement to influence the New Zealand Government to protest at 
British neutrality and the embargo on the sale of arms to Spain. The 
Weekly was increasingly critical of the attitude of the Labour Party 
and the Labour Government for, as the paper saw it, failing to take 
the lead in the solidarity campaign. Editorials in the Workers 
Weekly, often reprinted in "International Notes!!, again and again 
noted the silence of the Labour Government and urged the Labour 
Movement to ensure that their leaders become involved in the movement 
of solidarity for the Spanish Government. 141 By November, the 
Labour Party and its Government were accused of a "shameful" and 
"intolerable" silence. On 20 November, the Weekly expressed its 
dissatisfaction with the attitude of the Labour Government: 
Can we then be satisfied with the attitude of complete 
indifference of the Labour Party to the events in Spain? 
No! a thousand times No! Yet till now the Labour Party 
leaders and the Labour Government have neither by word nor 
gesture given any support, whether moral or material, to 
Spain's fighters for liberty. This is intolerable! There 
is so much that the Labour Party and the Labour Government 
could do! There is nothing except unwillingness, which need 
prevent the Government declaring it regards the 
constitutional and democratically elected Spanish Government 
as a friendly Government having much in common, in spirit 
and aim, with the declared policy of the Labour Government 
itself. There is no reason why it should not express 
disagreement with the fake "neutrality" policy which puts an 
arms embargo on the Spanish Government while the Fascist 
rebels receive unstinted supplies from Germany and Italy, .. 
The Labour Party must act! A hundred evidences show that 
workers of New Zealand are conscious of their international 
duty and are willing and anxious to come to the aid of the 
heroic Spanish people. They but lack the lead that should 
come from the Labour leadership. It will be a shame and a 
disgrace for our country and its great Labour Hovement if 
this is not given.143 
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At the beginning of December, the Weekly described the "obstinate 
silence" of the leadership of the Labour Party as an attitude that 
"can only be an encouragement to Fascism in Spain and New Zealand. 
It must be broken down".144 Yet, later the same month it praised 
W.J. Jordan's stand at Geneva, no doubt with the aim of encouraging 
New Zealand's delegate to the League of Nations and his Government to 
take a firmer stand in support of the Spanish Government: 
It is with a feeling of the greatest pride and pleasure that 
New Zealand friends of democracy will have read the cable 
that on December 12th Mr Jordan outspokenly denounced 
Fascist intervention in Spain. 
it is certain that Mr Jordan has added an honourable 
page to the history of New Zealand, which should call forth 
resolutions of congratulation and support from the whole 
Labour Movement. 145 
By early 
the rest of 
1937, the Weekly's tone had changed somewhat, and for 
the period of the war its attitude towards the Labour 
Government's policy was to be less critical and more encouraging, 
even coaxing. Once it was obvious that there would be no 
Labour-Communist joint action, and that the Labour Government was not 
about to make any public protest about British policy and the NIA in 
general, there was little point in maintaining a propaganda stand 
that would not help to endear the Communists to the Labour Party, to 
which it wished to affiliate. 
In April 1937, the Weekly reported the "disappointing" resolution 
about the Spanish Civil War passed by the Labour Party Conference, in 
terms more in sorrow than in anger. The Conference resolution 
included the statement that the Spanish people should be left to 
settle their own domestic difficulties. This view, of course, did 
not coincide with the Communist image of the war, which denied that 
the war was in anyway a civil war. The Weekly merely said: "We 
could have desired the resolution to have been less ambiguous. 
People who do not understand the Labour Movement might well place a 
wrong construction on the words."145 Even though the editorial 
went on to say that to infer that a civil war was taking place in 
Spain was to "falsify history and besmirch a courageous 
people" ,147 
benefit of 
Conference 
intended to 
enemies.,,148 
it apparently gave 
the doubt: "We 
resolution while 
line wup with 
220 
the Labour Party Conference the 
must, therefore, believe that the 
ambiguously worded was definitely 
Spanish democracy against its 
A week later, this qualified approval had changed to a view of 
the Labour Party resolution as an example to the rest of the Labour 
Movement in New Zealand. With the news that 10,000 more Italian 
troops had landed in Spain in March, the Weekly urged the New Zealand 
Government to aid Spain; the "important" resolution of the Labour 
Party conference had shown the way, and the Government and "all 
peace-loving organisations" would do well to follow that lead. 149 
Later comments on the attitude of the Labour Government tended to 
centre around New Zealand's stand at the League of Nations, urging 
the New Zealand Government to take its praiseworthy policy at Geneva 
one step further and exert its influence, as a member of the 
Commonwealth, on the British Government. It followed that since New 
Zealand, as a member of the League, had "consistently shown her 
support for real collective security and protection of an attacked 
nation against an aggressor",lSO it was only right that its 
Government should support the Republican cause in Spain. 
Jordan's speeches at the League were held up as an example of the 
progressive nature of the New Zealand Government. In July 1937, 
"International Notes" published part of the text of Jordan's latest 
speech at Geneva and commented that it showed that he had taken a 
long step forward in recognising the truth about the Spanish 
situation. But, it said, a clear lead was still needed and the 
Labour Government should be urged to disassociate itself entirely 
from non-intervention and act in "the name and spirit of the peace-
loving people [Jordan] represents."lSl 
Praise for Jordan from prominent members of the British Labour 
Movement was also published, again to reinforce the impression of the 
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reputation New Zealand had, which could, of course, only be enhanced 
by a stronger pro-Republican policy. Harry Pollitt, "popular General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain" was quoted in July 
1937, commenting upon Jordan's speech at the League in May: 
Mr Jordan made an exceptionally fine stand on behalf of 
the Government and was treated very unsympathetically by Mr 
Eden The stand that Mr Jordan made has had very 
considerable attention in the whole British press.1S2 
The Weekly also reported the comments of Ernest Bevin, President of 
the British Trade Union Congress, on his visit to New Zealand in 
1938: "Mr Jordan expressed the views of many of the British people 
when he asserted the right of the Abyssinian and Spanish peoples at 
Geneva."lS3 
An integral part of the Weekly's encouragement of the Labour 
Government and the Labour Party on the Spanish question, was the 
argument that New Zealand's views counted overseas, that what New 
Zealand did about Spain mattered to the rest of the international 
Labour Movement. Bevin's comment, for instance, impressed upon New 
Zealanders the fact that the New Zealand Government's opinion was 
also that of many British people. A Labour Government that was a 
member of the Commonwealth, and supposedly privy to the conferences 
and decisions of the British Government, could have a decisive 
influence upon British policy. In so doing it would act as a voice 
for this large body of British pro-Republican opinion. In October 
1937, the Weekly said: 
New Zealand with its Labour Government can do much, if it 
will, by vigorous representations at London towards helping 
British Labour to force the National Government to alter its 
policy of opposition at the Spanish Government. 154 
New Zealand's special 
movement, because of 
position in the international pro-Republican 
its Labour Government, was part of the 
implication behind the frequent exhortations, in the first months of 
the war, that the honour of the New Zealand Labour Movement was at 
stake if it did not support the people of Spain.1SS 
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This appeal to New Zealand "nationalism" was only a minor part in 
much of the propaganda of the Communist Party directed towards New 
Zealanders, often less stated than implied. It may have been one of 
the most potent arguments to use; after all, this was the way Savage 
and some of his colleagues felt. And some New Zealanders, 
particularly those with some interest in the outside world, filled 
with hope and the promise of great deeds now that Labour had come to 
power, felt that New Zealand's voice had value among the councils of 
the great. The Weekly quoted Arthur Sewell, Professor of English at 
Auckland University,156 in a speech to a Left Book Club meeting 
in Auckland, in July 1938: 
Small things may turn the scales in which are measured great 
issues. N.Z. is a small country but it is not beyond the 
bounds of possibility that what New Zealand continues to say 
and do in Geneva, in London, over the busy cables of the 
world may turn the scales in Europe.IS7 
This was an encouragement of the independent stand New Zealand was 
taking at Geneva. 
progressiveness of 
the vanguard of 
Liberal and Left New Zealanders' pride in the 
their nation, their sense that New Zealand was in 
social reform, an example to the rest of the world, 
was the chord played upon in this type of propaganda. The Spanish 
crisis provided another opportunity for New Zealand to prove its 
pre-eminent position in the ranks of democratic nations. An article 
by George Jackson, Secretary of the Auckland Spanish Medical Aid 
Committee (and a member of the Communist Party) ,158 written after 
the capitulation of the Spanish Government, and concerned with the 
plight of Spanish refugees in France, concluded: 
The N.Z. Spanish Aid Committee desires that the good name of 
N.Z. be maintained. Remember that the Spaniards said that 
N.Z. was a great little country. It is a great little 
country and you can help to maintain its reputation of being 
in the forefront of human progress, by assisting these 
victims of Fascist barbarism today.1S9 
A part of the propaganda concerning New Zealand's importance in 
the international pro-Republican movement was aimed at overcoming the 
insularity of New Zealanders, the problem of distance dimming the 
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call and cushioning the impact of the war. It was of course another 
facet in the argument that the outcome of the war in Spain would have 
repercussions everywhere, even in far-away New Zealand. The Weekly 
said: "We must not be swayed by the idea that New Zealand is many 
thousands of miles distant from Spain. Wellington is no further from 
Madrid than Sarajevo."160 
Woman Today's "feminist internationalism" also stressed this 
theme. Its 1937 Christmas editorial, entitled "Peace on Earth -
Goodwill Towards Men", urged readers not to be insular and think that 
"we are not as other men" (sic): 
Too many of us close our eyes to world conflict and say "We 
are not Spain"; "The Chinese are not like us." How can we 
work for peace wholeheartedly with peacelovers of all 
nationalities while we harbour in our hearts false ideas of 
our own superiority?161 
The next year's Christmas message to the women of other lands 
conveyed similar 
lands to readers 
sentiments. It pledged to present women of other 
not as images in their national costumes, but as 
real people, "in your daily lives, facing problems such as we have in 
New Zealand".162 "These Are Children Like Ours", lamented the 
headline of an editorial, in August 1938, which discussed the wars in 
Spain and China as examples of Fascist aggression. 163 
A Communist Party leaflet used the bombing atrocities to good 
effect in this respect, asking readers to imagine a Fascist plane 
"swooping over Christchurch and bombing our women and children to 
death".164 
Another tactic used to stir New Zealanders into action was merely 
a more specific application of the general argument that, in 
supporting non-intervention, Britain was endangering its own 
interests. The Workers Weekly, said in October 1936: 
the 
with the 
achieved 
safety and independence of New Zealand are bound up 
present struggles in Spain ... A Fascist victory 
through the bombing planes and military instructors 
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Send an Ambulance Unit to Spain 
Workers, democrats, the Spanish Workers' Government, fighting for its life against the attaeks 
of fascist degenerates, has sent out an appeal to the liberty-loving peoples of the world for aid. 
Beset by Franco's armies of foreign legionaries, deluded Moors, and now Germans a!1d Italians, all 
armed to the teeth and aided by bombing aeroplanes, tanks and guns sent by Hitler and Mussolini, 
the Spanish people united in their glorious Popu lar Front, are resisting the foul murderers with 
the utmost heroism. While. Madrid sleeps the bombing planes swoop over the city, releasing 
aerial bombs which tear the beautiful women and children of Spain to pieces. The blood-thirsty 
Fascist scoundrels machine gun to death harmless shoppers and innocent children. 
Murder most foul! Madrid will not yi eld! SHAME ON US IF WE ALLOW 'rHIS 
FRIGHTFUL THING TO CONTINUE. 
Imagine a Fascist aeroplane swooping over Christchurch and bombing our women and chil-
dren to death, hurling their incendiary bombs into the heart flf our homes. New Zealand workers 
and democrats can take a hand in stopping this frightful crime. Demand that the ban· on the 
export of arms to the Spanish Workers' Government, imposed by the Baldwin Government of 
Britain and other powers under the pretence of non-intervention, be lifted. WE HA VE LED THE 
WORLD BEFORE. NOW THAT WE HAVE A LABOUR GOVERNMENT WE CAN DO IT 
AGAIN. 
Medical Unit Needs Money 
Here is something we can do immediately to ease the sufferings of the Spanish masses. We 
can s~nd an ambulance unit of ~ew Zealand doctors and nurses to succour the wounded. Dunedin 
is giving a lead, and the committee there has organised a unit and raised some money, but more 
is needed. In Palmers ton North the public have pledged themselves to assist. ALL OF THE 
MAJOR TRADE UNIONS IN THE AUCKI.AND DISTRICT ARE SUPPORTING THE" MOVE· 
MENT. (Christchurch Press, Feb. 3.) Associated organisations are sympathetic. 
LET US GET THAT MEDICAL UNIT ON THE WATE.R. 
Vote money through your trade unions. 
Send donations direct to the Dunedin committee until a committee is organised in Christchurch. 
Call at the address below for all information., 
INTERNATIONAL BOOKSHOP 
68 Manchester Street, Christchurch 
Issued by the Communist Party, Christchurch Section. 
February 4, 1937. 
Bullivant 188'15 
A leaflet produced by the Christchurch section of the Communist Party 
in support of the Spanish Medical Aid appeal. (Leaflet from C.F. 
Saunders Papers. Item 10, Jack Locke Deposit, Canterbury University 
Library, Christchurch.) 
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of Hitler and Mussolini, would place Fascism in complete 
control of the Mediterranean. Hitler is the ally of the 
militarist-Fascist Japan; New Zealand under such 
circumstances would be thrown to the mercy of the 
warmongers. Our right to work out our own destiny in 
freedom and peace is being endangered by the treacherous 
pro-Fascist intrigues of the Baldwin Government.165 
In july 1937, the Weekly said that "British capitalism" was 
willing to sacrifice the interests of the Dominions rather than 
permit a People's Front Government to be victorious in Spain. 166 
An item in "International Notes", in August 1938 even went so far as 
to claim that Britain was planning to abandon Gibraltar, because the 
British base could not be defended adequately against the eight 
batteries of German guns alleged to be trained upon it. 167 
The Workers Weekly even used Anzac Day in its appeal to "the 
finest traditions of the British people,,168 that were at stake in 
Spain. The Weekly said that thousands of New Zealanders and 
Australians had gathered to pay homage to men who had fought for an 
ideal: 
We should never dare to 
again if we do not make 
people in their struggle 
themselves and the world.169 
celebrate the deeds of the Anzac 
every effort to aid the Spanish 
to save Democracy and peace for 
No doubt this reference to a tradition and a ceremony dear to the 
hearts of many New Zealanders was a useful tactic; however, it was a 
rather surprising sentiment to come from an organisation that had 
usually 
though 
heroes 
spoken of the First World War as an Imperialist war. Even 
the Weekly qualified its statement somewhat by saying that the 
and idealists of the "Great War" had been betrayed by 
politicians and "butchered by inefficiency in high places", one 
wonders how many members of the Labour Movement, who had suffered 
because of their opposition to conscription in World War One, reacted 
to this use of a New Zealand tradition glorifying war. 
The Spanish Civil War itself was, of course, a just war, as Woman 
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Today pointed out in its first editorial about the war. Its argument 
was possibly intended to justify support for one side in a 
particularly vicious war, in a magazine otherwise making a clarion 
call for peace: 
Men make war and women clean up the mess. The war in Spain, 
however, differs from the last war in that it is a clash 
between democracy and the reactionary Fascism.170 
Communist propaganda clearly showed the attack by Fascism in 
Spain to be a specific lesson to the New Zealand Labour Movement. 
New Zealand in the late 1930s was fertile ground in which to sow this 
type of propaganda about the menace of Fascism, which could strike 
anywhere. A new Labour Government had only recently been elected for 
the first time. Members of the Labour Movement were sensitive and 
defensive about any criticism of "their" Government, or about any 
apparent obstruction of its social and economic reforms. Notably, 
the Labour Movement was sensitive to any hint of anti-Labour 
sentiment in the daily newspapers. The Communist Party built on this 
feeling. The similarities between the New Zealand Labour Government 
and the Popular Front Government of Spain were emphasised. An 
article in the Weekly, on 16 October 1936, said: 
The manner in which [the Fascists] launched an attack in the 
early hours of the morning of July 19 with a view to 
destroying a constitutional Parliament is worthy of serious 
consideration.171 
An earlier call for solidarity with Spain had said: "Think of 
the glee of N.Z's anti-Labour forces if a progressive Government was 
overthrown by Fascism and the forces of democracy did not lift a 
finger to save it."172 The Weekly published articles concerning 
a pro-Franco article in the New ZeaJand Herald,173 and an 
interview in the Radio Record with Phillip Cross, a New Zealander who 
had fought for Franco. 174 These revealed to New Zealand Labour 
the pro-Fascists in their own country, whose response to events in 
Spain had unmasked them. 
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The exposure of pro-Fascist sentiment in New Zealand was also an 
element in the Weekly's attacks on the Spanish war news published in 
Catholic newspapers in New Zealand. Articles about the "lying" 
propaganda in Zealandia (the Tablet was not mentioned) also served as 
opportunities for the Weekly to promote the "correct" view of the 
war. From May to December 1937, the Weekly carried out an 
intermittent battle with Zealandia over that newspaper's claim that a 
photograph of a bombed Spanish child was a fake. 175 
The Weekly apparently placed more importance on the issue than 
did Zealandia. It issued a challenge to Zealandia to prove that the 
photograph was indeed a fake, offering to donate:lOO to a charitable 
fund, if Zealandia could do so. Later, the Weekly triumphantly 
"This was never accepted"; thus, proving the proclaimed 
Weekly's argument 
offer 
that 
anti-Communist lies of a 
Weekly then published what 
Zealandia was merely repeating the 
British Catholic newspaper. 176 The 
it called "a real faked photograph", of 
Generals Franco and Mala entering a city, with an applauding populace 
looking on. 177 Again, its challenge went unanswered by 
Zealandia. 
For the Weekly, the Catholic newspaper's attack on its coverage 
of the Spanish crisis were an obvious example of the lengths to which 
pro-Fascists would go to undermine the cause of the democratic 
peoples of Spain, and New Zealand: 
The greatest tribute that could be paid to the Communist 
Party, and the Worker's Weekly in particular, is the 
increasing VlClousness and unscrupulousness of the attacks 
made upon them by the forces of reaction. Particularly from 
the hierarchy of the Catholic Church are such attacks being 
launched as far as New Zealand is concerned,178 
said the Weekly, in October 193,7 with reference to Catholic attacks 
on the Communist view of the war in Spain. Such attacks, according 
to the Weekly, were all to the good, for they put members of the 
Labour Movement on their guard against the forces of reaction. This 
particular article was also an opportunity for the Weekly to promote 
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the concept of the United Front, and the aims of the Communist 
Party. The article concluded: 
The Catholic press may rave as it will, but the workers, 
whether Catholic or Protestant, who toil at the bench or in 
the shop with the Communist worker understand that, atheist 
or no atheist, he is sincerely struggling for the good of 
the working class people. 
No lies or distortions, however unscrupulous, can prevent 
the final unity of Catholic, Protestant and Communist worker 
against the exploiters, of all religions and no religion, 
who strive to divide them.179 
Yet the greatest enemy, as in Spain, was the enemy within. The 
most obvious appeal to the sensitivities of the New Zealand Labour 
Movement and their fears for the fulfillment of the Labour 
Government's policies came in an article about the Casado junta in 
March 1939. The Weekly built on earlier reports of treachery within 
the Spanish People's Army, when it solemnly concluded: 
Spain is a tremendous warning to New Zealand Labour. If, 
after nearly three years of armed struggle against Fascism, 
traitors were still to be found in the camp of the people 
how many more are there in New Zealand, in the State 
Department, in the military and police forces who must be 
weeded out without delay. Let Labour take warning and 
act!180 
Thus, the Weekly's propaganda made it clear that in New Zealand, 
as elsewhere, Spain was, at once, the great issue about which to 
build a United Front, and, yet, only a part of the wider aim of the 
creation of that coalition against Fascism. The focus of its 
specifically New Zealand-directed propaganda was aimed at mobilising 
opinion in favour of the Spanish Government, in order to influence 
the Labour Government, as well as to create the United Front: 
You can see that your organisation supports some sort of aid 
for Spain, that it protests against the Chamberlain policy 
and asks the N.Z. Government to do likewise; that it urges 
your local M.P. to voice support for Spain in the House of 
Representatives. 181 
The calls for New Zealand solidarity with Spain, unlike those for 
international solidarity, were more specific about the form that 
229 
solidarity should take. The above quotation gives some indication of 
the kind of activity encouraged by the Communist Partty of New 
Zealand. Resolutions of solidarity, messages to the Government, and 
the provision of aid were emphasised, and there was never any mention 
of the possibility of strike action to encourage the Government to 
adopt a pro-Republican policy. Nor did Communist propaganda actively 
encourage young men to join the International Brigades. 
Medical aid for Spain was one major form of action endorsed by 
the Weekly. In keeping with its virtual control of the Spanish 
Medical Aid movement,182 a great deal of news about the 
activities of the various S~C branches 183 was printed by the 
Communist newspaper. The despatch of the three New Zealand nurses to 
Spain, in May 1937, received, as could be expected, a pre-eminent 
position in the Weekly's pages. 184 Letters from the nurses to 
the Committee were also published regularly, adding to the Weekly's 
attempts to bring the events and conditions of the war closer to New 
Zealanders. Here were three of our own countrywomen in the thick of 
the fray, bravely giving of themselves in the cause of the Spanish 
people and exposed to the same dangers as the Spanish people. Surely 
an example to emulate, in whatever possible manner, and a personal 
responsibility for all members of the New Zealand Labour Movement to 
ensure that the nurses' bravery did not go unrecognised and unaided 
by their fellows back in the safety of peaceful New Zealand. 
The SMAC was held up as an example of the sterling work that New 
Zealanders were doing in the cause of Spanish democracy; it was an 
encouragement to all New Zealand democrats and it helped to show how 
the Communist Party itself was working in the cause of Spain. The 
Weekly published a list of donations to the SMAC in almost every 
issue over the period of the war. But all and any pro-Republican 
activies were grist to the Weekly's mill, as examples and 
encouragement to the rest of the Labour Movement. 
Publicity about the activities of the Trades Unions, their 
governing body, the Federation of Labour (FOL), and of Labour Party 
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branches was the most important in this respect, for it was at these 
groups, in the main, that the Communists were aiming their United 
Front propaganda. 
for instance, the 
Spain in September 
It may be also that the laudatory comments about, 
FOL's decision to send money for an ambulance to 
1938185 were designed to some extent to break 
down the suspicion of the Communists held in some areas of the Labour 
Movement. Here was the FOL in solidarity with the Communist Party 
over a particular cause; here too was the Communist Party extending a 
fraternal felicitation to the FOL on its activities, so different an 
attitude from that taken by the Communists prior to 1936. 
In the Weekly's report of the FOL council meeting whereat the 
decision to send an ambulance was made, headed If Federation of Labour 
Rushes Aid to Anti-Fascist Forces", the wider purpose behind the 
movement to aid Spain, the United Front itself, was obvious. The 
Weekly noted "the splendid spirit of internationalismlf at the Council 
and concluded its article with the optimistic assessment: 
Delegates to 
the inspiring 
meeting, and 
the way to 
of the prewar 
the National Council meeting bear witness to 
solidarity and progressive character of the 
are confident that the Federation is well on 
rival and surpass the great militant traditions 
Federation of Labour.186 
The factionalism and the somewhat piqued tone of the Communist Party, 
in discussing the lack of solidarity of other working class 
organisations, which was evident in the general propaganda, did not 
appear in the Weekly's news about the New Zealand scene. Of course, 
the general criticisms could have been taken as applying to the New 
Zealand Labour Movement as well; yet no specific attacks were mounted 
on particular organisations in New Zealand, after the Weekly's 
initial condemnation of the Labour Governments "shameful silence". 
Perhaps New Zealand was too small a country, and the sense of 
solidarity too precarious and too sought after to warrant attacks, 
which, given the size of the country, might too easily become bitter 
and personal. As well, the Communists must have been aware of the 
legacy of suspicion and distrust it had created with its pre-1936 
"Social-Fascist" policy. 
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At the close of the war, and in some items thereafter, on the 
plight of the thousands of Spanish refugees in France, the Weekly did 
chastise its readers, but only in very general terms, calculated to 
instil a sense of shame in New Zealanders for their lack of 
humanitarian concern for the Spanish people. "You could have stopped 
this" read the caption on a photograph of a Spanish refugee woman. 
And in similar vein to its articles on the failure of the 
international pro-Republican movement, the item stressed that there 
was still time to show solidarity with Spain: "This and the 
countless other tragedies of Spain could have been stopped if all of 
us had united to help British Labour drive out Chamberlain. It is 
not too late to act. ,,187 Yet, blame was not apportioned as it 
was in references to the International Movement. 
However, the Weekly did gently correct those views that it felt 
did not exactly coincide with the Communist view of the Spanish 
situation. At the close of a lengthy report of an "interesting" 
lecture given by Dr A.G. Butchers, a WEA tutor, to a Wellington WEA 
current history class, the Weekly noted that it did not agree with Dr 
Butchers' assessment of the role of Great Britain in the Spanish 
situation. It was Dr Butcher's view that the major factor in 
Britain's advocacy of non-intervention was a desire to prevent the 
war in Spain from spreading into the rest of Europe. This concern 
was also why Britain was attempting to come to an agreement with 
Italy, while stepping up its rearmament programme. An accord with 
Italy might ensure the withdrawal of her forces from the Spanish 
conflict. The Weekly noted: 
On this last matter we cannot by any means agree with Dr 
Butchers. Even though desire to prevent war be a factor in 
the British policy, the abandoment of the principle of 
collective security and sabotage of the League strengthens 
the Fascist aggressor nations and weakens the position of 
Britain. 188 
Similarly, 
Methodist 
the Weekly reprinted an editorial comment from the 
Times, which had been pro-Republican throughout the 
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war,189 in March 1939, that deplored Franco's victory in Spain. 
I 
The editorial concluded by praying that British statesmen would be 
guided in the right actions and policy. The Weekly commented: 
Methodists will endorse the Methodist Times' support for the 
Spanish Loyalists. However the paper's concluding comment 
indicates that it is ignorant of the real villain of the 
piece. It is these same British statesmen ... who were 
responsible for the policy of non-intervention, a policy 
which opened the gates to unrestricted Fascist invasion, 
while denying the Republican Government its lawful right to 
obtain arms for its defence.190 
Yet, the Weekly still published these articles, in order to show 
the extent of pro-Republican opinion in New Zealand, and its 
criticisms were in no way similar to the trenchant attacks on the 
international pro-Republican movement. The Weekly even printed the 
appeal of the National Relief Fund for Spanish Refugee Children, a 
non-political humanitarian aid organisation with aims that could have 
been seen as rivalling those of the SMAC.19l Indeed, the Weekly's 
opening comment gave a hint of that rivalry: 
In publishing the following appeal as requested by Mr K. 
Purdie, secretary of the NRFSRC, we desire to point out that 
this work is in part covered by the existing Spanish Medical 
Aid Committee, the President of which is Dr D.G. McMillan 
M.P. and the trustees the Rev. E.T. Cox, M.A. and Dr Mark 
Silverstone, director of the Reserve Bank.192 
The inclusion of the names of the SMAC's prominent and worthy office-
holders was no doubt in answer to the NRFSRC's naming of its equally 
prominent trustees. It was an indication that the SMAC had important 
people behind it as well, and, in addition, that these people were 
well-known members of the Labour Movement. 
The role of the Communist Party in the New Zealand pro-Repbulican 
movement was also given less direct publicity. The gUiding 
intelligence and leadership in activities, so emphasised as far as 
Spain was concerned, was not as evident in the Weekly's discussions 
of New Zealand pro-Republican activities. On the other hand, the 
pre-eminent role of the Party in the cause of Spanish democracy was 
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never disguised. There was never any attempt to cover up or deny 
that the SMAC was mainly in the hands of Communist secretaries, and 
the calls for a solidarity movement at the beginning of the war made 
the Communist Party's interest in the issue quite clear. The 
apparent openness of the Communist Party's involvement in the 
pro-Republican movement was a result of the United Front campaign. 
If the Party were championing democracy, what had it to hide? 
However, the more covert activities of the Party; for example, the 
influence of Communist members of Trades Unions, in having 
resolutions of solidarity with Spain passed, was not mentioned. It 
would belie the image of spontaneous and wide Labour Movement 
responses to the peril of democracy in Spain. 
Without doubt, the Weekly's coverage of New Zealand efforts to 
aid Spain was used to foster the image of the United Front in New 
Zealand as a broadly based organisation, wherein political 
differences did not matter. There was considerable emphasis on the 
pro-Republican opinions and activities of prominent people within the 
Labour Movement, and in Left and liberal organisations. The reports 
of their views added to the general propaganda about the war in 
Spain; they were also an indication of the strength and the 
worthiness of the pro-Republican cause, and an encouragement to the 
rest of the Labour Movement. "Broad Auckland Meeting", said the 
headline of a report on a SMAC-sponsored rally, where spoke Professor 
Belshaw, Head of the Economics Department at Auckland University, the 
Reverend Mary Dreaver, a Spiritualist Minister, E.M. Higgins of the 
WEA and J.G. Kennerly of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and 
Joiners ,193 
The involvement of Labour MPs in the pro-Republican movement was 
of especial note, since this indicated that, within its own ranks, 
the Government had a pro-Republican element, all the more reason for 
a strong stand on Spain from the Labour Cabinet. The fact that Dr 
D.G. McMillan, a Dunedin MP was the President of the SMAC was 
immensely useful in this respect. 194 
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Even the "Women's Corner" in the Weekly was put to the use of the 
Spanish cause. Along with articles on nutrition, calisthenics for 
children, and the like, the women's editor, Elsie Freeman, included 
small items about Spain; 
Pasionaria195 and calls for 
Spanish sisters' devotion 
for 
New 
to the 
example, the words of La 
Zealand women to emulate their 
cause of democracy. 196 The 
calls to women, however, despite the "liberated" example of the 
Spanish militia- women, centred mainly around traditional female 
tasks, such as the provision of clothing for war-torn Spain: 
I said we have staved off war, but the Spanish workers have 
had civil war thrust upon them. What have we done to help? 
(What about those scarves and socks and sweaters we are 
knitting for them? Are they ready to send yet?)197 
The same emphasis was found in Woman Today, where support for the 
Spanish "People's Government" was couched mainly in terms of appeals 
to women's traditional role as nurturers. An account of the New 
Zealand nurses' time in London before they went to Spain was 
accompanied by a photo of a dead Spanish child, captioned "Why the 
nurses went 
Woman Today 
to Spain".198 
dealt with 
Several of the articles about Spain in 
the plight of women and child 
refugees. 199 The most unusual "woman-identified" appeal was an 
article entitled "Spanish Relief and the Family Budget", in August 
1937. The article began with an account of a SMAC meeting in 
Christchurch, where a young husband and father of two, until recently 
on "sustenance" work, had offered to donate 10 shillings to the SMAC 
if twenty others in the audience would do the same. It went on to 
discuss ways in which the 
eradicate wasteful luxuries 
while providing extra money 
family budget could be revised, to 
and ensure a better standard of living, 
to be given to Spanish relief. The 
article had a two-fold political message: it was directed towards 
raising money for the SMAC and, in addition, towards battling 
capitalism by encouraging a rejection of consumerism. 2DD 
The New Zealanders in the International Brigades were also a 
major focus of the Weekly's New Zealand-directed propaganda: The 
publication of letters from Tom Spiller, Bert Bryan and Charlie 
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Riley201 helped to give a sense of the immediacy of the war, to 
bring it closer to home for insular New Zealanders. They were a 
reminder that some New Zealanders felt strongly enough about the war 
to risk their lives in the service of democracy, and an encouragement 
to others to do their best, not only for the sake of Spain, but so 
that these men were supported in their bravery by New Zealanders at 
home, and knew that their courage and self-sacrifice did not go 
unacknowledged. 
Those New Zealanders who died in Spain were the image of the 
ultimate sacrifice for democracy, and, thus, the greatest example to 
the rest of the Labour Movement. In May 1937, the Weekly said: 
The death within the last few weeks of two New Zealand 
fighters against Fascism provides a striking example of the 
solidarity of the world working class movement. Robertson 
was a worker, Maclaurin was a student. This also is fitting 
at a time of social change when workers and students should 
march together in the van of world progress. May Day in New 
Zealand celebrates a very vital sentiment. That this is no 
abstraction in the New Zealand of 1937 is shown by such 
examples as a self-sacrifice of our comrades in Spain.202 
The deaths of New Zealanders in Spain also reinforced the argument 
that New Zealand had a part to play in the international movement to 
save Spain. These New Zealanders showed the rest of the world that 
the anti-Fascist spirit in New Zealand was strong, and that its 
United Front was growing: 
Maclure's life has not been sacrificed in vain. Together 
with Maclaurin and Robertson, killed in previous engagements 
he demonstrated that New Zealand can point to men to whom 
freedom means more than life itself. Fascism has not passed 
in Spain; it shall not pass in New Zealand, where it backs 
the leaders of the National Party in their savage attack on 
the Labour Government. While the spirit lives in the New 
Zealand people that sent these three men to Spain, reaction 
can spin its plots in vain.203 
The Weekly gave wide coverage to the meetings and speeches of 
returned International Brigaders, Tom Spiller, Bert Bryan, and Dr 
D.W. Jolly, a surgeon with the British Medical team in Spain. 204 
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Propaganda about the civil war and appeals to aid the people of 
Spain continued after the war had ended, until as late as July 1939, 
as also did the activities of the SMAC. The theme of most of the 
post-war propaganda was the plight of the Spanish refugees in France, 
with a more humanitarian basis to the appeals than to those for a 
pro-Republican movement during the war. 20S 
The propaganda in the 
Today was the most public 
Heekly, "International Notes" and ltloman 
face of the Communist drive to create a 
strong, broad pro-Republican movement, and thereby a United Front, in 
New Zealand. The Party did also send telegrams to the Government, 
pass out leaflets and sponsor some meetings, although one suspects 
that it preferred most meetings to be held under the aegis of other 
organisations. The major focus of Communist activity about the war 
was, of course, the SMAC, which will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
More so than Catholic propaganda, the Communist Party's 
presentation of the issues of the war aimed at creating support for 
its particular view of events in Spain and their ramifications. Like 
Catholic propaganda, the Communist image of the war was partial, 
mixing facts, fiction and omission. Both had as a central message 
the concept that what was happening in Spain was relevant to New 
Zealanders. 
There is no doubt that Communist activities and propaganda played 
a major part in creating the pro-Republican movement in New Zealand. 
The key points of the Communist portrayal of the war - Fascist 
aggression against a 
either connived at 
democratically elected reformist Government, 
or ignored by the Western democracies - were, in 
the basis of most pro-Republican opinions, as or another, one way 
Chapters 5 and 6 will show. 
mean unity of action. 
Front grew out 
War, and some 
Republican cause 
But unity of opinion did not necessarily 
There is no evidence that any wider United 
become involved 
of the co-ordination of opinion on the Spanish Civil 
groups that expressed support for the Spanish 
in their publications, did not in any other way 
in the pro-Republican movement. Discussion of the 
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organisation and activities of the SMAC will show that, however 
broadly based it was claimed to be, its main support came from 
Communists and Trades Unionists. 
The Communist Party's primary aim of joint action with the labour 
Party on the Civil War, in pursuit of affiliation with Labour, was 
not successful, although there was considerable pro-Republican 
opinion among the ranks of the governing Party. In this respect, the 
fact that Labour was in power, which was used by the Communists to 
encourage the Labour Movement into solidarity over Spain, may have 
worked against the Communists' aim. Joint action was not likely to 
aid Labour's electoral chances. 
Given the absence of any available figures on membership of the 
Party, it is impossible to judge whether the Party's presentation of 
itself as in the vanguard of the battle to preserve democracy had any 
effect on the growth of the Party in this period. The attraction of 
new members was, of course, another facet of the United Front 
policy.206 The Communist Party's "hidden agenda" - preservation 
of the Soviet Union and self-promotion - was made quite clear in the 
Weekly's propaganda, and this, as well as dislike and suspicion of 
Communism among some of the Left in New Zealand, may have militated 
against and the creation of the United Front. Any gains made from 
1936 onwards among anti-Fascists were probably lost again at the time 
of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939. 
Any further conclusions about the influence of the Communist 
Party's Spanish Civil War propaganda and activities must wait until 
the views of other pro-Republicans have been examined. 
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CHAPTER 5 
INTERNATIONALISM, CLASS WAR AND CAUTION: 
THE RESPONSE OF THE NEW ZEALAND LABOUR MOVEMENT 
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The late 1930s were heady years for the Labour Movement in New 
Zealand. The election of the Labour Government in 1935 was for many 
in the Movement the signal of a new dawn, the beginning of a 
progressive age. Some of the energy and excitement created by the 
vision of Labour in power spread over into the Movement's perception 
of international issues. 
The Labour Party, internationalist in outlook, committed to 
collective security, saw their ideals voiced at Geneva by William 
Jordan and in the councils of the Commonwealth by Michael Savage and 
Walter Nash. The sense that New Zealand, soon to become a 
social-democratic paradise, could influence the rest of the world was 
best expressed by the Labour MP for Wairarapa, B. Roberts, in the 
debate on League of Nations Sanctions in Parliament, in May 1936: 
This Dominion has had a new political birth, and I hope that 
the spirit born with it will ultimately permeate all its 
consciousness, and the individual who will represent this 
Dominion at the League of Nations ... will be able to carry 
with him that same new spirit of generosity, recognising 
that the whole of the nations of the earth are one family of 
the earth ... 1 
Trades Unions found greater unity after May 1937 with the 
establishment of the Federation of Labour (FOL) as their national 
representative body. The FOL created far greater unity, where 
previously there had been bickering and hostility between the largely 
industrial Alliance of Labour and the mainly craft union-oriented 
Trades and Labour Councils. 2 This healing of rifts in the Trades 
Union movement, according to one commentator, resulted in the FOL's 
being able to maintain "a fairly united front on a progressive 
platform", which, in terms of international issues, was a policy 
described as "Socialist internationalism".3 
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Under such conditions, an attack on an apparently similar social 
democratic Government in Spain naturally reverberated on the New 
Zealand Labour scene. But, the very event that helped build a sense 
of international solidarity in the Labour Movement, also focussed 
attention inwards. The Labour Movement's priorities were to support 
and encourage "its" Government and to defend it from domestic 
opposition. Its main interest was in the development of the Labour 
Government's domestic policies. 
Internal, New Zealand, preoccupations particularly affected the 
Labour Party's response to the Spanish Civil War. Not only was the 
war of less immediate importance than, for example, preparations for 
the 1938 election, it also presented a complex and potentially 
divisive political problem for the Labour Party. On one hand, the 
Communist Party was 
the Labour Party to 
urging joint action over Spain and calling for 
take the lead in a campaign of solidarity with 
the Spanish "People's" Government. On the other, there were Catholic 
objections to the Labour Government's "limited pro-Republicanism". 
If the Labour Party adopted a more openly pro-Republican stand than 
its Government, it would not only embarrass the Government, but lose 
support for Labour from some Catholics who might feel forced to 
choose between their religious and political allegiances. Therefore, 
the Labour Party followed a path of cautious pro-Republicanism, 
maintaining a low profile on the issue and avoiding discussion of the 
political issues in Spain. Conferences passed only innocuous 
resolutions that indicated qualified support. However, some Labour 
MPs made clear their support for the Republican cause, and the Labour 
Party newspaper, the Standard, produced trenchant criticism of the 
British Government's Spanish policy. 
Trades Unions displayed a stronger pro-RepUblican attitude, but, 
in some responses, demonstrated a concern not to embarrass the Labour 
Government. Some unions went further than conSidering the Spanish 
Civil War a case of Fascist aggression against democracy, and 
labelled the conflict a class war. Parallels between events in Spain 
and the New Zealand scene were clearly drawn. The FOL gave a strong 
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lead in espousing pro-Republicanism, but not all unions responded. 
Support for the Republican cause was mainly confined to the large, 
militant industrial unions. There was also some evidence of 
Communist influence within the unions on the issue, but, equally, 
suspicion of Communist activities and motives was apparent. 
In both the political and industrial wings of the Labour Movement 
the most tangible evidence of support for the Government of Spain was 
in the form of donations either to the Spanish Medical Aid Committee, 
or to other funds established to aid Republican Spain. Trades Unions 
also demonstrated support by passing resolutions of sympathy with the 
Government or the people of Spain. 
Detailed discussion of the attitudes of the Labour Movement is 
divided into two parts. First, the Trades Union response will be 
considered and, then, the attitudes of the Labour Party, to which 
many unions were affiliated. 
The main source of information for the responses of Trades Unions 
are their own records. Minutes of meetings recorded resolutions of 
solidarity with the people of Spain, and the donation of funds for 
aid. For the purposes of this study the records of 27 Trades Unions 
were checked for reference to the Spanish Civil War; of that total, 
16 were found to have mention of the war. 4 The few union 
journals available did not contain many references to the Spanish 
Civil War, with the exception of the Borer, the publication of the 
Auckland branch of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners 
CASC & J) and the N.Z. Transport Worker, the official organ of the 
Waterside Worker's Union. The latter, however had no articles 
written specifically for New Zealand workers, but merely reprinted 
material from the International Federation of Trades Unions. 
Many of the resolutions of solidarity were made in the first few 
months of the war and clearly showed that the war in Spain was 
regarded as a battle for democracy, and even as a class war. The 
resolution passed by the Otago Carpenters Union was in somewhat 
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stronger language than most, yet it indicated the general trend of 
thought about the Spanish situation. 
resolved: 
In August 1936, it was 
That this branch of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters 
and Joiners extend to our fellow workers in Spain our 
sympathy and moral support in their heroic struggle to 
defend their Democratic Liberty against the Military-Fascist 
Butchers of Finance Capital. And express the hope that the 
Spanish Government will successfully overcome the Fascist 
Rebels.5 
New Zealand Trades Unionists identified the Government of Spain 
as a workers Government; almost all the resolutions passed spoke of 
the "Spanish workers" struggle. Thus, a clear judgement was made -
the Republican forces were those of the working classes; here were 
their fellows engaged in a battle for that which the New Zealand 
working class had just achieved with the election of a Labour 
Government. It was only fair that New Zealand's workers should 
support the cause of the Spanish workers. Among other unions that 
made similar resolutions in the early months of the war were the 
Auckland 
Union,6 
and 
the 
Wellington branches of 
Auckland Tramways Union,7 
the 
the 
Federated Seamen's 
Dunedin Unemployed 
Workers Movement,8 the Canterbury branch of the Amalgamated 
SOCiety of Railway Servants (ASRS),9 the Auckland Cutters and 
Pressers Union10 and the Auckland, Wellington, and Hamilton 
branches of the General Labourer's Union (GLU).ll 
Many of the resolutions also contained 
Government to support the Spanish Government. 
the Federated Seamen's Union in September 
appeals to the Labour 
The Auckland branch of 
1936 urged the Labour 
Government 
possible 
to: "appeal 
facilities (sic) 
to the Imperial Government to afford every 
for the democratically elected Spanish 
Government to defeat the belligerent Fascist rebels."12 
Once the Non-Intervention Agreement had come into force calls, were 
made for the Labour Government to protest about the embargo on the 
sale of war materials to the Spanish Government. The Auckland 
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Cutters and Pressers Union called on the New Zealand Government: 
to use its influence both at Geneva and with the British 
Government. The object of having the iniquitous 
non-intervention clause removed so as to enable the Spanish 
Workers Government to purchase the munitions and war 
materials to successfully defend themselves against bloody 
reaction. 13 
Most of the resolutions, whether or not they contained calls to the 
Labour Government to act in some way, were sent to the Government. 
Articles in the Borer also indicated a sense of identification 
with the Spanish workers. Of all the union journals Borer, carried 
the most items about Spain and the only ones that related the 
struggle 
received 
in Spain 
from the 
to the New Zealand scene. Along with articles 
International Federation of Trades Unions,14 
and some from Communist writers such as Frank Pitcairn,IS all of 
which stressed that the war in Spain was a struggle against an unholy 
alliance of the Church and the "big bosses", were articles written 
for New Zealand unionists that placed the implications of the Spanish 
War firmly in a New Zealand context. An article simply entitled 
"Spain", in July 1937, expressed the fervent hope that the same 
attack on democracy would not occur in New Zealand "if the Government 
runs counter to vested interests".16 Another declared that the 
Government of Spain was less radical than the New Zealand Labour 
Government in New Zealand, leaving its readers to draw their own 
conclusions about support for the Spanish Government and the lesson 
of Spain for New Zealanders. 17 
Yet 
daily 
others decried the "falsifying" of civil war news in the 
newspapers, and particularly in the New Zealand Herald. (This 
too was seen as a factor in the "struggle for Socialism", which, for 
one correspondent, was exemplified in the Spanish Civil War. IS ) 
An article entitle'd "The Herald on Spain" concluded: 
The rule of the people will 
become intelligent enough to 
only come when the workers 
discredit such newspaper 
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propaganda and become strong and organised to end the rule 
of the many by the few; then newspapers will become the true 
voice of the people.19 
Thus, the lessons of Spain were not only apparent but immediately 
applicable to New Zealand workers: 
We do not think many of the thinking members of our 
organisation have any doubts as to the importance of the 
matter as in nearly every branch a small sum [for Spanish 
Medical Aid] has been voted.20 
The donation of money for aid to Spain was the means by which 
many unions showed their solidarity with the Spanish workers, over 
and above resolutions that indicated moral support and denoted the 
unions' viewpoint on the matter. 
Spanish Medical Aid Committee 
Many unions gave money to the 
and supported the Committee's 
activities by attending meetings "affiliating" their unions to the 
Committee and having SMAC speakers at their own meetings. The 
connection between the unions and the SMAC will be dealt with at 
length in Chapter 7. At this point, however, it is worth noting that 
the sums of money given to the SMAC were often large irregular 
donations as in the case of the Denniston miners, who gave £.45 in one 
month in 1938. 21 Other unions gave less, but made regular 
donations. The total contributions from trades unions alone in 1938 
and 1939 to the SMAC's funds were over ~l,OOO, which represented a 
considerable proportion of the total amount raised in that period. 
The unions also established their own fund to aid the Spanish 
people. Variously referred to as the "Spanish Workers Fund" or the 
"Spanish Relief of Distress Fund" (apparently its official title), 
its origins and instigators are unclear. A final balance sheet in 
the Roth Labour Movement Collection,22 printed by the Standard 
Press, gives the date of inception as 22 September 1936; the date of 
closure was 1 November 1937. The National Industrial Conference, 
which inaugurated the FOL, endorsed the appeal, urging all unions to 
give the utmost financial aid. A spontaneous collection at the 
conference, after an address by a member of the Wellington Trades and 
Labour Council on the plight of Spain, raised £22.Ss4d for the 
appeal. 23 
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It appears that the appeal was overseen by the New Zealand 
Waterside Workers' Union, and that the money was generally sent 
through the Standard, the Labour Party's newspaper, which published a 
subscription list in each issue. The secretary's report to the 21st 
Annual Conference of the New Zealand Waterside Workers Union, on 24 
of November 1937, noted: 
e348.3.6 received for assistance for the Spanish workers 
through the appeal in the "Standard" Delegates would note 
from the payment side that i343.1.2 had been forwarded to 
the International Federation of Trades Unions leaving £5.2.4 
in hand to meet the cost of stamps and exchange and printing 
the balance sheet of the fund.24 
The balance sheet entitled "Spanish Relief of Distress Fund" in fact 
shows that t 375.11.2 was sent to the International Federation of 
Trades Unions; the amount kept for expenses is the same as in the 
secretary's report. 25 However, an analysis of the contributions 
recorded shows that the total contributed by trades unions was indeed 
the £ 343 noted; the rest came from Labour Party branches and 
individuals. 
The Waterside Workers' Union itself sent £ 300 to the 
International Transport Workers Federation for aid to Spain. A 
special conference in 1936 had decided to donate the money and recoup 
the sum through a levy on all members. James ("Big Jim") Roberts, 
the powerful secretary of the union, and a leading figure in the 
Labour Movement in New Zealand, appears to have had a great concern 
for the Spanish situation. 26 With reference to the objections of 
some union members to the donation he said, "as far as I am 
personally concerned I think the grandest thing we have ever done was 
to show our appreciation of the splendid fight put up by Trade 
Unionists in Spain". He recommended that branches did not pay their 
share of the donations out of general funds but that they raised it 
by direct levy on members. 27 Roberts, who became President of 
the Labour Party in 1937, had initiated the resolution at the 
National Industrial Conference that endorsed financial aid to the 
Spanish Government. 28 
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The role of the Federation of Labour in pro-Republican activities 
was of some importance to its affiliated unions. The FOL was the 
voice of the New Zealand Labour Movement, and it was the national, 
"overseeing" organisation whose decisions and attitudes had an 
influence on the activities of the affiliated unions. An executive 
meeting of the Canterbury Carpenters' Union, upon receipt of an 
appeal from the SMAC, decided to take no action "pending advice as to 
what the local branch of the FOL intend to do in this matter".29 
The Federation of Labour did endorse the work of the SMAC and 
urged its members to give 
In May 1938, the National 
it "all support possible" in 1937. 30 
Council of the FOL further resolved to 
write to each Trades Council (its local representatives) asking them 
to take up collections for the SMAC funds. 31 The FOL also made 
its own contribution to the cause of Spanish democracy, in the form 
of the despatch of money for the purchase of an ambulance, in August 
1938. The money for this donation was taken from FOL funds, 
amounting to "about f:: 570, and was then requested from the 
affiliations in the form of a levy.32 
The impulse for this act of solidarity with the Spanish 
Government came both from the National Council of the FOL and from 
its branch organisations, the Trades Councils. The Auckland, Otago 
and Wellington Trades Councils, had all forwarded resolutions to the 
National Council asking that such action be taken. 33 There was 
some discussion as to whether the National Council could authorise 
what was, in the words of FOL President Angus McLagen,34 "a great 
dip" in the Federation funds, for such a "lump sum" donation. 
However, because it would take rtfully six months" to raise the money 
by direct appeal to unions, and because of the urgency of the Spanish 
situation by this time in 1938, it was decided that the National 
Council did have the power to authorise such an action. It was 
estimated that a levy on each member of 3d would cover the 
cost. 35 Affiliated unions still had to vote to endorse such a 
donation and to agree to pay the levy, but there is no record of any 
objections being made, either to the FOL itself, or at local level on 
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the occasions of union resolutions agreeing to the donation. 
According to the balance sheet, entitled "Unions Which Have 
Contributed to the Spanish Ambulance Fund",36 the total amount 
raised by levy was £612.3.2, of which £562.7.4 went to purchase the 
ambulance, which was later reported to New Zealand workers as being 
in use on the Madrid Front. The remaining £ 49.15.10 went to "Spanish 
Refugees Fund". Whether this referred to a SMAC appeal or another 
fund is unknown. 
FOL Conferences were an important opportunity for affiliates to 
make their views known to their National Organisation, and to 
determine policies the FOL, as the united voice of the Labour 
Movement, could then authoritatively express in high places. At 
Conferences in the period of the Spanish Civil War, the "socialist 
internationalism" of the FOL was elucidated in resolutions of concern 
about the international situation, particularly with regard to 
Fascist aggression. Trades Unions' concern about Spain was usually 
not expressed as a separate issue, but rather as a part of the whole 
complex of Fascist expansionism and its appeasement by Britain and 
France. At the 1938 Annual Conference, a lengthy resolution was 
passed condemning Fascist aggression, which included the problem of 
Spain. In part it said: 
The cause of world peace today depends upon the checking of 
Fascist aggression in central Europe, Spain and China. 
Therefore we urge the Labour Government to insist that the 
British Empire will (a) support France and the Soviet Union 
in guaranteeing the independence and security of 
Czechoslovakia, (b) lift the embargo on arms to the Spanish 
Government and insist upon the immediate withdrawal of the 
Fascist interventionist forces in Spain, and (c) organise 
collective action to bring to an end Japanese aggression in 
China. 
Also we call upon the trade union movement to improve in 
every way its support for the Spanish Government and to 
strengthen the boycott of Japanese goods.37 
The Conference heard an address from Torn Spiller, recently returned 
from Spain, 
Government as 
in which he described the attack on the Spanish 
"one of the greatest tragedies that had ever befallen 
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the human race".38 FOL President Angus McLagen said that the 
situation in Spain held a "serious lesson" for the Labour Movement 
and that he believed that more could be done for Spain. 39 The 
Conference voted to send a telegram to the Prime Minister of Spain, 
expressing sympathy and solidarity, and took up a collection for the 
SMAC immediately, which totalled £30.14.9. 40 
Like its individual affiliates, the FOL also appealed to the 
Government with regard to Spain. Again, its resolution placed Spain 
in the context of wider Fascist aggression. In March 1938, the 
National Council resolved to ask the Government: 
in connection with their discussions with the Imperial 
Government, that it will endeavour to secure the collective 
security of all democratic countries against fascism. This 
will apply to countries like Spain, Austria, China and other 
nationalities likely to be under attack by Fascist 
governments, and in doing so to carry out the principles and 
policy as laid down by the League of Nations.4l 
And yet, activities relating to the role of the New Zealand 
Government in the Spanish crisis posed a problem for the Trades 
Unions. On one hand the Labour Government was seen as "their" 
Government, likely to share attitudes and to listen sympathetically 
to unionists' opinions. On the other hand, part and parcel of the 
feeling 
sections 
of 
of 
kinship with the Government, there was a concern in some 
the union movement not to embarass the Government, and 
thereby give ammunition to its enemies. This was particularly 
evident with 
arisen from 
regard to the Seamens' Union, a situation which may have 
the close relationship between Peter Fraser and Seamens' 
President, Fintan Patrick Walsh, a member of the National Council of 
the FOL and later to become the Federation's President. 42 The 
secretary of the Auckland branch of the Union reported to a meeting 
that, at the time of the police interrogation of the nurses for Spain 
(when it was feared by the SMAC that the women either would not be 
permitted to leave or miss the boat43 ), Tom Stanley, President of 
the Auckland SMAC, and Leo Sirn, Communist General Secretary, had 
requested that the seamen hold up the Awatea until the nurses were 
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allowed to board. The secretary said that: 
he had refused to take such action without further 
information because to do so would have been to fight the 
Government, and it appeared most unlikely that the 
Government was any party to what was being done and that it 
was more probable that the police had exceeded their 
instructions. 44 
Nevertheless, the union decided to protest to the Government 
about the police interrogation of the nurses, which they felt was 
"most scandalous"45 and to press the Government to institute an 
enquiry. Several other unions also resolved to do so, no doubt also 
secure in the belief that it was not the Labour Government which was 
at fault, but the remnants of the "old guard" left in the services of 
the state, such as the police force. 46 
Not all the unions felt as "protective tl towards the Labour 
Government. The Auckland ASC & J's opinion was expressed in the 
Borer in strong words. The Borer suggested that perhaps the New 
Zealand Government was afraid of offending Britain,47 and urged 
it to take a firmer pro-RepUblican stance; the British Government, 
after all, was just as much composed of class enemies as were the 
Fascist forces in Spain. 48 
Yet, the Borer too saw the interrogation of the nurses not as an 
example of the Labour Government's ambivalence ab9ut the Spanish 
situation, but as an indication of which side the "bureaucratic 
authorities" supported. 49 This perception, of course, added to 
the argument that what was happening in Spain could also happen in 
New Zealand, which encouraged New Zealand workers to take an interest 
in the conflict in Spain and to become involved in supporting the 
Republican Government that was considered to be fighting for them as 
well. 
It may have been the fear of causing problems for the Labour 
Government that prevented unions from taking stronger action to 
enforce their views on the Government, and to persuade it to take a 
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firmer line itself, which did happen in the case of the Sino-Japanese 
war. The Waterside Workers' Union placed a ban on the loading of 
scrap-iron for export to Japan. After having said that his 
Government would not be blackmailed in such a way, Savage then banned 
the export of scrap iron anywhere. R.M. Burdon points out that 
scrap-iron went mostly to Japan, so this act really meant that the 
Government agreed to use the issue to make a gesture of disapproval 
of Japan's aggression in China. 50 
The Spanish Civil War raised more complex political issues than 
did the Sino-Japanese conflict. The endorsement of a committed 
pro-Republican "line" involved the acceptance of the Communist 
viewpoint as well. Any direct union action, such as the holding up 
of the Awatea, would not have resulted in the Government's becoming 
more publicly pro-Republican and would have, no doubt, aroused public 
disapproval of the union action, because of the political nature of 
the issues involved with the war in Spain. There was some suspicion 
of Communist motives of some influential sections of the labour 
Movement; for example, by this stage Fintan Patrick Walsh, after 
having earlier been a member of the Communist Party was becoming 
increasingly hostile to Communist activities. 51 
As well, there were purely practical obstacles to direct, or more 
public, action to display concern over events in Spain. It does not 
appear that New Zealand exported anything to Spain in this period, 
although it received a small number of imports, such as olive oil. 
Thus, there was no ready target for a display of pro-Republican 
sentiment. Nor was it practicable, or likely to be condoned by the 
~overnment, the public and a large section of the unions, to take 
direct action with regard to trade relations with Britain to protest 
at its non-intervention policy. 
At least one unionist interviewed for this study felt that New 
Zealand unions' failure to take direct action of some kind was 
indicative of a certain lack of commitment to the Spanish cause on 
the part of the unions; that they did not feel strongly enough about 
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the issue to involve themselves in public action which would 
incontrovertably reveal their views. 52 Yet there \vere the 
Without doubt f the obstacles to this kind of action discussed above. 
unions that gave money and passed resolutions of solidarity with 
Spain were sincere in their concern. The level of commitment of 
individual unionists to pro-Republicanism is less easy to gauge. To 
resolution recognising the fellowship of New 
workers in the battle to defend democracy, or 
what exactly did a 
Zealand and Spanish 
establish socialism, commit New Zealand workers, apart from a certain 
philosophical and ideological standpoint? There is a sense that 
while sincerely felt, these resolutions were in some manner rather 
like popular slogans, easy to voice without really engaging hearts 
and minds on the issue. 
It must be emphasised that there were, naturally, more immediate 
concerns in New Zealand for unionists. The Labour Government's 
policies, the inauguration of the FOL, the move among some unions to 
form national organisations of their own, including the "One Big 
Union" campaign of the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, 
engaged a large part of the attention of New Zealand workers. 
Concern about Spain was a part of concern about the whole trend of 
international events and came a poor second to national issues. 
On the face of it, resolutions of solidarity and the 
unquestionably generous and sincerely motivated donations of money 
seemed to indicate the New Zealand Trades Union Movement's approval 
of and participation in the United Front promoted by the Communist 
Party, 
whole. 
as did 
The 
the Communist 
Movement in a 
the "socialist internationalism" of the FOL as a 
passing of resolutions was, after all, a major point in 
Party's campaign to involve the New Zealand Labour 
campaign for solidarity with Spain. 53 However, 
there was not a wholehearted acceptance by the Labour Movement of 
this ambitious plan for a "common front of all progressive people". 
Interest in Spain and in the Sino-Japanese war fitted well into the 
Communist scheme of things; the FOL did take the lead in forming 
opinion on such matters. Yet, the trades unions response to the war 
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in Spain, as to other international issues, was not a united and 
unanimous response. 
In general, it was the larger industrial unions, with a tradition 
of militancy, that involved themselves in pro-Republican activities. 
The large membership of such unions, of course, had some bearing on 
the donations they gave to the SMAC. The Waterside Workers' Union, 
the miners, the Federated Seamens' Union, the railwaymen and the 
freezing workers were among those unions expressing the greatest 
concern and donating the most money. These unions had a tradition of 
involvement in issues wider than those of merely wages and 
conditions; they had a socialist analysis of the system and a history 
of militant action. Conrad Bollinger attributes the "socialist 
internationalism" of the FOL entirely to the prompting of these 
large, industrial, militant unions. 54 Other unions contributed 
small amounts of money as well; yet, noticeable in both the accounts 
of the SMAC and the balance sheet of the "Spanish Relief of Distress 
Fund" is the absence of contributions from what might be described as 
"white collar unions", or craft unions. 
The role of certain individuals in the unions, and particularly 
in the more militant unions, also had a bearing on their response to 
the Spanish Civil War. The influence and activities of Communist 
unionists was particularly important. A draft resolution of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party in March 1937 stated that 
all Communist Workers must be Trade Union members: 
It is necessary to work for the strengthening of the 
membership and unity of the N.Z. Federation of Labour, to 
secure the Affiliation of all Unions to it, to work towards 
complete Trade Union Unity, to campaign for the ousting of 
the Trotskyist Splitters from the Trade Unions, to bind 
closer the relations between the Trade Unions and the L.P. 
In each Trade Union Communists have to work for 
international Trade Union Unity ... 55 
According to Sid Scott, editor of the Workers Weekly in this 
period, Communists indeed became a "definite force" in the unions and 
in the FOL itself at this time, and to a certain extent these 
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Communist unionists became Itrallying points" for the more radical 
among the workers. 56 Evidence of Communist involvement in Trades 
Unions comes also from the records of the Christchurch Branch of the 
Communist Party. In reply to a questionnaire from the Central 
Committee about membership, the branch replied that it had 22 
members, of whom 16 were Trades Unionists. One was president of the 
Addington branch of the ASRS, one was on the executive of the 
Furniture Trades Union and three were members of the FOL. (It is not 
clear whether this last reference meant that the three were members 
of unions affiliated to the FOL, or that they were members of the 
local Trades Council; since most of the unions mentioned in the 
report were FOL affiliates, probably the latter was meant.)57 
It followed that, if Communist membership in the Trades Unions 
had as its aim the creation of the United Front, then the impulse for 
some resolutions of solidarity with the Spanish Government came from 
Communist 
readily 
of the 
members of the unions. In some cases, these people are 
identifiable. Tom Stanley, chairman of the Auckland branch 
SMAC and a member of the Communist Party, was also secretary 
of the Auckland General Labourers Union and in this capacity was 
elected to the Auckland Trades Council, and thence to the National 
Council of the FOL in January 1938. At Easter 1938 he was elected 
President of the Communist Party. It was he who initiated the 
resolution about the international situation at the FOL Conference in 
1938. 58 George Jackson, secretary of the Auckland branch of the 
SMAC, was a Communist and a member of the Otahuhu Railway Workshops 
Union, which gave often and generously to the SMAC. The resolution 
passed by the Canterbury General Labourers Union that asked the FOL 
to organise a national movement to raise funds for aid to Spain59 
was initiated by one Mr Greatorex, who was also a member of the 
Christchurch section of the Communist Party.60 Some deductions 
may be made where party affiliation was not obvious. For example, 
someone who moved a motion of solidarity with Spain61 and also 
promoted remits for the Labour Party Conference urging acceptance of 
Communist Party affiliation and permission for Labour Party members 
to also belong to the Friends of the Soviet Union,62 as in the 
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case of "Brother Jamieson" of the Otago Carpenters' Union, may 
reasonably be expected to have been sympathetic to the views of the 
Communist Party, if not a member. 
Trades Unions usually kept very clear and full minutes, yet the 
discussion surrounding resolutions put was not often included, nor 
was it often indicated if a motion was carried unanimously, or on 
what basis any objections were made. The impulse of one member and 
his personal and political interest in Spain, may have generated a 
resolution; there is no way of discovering if the same commitment was 
felt by his fellows, or even if they agreed to the resolution. 
There is some indication that not all Trades Unionists felt that 
the cause of the Republican Government of Spain should be supported. 
The Auckland District Council of the Amalgamated SOCiety of 
Carpenters and Joiners received a letter from a member, "Brother 
Armanesco", objecting to a donation to the Spanish Workers Fund. The 
meeting resolved to inform the member that the resolution was carried 
unanimously and had he attended the meeting he could have made his 
objection known. Further, the District Council added that the 
resolution was "in keeping with the objectives of our union in that· 
we believe in assisting workers organisations wherever 
possible".63 
It might have been expected that Catholic unionists would object 
to moral and financial support being given to a regime their Church 
regarded as tantamount to the personification of the anti-Christ; 
yet, there was little reference to any complaints in union records. 
Catholic objections may, of course, have contributed to the silence 
of some West Coast unions on the issue. (The West Coast of the South 
Island had a large Catholic population and was a traditional Labour 
stronghold.) James Roberts, as well, noted some objection on a 
"religious basis" to the Watersiders' Unions' donation of r 300 for 
aid to Spain in 1936 when he remarked on the money yet to come in for 
the donation. 64 In 1938, he indicated that there was still 
some .£ 21.17.6 still to come from branches, particularly Palmerston 
North and Napier. 65 
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The secretary of the Canterbury Freezing Workers Union also 
reported to members that some were not giving all they could, or 
should, to aid Spain, in May 1937: 
The appeal for funds to support the Spanish people in their 
struggle shows some anomalies when the efforts of the large 
and small branches are compared ... Some of the Freezing 
Works Branches are subscribing to the appeal to a man, 
others, again are showing an utter disregard for the 
sufferings of the Spanish people and of the possible effects 
of the struggle upon ourselves and other democratic peoples 
if the people of Spain are ultimately subjected to a Fascist 
dictatorship.66 
Whether this was due to lack of interest, or disagreement with the 
analysis of the Spanish situation promoted by the secretary, was not 
stated. 
The Secretary of the Auckland branch of the Federated Seamen's 
Union gave evidence of his suspicion of Communism both in New Zealand 
and Spain. 
Dunedin that 
In November 1938, he complained to his counterpart in 
a watersiders' dispute that had almost affected the 
seamen was "the sort of thing" that could "seriously endanger the 
Government" if those responsible were not checked. He concluded: 
The example 
happened in 
workers not 
masquerading 
of what is happening in France, and has already 
Spain, ought to be sufficient warning to the 
to allow themselves to be led by irresponsibles 
as the saviours of the working class.67 
Even this comment, however, showed that the situation in Spain 
was used as some kind of example of ramifications that could be 
applied to the New Zealand scene, although not quite in the manner in 
which the Left, and particularly the Communists, usually directed 
such application. It is clear, then, that the Spanish Civil War did 
have some impact upon Trades Unions in New Zealand, and that events 
in Spain were seen to have significance for New Zealand. While there 
was a certain amount of Communist influence, some of the concern and 
the impulse to donate money came from non-communist Trades 
Unionists. After all, if a Communist proposed a resolution, 
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particularly in the case of the FOL, it would still have been 
possible to oppose or defeat it. Trades Union responses to Spain 
indicated not only a certain level of Communist involvement, but also 
that there was some agreement with the Communist presentation of 
international issues in terms of the threat of Fascist aggression. 
Nevertheless, the United Front policy of the Communists can be seen 
to have had only limited success with Trades Unions, one of the 
groups most important in the creation of this "progressive" coalition 
against Fascism. Its success was also in the area where it might be 
most expected to have had results, among the militant unions with a 
predisposition to radicalism and a desire for Socialism. Even though 
the FOL gave a positive lead in the matter, there is little evidence 
that the rhetoric of pro-Republicanism and the United Front against 
Fascism gained any significant number of adherents among smaller or 
more conservative unions. 
Although Spain and its bloody internecine strife was overshadowed 
by the greater war that followed. there are indications that the 
Spanish Civil War became a part of Trades Union mythology, at least 
while the membership of unions still comprised those who had been 
unionists in the late 1930s. The lessons and rhetoric of the Spanish 
Civil War had not been forgotten by the time of the 1951 waterfront 
dispute. Film of a meeting of workers during the dispute shows Eddie 
Taylor of the Drivers' Union exhorting workers to remember the words 
of La Pasionaria in their struggle with the National Government. He 
said, misquoting the famous slogan: "Far better to go down fighting 
than to live forever on your knees."68 
The attitudes of the Trades Unions had some influence upon the 
response of the Labour Party, for many unions were affiliated to the 
Labour Party and the advent of compulsory unionism had increased the 
unions' voting strength at Annual Conferences. 69 However, the 
Labour Party's official attitude to the Spanish Civil War was 
considerably more cautious than the unions', at least in terms of any 
analysis of the political situation in Spain. 
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Unfortunately, the records of the central Labour Party 
organisation were not available for use in this study; therefore, 
most of the evidence of the Labour Party's attitude has come from 
newspaper reports of MPs' statements, branch records and opinion 
expressed in the Labour Party's newspaper the Standard. The minutes, 
correspondence and files of the National Executive of the Labour 
Party would, no doubt, have given a much clearer indication of the 
development of the Party's opinion on the matter. However, the 
sources used reveal the basic elements of the response to the Spanish 
Civil War. 
Several considerations precluded a strong pro-Republican response 
from the Labour Party. To begin with, its attention was focussed 
mainly upon the Government's domestic policies; by 1938, not only the 
coming 
within 
election, 
the 
preoccupations. 
deep-seated and 
but also internal differences over financial reform 
Parliamentary Labour Party70 were major 
The Labour Party's dislike of Communism was 
relative 
achieving 
ruled that 
merits 
grew 
of 
Socialism. 
members 
Labour Representation 
out of differences in the 1920s over the 
parliamentary or revolutionary methods of 
In 1926, the Labour Party's National Executive 
of the Communist Party could not be delegates to 
Committees (LRCs). Later, in 1933, membership 
of the Communist-inspired Friends of the Soviet Union and "Movement 
Against War and Fascism" was declared to be incompatible with 
membership of the Labour Party.71 The use of the Spanish Civil 
War as a tactic for joint action and eventual affiliation with Labour 
by the Communist Party was also a significant influence upon the 
Labour Party's maintenance of a low profile on the issue. Comment in 
the Standard revealed not only a suspicion of Communism among some 
Labour Party members, but also the objection of some Catholic's to 
their Party's apparent pro-Republicanism. 
The attitudes of individual Labour Party members and MPs are 
difficult to ascertain. Few expressed publicly their opinions on the 
Spanish crisis. Parliament devoted very little time to the 
discussion of international affairs, and specific references to a 
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particular international event, except in the making of general 
observations, were few and far between. At the very beginning of the 
war, in August 1936, C. Morgan Williams, MP for Kaiapoi, drew 
Parliament's attention to cable messages which, in his opinion, 
showed that British warships were offering protection to British 
merchant vessels carrying war material to the Spanish rebels. The 
Prime Minister assured him that the British attitude was one of 
strict neutrality.72 The incident to which Williams referred was 
the stopping of a British petrol tanker by a Spanish Government 
cruiser, after the British Government had affirmed its right to 
protect British shipping from interference. William's assessment of 
the situation from these bare facts indicated some concern for the 
role of the British Government in the crisis. Apart from this little 
was said about Spain in the House. The comments of Labour Cabinet 
members have already been noted in consideration of the Government's 
response to the war. 73 
Labour MPs clearly stated their support for the Government's 
foreign policy as expressed by Jordan at the League on several 
occasions when the Opposition attacked Labour's handling of foreign 
policy, which also implied support for the Government's attitude 
towards the Spanish problem. 74 Most Labour backbenchers were 
convinced, like Savage, Jordan and Nash, that New Zealand had a part 
to play in international affairs, and that the path to peace lay 
through the League of Nations and collective security. 
Outside Parliament, some Labour MPs did become publicly involved 
in pro-Republican 
themselves 
particularly 
with 
the 
activities and even went so far as to associate 
the Spanish Medical Aid Committee. This was 
case with the three Dunedin MPs. Dr D.G. McMillan, 
MP for Dunedin West, was President of the SMAC, a nominal position, 
which did not commit him to active involvement in the day to day 
organisation of the Committee, yet, even so, a public acknowledgement 
of association with the aims and activities of the appeal, and, 
therefore, with pro-Republicanism. The two other Dunedin 
Parliamentarians, Peter Neilson (Dunedin Central) and James Munro 
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(Dunedin North) also publicly endorsed the SMAC's appeal at least in 
the first few months of the Committee's existence. It may be that 
enthusiasm waned later, when it became more obvious that the 
Committee had a distinct Communist bias. 
Personal associations played some part in the Dunedin trio's 
willingness to become involved with the SMAC. Ted Hunter, the 
Dunedin SMAC secretary, was a long time member of the Labour Party, 
and had been MP for St Kilda from 1933 to 1935. He was well known to 
the three and it may have been his personal influence that induced 
them to give support to the SMAC, when, otherwise, prudence may have 
been stronger than pro-Republican sympathies. 75 
No other MPs nor even Labour Party members became so closely 
associated with New Zealand's major pro-Republican organisation, 
although a few were prepared to speak out on the Spanish issue. 
Ormond Wilson, who won the Rangitikei seat for Labour in 1938, spoke 
with W.B. Sutch at a meeting organised by the Victoria University 
Students Association, in Wellington. 76 E.J. (Ted) Howard, Labour 
MP for Christchurch South, made some comments about the Spanish 
conflict among more general discussion of the European situation in 
September 1937, on his return from the Empire Parliamentary 
Association Conference: 
If Germany and Italy beat Spain - and it is hardly likely 
that poor little Spain can hold the country - the Fascist 
movement will be subsidised in the same way in other near 
European countries.77 
Howard considered that Fascism was using internal dissension in other 
countries to gain control of 
concerted attack upon Russia. 
expressions of sympathy for 
Europe in order to then launch a 
However, the dangers of such public 
the Republican Government of Spain may 
have been brought home to M.P.s by Zealandia's attack on Howard's 
comments in October 1937. Zealandia's dire warning of electorial 
retribution from Catholics if Labour MPs and the Government itself 
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did not refrain from taking a pro-Republican stance may have been a 
contributing factor to the silence of many MPs on the issue. 78 
The records of Labour Party branches, and of Labour 
Representation 
revealed little 
Committees, the Party's regional organisations, also 
comment on the Spanish Civil War. Of the records of 
the four LRCs and five Labour Party branches available for 
consultation, three LRCs and two branches discussed the issue. 
Resolutions of solidarity or sympathy for the Republican Government 
of Spain, similar to those passed by unions, were almost 
non-existent. The Waikato LRC seems to have been one of the few 
sections of the Party to have passed any resolution on the Civil 
War. In December 1936, on the motion of the Taupiri branch, a 
meeting of the LRC resolved: 
That this meeting of the Waikato LRC, being convinced that 
of the British and other European Governments in 
arms embargo to the friendly Spanish Government 
breach of international law, calls on the 
press for removal of the embargo.79 
the action 
applying an 
is a direct 
Government to 
This resolution studiously avoided taking sides over the Civil War, 
confining its assessment of the situation to the frame of reference 
of international law. The Labour Government also couched much of its 
Spanish policy primarily in these terms. Whether this approach by 
the LRC was from prudence or was genuinely the way in which the Civil 
War was viewed is difficult to say. 
Earlier, in August 1936, the North Canterbury LRC had put before 
it a resolution that would have clearly indicated pro-Republican 
sympathies from an ideological standpoint on the war. The resolution 
expressed "sympathy with the loyal Spanish working class" and called 
on the New Zealand Government to assist the Government of Spain "to 
the limits of international law". The resolution was rejected, after 
"long discussion", in favour of an amendment that established a 
sub-committee of three "to go into the matter", a neat bureaucratic 
solution which effectively buried the issue. Whether the 
sub-committee ever met, and whatever it may have decided was not 
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recorded in subsequent minutes. 80 
The example of the Otago LRC also revealed the Party's 
circumspect treatment of an 
resolving to donate -£ 2.2.0 
affiliations and branches to 
ideologically explosive issue. While 
to the SMAC appeal and to request 
do the same, the executive committee 
decided to take 
provide a speaker 
been requested by 
no part in a procession planned by the SMAC, nor to 
for the meeting to be held afterwards, which had 
the SMAC.81 The Auckland LRC also donated 
money to the SMAC, but refused to pass to the Medical Aid Committee a 
list of branches and affiliations to enable the SMAC to circularise 
them for the Spanish aid appeal. 82 
Branches appear not even to have formulated resolutions concerned 
with the Spanish crisis (with the exception of the Tau piri branch), 
much less debated the wisdom of passing them. Lack of interest or 
concern seems not to have been the reason for this, although the 
level of both is difficult to gauge. Some branches revealed their 
concern by donating money to the Spanish Medical Aid funds and to the 
Standard's "Spanish Relief of Distress Fund".83 It seems likely 
that either the level of interest was not high enough to warrant 
discussion at meetings, or the issue was safer kept one of 
humanitarian aid rather than one of political analysis. Some 
branches were more concerned than others. The Mount Eden branch 
allowed speakers from the Eden Communist group to address a meeting 
about the Spanish situation in August 1936. The Communist delegation 
"asked for the co-operation of the Party in a project against the 
interference with the present Spanish Government. ,,84 The 
response of the meeting to that suggestion was not recorded. Later, 
in April 1937, a collection was taken up for the SMAC at a meeting of 
the branch. 85 
Some Auckland 
to send delegates 
second meeting of 
from five Labour 
branches of the Labour Party were concerned enough 
to the Auckland SMAC's first few meetings. The 
the newly-formed Auckland SMAC boasted delegates 
Party branches": Devonport, Onehunga, Auckland 
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West, Birkenhead and Glenfield. 86 The first three branches, as 
well as the Tamaki, Grey Lynn, Milford, Manurewa, Mt Albert Women's 
Division and 
SMAC. 87 It 
in 1938 and 
been closed. 
that matter 
Huntly West branches later donated money to the 
is worth noting that all of these donations were made 
1939, after the "Spanish Relief of Distress Fund" had 
None of the donations were more than.t2.10.0, nor for 
were those made by Labour Party branches to the 
Standard's fund. Few branches had large amounts of money in hand. 
Most of their money went to the Labour Party itself for campaign 
purposes or to other appeals for which there may have appeared a more 
immediate and urgent need, such as the fund established to provide 
enough finance to enable the Standard to become a daily newspaper, in 
order to combat the anti-Labour tone of most New Zealand dailies. 
Reports of the 
little attention to 
Labour 
the 
Party's Annual Conferences also revealed 
Spanish Civil War, yet gave a clearer 
indication of the Party's attitude to the conflict. The resolutions 
of the Defence, War and Peace Committee indicated the Party's concern 
about the international situation, in which Spain was a factor. The 
Labour Party's traditional hostility to militarism and the 
manufacture and sale of armaments, and its conviction that the League 
of Nations and collective security were the best means of securing 
world peace were affirmed at conferences in 1937, 1938 and 1939. The 
issue of Spain was for the Party, as for its leaders in Cabinet, 
inextricably linked with the problem of the maintenance of the League 
of Nations as a force for world peace. The endorsement given by the 
Party in 1937 to William Jordan's stand at the League, while 
primarily related to the wider issue of the Government's support of 
the League, was also an acknowledgement of the Party's acceptance of 
the policy on Spain he had expressed at the League. The Party 
pledged itself: "to unceasingly support the Government in its 
efforts for world peace and to work untiringly for the triumph of the 
Democratic principles for which the party stands."88 
This conference in 1937 also passed a specific resolution on 
Spain, although it was not included in the deliberations of the 
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Defence, War and Peace Committee, which dealt with remits on the 
international situation, but in those of the General Committee. The 
resolution, related to a remit asking for the establishment of a 
fundraising committee for aid to Spain, and for consideration of the 
SMAC appeal, stated: 
That conference deplores foreign intervention in the Spanish 
Civil War and urges the New Zealand Government to press the 
Imperial Government to ensure the withdrawal of all foreign 
troops from that country and to leave the Spanish people to 
settle their own domestic difficulties.89 
the WQrkers Weekly pointed out,90 the analysis of the As 
Spanish 
somewhat 
conflict contained in the resolution was begging the question 
in insisting that the Civil War was still a domestic 
problem. Yet, by maintaining the view that the war was, even now, in 
April 1937, the same type of conflict as it had been at the very 
beginning, a civil revolt, the Labour Party avoided the pitfalls of 
debating what exactly the war did represent (in much the same way as 
the League of Nations avoided defining the war's status). The 
resolution was also an echo of the Labour Government's stand, in that 
both Jordan and Savage expressed the wish that the Spanish people be 
allowed to choose 
interference. 91 
their own form of Government without 
The strength of the British connection was also revealed in this 
resolution, 
the lack 
even if the Party and its leaders in Parliament deplored 
of commitment to the League manifested by Britain's 
Government. The Imperial Government was regarded as powerful enough 
to ensure the withdrawal of foreign troops from Spain. It was, of 
course, in part a recognition of the responsibility the British 
Government had taken upon itself, albeit in a somewhat ambivalent 
manner, in its continued support of the NIC. This conviction of 
British strength and of the weight of its opinion in the affairs of 
Europe was to be echoed in the Standard, although usually in a 
negative manner, exhibited in the indignation and frustration 
expressed at the British Government's unwillingness to use its 
influence to halt foreign aggression in Spain. 92 
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Another remit presented to the Conference in 1937 may have had 
reference to the Spanish Civil War. If so, it showed that, despite 
the wide berth the Party kept around discussions of the political/ 
ideological issues raised by the war, its meaning for democracy and 
its application to the New Zealand situation were not lost on the 
Party. In part the remit said: 
in view of the situation in Europe where 
constitutionally formed Governments have been overthrown by 
militarists and Fascists we urge the Government to take 
steps to ensure that all persons appointed to the army, air 
and police forces of the Dominion are in sympathy with the 
Democratic form of Government.93 
It would be difficult to argue that the remit had not been 
influenced by the situation in Spain. It indicated that the 
"lessons" of Spain, which the Communists were so eager to impress 
upon the New Zealand Labour Movement, had, indeed, had some impact 
upon members of the Labour Party. Trades Unions' opinions had also 
expressed a similar application of events in Spain to the New Zealand 
scene. 
By the time of the 1938 Conference, a subtle change had taken 
place in the Labour Party's perception of the international 
situation. Whilst reaffirming support for the League of Nations and 
collective security, and encouraging the Government's "urging the 
necessity of 
principles",94 
defence needs. 
basing British 
the Party evinced 
international 
more awareness 
policy on these 
of New Zealand's 
International tension was increasing, and signs of 
impending war were more apparent. A remit calling for the abolition 
of compulsory military training95 was not included in the final 
recommendations of the Defence, War and Peace Committee, which 
instead pledged: "to support the Government in every step necessary 
to ensure the adequate defence of the Dominion in its support of the 
defence of democratic principles and world peace."96 
The 1938 Conference report made no mention of Spain. By the time 
of the 1939 Annual Conference, the threat of war was even closer, and 
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the Spanish Civil War was over and far in the background of Labour 
concerns about the international situation. The Committee on 
Defence, War and Peace recommended that nothing be done about a remit 
calling for the provison of relief for the people of Spain. 97 
Hitherto the greatest manifestation of the Labour Party's concern 
about the Civil War, and possibly one of the few steps it could take, 
had been the donation of money for Spanish aid. But by 1939 other 
international issues, and the problem of national defence, were more 
urgent than the problem of stateless and starving refugees from 
Spain. 
During the three years of the Spanish Civil War, the Labour Party 
moved from a period of interest and demonstrable concern for at least 
the humanitarian aspects of the war, to a mood of concern for 
approaching general war and New Zealand's part in it, which over-
shadowed any sympathy, doubtless still felt, for the benighted and 
betrayed Government of Spain. 
In all, the interest and involvement in the issue displayed by 
the Labour 
records of 
Party appears to have been 
branches, LRCs and conferences. 
slight, judging from the 
The pages of the Labour 
Party's official weekly newspaper revealed rather more about both the 
attitude of the Party to the conflict and the difficulties of taking 
a pro-Republican stand on the issue. 
The Standard reflected the Labour Party's concentration on 
domestic issues, while still demonstrating that there was interest in 
the Spanish war. Most of the newspaper's content was devoted to news 
of the Labour Governments policies, and developments within the party 
itself, as well as other local news of particular interest to the 
Labour Movement, such as the National Industrial Conference in 1937. 
Few news items as such about the war were published; presumably there 
was little space for them. Most of the Standard's material on the 
civil war was in the form of reports of local meetings and local 
views about the conflict, as well as the comments of British Labour 
leaders, and press releases from the Labour and Socialist 
International and the International Federation of Trades Unions. 
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There was no mention in the Standard of the battle raging in 
Spain until September 1936, more than a month after the war had 
begun. One of the first major items published was a report of a New 
Zealander's reaction to and analysis of the situation. The Standard 
devoted almost the whole of page two of its issue of 16 September 
1936 to a transcript of a radio journalist's broadcast on Station 1ZB 
in Auckland, which dealt with the political and social background of 
the war, and concluded with a prediction that the Non-Intervention 
Agreement would not work, and that without intervention the 
Government would eventually win because its supporters were spurred 
by an ideal of democracy and freedom. 98 
In keeping with its concentration on domestic issues, the 
Standard devoted no editorials to the subject of the Civil War. 
However, comment on international events was provided in a column 
entitled "Week by Week" , situated next to the editorial column, in 
which brief paragraphs discussed major international issues. The 
Spanish Civil War, and particularly the international aspects of the 
problem and the activities of the Non-Intervention Committee, 
featured largely in this column throughout 1937. Comment on the 
civil war in the column ceased in early 1938 and, in general, the 
Standard gave less coverage to the war after 1937. 
The column closely followed international news reports and 
provided commentary on, and the interpretation of, international 
events. Such was the nature of the column that there was little 
space devoted to discussion of the issues behind the war in Spain as 
such, nor of the nature of the Republican Government itself. The 
major focus was on the role of European powers in the struggle and on 
the NIC, as the most salient feature of international deliberations 
about the conflict. 
Although the column was not used merely as a vehicle for pro-
Republican propaganda, it was clear that the sympathies of the 
commentator, identified simply as tlL.E.", lay with the Republican 
Government of Spain. The unstated, yet obvious, interpretation 
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running through discussions of the civil war was that Spanish 
democracy was being threatened by Fascism, and that this would have 
repercussions for other democracies if Fascist expansionism were not 
halted in Spain. No brief was held for Franco's argument, and that 
of his German and Italian allies, that they were saving Spain from 
the pernicious influence of Communism. In June 1937, the column 
reported an interview given by Franco to the London Times, in which 
he made this claim, and commented drily: 
It may be, as he says, that the Government was responsible 
for crimes and that there were Spaniards who were against 
the Government. If Franco considered it his duty to 
liberate the reactionaries and to exact punishment for the 
crimes, he has gone about it in a strange way.99 
Italian and German intervention in the war was seen as another 
step on the path of Fascist expansionism; a belief often expressed 
was that both Fascist nations wanted Spain for her raw materials and 
strategic 
would have 
position. 100 Franco was a dupe of the Fascists, and he 
greater difficulty in dislodging them from Spain than he 
had had in inviting them. Whatever side won was really beside the 
point, because the Fascists would not relinquish their hold on 
Spanish territory.10l 
Unlike the Communist newspaper, the Standard gave some credence 
to the idea that there were Spaniards fighting in Franco ' s army. 
Several times the opinion was expressed that even in the unlikely 
event of a withdrawal of foreign troops there would be no sudden end 
to the war, nor a clear cut victory for either side; the end of 
hostilities would probably see a divided Spain with little hope of 
reconciliation between the two sides. However, this result, it was 
implied, would be in a large measure because of the escalation of the 
war caused by Fascist intervention, and the bitterness resulting from 
this. 102 
The danger to France 
emphasised, following from 
of a Fascist victory in Spain was 
the premise that Germany and Italy would 
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hold Spanish territory, in an analysis similar to the Communist 
"domino theory" of Fascist aggression: 
All the while France has been alarmed by thoughts of what 
might happen if the Spanish issue were to be dependant on 
German and Italian intervention. The British Government 
ought to have been as greatly perturbed; the Fascists would 
like nothing so much as a stand which would bring them in 
easy striking distance of France and with that the whole 
European democracy.103 
Although the menace of Fascism to civilisation was an obvious 
part of the line of argument pursued in the "Week by Week" column, 
there was little attempt to reinforce this view by discussion of 
reports of Fascist atrocities, or to deny atrocities allegedly 
perpetrated by the Republican forces. The column was not a vehicle 
for propaganda as such, although early in the course of the war it 
had warned readers that many newspapers were bolstering the "Fascist 
attack on the workers' Government", by publishing falsified reports 
of Republican atrocities. 104 This was the only mention of 
Republican atrocity stories. Two atrocities too widely publicised to 
be ignored, the bombing of Guernica and the shelling of Almeria, were 
the exceptions with regard to Fascist atrocities. Indeed, the 
Standard was one of the few New Zealand newspapers that specifically 
discussed the tragedy of Guernica. The emphasis was on the horror of 
the event itself, rather than on the question of who was responsible, 
and what that revealed of the perpetrators' regard for human life and 
their style of warfare: 
It is not surprlslng that so outrageous an attack on a civil 
population was denied by every party which might have been 
responsible for it ... But actually it is not important who 
were the offenders, it matters most that 1937 should see a 
repetition of the outrages to humanity that were seen also 
in the Abyssinian war.IOS 
Yet the comparison with Mussolini's Abyssinian adventure could be 
read as implying that the rebels and their allies were responsible 
for the atrocity. 
Throughout 
importance of 
274 
the commentaries there was an emphasis on the 
definite action by Britain and France to put a stop to 
Fascist aggression, in Spain and elsewhere. It was on this aspect of 
the Civil War that most of the "Week by Week" discussion focussed: 
the failure of Britain and France to provide an adequate defence of 
Spanish democracy and, therefore, of all democracy, particularly as 
revealed in the workings of the Non-Intervention Committee. 
As in the Communist newspaper, it was the British Government that 
was seen as the leading actor, and France the unwilling understudy in 
the farce of non-intervention: 
But it was the British Government which demanded from France 
observance of the Non-Intervention pact, and France, afraid 
to offend Britain at so critical a time, agreed to 
anything. 106 
The blame for most of the international entanglements of the Spanish 
problem was laid upon the British Government's timidity and 
ambivalence about the outcome of the war. From the very beginning of 
the war the ambiguous nature of the British attitude was emphasised. 
The first comment in the "Week by Week" column on the Spanish 
situation, and, incidentally, the first mention of the war in the 
pages of the Standard, on 2 September 1936, condemned civil aviation 
firms that had supplied planes to both sides in the war (reflecting a 
traditional Labour concern with the manufacture and sale of war 
materials) and concluded: 
The fact remains that in the eyes of the world no country is 
more culpable than Britain itself who, while negotiations 
[for the NIC] were proceeding, permitted the export of civil 
aeroplanes to Spain in increasing numbers.107 
Once the NIC had been established and its ineffectual nature 
demonstrated, even in its very composition, the culpability of the 
British Government became even more evident to the Standard's 
commentator. A heavily ironic tone soon invaded discussions of the 
activities of the NIC and conveyed a sense of the unreality of the 
whole procedure. Various epithets were used to describe the 
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Committee; the favourite of pro-Republicans, "farce", was the most 
frequently used; other more inventive descriptions were "wistful 
legend"108 and "fairytale".109 Notwithstanding several 
comments about the absurd, comic aspect of the Committee's 
deliberations and of the Powers' manoeuvrings to create the illusion 
that something was being done, an overtone of indignation of the two 
Western democracies' abandonment of their obligations at the 
Republican Government of Spain was very evident in the "Week by Week" 
column. 
The only member of the NIC whose behaviour was noted with any 
sort of approval was Russia. The columnist praised the Russian 
representative's stubborn refusal to participate in the "charade" of 
non-intervention and in the camoflaging of German and Italian 
activities in Spain, even though it was considered that this, too, 
was used by the Fascist powers as yet another excuse for obstructing 
the progress of the NrC towards some solution of the Spanish crisis. 
When Italy refused to participate in the Nyon piracy conference 
in September 1937, "Week by Week" noted that the refusal was 
ostensibly due to Russian accusations of Italian responsibility for 
Meditteranean piracy. While giving some credit to the Fascist view 
was a deliberate attempt to spoil the that Russia's action 
conference, the column, nevertheless, judged the Russian move as the 
"only possibly course of action" in placing blame where blame was 
due: 
If, like 
piracy at 
pirates to 
shortlived 
account.110 
Russia, the other Powers had the courage to fight 
its orlglns instead of politely inviting the 
talk it over, Meditterranean outrages would be 
and Fascist obstreporousness would be brought to 
Even though Russian motives might be suspect, the Soviet Union's 
unwillingness to enter into "the conspiracy of evasion",lll which 
was regarded as the main feature of NIC deliberations, and its 
insistence on the reality of Fascist intervention in Spain could only 
have been appreciated by a newspaper column that was also undeceived 
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(and unwilling to deceive itself) about the situation in Spain. 
Perhaps too, although this was never stated, Russian attempts to 
bring the crisis to a head, and to create a rift between the two 
Western democracies and the Fascist Powers so wide that there would 
be no option but to go to war over Spain, were not far removed from 
the Standard's commentator's idea of a solution to the problem. His 
frequent insistence in discussions of international involvement that 
a display of strength by Britain would solve the problem of Fascist 
aggression in Spain must surely have had as a consideration the 
prospect of outright war in consequence of such action. 
The policy of the British Government in encouraging and 
continuing the Non-Intervention Pact long after it was obvious to all 
concerned that it was nothing more than a "camoflage", and a "polite 
fiction" was treated with what almost amounted to scorn and 
contempt. Indeed, the Standard's commentator was far more outspoken 
in his condemnation of British policy over Spain than the Labour 
Government could ever dare to be. A wealth of bitterness was 
conveyed by comments such as: "But Britain of course has not been 
completely passive. Looking on from Downing Street, her ministers 
have felt, as they said "Deep concern"."112 
Non-Intervention was regarded as the British Government's creation; 
therefore, much of the blame for its ineffectiveness was laid upon 
Britain's attitude towards the conflict. Naturally, the part played 
by Germany and Italy, first of all by intervening in Spain and then 
by prevaricating and paying only lipservice to the concept of non-
intervention, 
that German 
was 
and 
not overlooked. However, it was taken for granted 
Italian diplomacy was based on deception and 
aggression rather than on rules and gentlemanly agreements. 
Therefore, it was considered all the more to the discredit of the 
British Government that it had for one moment considered that the 
Non-Intervention Pact would have any effect in defusing the Spanish 
crisis. Indeed, the columnist's comments revealed his doubts as to 
the sincerity of this motive in the British Government's adherence to 
non-intervention. The very first comment on the Non-Intervention 
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Committee expressed clearly the two points about British policy that 
were to be stressed again and again in his observation of the 
international implications of the Spanish Civil War: 
Non-intervention, by what indications there are, is another 
of those weakling shifts which Hitler and Mussolini are past 
masters at making farcical Non-intervention was a 
glaring halfmeasure amounting almost to inverted 
intervention. There was never any reason in the first place 
for supposing that a rebel victory in Spain would be at 
variance with British interests.113 
"Week by \veek' s" writer clearly considered that the apparent 
self-delusion of British statesmen about the willingness of the two 
Fascist Powers to abide by some form of international co-operation to 
solve the problem might not be self-delusion at all, but 
self-interest, a calculated move designed to allow Franco to win 
without appearing to have actively aided his efforts. Evidence of 
Britain's partiality was given by the column firstly in the serious 
consideration given by the NrC to the granting of belligerent rights 
to Franco in July 1937. This move was also seen as indicating the 
British Government's desire to extricate itself from an increasingly 
complicated and fruitless, as well as embarrassing, situation: 
Give Franco his belligerent rights, in other words, and see 
if he will end things more quickly - that is the sum of the 
week's deliberations, though it has been well shrouded in 
Edenesque humbug ... Mr Eden, one of these days, may make an 
excursion into that appalling frankness upon which Earl 
Baldwin of Bewdley's fame may rest. He may tell the nation 
that the Government, in distributing belligerent rights to 
Franco, was aware that it was playing into Fascist hands. 
Perhaps also he will admit that the Government thought it 
was the easiest thing to do.114 
The exchange of commercial agents between Burgos and London, in 
November 1937, however much Britain protested to the contrary, was 
held up in the "Week by Week" column as the final proof of Britain's 
partisan interest in the outcome of the war, and as the logical 
conclusion to the policy of "inverted tt intervention. Even if Britain 
did not really intend it as such, it was a recognition of Franco's 
sovereignty over at least part of Spain. The claim that the agents 
278 
did not have diplomatic status was discussed as hopelessly 
transparent; on 11 November 1937 the columnist sniffed: 
Presumably there is some notable difference between being a 
diplomat and a diplomat's mouthpiece ... If this does not 
mean de facto recognition of Franco, it is hard to know what 
it does mean. liS 
The suggestion of British complicity in Italian and German use of 
the NIC as a temporizing measure whilst they continued to influence 
the course of the war in Spain, was a delicate matter in the pages of 
a newspaper 
closely with 
often made 
whose 
the 
in the 
party was the Government of New Zealand, dealing 
Government of the "Mother Country". The claim, 
Worker's Weekly, that the British Government was 
Fascist aggression in Spain because it was itself 
pro-Fascist, never became an overt part of the Standard's analysis of 
the British response to the Spanish conflict. Yet, it was obvious 
aiding and abetting 
that British policy, 
Franco (rather than 
whether from weakness or partiality towards 
his foreign allies), evoked nothing but disgust 
and anger in the "Week by Week" column. 
The impression given in the column was of outraged astonishment 
at the gullibility of British statesmen in allowing non-intervention 
to continue when it was obvious to all, surely including British 
statesmen, that discussions in the NIC about the withdrawal of 
volunteers and belligerent rights would never come to anything. If, 
by July 1937, the British Government was having to extricate itself 
from an embarassing situation by considering the granting of 
belligerent rights to Franco, British statesmen only had themselves 
to blame for the whole farcical situation: 
The polite treachery of both Germany and Italy, however much 
it is immediately responsible for the present tangle and 
however much it may be deplored by a righteous Britain, can 
be traced back to British vacillation in the earliest stages 
of the war. Non-intervention, properly handled, may have 
much to be said for it, but at no time was there room to say 
that Britain had used it to any definite purpose. It has 
been a half measure from the beginning. By taking an 
opportunist attitudes towards it, by using it as the fabric 
with which to patch dangerous situations Britain plainly 
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made the way for such a situation as she now dreads [the 
total collapse of non-intervention].116 
Even the Nyon piracy conference, held in September 1937 after a 
disturbing number of submarine attacks on shipping in the 
Mediterrannean, and the only occasion of relatively firm action by 
Britain and France, was dismissed at its conclusion as ineffectual. 
Heralded by the column when it was announced, as the "first really 
determined move since the Spanish War began",117 by the time of 
its conclusion it was described as a "squib". The absence of Italy, 
whose responsibility for the piracy was an "open secret", admitted by 
none except the Russians, was seen as ensuring that the conference 
would achieve little, since Mussolini would not agree to conditions 
made without his representatives' involvement. Conceding that the 
proposals made by the Conference to curb piracy were good in theory, 
the commentator nevertheless saw the outcome of the conference as yet 
another triumph for Italy over British statesmen who still hoped to 
halt aggression by holding discussions with the aggressor. Italian 
absence from the decision-making process gave Mussolini the perfect 
excuse for refusing to adhere to the agreement. 118 
Behind all this criticism of Britain lay the firm conviction that 
the British Government could and should act decisively to stop 
foreign aggression in Spain. The reasons given by the British 
Government itself for the establishment of non-intervention, in "Week 
by Week's" assessment of that institution, were also the subject of 
criticism. 
beginning 
discounted; 
contention 
Eden's 
would have 
yet, the 
that a 
claims that positive British action in the 
increased the danger of a general war were 
Standard's commentator did not disregard the 
general war might result from the Spanish 
he saw the prospect of more widespread warfare 
as resulting in part from the exacerbation of international tensions 
over the Spanish Civil War by the long drawn out and ineffectual 
process of non-intervention, as well as from the bolstering of 
Fascist confidence caused by British inaction. 
imbroglio. However, 
The argument that more progress in British rearmament was needed 
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before a firmer stand against Fascist aggression could be taken was 
also taken into account: 
British statesmen repeat continually their determination not 
to be sucked into a general European upheaval meaning that 
wars are inconvenient interruptions to an armaments bUilding 
campaign. 119 
Given Labour's strong opposition to war and to rearmament it is not 
surprising that this particular argument for non-intervention in 
Spain should be treated so dismissively. It would seem that the 
"Week by Week" columnist was of the opinion that war would not have 
ensued from firm British action at the beginning of the Spanish 
crisis, yet what other form it could have taken and what other 
response there might have been from Italy and Germany was left to the 
readers' imaginations. The statement quoted above was in itself, 
rather peculiar, for what other reason could there be for armaments 
building, if not preparation for war? Perhaps a general war over 
Fascist aggression in Spain was a "just" war and preferable to the 
stockpiling of armaments for a future less justifiable conflict. 
There was also some recognition of the wider purposes of British 
appeasement of the dictators over Spain, particularly the attempt to 
win Italy away from the alliance with Germany cemented during their 
Spanish campaign. However, the "Week by Week" column again saw in 
this "Italian venture", and especially in the proposal for a Three 
Power Conference, the ingenuousness of British statesmen and their 
almost wilful lack of understanding of Fascist "diplomacy": 
Actually the Three Power Conference seems a waste of time. 
Italy may attend it. But even if we imagine her allowing 
discussion to get anywhere [save to her own advantage] it 
still seems ingenuous. Fascist obstreperousness is not a 
matter for conferences, so much Britain and France ought by 
now to have learned. Stripped of diplomatic language the 
invitation to Italy is clearly an attempt to get the Fascist 
fly into the conservatist parlour.120 
A feature of British appeasement of the Fascists in Spain that 
caused much concern to the Standard's commentator was the damage to 
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British prestige that resulted from this display of weakness. He was 
quick to point out that the interests of British statesmen in a 
victory for Franco did not necessarily coincide with the interests of 
the British Empire as a whole. Apart from the general impression 
created of British helplessness in the face of aggression, the war in 
Spain had resulted in specific dangers to the Empire, in the Italian 
challenge to British Meditterranean supremacy. In April 1937, the 
column said: "Matching Fascist intervention with a stand of 
unenlightened neutrality Britain stood by to watch an open Italian 
encroachment on her Mediterranean interests."12l 
Italian presence in the Mediterranean created difficulties for 
the Empire's link through that sea-route, and moreover, endangered 
British status as a major sea power. This loss of status would make 
it all the more difficult for Britain to act firmly in the future, 
once it had become obvious that it would not resist encroachments on 
her interests nor respond to the lowering of status this entailed. 
The blockade of Bilbao was cited as a particularly glaring example of 
British readiness to sacrifice prestige in order to "keep the peace": 
No one can welcome the unsavoury truth that the Spanish 
rebels by their sheer effrontery enforced an intolerable 
restriction upon British shipping. Above all in a series of 
slights borne by the British Government in the cause of a 
backhanded neutrality this is the hardest to endure. At 
best it can be said for the Government [of Britain] that it 
was strict in following the letter of its chosen policy of 
non-intervention. That is scant comfort for the loss -
which may have consequences of an important right which 
allows Britain to protect her merchant ships and which is 
vital in the scheme of Europe.122 
In this connection, the "Week by Week" column affirmed that the 
Spanish issue was one in which the whole of the Empire was involved. 
The column noted the statement of the Dominion Prime Ministers at the 
Imperial Conference that England and the Dominions should not become 
embroiled in incidents in Europe that were not the concern of the 
Empire, and expressed surprise that the Dominions should see the 
consequences of the Spanish Civil War as "beyond the Pale of Empire 
affairs". Italian threats to Britain's Mediterranean interests were 
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surely a problem for the whole of the Empire, although they might not 
have become so had it not been for British timidity in the early 
stages of the war. 123 
It seemed impossible to escape the conclusion that throughout the 
course of the war in 1937 the British Government, if not actively 
pro-Fascist, had by its inaction proved "a good friend to the 
Fascists"124 and was intent on sacrificing Spain in the cause of 
appeasement. However, at times the commentator appeared to hesitate 
about this judgement. On occasion, there seemed to be some agreement 
with the view later to be expressed by Ne\.J Zealand's representative 
to the League of Nations, that an ineffectual policy of 
non-intervention was better than no policy at all. 125 For 
instance, in April 1937 it was suggested that "for what it is worth 
as a safeguard, Italy 
intervention".126 The next 
must 
month, 
be 
the 
kept pledged 
column claimed 
to non-
that the 
NIC was more suited to deal with the Spanish crisis than the League 
of Nations. 127 This latter judgement may have been the result of 
negative rather than positive conclusions about the NIC. It had, 
after all, pre-empted the role of peacekeeper in the 
conflict, which should have been the League's prerogative. 
Spanish 
The NIC 
was a fait accompli, however little it did in reality achieve and, 
therefore, the onus was on it rather than the League to solve the 
problem. 
Indeed, the Standard's columnist displayed a view of the efficacy 
of the League of Nations in the Spanish crisis surprisingly at 
variance with the policy pursued by New Zealand's Labour Government. 
Far from regarding it as the League's duty to act, the column rather 
echoed the British assessment, which was aimed at keeping the League 
well away from involvement with the Spanish War, and its attendant 
international entanglements. As did Jordan and his colleagues, the 
"\veek by Heek" column saw the Spanish Civil War as an issue 
fundamental to the survival of the League. Rather than seeing Spain 
as the issue that would reawaken the League to its responsibilities 
as protector of its members against aggressors, the columnist saw any 
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raising of the Spanish question at Geneva as sure suicide for the 
League of Nations. He considered that, in view of the League's 
failure to halt aggression in Abyssinia, there was little point in 
expecting the League to be able to act effectively a year later on 
much the same kind of problem. Moreover, to involve the League in 
the matter would be to expose its weakness further, and might result 
in the loss of what little credibility the League retained. 128 
This was not a denial of the right of the Spanish Government, as 
a member 
questioned 
nation, to 
the wisdom 
bring 
of 
its grievance before the League, but it 
so doing when it was apparent to all that 
the League was moribund. This view, curious in its rejection of the 
solution most favoured by Labour leaders, was nevertheless not a 
reversal of Labour's fundamental belief in the concept of the League 
and of collective security as a means of avoiding war. It was, 
rather, an appreciation of the helplessness of the League as 
constituted, a recognition that unless all members were willing to 
fully participate in a system of collective security the League could 
never hope to be effective. This, too, was what Labour's leaders 
believed, but they were sanguine enough to see the Spanish crisis as 
a means by which the League members could be stirred into an 
awareness of their duty to each other and of the need for decisive 
action. The "Week by Week" column was less optimistic: 
Until the nations are agreed once more on a collective 
system, centred around a restored League, it would be merely 
ingenuous to carry fundamental grievances to Geneva. Worse 
it would be doing the League a serious disservice; to force 
upon it a strain it is unable to take is only to weaken it 
further. 129 
It is significant that there was no discussion of the New Zealand 
Government's stand on Spain at the League 
statement quoted above was made only days 
or elsewhere. The 
before Jordan's much 
publicised speech of 29 May 1937, and the Eden-Jordan "blue-pencil" 
incident; its criticisms fo the ingenuousness of the Spanish 
Government in applying to the League for aid could well have been 
applied to Jordan's hope that he could awaken the League to its 
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responsibilities. Jordan's speech was reported in the Standard, on 
the front page, but without comment. In addition, the heading of the 
report, "Menacing the World - Rule of Force", focussed attention on 
Jordan's assessment of Fascist aggression in Spain, shared by the 
Standard, rather than on his attempt to restore the League to its 
proper function. 130 
The Labour Government's objections to British policy on Spain 
would have fitted well with the stand taken by the "Week by Week" 
column, even despite differences over the role of the League. It can 
only be concluded that the Standard was scrupulously avoiding 
involving the Labour Party and the Labour Government in any kind of 
controversy over the war. Criticism or appreciation of the 
Government's policy would surely have drawn some response. In the 
same way, the sudden disappearance of any mention of Spain from the 
paragraphs of the "Week by \~eek" column after January 1938, except 
for one reference to Tom Spiller's speaking tour,131 cannot 
solely be explained by the submerging of the issue by other 
international issues. It is true that considerably less attention 
was paid to the Spanish problem by the daily newspapers in 1938; 
other conflicts took prominence, yet most managed a few editorials to 
keep abreast of developments on the Iberian peninsuala and in the 
offices of the NIC. 
Perhaps it was decided that the safest course was to avoid any 
discussion of the issue at all. Criticism of the British attitude 
had been trenchant in 1937; it is possible that in 1938 this attitude 
was deemed no longer wise, or no longer for public consumption, as 
war clouds grew more ominous and New Zealand's qependence for defence 
on Britain became more important. 
The Standard and the Labour Party itself avoided expressing a 
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clear policy on the Civil War. It was a difficult and complex issue; 
the Communist Party and the Catholic Church had taken opposing sides, 
and both religious and political passions had been aroused by the 
war. It must have been difficult for the Labour Party's newspaper to 
tread a pro-Republican path while avoiding involvement in any kind of 
controversy over the war. 
These difficulties must have been brought home to the editor not 
long after the outbreak of war in 1936, when a debate erupted over 
the religious 
Standard. 
correspondent 
issues of the war in the correspondence columns of the 
The controversy was sparked by a letter from a 
",ho was "a member of a church whose faithful sons are 
being slaughtered for nothing 
faith" .132 This writer, who 
denounced Ne", Zealand Trades 
Spain, items about which had 
other than their allegiance to the 
used the nom-de-plume "Catholic", 
Unions' support for the Government of 
been published in the Standard. The 
letter went on to repeat Catholic claims about the illegality of the 
Spanish elections of February 1936, and about the Russian money and 
propaganda behind the Popular Front, as well as pointing out the 
church people and buildings perpetrated by the atrocities against 
Spanish Government's supporters, all to reinforce the argument that 
should not support such a regime. "Catholic's" 
warning about loss of Catholic support for the 
New Zealand Labour 
letter ended with a 
Labour Party if it continued to demonstrate sympathy for a "herd 
comparable with the supporters of Barbarossa".133 
The response to this letter indicated that not all Catholics were 
about to withdraw their support for the Labour Party over the Spanish 
issue. In the month following publication of "Catholic's" letter 
there appeared one further in support of his view and five against, 
at least two of which were ",ritten by Catholics. 134 All of the 
five stressed the political, as opposed to the religious, nature of 
the war and the justice of the Spanish people's cause against the 
large landowners and repressive church hierarchy whose association 
with the Fascist powers would do nothing but harm to the Church. One 
correspondent, also a Catholic, assured the Standard's readers that 
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"Catholic's" point of view was not held by a large number of 
Catholics in New Zealand and that many Catholic workers voted in 
terms of class rather than creed. Religion, said this writer, should 
be separated from politics: "I would as soon take my politics from 
Moscow as from Rome, while still upholding my faith."135 
The editor noted, in the issue of 21 October 1936, that many more 
letters had been received for which there was not space. He was also 
at pains to point out that, at this point, the New Zealand Labour 
Party was not expressing any opinion on affairs in Spain, and that it 
was not bound by any resolutions passed by affiliated unions. 136 
With the publication on 4 November of a letter in support of 
"Catholic's" view, the correspondence was abruptly closed without 
explanation, saving right of reply from "Catholic".137 
At the same time as the controversy over the religious aspects of 
the war in Spain there also appeared two letters dealing with the 
political issues of the war, warning the Standard's readers of the 
dangers of supporting a Communist-led regime. Inspired by a comment 
in the "Week by Week" column about the pro-Fascist bias of some 
newspapers, the first writer, whose letter appeared on 21 October, 
accused the Standard of the opposite bias, of assuming that all 
stories of Fascist atrocities were true and all of Republican were 
false: 
The Standard as a Labour paper is against communism, but it 
would seem that in regard to Spain the Standard will pass as 
good reports against the enemies of communism and will take 
trouble to deny reports against the Communists. 138 
Another correspondent, whose letter in support of this claim 
appeared three weeks later, on 11 November, warned that it was 
communism, "red rebellion", that led to the rise of Fascism. The 
lesson of Spain should be clear to New Zealanders: "Sow Moscow, reap 
Spain". This letter also denounced any Labour support for the 
Republican Government, although on political rather than religious 
grounds: "With Barcelona controlled by the Anarchists how any 
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orthodox Labour man can advocate financial aid to people whom Bob 
Semple called "the enemies of all mankind" puzzles me."139 
It is possible that these two letters also came from Catholics; 
although there was no specific indication of the basis for their 
views, their rhetoric echoed that of Zealandia and the Tablet. 
"Catholic" replied to his critics on 18 November, concluding that 
Spain: 
would be better to follow the greatest Government in the 
world today our own Labour Government in New Zealnd than 
to fall into the materialism of the Soviet with its class 
hatred and destruction of the good in the past as well as 
the bad .140 
Thereafter not one letter was published about the Spanish Civil 
War until 1939. A letter then published, on 9 February 1939, 
expressed a view of Labour involvement with the Spanish issue at odds 
with the letter of 11 November 1936. The two letters possibly 
represented two opposing poles of thought within the Labour Party on 
the issue. The 1939 letter, signed "A New Zealand Mother", reported 
the meeting of welcome for the two New Zealand nurses, in Wellington, 
and voiced concern and indignation that there were not more official 
representatives of the Labour Party present. Mrs C. Stewart, MP for 
Wellington West, was the only Labour representative. The writer 
said: "Why is it that a matter so vitally concerning the people 
should be so quietly received ... It might be our turn next. tll41 
These two points of view were the horns of the dilemna on which the 
Standard found itself. By February 1939 it was apparently safe 
enough to resume publication of letters about Spain, but in the early 
stages of the war safety lay in silence. The Editor's reply to a 
correspondent on 7 May 1937 revealed both that letters on the issue 
were being received, and the reason for non-publication. 
As you are 
weekly for 
funds for 
publishing 
a subscriber to the Standard you will know that 
the past six months we have been appealing for 
the relief of distress in Spain. We are not 
correspondents' letters especially when they deal 
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with the political situation, which is far from clear, and 
no good would come from any controversy that may be 
started.142 
Yet it was obvious, particularly in the first few months of the 
war (excepting August 1936, when the Standard was obviously deciding 
what to say about Spain) that the paper's sympathies lay with the 
Republican Government. However, even before it had been demonstrated 
that controversy would be caused by the issue, the political aspects 
of the war were not much discussed. Even the "\veek by Week" column, 
as critical of Britain as it was, refrained from much discussion of 
the nature of the two Spanish sides in the war. Much of the initial 
material about the war focussed on the humanitarian aspect of 
pro-Republicanism. Several photographs of civilian victims of the 
war were published with captions urging New Zealanders to give 
generously to aid Republican Spain. A general anti-Fascist note was 
also present; presumably the Standard took it for granted that its 
readers were anti-Fascist, whatever they may have felt about 
Communism, either in relation to Spain or in general. The Editor's 
comment to the correspondent complaining of bias made this clear; he 
said: "May we suggest that truth as the people see it can never be 
what a Fascist, for instance, sees.,,143 
Even if the Standard itself refrained from making comment about 
the political issues involved, and from making too open a 
pro-Republican stand, the material it published, particularly the 
reports of meetings and resolutions in support of the Republicans, 
indicated where the sympathies of the Labour newspaper lay, and were 
perhaps intended to subtly direct the attitudes of its readers in 
that direction also. 
Nevertheless, mentions of Spain after December 1936, outside the 
"Week by Week" column, were few and far between. The only article 
about the Republican Government, a report on its education policies, 
was published on the Women's Page, which also occasionally carried 
items about the involvement of foreign women in relief work in 
Spain. 144 There was some coverage of SMAC activities, although 
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little mention was made of the Committee's political affiliations. 
Indeed, the first mention of the SMAC, a report of the establishment 
of the Auckland branch, again published on the Women's Page in March 
1937, described the Committee as "Dr McMillan's scheme to send a 
medical unit from N.Z. to the aid of 
hostilities".145 Perhaps this was an 
Committee, or, more likely, the image 
sufferers in the Spanish 
attempt to legitimise the 
of the Committee which the 
Standard, and doubtless other Labour people, preferred to keep in 
mind. 
The SMAC's despatch of the three nurses to Spain was also 
covered, with reports on the farewell meetings he1d. 146 The 
Standard's view of the police interrogation of the nurses, despite 
indignation among union affiliates, very carefully followed the 
official line expressed by Fraser and Parry. The report of the 
incident, published on the front page, quoted the Ministers' 
statements and made no comment. It was not published until 17 June 
1937. 147 The return of Nurses Shadbolt and Dodds in early 1939, 
and their experiences in Spain, were also the subject of an item in 
the Standard on 26 January 1939. The interview with the nurses 
stressed the problem of food in Republican Spain, the progressiveness 
of the Republican Government and the determination of the Loyalists 
to fight on despite overwhelming odds. 148 
While the Standard refrained from editorial comment on the 
Government's policy, it nevertheless published in reports of meetings 
and other items the comments of members of the Labour Movement in 
praise of the Government, which it must have condoned, since it 
allowed their publication. Several items lauded the "splendid" stand 
taken by Jordan at Geneva, in marked contrast to the general comments 
made in the "Week by Week" column about the danger of involving the 
League in the issue. A letter from Bert Bryan, a New Zealander in 
the International Brigades, published in August 1937, mentioned this 
and presented a view of the war that stressed its significance for 
world democracy, and specifically New Zealand democracy. 149 
Reports of the National Industrial Conference in 1937150 and of 
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the FOL Conference in 1938,151 of the Dominion Conference of the 
SMAC in December 1937152 and of a meeting held in Auckland to 
mark 
the 
the 
New 
second 
Zealand 
anniversary of the 
Government's policy 
war in 1938153 also mentioned 
in terms of approval and 
reinforced, with the reported speeches and attitudes, the opinion 
held by many Labour members, particularly in the unions, that the war 
was an issue that should involve New Zealanders. 
The Standard's pro-Republicanism, circumspect in terms of 
political analysis and propaganda, was most clearly indicated by the 
establishment of the "Spanish Relief of Distress Fund" in the 4 
December 1936 issue. 
are obscure. 154 
As mentioned above, the origins of this fund 
The Standard directed contributions to a Spanish Relief of 
Distress Committee at a Wellington Post Office box number; however, 
it appears that the fund was administered in part by the New Zealand 
Waterside Workers' Union. According to the Standard's report of the 
fund's establishment, the impulse came partly from the example of the 
British Labour Party. The British National Council of Labour had 
appealed to 
of distress 
children". 155 
British Labour to donate money "entirely for the relief 
amongst the Spanish people, especially the women and 
Accordingly, said the Standard, it was opening its 
columns to New Zealand donations, which would be acknowledged weekly 
in a subscription list and, like the British fund would be sent to 
the International Federation of Trades Unions to distribute. Like 
SMAC appeals, the item 
great, do your part, do 
subsequent item on the 
fund had raised £ 375, 
unions. 
closed with the exhortation. "The need is 
it now", the like of which followed every 
fund. When it closed in November 1937 the 
most, as discussed earlier, from the trades 
The Standard, then, provided some leadership for New Zealand 
Labour on the Spanish issue, even if it was careful not to become 
involved in the controversy. Despite editorial silence, the attitude 
of the paper was revealed more subtly in the material it published 
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concerning Spain, and its reports of New Zealanders' responses to the 
conflict. All these items were an encouragement to cautious 
pro-Republicanism, even if it were primarily endorsed for ostensibly 
humanitarian motives. The anti-Fascism of the Standard was clear, 
however, and the activities of Germany and Italy in Spain were of 
concern. 
Almost paradoxically, the guide given by the Standard on the 
Spanish issue was also revealed in its avoidance of discussion of the 
political issues of the war; its pro-Republicanism, and that of the 
Labour Party as a whole, indicated by the reports of Labour Party 
Conferences, was a limited pro-Republicanism, circumspect in the 
extreme. Small pockets of strongly pro-Republican sentiment were to 
be found within the Labour Movement, but, in a sense, the official 
view was that the Labour Party should keep the issue at arm's 
length. The need to protect the Labour Government from controversy 
over ideological viewpoints was an essential part of this attitude. 
The Standard's silence about the Government's stand on Spain, and 
Conferences' lack of specific reference to this or to other stands in 
defiance of British policy (such as the recognition of Mussolini's 
conquest of Abyssinia) was a reflection of the Labour Government's 
own caution in not treating the issue as matter for public debate 
over its policy. 
If the responses of Trades Unions revealed the limited success of 
the Communist Party's "Spanish Solidarity" campaign, the attitude of 
the Labour Party indicated the reverse. There is no doubt that 
avoidance of association with the Communist Party, both with regard 
to public opinion and because of dislike and suspicion of Communism, 
played a part in limiting the Labour Party's active commitment to 
pro-Republicanism. The domestic responsibilities and preoccupations 
of a party whose Parliamentary wing was the Government restricted the 
public expression of what was undoubtedly felt by many, sympathy for 
the Republican cause. Within the Labour Movement, the Trades Unions 
took the lead, but the Labour Movement as a whole was not the driving 
force in the New Zealand pro-Republican Movement. That role was 
largely left to the Communists. 
292 
Nevertheless, the responses of the Labour Movement indicated 
little deviation from the basic Communist argument about the Spanish 
Civil War. In viewing the conflict as an attack on democracy that 
had significance for Labour democracy in New Zealand, in criticisms 
of British policy and in support of Jordan's stand at Geneva, the 
Labour Movement was in the mainstream of pro-Republican belief in New 
Zealand. 
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CHAPTER 6 
"PROGRESSIVE PEOPLE": 
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AN INTERNATIONALIST ANTI-FASCIST ALLIANCE OF OPINION 
Ted Hunter, National Secretary of the Spanish Medical Aid 
Committee, once referred to the diverse group of supporters of the 
Republican cause as "progressive people".l His nomenclature is 
as definite and as appropriate as any. The espousers of 
pro-Republicanism in New Zealand were not all motivated by positive 
democratic zeal, for some based their attitudes upon negative 
anti-Catholicism. They were, however, "progressive" in their 
insistence that a world in which there was social justice, reason and 
liberty was preferred to the rule of privilege and militarism. They 
were united in dislike of Fascism and Nazism in an internationalist 
outlook that insisted that events in Spain had a bearing upon life in 
New Zealand. This alliance of Communist fellow-travellers, 
Socialists, liberal and Left-wing academics and students, some 
Methodists and ordinary citizens with a world view was primarily 
expressed in published pro-Republican opinion, rather than in 
concerted activities aimed at both increasing public acceptance of 
Republicanism and providing aid for the Spanish Government. 
Opinions included in this alliance were those' expressed by two 
daily newspapers, The Press and the Grey River Argus. The latter was 
a Labour daily, published on the West Coast. Its preoccupation was 
with the Government's domestic policy, but in the few editorials it 
produced on the Spanish Civil War the Argus took a cautious 
pro-Republican stand. The editorials of The Press, a Christchurch 
paper, contained relatively little discussion of the contending 
forces in Spain, 
aggression upon a 
war concerned the 
severe criticism 
but it clearly considered the war one of Fascist 
democracy. Much of its editorial comment on the 
international aspects of the crisis and contained 
of British policy. Pro-Republican letters to 
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newspapers have also been considered in this discussion of the 
"progressive" alliance, since in few cases were their political 
affiliations able to be established. Before detailed discussion of 
the pro-Republicanism of this diverse group, some of the elements 
within it must be delineated. 
In the case of both the Methodist Church and the Student 
Christian Movement (SCM) the expression of pro-Republicanism was 
limited to intermittent comment in their publications, respectively 
the Student and the Methodist Times. 
The Methodist Church at its Annual Conferences displayed a 
generalised concern for the international situation and recognised 
that both secularism and economic inequalities played a large part in 
international tensions. 2 In 1936, the Conference recommended 
that church members become individual and corporate members of the 
League of Nations Union3 and, in 1937, the Public Questions 
Committee of the Conference endorsed a decision by the President of 
the Conference to write to the Prime Minister proposing some solution 
to international tension. The Conference, "profoundly concerned at 
the perils to world peace resulting from growing disregard of 
international obligations and the world-wide increase in armaments", 
asked the Government to call for an international conference: 
to grapple with the economic and territorial causes of the 
international tensions which threaten war, and to make a 
resolute attempt to prove to each nation that it will be 
treated with justice and goodwill.4 
But the Church was anxious to avoid the unedifying spectacle of 
political disputation within its ranks. When a resolution was 
proposed at the 1938 Conference expressing appreciation of William 
Jordan's stand at Geneva, there was some feeling that the resolution 
was inappropriate because it had a political flavour. Nevertheless, 
after it was argued that Jordan was speaking in the name of Christ 
and humanity, the resolution was passed unanimously.S 
Undoubtedly. the Spanish Civil War was considered too politically 
300 
fraught a question to be appropriate for discussion at Conferences. 
But in several editorials, the Methodist Times expressed concern 
about the war, based partly upon humanitarian distress for its 
"sanguinary" nature, but also upon anti-Fascism and anti-Catholicism. 
The Student Christian Movement nurtured an approach to 
Christianity that demanded the application of spiritual values to the 
secular world. First founded in New Zealand in 1894 as the Christian 
Union, with strong international links through the World Christian 
Student Federation, the SCM was based around students at Universities 
and Training Colleges and derived support and guidance from young 
ministers of the Protestant Churches, like Alun Richards and Lex 
Millar, both Presbyterian ministers. According to Alun Richards, 
many of the SCM members were disposed to question the present 
organisation of society, particularly its economic basis. They 
questioned the morality and efficiency of the capitalist system and 
at least some were prepared to consider that other political social 
and economic systems might be more just. 6 
Despite the involvement in secular issues deemed necessary for a 
proper evaluation of Christianity in an increasingly materialistic 
world, the voluminous correspondence and minutes of the SCM do not 
make any reference to the Spanish Civil War. However, in 1937 the 
Student's "Current Events" column discussed the war frequently. The 
Student considered that the war raised profound questions about the 
involvement of Christians in war; its pro-Republicanism was based 
upon a dislike of Fascism, and it questioned the morality of British 
policy. 
Other University students also demonstrated their support for the 
Republican cause. Individual Students' Associations and their 
national body, the New Zealand University Students' Association, were 
generally silent on the issue. It appears that they regarded their 
function as having more to do with looking after student interests, 
organising inter-University sports tournaments and awarding sporting 
"blues" than promoting any particular political or ethical standpoint 
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on campus. The Canterbury University Students' Association refused 
to allow the showing of the pro-Republican film "Defence of Madrid" 
as part of the "Helcome to Freshers" week at the beginning of the 
1938 academic year. The President of the Students' Association 
considered that it would "introduce a political bias into the Student 
Union bui1dings".7 However, the Victoria University of 
Wellington Students' Association collected funds for the NRFSRC's 
aid campaign,8 and in Dunedin, Otago University's Student 
President, Douglas Kennedy was involved with the establishment of the 
SMAC.9 
Pro-Republicanism upon campuses found expression in the clubs 
established to discuss international and political issues, usually 
styled "Radical Clubs". At Otago University the Independent Radical 
Club, politically "somewhere between the Labour Party and the 
Communist Party",10 attempted to have the Students' Association 
pass a resolution of sympathy with "the struggle of the workers in 
Spain against the forces of Fascism". The motion was lost. ll 
The Canterbury University Radical Club held meetings on the Spanish 
Civil War, including one at which Dr D. Jolly and Bert Bryan, New 
Zealanders returned from Spain, spoke. 12 It also opened an 
appeal for donations to the SMAC.13 The student newspaper Canta, 
although it made little editorial comment, demonstrated a mild 
pro-Republican sympathy. At Auckland University, the Labour Club and 
the International Relations Club jointly sponsored meetings addressed 
by Tom Spiller and "Taffy" Patterson. 14 At Victoria University 
Salient, which replaced the student newspaper SMAD in 1937, was far 
more political in content than any of the other campus newspapers. 
In March 1938 it produced a "Spanish Number" in which three pages 
were devoted to pro-Republican comment. IS Almost the whole front 
page was given over to an interview with Tom Spiller, which, rather 
than dealing with his personal experiences in Spain, presented 
conventional Communist propaganda on the war. Inside there were 
reviews of Elliott Paul's The Life and Death of a Spanish Town and 
Arthur Koestler's Spanish Testament (both accounts of experiences in 
Spain published in London in 1937) and excerpts from poems about 
Spain by English poets W.R. Auden and John Cornford. There was also 
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an editorial that used the Spanish Civil War as an example of the 
decay of the established social and economic order, related the 
conflict directly to the New Zealand scene and condemned British 
policy. The paper's editor, A.H. Scotney, later took part in a 
debate on the war in answer to a challenge by Catholic students, in 
which the pro-Republican side was triumphant. 16 
The pro-Republican sympathies of academics were most often 
expressed by involvement with the SMAC. Auckland's Professor of 
Economics, Horace Belshaw; lecturer in History, Willis Airey; English 
lecturer, Arthur Sewell; and Philosophy lecturer R.P. Anschutz were 
all associated with the Auckland branch of the SMAC. In Wellington, 
J.e. Beaglehole, lecturer in History and one of New Zealand's most 
eminent historians, was chairman of the Wellington SMAC, and 
dedicated the proceeds of his volume of poems Words For Music, 
published in 1938, to the SMAC. Winston Rhodes, lecturer in English 
and co-editor of the radical periodical Tomorrow, was Chairman of the 
Christchurch branch of the SMAC. There were also other academics who 
allowed their names to be used in endorsement of the SMAC's appeal 
for funds. 
All of these men held left-wing views; some also were tutors for 
the Workers Educational Association (WEA) and belonged to the League 
of Nations Union (LNU) and the Left Book Club (LBC). Left Book 
Clubs, forums for discussion as much as the dissemination of 
left-wing books, had been established in England by the publisher 
Victor Gollancz, and appeared in New Zealand in 1938, and by their 
very nature promoted pro-Republicanism. There was also some 
pro-Republican sentiment expressed within the LNU. However, the LNU 
was divided on the issue and in the late 1930s was focussing its 
attention on reform of the League. The decline of the League after 
the failure of sanctions in the Abyssinian crisis in 1935 was 
reflected in the 
dissension between 
like Airey, and 
University, and 
League of Nations Union and there was increasing 
its more radical intellectual leadership, people 
F.L.W. Wood, Professor of History at Victory 
its more conservative middle-class rank-
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and-file. 17 The LNU supported Jordan's stand at Geneva, because 
it was perceived as upholding collective security, but was generally 
silent on the Spanish Civil War. 
The views of many of New Zealand's left-wing intellectuals found 
expression in the fortnightly magazine Tomorrow. Published in 
Christchurch by Kennaway Henderson, artist, Socialist, and the 
magazine's co-editor and cartoonist, Tomorrow was the major 
disseminator of pro-Republican opinion in New Zealand after the 
\vorkers Weekly. In the view of Charles Brasch, poet and founding 
editor (in 1947) of Landfall, a literary journal, Tomorrow was 
"probably more influential 
before or since".18 The 
than any other New Zealand periodical 
magazine was contributed to (and read) 
by academics like Airey, Sewell, Beag1ehole, Rhodes (a co-editor) and 
Frederick Sinclaire, Professor of English at Canterbury University. 
Leading New Zealand poets of the 1930s and 1940s like R.A.K. Mason, a 
Marxist, Denis Glover (also a co-editor), A.R.D. Fairburn, Allen 
Curnow and Peter Middleton were published in Tomorrow, as was writer 
Frank Sargeson. Other contributors included W.B. Sutch, an economic 
advisor to the Minister of Finance, James Bertram and Ian Milner, 
both New Zealand Rhodes Scholars, and W.N. Pharazyn, an official of 
the Clerical Workers' Union. 
Most of Tomorrow's coverage fo the Spanish Civil War appeared in 
regular columns, notably in "News and Views", paragraphs of comment 
and quotes on the news of the day, and in "Foreign Affairs", a 
weightier column, written by Junius, the pseudonym of Bruce Souter, 
an official of the Public Trust in Christchurch. Tomorrow began 
regular editorials in April 1937, stating that the lack of editorial 
opinion had been a weakness in the magazine and that "sooner or later 
everyone will be forced to take sides".19 The first editorial 
was on the subject of intervention in Spain and others on various 
aspects of the Spanish situation were to follow. Winston Rhodes' 
column "Life and Letters" and F. Sinclaire's "Notes by the Way" also 
included comment on Spain, and there were also individual articles on 
the subject. An "Australian Notes" column written by Nettie Palmer, 
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an Australian Socialist and writer, contained some news of Australian 
pro-Republican activities. From late 1937 a column entitled 
variously "Spain from Fleet Street", "Notes on Spain", "Spanish 
Notes" and "News from Fleet Street" reported snippets of information 
and comment from various British and foreign newspapers, apparently 
intended to publish the news from Britain about Spain that New 
Zealand daily newspapers could not or would not print. 
Tomorrow's own writers drew on a wide variety of sources for 
their information. As well as the British newspapers whose items 
also appeared in New Zealand dailies - the Daily Mail, the Times, the 
News Chronicle, and the Manchester Guardian, for example, 
Tomorrow's writers (and possibly many subscribers) also read overseas 
periodicals not widely available in New Zealand, such as the New 
Statesman and Nation, the New Leader, the Labour Weekly, and Time and 
Tide, Such periodicals were rarely to be found in New Zealand 
bookshops and generally had to be subscribed to in order to be 
obtained. 
Tomorrow's treatment of the Spanish Civil War was rather more 
thoughtful than 
acknowledgement 
exhortations for 
the 
of the 
all 
_W_o_r_k_e_r_s ____ W_e_e_k_l~y_'_s and there was more 
complexity 
democrats to 
of the situation. There were no 
support the Spanish people, no 
frantic eulogies to the Republican Government and few atrocity 
stories. Instead, there was generally reasoned discussion that 
seemed to take for granted that readers would accept the point of 
view expressed. Tomorrow's stance as an independent journal of 
opinion and its editorial policy of allowing critics right of reply 
meant that several shades of opinion about the war were expressed in 
its pages, although, in general, the magazine's pro-Republicanism 
differed little from other sources. Bruce Souter's "Foreign Affairs" 
column presented a generally Communist view of the war, but there was 
some Trotskyist opinion as well, at least until the defeat of the 
PODM in Spain. That the journal even discussed the conflict between 
the PODM and the Communists in Spain and evinced some sympathy for 
the PO~1's standpoint indicated the differences between Tomorrow and 
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the Workers Weekly. Tomorrow 
opinions, the only discovered 
Republican cause followed by 
also provided, in F. Sinclaire's 
example of initial support for the 
disillusion because of the increasing 
influence of the Communists in Spain. 
Because Tomorrow provided the greatest source of pro-Republican 
opinion amongst these "progressive people", there will necessarily be 
considerably more discussion of the attitudes expressed in the 
magazine than of the opinions of others in the pro-Republican 
alliance of opinion. 
Assessments of the nature of the war, the forces involved and its 
ramifications displayed the most diversity of opinion among those who 
supported the Republican Government, especially in the first few 
months of the war. 
Initially, the Spanish Civil War appeared to pose certain 
ideological problems for the SCM. The first mention of the war in 
the pages of the Student came in the editorial in the issue of July 
1936, only days after the war had begun and too early for any real 
assessment of the situation. The editor reported that, from the 
available evidence, it appeared that "a Communist Government is 
opposed 
forces 
for its acts of oppression by Fascist rebels", the opposing 
having the aid, respectively, of Russia and of Italy and 
The editorial went on to note that the Government was Germany. 
apparently 
that the 
guilty 
Catholic 
of repressing religion, and proferred the opinion 
Church, despite some responsibility for Spain's 
social ills, was still the representative of God in opposition to an 
atheist Government. However, reservations were expressed as to the 
political ideals apparently espoused by those who had rebelled "in 
defence of the faith": "The Communistic ideal is perhaps preferable, 
at least in its possibilities, to the Fascist regime as seen in our 
midst today."20 
Thus depicted, the war took on the appearance of both a religious 
crusade and an ideological battle. For the Student, these 
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complexities raised the essential question of which side the 
Christian should support. Alongside this problem, of Christian 
belief in conflict with political or ideological preferences, the war 
in Spain raised an even more essential question: should Christians 
take up arms at all? The Student gave no answers to these questions 
but instead concluded with another of particular reference to the New 
Zealand scene: did New Zealand's distance from the battleground 
absolve its people from concerning themselves with these problems? 
The Student's final warning that the problem might not long remain 
remote reinforced the sense conveyed in preceding paragraphs that the 
Student saw the Spanish Civil War as an event of significance. 
By the time of its next comment on the Civil War, in April 1937, 
the Student's views on the nature of the war had changed 
considerably. Its "Current Events" column now described the war as 
"one phase of the worldwide struggle against Capitalism and its paid 
bully Fascism.,,21 In the interest of giving its readers a basis 
on which to form opinion about the war, the paper devoted the bulk of 
its comment on Spain in the April issue to a summary of the two major 
interpretations of the war, while warning that "there are as many 
versions of the affair as there are social and political philosophies 
in the world todayll.22 The pro-Francoist claim that the rebels 
were saving Spain from Godless Communism, which Russia and a few 
radical Spaniards were attempting to force on an unwilling populace, 
was described as "wildly astray" and "wilfully misleading".23 
In contrast to the negative analysis of the pro-Francoist 
argument, considerably more sympathy was shown toward the 
pro-Republican interpretation of events. This was delineated by the 
Student as a view which saw the war as a long-planned Fascist war of 
reaction by entrenched interests against a reformist, not Communist, 
Government of united radical groups intent on divesting such 
interests of their monopoly over Spanish society. The only criticism 
made of this particular argument was that it was simplistic, "but we 
can make no sense of the Spanish situation unless we take it into 
account".24 
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The Student was obviously of the opinion that the members of the 
SCM were, or should be, interested in the Spanish Civil War, for, as 
well as offering 
understanding might 
this summary 
be gained by 
it suggested that a fuller 
reading the Workers Weekly, or 
better the Manchester Guardina Weekly or the New Statesman and 
Nation, as a counter to the "one-sidedness" of the daily newspapers' 
coverage. It was considered that: 
History is being made in Spain, not only for Spain but for 
Europe and for the world. The issues lie deeper than a 
difference of oplnlon about a form of Government; and the 
implications of the struggle are a good deal wider than the 
Iberian peninsula.25 
The first issue of Tomorrow that appeared after the rebellion was 
that of 5 August 1936. Both "News and Views" and "Foreign Affairs" 
devoted considerable space to the situation in Spain. The former 
discussed the immediate situation. In the writer's view, what had 
happened in Spain was a Fascist rebellion against a liberal coalition 
government pledged to economic and social reform through 
constitutional means, a fairly common pro-Republican analysis. 
However, it was clear that the writer did not think that 
constitutionalism would survive in Spain; the outcome of the war, he 
said, would be dictatorship of one kind or another. There was no 
longer room for compromise, and the Government of Spain must now 
confiscate the land and other property of the aristocracy to ensure 
the support that would guarantee its victory and its future in 
power. Once back in control it would have to "render absolutely 
powerless" any who might foment further revolt. In his opinion 
events were approaching a situation that "the theorists" termed 
"imminently revolutionary" and if the urban workers could seize the 
initiative there was a "real prospect" of a dictatorship of the 
proletariat emerging from the conflict. He prophesied the conclusion 
as either workers' revolution, fascist dictatorship or "a Spanish 
French revolution".26 
His comment that the fate of the left-wing Government of Spain 
Has of "enormous international significance" may, then, have had 
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less to do with the survival of democracy in Spain than with the 
possible transformation fa the Popular Front into a workers' 
revolutionary government; in other words, the significance lay in the 
path of the Left in Spain and was for the Left elsewhere. 
Junius' initial appraisal in the "Foreign Affairsl1 column of the 
nature of the conflict was somewhat different and closer to the 
rhetoric of Communist propaganda: 
The Republican Government of Spain, assisted by the workers 
and peasants, is at present fighting for its life against 
the reactionary forces grouped under the leadership of the 
army officers.27 
The bulk of his article discussed the political and social background 
of the present conflict and provided an analysis of the elements in 
Spanish society that differed from that presented in "News and 
Views". Whereas the latter had mentioned that some support for the 
rebels must be coming from the "priest-ridden peasantry",28 
"Junius" presented an image of a Spanish peasantry "urgently 
interested in agrarian revolution" and "always willing to act against 
the landowners".29 Like his opening statement, this view had the 
ring of the orthodox Communist image of the Civil War. 
Junius also saw the rebellion as having a significant impact on 
the Left in Spain. He noted a disunity among the Left peculiar to 
Spain resulting from the influence of Anarcho-syndicalism, that the 
Communists had partially succeeded in breaking down in the elections 
that had brought the Popular Front to power, and said that "the 
present conflict should complete this work". 
Both "Junius" and the "News and Views" column hinted that these 
Left observers of the conflict saw it in some measure as a "blessing 
in disguise" for the Left, in that it would force not only unity, but 
also the adoption of a more radical position in order both to create 
popular support and ensure victory. "Junius", for one, laid some of 
the blame for the rebellion at the feet of the Republican 
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Government. In a much earlier article in March 1936, he had 
discussed the elections that brought the Popular Front to power. He 
had warned then that the Popular Front must "continue to organise the 
workers, peasants and intellectuals apart from the Cortes in order to 
prevent a coup d'etat from the Fascists". In August 1936, it seemed 
that his prophecy had been fulfilled. The Popular Front Government 
had paved the way for the rebellion, he said, because it had 
"exhibited the weakness of all social democratic Governments, namely 
the desire to please both the Left and the Right", and so had failed 
to suppress the elements that might rebel. 30 
If, at the beginning, the war was not for these two writers 
simply the embodiment of a clash between democracy and Fascism, it 
was for "Junius" a part of the culmination of other historical 
forces. He reviewed the events of 1936 in an article in February 
1937, entitled "1936: The Year in Retrospect". In it he drew 
parallels between the years 1914-18 and 1936, for, in his opinion the 
international imperialist struggle for the redivision of the world 
and the international class struggle, both evident in 1914-18 were 
again in 
example of 
1936 racing towards a climax. The war in Spain was an 
both. Italy and Germany had intervened in Spain in the 
hope of gain rather than for ideological reasons and the nature of 
the two Spanish sides engaged in the struggle placed it clearly in 
the category of class war. 31 
The Grey River Argus also regarded the war in Spain as a class 
war, and, initially, produced similar criticisms of the Popular Front 
Government as "Junius" had. The Argus' editorials began on 22 July, 
by attributing some of the blame for the rebellion to the Spanish 
Government, which, the paper considered, had "tried to run with the 
hares and hunt with the hounds". The Government had gone a certain 
distance with the Communists because it needed to retain the support 
of the Left-wing, but had also introduced changes that had "conformed 
with the notions of cosmopolitan capitalism". Yet, this apparent 
condemnation of moderation was followed by the opinion that the 
Government had lost the opportunity to render permanent changes by 
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allowing strife between opponents and proponents of the new order to 
continue, rather than subjecting them to restraint and promoting 
conciliation. 32 
By the last two months of 1936, however, the paper was ascribing 
the causes of the war more to economic and social issues, namely 
industrial development and the incidence of industrial capitalism. 
The true revolutionists 
not military rebels, 
in Spain, the paper said in November, were 
but those who supported the Madrid 
the Argus described the war as one between regime. 33 In December 
the old order and the new, which wanted a revolution on the Soviet 
model. In this particular editorial, the paper provided an analysis 
of the contending forces that clearly revealed a "class war" 
interpretation. The Government's support, "apart from anarchists, 
liberal anti-clericals and Russian-style Communists", carne from the 
the wage-earning class in capitalist proletariat, 
society". 
"that is, 
The Argus also noted that among the large proportion of 
Spaniards who were not directly involved in capitalism, there was a 
section of peasantry who had been denied ownership or even a fair 
living standard and had for years opposed the old order. The rebels' 
support 
clergy, 
engaged 
was said to comprise "the owning classes", the Army, the 
and "a large section of the peasantry and workers who are not 
to employers who are anonymous and merely profit 
seeking l1 • 34 
Given that the Argus promoted itself as a workers' paper, this 
analysis 
did not 
proclaim 
of the 
go on 
that 
war was not surprising. However, future editorials 
to lend support to the Government of Spain, nor to 
popular pro-Republican slogan "Fascism versus 
Democracy", The paper preferred the more neutral "Right versus Left" 
and considered that the European powers involved in the war had 
aligned themselves according to this interpretation. 35 Most of 
its later editorials discussed the international aspects of the 
situation in somewhat guarded terms. 36 
The Press' pro-Republicanism was to be revealed largely in its 
311 
assessment of international involvement, but in its early analyses of 
the situation, the newspaper revealed an anti-Fascist stand that 
echoed "Junius'" rhetoric about a "people's war". In August 1936 the 
paper said: 
the war is a war between an army of people. If the 
rebels win it will be a victory not of Christianity over 
paganism (unless Moors are the defenders of Christianity) or 
of European civilisation over Communism (unless Fascism and 
European civilisation are synonymous) but of discipline and 
high explosives over popular enthusiasm and rifles.37 
The more orthodox portrayal of the Republican forces was also 
represented in the pages of Tomorrow; the most salient example 
appeared before divisions among the Popular Front became so 
apparent. On 30 January 1937, an article by Nettie Palmer was 
published, entitled "Who are the Spanish People?" Palmer and her 
husband Vance were Australian writers and Socialists who had been in 
Barcelona when the rebellion began. In her article, Palmer was 
concerned to contradict Franco's claims that he was leading a 
nationalist movement fighting for the Spanish people against the 
encroachments of Communism. Therefore, she proposed to "restate a 
few clear facts about this democratic Government". She discussed the 
February elections and pointed out that only 14 of the popular Front 
majority were Communists and, further, that the Spanish Communists 
were not militant, but interested in peaceful co-operation between 
anti-Fascist and democratic groups. The slow progress towards unity 
on the Left and improvement of Spanish society was brought to a halt 
by the rebellion, but the revolt of the Right had also served to make 
all divisions between the various left groups "academic". 
Mrs Palmer recounted her own experiences in Barcelona, which 
seemed to give the lie to Franco's claims of Communist domination. 
There, she claimed, the militia was composed first of Anarchists, 
then Socialists, and, only later, of Communists, some not even Mosco,,, 
aligned. 38 She then quoted from a letter from a Catalonian 
fisherman that gave further evidence of the spirit of unity and 
democratic ideals among the Spanish people: "All of us from 
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republicans to anarchists are determined to destroy the false old 
Spain ... and to build a state of liberty and justice".39 
This image of the united Popular Front and a moderate reformist 
Government was also the one most commonly portrayed in pro-Republican 
letters to newspapers. Since, of course, many of these letters were 
in answer to pro-Francoist attacks, it is not surprising that most 
repeated conventional pro-Republican propaganda, rather than 
providing any deeper analysis of the Republican forces or discussing 
the possibility of proletarian revolution in Spain. There was, as in 
Mrs Palmer's article, considerable emphasis on the claim that the 
Government was "legitimately constituted authority", and that few 
Communists had won seats in the February elections,40 as well as 
upon the democratic reformist nature of the Government. 41 
One suspects that the apparently legitimate status of the 
Government was 
Zealanders, who 
by Parliamentary 
those who had 
accepted these 
Spanish Popular 
considered to carry a good deal of weight with New 
saw political and social change as normally effected 
means rather than through armed rebellion. Even 
little brief for some of the Government's supporters 
arguments about the constitutional nature of the 
Front Government. One correspondent to the Otago 
Daily Times said that although the Government of Spain was "more or 
less Communistic", it was the legitimately elected Government and 
should have 
action. 42 
been given a chance to put its policies into 
Salient's editorial in its "Spanish Number" in March 1938 also 
promoted a view of the Spanish Government as moderate and reformist, 
akin to the New Zealand Labour Government, but went on to use the war 
as the starting point for a radical critique of present social 
organisation. The editorial, entitled "A Lesson to Learn",43 
totally condemned the attitude that the war was a struggle between 
Fascists and Communists that had no relevance to New Zealand: 
We are 
dreadful 
asked to look at it as if it were some kind of 
catastrophe which has fallen on the Spanish people 
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because of their temperament, "the cruel streak in their 
nature". 
In Salient's view, the war was not a civil war at all, but an 
invasion of Spain by European Fascist powers, and, more importantly, 
it was an attack on democratic processes. The presence of German 
bombers and Italian and Moorish troops proved that the Spanish 
temperament was no explanation for the outbreak of the war. The 
reason for the rebellion was that "the existing social and economic 
order was being challenged by a Government elected by popular vote" 
which was moving "timidly and with hesitance towards some long 
overdue curtailment of the property rights of the Spanish landlords, 
army officers, clergy and owning class in general". This, for 
Salient, raised fundamental questions about the nature of present 
social organisation and the future of democracy: 
That struggle [in Spain] is 
whether a people has the right 
existing economic system 
being waged upon the issue of 
to modify by popular vote the 
It is being waged, in a word, 
to decide whether democracy such as you and I live in is an 
illusion or a reality. 
It was in this respect that the Spanish Civil War was 
particularly pertinent to New Zealand; it had a lesson "which we will 
fail to learn at our peril". Salient drew parallels between the 
situation in Spain immediately before the rebellion and that in New 
Zealand at the time of writing. The editorial pointed to the 
establishment of "semi-fascist" bodies like the New Zealand Defence 
League44 and the 
direct response to 
the New Zealand 
New Zealand Freedom League (established in 
Labour's policies),45 the hostility of most of 
press towards the Labour Government and the 
opposition and sometimes deliberate obstruction of manufacturers to 
Labour policies, all leading to the conclusion that eventually New 
Zealand's Government would challenge the property rights of a 
minority as had the Spanish "liberal" Government. If Spain were any 
example, the Labour Government would therefore run the risk of a 
civil war. 
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For Salient, the war in Spain and the British response to it 
seemed to vindicate the Communist argument that existing democratic 
principles would only survive as long as capitalist property and the 
capitalist system itself remained unthreatened; once this happened 
the wishes of the people would be overruled, if necessary by civil 
war. 
However, Salient's predictions were not entirely pessimistic. 
The "lesson to learn" of the editorial's title was not only that the 
war in Spain had a bearing on democracy in New Zealand, but that 
civil war could be averted if the danger to democracy shown in the 
Spanish situation were recognised and acted upon in time. The manner 
in which this was to be done was not clearly stated. Salient's 
concluding statements could be seen to be a clarion call for the 
establishment of a United Front. The "popular forces as a whole" and 
their leadership must shed their illusion that the "owning class" 
would allow a progressive Government to undermine their entrenched 
positions. Presumably they could only do so as a united body, as by 
so uniting they would be able to stand firm against the "capitalist 
threat". However, the editor's final remarks had a somewhat ominous 
undertone as well: 
Once that illusion has been shed, then it is perfectly 
possible for such a Government to make it impossible for the 
forces of reaction to plunge their country into civil war 
"in order to save it from Bolshevism" 
How this was to be done? Salient's editor gave no indication. 
In terms of the editorial's discussion of Communist suspicion of 
the democratic process as it then existed, this raised the question 
of the editor's concept of democracy, that catch-cry of 
Pro-Republicanism. Communist propaganda about Spain used the threat 
to democracy as its basic element, despite Communism's own lack of 
commitment to that principle. Many non-Communist pro-Republicans 
sincerely viewed the Spanish Civil War as revealing a threat to 
democracy from the Fascist powers. This editorial was one of the 
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most overt statements of dissatisfaction with the democratic system 
as it was then practised; the Communist Party's own propaganda in the 
Workers Weekly shied away from any discussion of the deeper questions 
about democracy which arose from the Spanish Civil War, although it 
often emphasised threat to new Zealand's own "democratic forces" from 
"capitalist reaction". The Communists were concerned to create a 
United Front around the Spanish issue, which would include many of 
less radical persuasion. Salient, although naturally eager to arouse 
pro-Republican sentiment among students, did not have quite the same 
need to skirt the deeper issues, and thus presented a more radical 
critique of democracy and more radical conclusions about the 
significance of the Spanish Civil War than were voiced overtly in the 
_W_o_r_k_e_r_s __ W_e_e_k_l_y~. The Canterbury University Radical Club had also 
in New Zea1and. 46 However, their detected the "seeds of Fascism" 
public analysis of the nature of the war in Spain was the more common 
image of 
expressed 
"International Democracy against International Fascism", as 
by Winston Rhodes in an appeal for medical aid to 
Spain. 47 
As the war continued and the extent of Italian and German 
intervention became clear, it was inevitable that the simplistic 
slogan of "Democracy versus Fascism" should become the catch-cry and 
that differing views of the Republican forces and variant hopes for 
the eventual outcome in Spain should be subsumed into a general 
desire for the defeat of Fascism by forces that, for most of these 
"progressive people", represented a better chance for social justice 
and progress. 
It followed that in this simplistic overview, the divisions among 
the Republican forces were generally overlooked. As befitted its 
deeper coverage of the war, Tomorrow was the only vehicle of 
pro-Republican opinion that ventured any discussion of the 
differences between the supporters of the popular Front Government. 
The Workers Weekly had, of course, also noted these divisions, but in 
a rather different manner. The clash between PODM, Anarchists and 
PSUC was follo\ved by Tomorrow, if somewhat intermittently, until the 
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eventual victory of 
naturally followed 
transformation of the 
revolution" in Spain. 
the Communist point of view. Such discussions 
from initial speculations about a radical 
Spanish Left and the prospect of a "workers' 
W.N. Pharazyn's "Spanish Puzzle", in March 1937, was the first 
mention in Tomorrow of the cracks in the Popular Front's facade of 
unity. In Pharazyn's opinion, the Popular Front was an uneasy 
alliance between Trades Unions and the organised working class and a 
Government representing the interests of the industrial and 
commercial classes. This alliance was now seen to be breaking down 
and, in the writer's view, the "original Tf policy of Soviet Russia was 
at least partly to blame. His explanation for the divisions among 
the Popular Front was based upon an interview between POUM leader 
Maxim Gorkin and Fenner Brockway, a leader of the British Independent 
Labour Party (ILP), which supported the PODM argument. 
The 
Spanish 
Communist 
ultimate 
policy; 
is the 
salient points of this interview were that Russian aid to the 
Government was dependent upon the Government's adoption of 
policy that democracy rather than social revolution was the 
aim of the war. Naturally Gorkin disagreed with this 
the PODM's stand was that "the revolution is the war, the war 
revolution". The small pre-rebellion Communist party had 
grown in members largely because of the prestige conferred upon it by 
Soviet aid; however, Gorkin claimed that Communist attacks on the 
PODM had shocked workers and that most of the non-Communist Left was 
supporting the FODM's stand that workers' power should be the aim of 
the war. 
Pharazyn acknowledged that the interview told only one side of 
the story; yet, there were indications that he was more inclined 
towards this side than to the Moscow Communists' view. For Pharazyn, 
the Communist's arguments tha 
fascists, and Trotskyists was 
the PODM was a party of saboteurs, 
undermined by the presence of large 
numbers of the FODM at the front line, the shooting of Andre Maurin, 
a PODM leader, by Franco, and criticism of the party from Trotsky and 
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the Fourth International. It appeared that Pharazyn held no brief 
for Russian-aligned Communism. He felt that Russia had abandoned its 
policy of international revolution for one of alliances with 
capitalist powers. He saw this as partly responsible for Russian 
policy in Spain being directed towards democracy rather than 
revolution. A workers' revolution in Spain would endanger Russia's 
alliance with France (he did not explain how) and, thus, threaten 
Russian 
essays 
national interests and military security. Yet, Russia "still 
to carry the old banner of Lenin" and could not totally 
abandon Spain. These conflicting concerns were the explanation for 
both Russian diplomatic policy and that of the Russian-led Communists 
in Spain. 48 
A footnote to his article in the next issue of Tomorrow revealed 
that Pharazyn, like others, saw in Spain a situation not unlike that 
of Russia in 1917, giving rise to hopes of another workers' state. 
It also underlined Pharazyn's disapproval of the Russian Communists' 
line. He noted that the division in the Popular Front forces was 
clearly becoming an alliance of Moscow Communists, Republicans and 
supporters of "the present non-working class government" against the 
Anarchists and revolutionary Communists. Moscow was using its 
"powerful influence and revolutionary prestige ff to ensure that the 
outcome of the war was little more than the establishment of a 
liberal capitalist regime (which tallied with the hopes of the 
British and French Governments). While Pharazyn saw some 
justification for this policy, in that Spain was so backward 
industrially and socially that a workers' government might not be 
able to hold power for long, he said "if in Spain in 1937 Moscow is 
right, then in Russia in 1917 Lenin was wrong.,,49 
Further support for the PODM came from the "News and Views" 
column. On 12 May 1937 the column brought news of the Barcelona "May 
Days" and delineated the arguments of the two sides in much the same 
way as had Pharazyn. 50 Later in the same month, the column noted 
that the probable reason for the exclusion of Largo Caballero from 
the nev.r Spanish Government was that he was "too revolutionary". 
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Again, the parallels with Russia in 1917 were drawn: the Spanish 
syndicalists desire to raise mass support against Franco by 
collectivising the land and granting workers' control of factories 
repeated Lenin's technique which "alone" had allowed the overthrow of 
the Kerensky Government. Yet, in Spain, the Communists were opposing 
revolutionary tactics. Fenner Brockway was quoted on evidence that 
the revolution was slowing down and that workers' committees were 
being suppressed. The columnist remarked cynically that if the 
counter-revolution were successful, the new Government might then be 
able to come to terms with Franco, which "would be the ideal solution 
for everyone except those who wish to see a socialist republic in 
Spain."SI 
In June 1937, the column reported more evidence in support of the 
PODM argument for revolution within war and damaging to the Communist 
propagandist's image of the Popular Front's united war effort. The 
fact that Franco could apparently maintain control over half of Spain 
suggested to the columnist that the majority of Spaniards were still 
neutral in the conflict. Therefore, the column's conclusion was that 
the PODM policy of revolutionary socialist objectives was the only 
way to mobilise the mass of the population against Franco. (These 
statements 
that the 
democracy; 
begged 
people 
did 
as many questions as the Communists' insistence 
of Spain were united against Franco in defence of 
the mass of the population want revolutionary 
socialist objectives?) Again, the columnist's source was the ILP's 
publication The New Leader, and in particular Fenner Brockway, who 
claimed that revolutionary enthusiasm was no longer strong in 
Barcelona because of Communist suppression. The dissensions among 
the Popular Front's supporters, especially the predominance of the 
Communist viewpoint, were seen as causing the loss of Bilbao to the 
Fascists. "News and Views" noted that it was reported that an 
offensive on the Aragon front had been made impossible because the 
Government had starved the potentially revolutionary militia of 
weapons. 52 
The final comment in "News and Views" on the issue of "revolution 
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or democracy" provided more damning evidence against Communist 
policy. The column quoted George Orwell, late of the PODM militia, 
on the situation on the Aragon front. According to Orwell, the 
infantry were poorly armed, while the troops in the rear, whose 
charge was to keep order, were supplied with the most up-to-date 
Russian weapons, and, further, that when the PODM militia returned to 
Barcelona from the front they were arrested. The news that their 
party had been suppressed had been kept from them to ensure their 
participation in the offensive against Huesca. 53 
This was the last comment that presented the PODM side of the 
argument. Their publication had not brought angry responses from 
those committed to the Communist view of the war, nor caused any kind 
of debate about the merits or otherwise of either PODM or Communist 
policy. However, some support of the latter policy was also to be 
found in the pages of Tomorrow. In the issue of 13 October 1937, in 
a "Foreign Affairs" article largely devoted to the tortuous workings 
of non-intervention, "Junius" made a passing reference that hinted at 
the Communist charge that the PODM were "saboteurs", He noted that 
the Government had made spectacular advances on the Aragon front, 
which: 
discount the allegations of Fenner Brockway and his 
followers that the PODM was the backbone of the revolution 
in Barcelona. It is only since the PODM was suppressed that 
any substantial activity has taken place on the Aragon 
front.54 
Readers of the earlier comments in "News and Views" may have wondered 
if "Junius" was talking about the same revolution. 
A far more substantial presentation of the Communist case ended 
Tomorrow's somewhat intermittent commentary on Republican internecine 
disputes. In February 1938, portions of John Langdon-Davies' "The 
Struggle for Anti-Fascist Unity in Spain" were reprinted from the 
Labour Monthly. The editors' note stated that the article was 
published in view of the war's general significance and because of 
conflicting opinions about the suppression of the PODM and the 
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resignation of Largo Caballero. The editors also pointed out that 
Langdon Davies' book Behind the Spanish Barricades had received 
acclaim from both the Times Literary Supplement and the New 
Leader. 55 They failed to note, however, that Langdon-Davies, an 
English writer, was also a Communist, and scarcely likely to provide 
a neutral assessment of the situation. Langdon-Davies claimed that 
the Negrin Government had been the only solution to the conflict over 
the direction of the war, and that any other would have led to the 
victory of reaction and international Fascism. He disclaimed any 
suggestion that he could speak for official Communist policy, but 
considered that the Party in Spain had saved the cause of 
anti-Fascism. In his view, the "May Days" in Barcelona were an 
example of men doing Franco's work, whether deliberately or out of 
stupidity. The crisis that came to a head in the "May Days" was the 
result of a coalition of incompatibles, with the Anarcho-syndicalists 
more interested in the triumph of anarchism than in the wider aim of 
winning the war. 56 
The bulk of Langdon-Davies' two-part article in Tomorrow 
consisted of a number of enumerated points justifying the measures 
taken by the Negrin Government against the Anarchists. The main 
thrust of all these points was that Anarchism's lack of co-operation 
with other Republican forces had undermined efforts to co-ordinate 
all aspects of the war effort. 
disorganisation among Anarchist-run 
Langdon-Davies spoke of the 
munitions factories, which 
resulted in loss of production, lack of planning to meet war needs 
and, worse, diversion of munitions from the front to Anarchist 
stockpiles. Anarchist-run industries also refused to direct their 
profits towards the war effort. Thus, the new Government's 
determination that all industries should be controlled by the State 
was not a surrender of the workers' revolution to bourgeois 
democracy, but "the consolidating of its economic strength against 
Fascism".57 
Langdon-Davies also stressed the problems of discipline. 
Anarchists would not obey orders; their representatives on the 
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Barcelona Government would not implement decrees they had themselves 
voted for; the secret police in Barcelona had become an Anarchist 
army of 
tap the 
private vengeance; and the Anarchists even went so far as to 
telephones of members of the Government. These and other 
claims were made in order to illustrate Langdon-Davies' central 
thesis that the Anarchists were not only hampering the Republican war 
effort, but also that the revolution they claimed to support was not 
a workers' revolution but a sectarian Anarchist revolt. 58 
Largo Caballero was 
Langdon-Davies' analysis: 
and out of touch with 
tarred with the Anarchist brush in 
he was arbitrary, egoistic, unco-operative 
the realities of the situation. In 
Langdon-Davies' view, the Negrin Government had helped deflect the 
course of the revolution in Spain from the blind alley of a sectarian 
revolt with unrealisable objectives that would alienate the majority 
of the population and ignore the bourgeois phase of the revolution 
that was necessary for its success. 59 
This article provided justification for the suppression of the 
Anarchists in the name of victory over Fascism and in terms of 
Marxist theory; the PODM, by associating itself with the call for 
immediate revolution by the Anarchists, was discredited by 
association. 
By the time 
Communist point 
to discuss the 
Langdon-Davies' article appeared in Tomorrow, the 
of view had prevailed. There was no longer any need 
possibility of workers' revolution in Spain. The 
earlier airing of the issues in Tomorrow was only a minor part of its 
coverage of the war; however, it was significant for two reasons. 
The first was the very fact of discussion; it indicated that this 
type of information was available to some New Zealanders at least and 
that not all pro-Republicans took for granted the Communist 
presentation of the war as a united anti-Fascist effort of all the 
Spanish people. It was also significant in that such discussion 
aroused very little debate - there was no vehement taking of sides by 
PODM or Communist supporters, suggesting that, in fact, knowledge of 
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dissensions among the Government forces did not matter a great deal. 
There was no evidence that the divisions and the Communist 
suppression of the "revolutionary" elements caused pro-Republicanism 
to lose support in New Zealand, although perhaps those who lost faith 
preferred not to advertise the fact. 
The only hint of protest against the commonly held view of the 
Spanish Government came well before the Popular Front's divisions 
began to receive attention from Tomorrow. Frederick Sinclaire had 
initially supported the Spanish Government in its battle to suppress 
the military revolt. He, too, saw at the beginning of the war the 
possibility of a workers' revoltuion, but he did not welcome it. 
Sinclaire became convinced that a victory for either side would 
result in "detestable tyranny".60 These views were expressed in 
Sinclaire's column "Notes by the Way" in the 20 January 1937 issue of 
Tomorrow. 
The column was one of opinion on events national, international 
and literary, in which Sinclaire hoped to stimulate debate and 
controversy. His views on the Spanish Civil War may have given him 
more than he bargained for. They resulted in a debate between the 
columnist and his old colleague in the Victorian Socialist Party, 
Vance Palmer, which began in gentlemanly and even affectionate 
fashion, but ended bitterly and, reportedly, created a rift between 
the two that was never to heal. 61 
On one level, it was a debate about partisanship and neutrality 
in the Spanish Civil War, but on another, deeper, level it was an 
intensely personal debate between old comrades about the quality of 
their respective commitments 
convinced that neutrality over 
point of view not deserving 
to social change. Sinclaire was 
the war in Spain was an alternative 
the accusations of cowardice from the 
partisans of either side. In his first comment on the issue, 
Sinclaire quoted Don Miguel de Unamuno, the Spanish novelist and 
philosopher who had recently died. 62 Sinclaire commended to 
readers Unamuno's statement that whoever won, HI shall be on the 
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other side". In Sinclaire's view, there was no clear division into 
right and wrong between the two contending forces in Spain. However 
black liberals and radicals painted the rebels and their allies the 
other side also had its faults: 
to say that the present Spanish Government has an 
exceedingly bad record and gives little promise of making 
Spain a tolerable place to live in, is to state the fact 
with considerable restraint.63 
Palmer's short reply to this on 3 March 1937 took issue with both 
Sinclaire's championing of Unamuno's neutrality and his view of the 
Spanish Government. In Palmer's view the tragedy of Unamuno was that 
he had thought he could take a place above the battle only to find 
that finally it was "an ignominious funkhole". Palmer defended the 
Spanish Government: it had only been in power a few months when the 
rebellion began and yet it had showed that it was liberal and 
progressive, 
society".64 
"painfully trying to create a humane and ordered 
Both these rebuttals were essentially an argument for a partisan 
attitude toward the war as opposed to Sinclaire's option of 
neutrality. Palmer's final statement clinched his argument with the 
greatest of the partisan claims: it was not a Government that Franco 
and his allies were fighting but the people of Spain. Sinclaire's 
reply to this was to explain further the reasons for his own 
neutrality and his opinion that there was a case for withholding 
partisanship from either side. He said that he had read widely of 
literature from both sides and had concluded that there was "a good 
deal" to be said against the Popular Front and "a little" to be said 
for the insurgents. 65 He quoted Professor Allison Peers66 on 
the Government's failure to prevent disorder, arson and the 
assassination of prominent Rightists and on doubts as to whether the 
Government was, in fact, constitutional. 
The debate 
pro-Republican 
was beginning to have the appearance of many 
pro-Francoist controversies, in that each side used 
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different sources to justify their opinions. Yet the debate between 
Sinclaire and Palmer had one fundamental difference: Sinclaire was 
not attempting to make a case for the rebels or their supporters. He 
was using Professor Peers' views to justify his own lack of 
enthusiasm for the Government of Spain and to query the validity of 
some arguments used by its supporters, in order to question the 
nature of that support. Thus he noted that constitutional points 
might not be of importance in themselves, but important because the 
Government's defenders appealed to constitutional law. Sinclaire 
also pointed out that 
side through reading 
same thing as having 
He also questioned the 
prepared to speak of and 
one might feel sympathy with the Republican 
partisan statements, but that it was not the 
confidence in the Government as a Government. 
confidence with which so many foreigners were 
for the people of Spain. 67 
However, Vance Palmer was arguing from a committed pro-Republican 
point of view; his premises were not the same as Sinclaire's and his 
partisanship assumed that sympathy for the Spanish Government also 
meant confidence in its ability to govern Spain and that neutrality 
was the same as supporting Franco. His final word was an "open 
letter" to Sinclaire. In this letter he widened the issue into a 
general 
Spain. 
argument against neutrality with specific reference to 
He asked if to commit oneself to one side in any conflict was 
to be partisan and asserted that Unamuno's statement was not the only 
attitude possible to "reasonable men".68 One could weigh up the 
arguments on both sides and reach a conclusion in favour of one. 
Palmer himself had done this and had failed to find a dramatic 
balance between the Republicans and the Nationalists. In answer to 
Sinclaire's reference to Professor Pears he cited Professor J.B. 
Trend of Cambridge, an active campaigner for the Republicans. He 
felt that both Peers and Unamuno concentrated on the decorative side 
of Spanish life (bullfights and fiestas) , the side that most 
concerned the upper classes in Spain, while the masses were 
preoccupied with the assertion of human dignity and the spiritual 
value of the common man, the other side of Spanish life. Palmer also 
refuted Peers' views on the grounds of personal experience as well as 
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literary and spiritual grounds. He said that while he was in 
Catalonia 
In any 
he had seen no sign of anti-clericalism or church burning. 
case, his view was that the Government may not have been able 
to keep order, but that its intentions were the important thing - it 
had nothing to gain by disorder. 
The crux of Palmer's argument was in the last paragraph of his 
letter. His parting shot was a personal one, that contributed to the 
bitterness of Sinclaire's response. He suggested that the logical 
conclusion of Sinclaire's view was that people should refrain from 
supporting the side they felt to be right in case they were accused 
of partisanship. In the past, said Palmer, Sinclaire had not placed 
such importance on detachment and neutrality.69 
Sinclaire's final word on the matter was a bitter and 
intransigent response. He described Palmer's "sentence of moral 
excommunication" as "nothing but thunder" and reiterated his point 
that he was dealing with a case where right and wrong were not 
clearly defined. 70 Sinclaire obviously felt that in Palmer's 
widening of the issue there was a suggestion that he advocated 
"cowardly neutrality" on all issues, when in fact he felt that one 
should espouse the right, but that in the case of Spain that right 
was not to be found. He accused Palmer of not using evidence; but "a 
sort of inner light" to justify his stand and of claiming to know 
more about Spain that Unamuno or Professor Peers. What had begun as 
a discussion between old friends had become an acrimonious argument 
between two irreconcilable viewpoints: Palmer was a supporter of the 
Spanish Government; Sinclaire was not. In Palmer's view that made 
him an opponent of the Spanish Government, and that, in turn, 
convinced Sinclaire even more of the pitfalls of partisanship. 
Sinclaire ended his column with a diatribe against those who argued 
that sides had to be taken, which rejected the idea that the war in 
Spain was the paradigm that both sides claimed. This made the issue 
simply one of Left or Right, and to say that the world had no other 
choice but a dictatorship of either was to "admit despair as a 
counsellor, and to abandon the appeal to reason".71 
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Sinclaire's views were clearly out of step with most of 
Tomorrow's other contributors opinions on the Spanish issue. The 
magazine's editors did believe that sides had to be taken and that 
world events were entering a stage when, in Sinclaire's words, 
"neutrality is either impossible or indefeasible".72 
They were certainly not the views of his colleague in the English 
Department at Canterbury University, Winston Rhodes, who wrote a 
column entitled "Life and Letters" for Tomorrow. In two of these 
columns Rhodes put forward the case for intellectuals to commit 
themselves to political causes, rather than remaining "above the 
battle". One used the example of English intellectuals in the 
International Brigades73 and the other a Left Review pamphlet on 
writers' views on Spain74 to argue that intellectuals must take 
sides: 
For many years the writers have been accused with justice of 
having forsaken the cause of the people, of having betrayed 
the cultural heritage for the sake of popularity and the 
plaudits of the wealthy, but the stain of betrayal is being 
wiped out not only in the trenches before Madrid but in the 
universities and studios and writers' circles in England, 
France and every country in the world today. The forces of 
reaction will obtain little help from the men of 
letters, the workers or the scientists who more and more 
realise that there is a future for art and letters, a future 
for science, a future for a free society only if fascism can 
be checked.75 
Yet Sinclaire's attitude revealed yet another aspect of New 
Zealander's responses to the Spanish Civil War. Perhaps there were 
others who had studied the issue as he had and had come to the same 
conclusions. His was an argument from another perspective than that 
which said that the war had no significance for New Zealanders, 
because it was a battle between the supporters of extreme political 
beliefs that had no parallels in New Zealand, or only saw its 
relevance in terms of British interests and policy. Sinclaire was, 
or had been, a committed "SOCialist", who was now re-examining his 
views in the light of the polarisation of political attitudes in the 
late 1930s. His argument was aginst simplification of the issues by 
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neutrals, pro-Republicans or pro-Francoists and a plea for the issues 
of the war to be seen in their own right rather than as exemplifying 
certain political movements and their beliefs. It was also an 
objection to any alliance with Communism over the issue. 
If there was recognition among the members of the pro-RepUblican 
alliance of opinion that the largely Communist-inspired image of the 
war was lacking, in terms of its view of the forces engaged in Spain, 
it was far less evident in discussion of the Spanish Government's 
opponents. There was virtually no examination of the different 
groupings behind the rebellion and the Nationalist war effort. In 
Tomorrow, "Junius'" initial article on the war, in August 1936, 
mentioned only two elements among the rebels' supporters. Readers 
were told that tlpolitically the reactionaires are organised in the 
Accion Popular", which "like all fascist organisations ... endeavours 
to conceal its real nature and beguile the workers with democratic 
slogans 
group" 
confined 
and 
was 
its 
pseudo-socialistic 
said to be the 
description to 
phrases!1. The other "formidable 
army officers. 76 Even The Press 
"the army fascists".77 It is 
possible that the absence of discussion of the various political and 
social groupings among the rebels was an indication that sides were 
taken rapidly on the conflict and that there were few who saw the 
matter as anything other than a war against Fascism, whatever their 
opinions of the PopUlar Front Government's policy. 
The only element among Franco's supporters to receive more than 
cursory mention was the Catholic Church. Since most pro-Francoist 
opinion in New Zealand came from Catholics, it was inevitable that 
there should be some attention devoted to this aspect of the war. 
Tomorrow featured two debates on the issue of the Catholic Church's 
involvement in the war, the first between "Junius" and Father E.M. 
Higgins S.M.78 in October 193679 and the second between the 
editors and a correspondent writing under the pseudonum of Christian 
in May 1937. 80 
The first debate was sparked off by "Junius'" comment in a 
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"Foreign Affairs" column that rebel equipment was "no doubt" financed 
by not only "English, French, German and Italian capitalists", but 
also the Catholic Church.8l In the same issue of Tomorrow there 
appeared a cartoon 
drunken men, one 
Fascism", lurching 
mainly of claims 
by Kennaway Henderson showing two brutal-looking 
dressed as a monk and the other labelled "Spanish 
towards a cliff edge. 82 The debate consisted 
and counter-claims and the production of 
"authoritative evidence" in support of arguments, which was then 
dismissed by the other side. The essense of "Junius'" argument was 
that the Church in Spain was a reactionary force with a deep interest 
in maintaining its enormous economic, social and political power in 
Spain. Accordingly, it was supporting the rebels against a 
progressive Government that would strip it of this power. He claimed 
that there was evidence that the Church was co-operating with Fascism 
in Italy and Nazism in Germany, and that the Accion Popular Party in 
Spain was not only a "Vatican" party that received financial support 
from the Church, but also a Fascist party. It followed, therefore, 
that the Catholic Church was supporting Fascism in Spain. "Junius" 
considered that there was enough "damning" circumstantial evidence of 
the involvement of priests in the fighting and the storing of 
ammunition in churches to support the claim of the Church's active 
support for the rebels. 83 
The editorial comments in Tomorrow in May 1937 addressed the 
wider question of the Church's support for Fascism, using the Spanish 
Civil War as an example. The first editorial noted the "unconcealed 
entry into the political arena"84 by the Catholic Church and, 
while not denying the Church the right to take sides in a political 
conflict, warned that it must expect criticism on political rather 
than religious grounds. The editorial's main concern was with the 
Church's "shameless support of the foreign fascist invasion of Spain" 
and the methods by which the Catholic laity was influenced to support 
the rebels. Again, it was a case of discredited, distorted or 
dismissed evidence. The editorial claimed that New Zealand Catholic 
papers totally misrepresented the war in Spain. The newspapers 
always referred to the Spanish Government as "Reds", thus misleading 
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Over they will go; if not today, then tomorrow. 
Kennaway Henderson's view of the Spanish Catholic Church. (Tomorrow 
30 September 1936, p 9.) 
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readers as to the nature of the Government. "Well-authenticated" 
events such as the bombing of Madrid, the Badajoz massacre,85 and 
the attack on Malaga86 were ignored in preference to "dubious 
atrocity stories which must inflame the minds of Catholics".87 
The response to this editorial from "Christian" was mainly 
concerned with what he 
anti-Catholicism, which 
propagandists for Franco 
was 
considered to 
the usual 
be the periodical's 
response of Catholic 
to criticisms of their position.S8 
"Christian" considered that Tomorrow's real objection to the Catholic 
Church was the Church's opposition to Communism and the fact that the 
Church stood for "spiritual values that condemn your blatant 
materialism". The writer contended that Communism was in fact much 
more than politics and that it was deceitful of Tomorrow to accuse 
the church of going outside its sphere when it attacked Communism. 
The reason for Tomorrow's editors so doing was, of course, that they 
did not want the Church to defend itself against "an enemy which 
strives for its destruction".S9 
The editors' reply did not directly answer "Christian's'" charges 
that at the basis of Tomorrow's anti-Catholic view was the Church's 
opposition to Communism. In the editors' view, world events were 
coming to a climax in the struggle between the possessors and the 
dispossessed. Because the Catholic Church was a great force in the 
world its position was important to understand, and it seemed that 
the logic of events was forcing the Church, opposed to Socialism, to 
the support of capitalism and, at the extreme, of Fascism. The 
fundamental weakness of the Church's position was that it would not 
accept that the war in Spain was one waged by the possessors against 
a democratic reformist Government. As an answer to "Christian's" 
contention that the Government of Spain had not been proven to be 
constitutional, Tomorrow's editors used an argument in common 
currency among New Zealand pro-Republican propagandists: the New 
Zealand Labour Government had not received a majority of votes in the 
1935 elections, but did this prove that it was not constitutional and 
would the Catholic Church therefore support a rebellion against the 
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Labour Government? In the editors' view, it was the weakness of the 
Church's argument that led it to use questionable propaganda like the 
atrocity stories and the attempt to label the Spanish Government 
Communist. 
that the 
argue that 
elsewhere 
"Christian's" arguments had left the editors unconvinced 
Church did not support Fascism. No one, they said, would 
the Church was supporting Fascism in New Zealand, but 
if democracy were threatened by Fascism the Church 
preferred to make a deal with Fascism than to fight for democracy's 
maintenance. 
The question of the involvement of the Catholic Church on the 
side of the rebels was the only aspect of the war that received 
attention from letters to the editor in Tomorrow, all of which 
supported the periodical's view. gO Given this ready response and 
Henderson's cartoon, there can be seen to be some justice in Catholic 
claims of anti-Catholicism in pro-Republican arguments, although not 
to the degree that Catholics saw it. 
The Methodist Times' response to the Spanish Civil War was 
largely based upon anti-Catholicism although it was also motivated to 
some extent by democratic anti-Fascist sentiment. In fact, the two 
were connected in Methodist thinking, for, of all the democratic 
liberties at stake in Spain, the most important to the Methodist 
Times was that of religious freedom. 
In its very first comment on the war, in August 1936, the Times 
made its position clear: 
Insofar as the Government in po\ver stands in any measure for 
democracy and freedom it must have the support of all right-
thinking Christians men and women. The monarchist element 
in Spain has always been intimately associated with the 
Roman Catholic Church, which has been distinguished all 
through Spanish history with superstition, bigotry and 
intolerance.91 
This 
editorial 
statement was made despite a comment earlier in the 
that the Government was closely associated with the 
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Communists and would undoubtedly have the support of Russia, as the 
rebels had German and Italian aid. 92 The theory of Communism in 
general, and its application in Russia, was hardly notable for 
religious 
which the 
tolerance, and Communism was one of the "secular religions" 
churches saw as responsible for the breakdown of 
international 
important to 
amity. 
the 
The religious issue in Spain was obviously more 
Methodist Times than was the civil war's 
significance as a symbol of the clash of Fascism and Communism. The 
view that the war was a battle between Fascist Italy and Nazi German 
on the one hand, and Communist Russia, orr the other, was a component 
of the Methodist Times' discussion of the war, but only initially. 
The final comment on this appeared in September 1936, when the Times 
predicted that a victory for either side would pose a problem for 
Europe, with either another Fascist state, or an ally for Russia in 
Western Europe, and "after all one Soviet Government for the time 
being is enough".93 
From this issue until the end of the war there was almost no 
mention at all of the part Russia had in the war, or of Communism in 
the Government. Indeed, shortly after this article, a rather 
different view of the Government of Spain began emerging in the pages 
of the Methodist Times. In November 1936, the Times noted that the 
evangelical churches in Spain were supporting the Government94 
and, on 30 January 1937, reported the remarks of the Spanish 
Ambassador to Britain that his Government would guarantee religious 
liberty, but wished also to curb the power of the Catholic Church so 
that no one faith had more influence in the State. The Methodist 
Times acknowledged that the Ambassador was a propagandist for his 
Government, but felt sure that he was speaking with sincerity.95 
The Methodist newspaper also published the report of the English 
Anglican and Free Church delegation to Spain,96 which supported 
the Ambassador's earlier claim that there was no official persecution 
of religion in Republican Spain, and reported favourably on the 
status of the Protestant churches. The item was entitled, "An 
Impartial Report on Spain", which was perhaps special pleading. 97 
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This espousal of the Republican cause for religious reasons was 
almost as strongly influenced by Francoist propaganda as it was by 
Republican. Francoist propaganda aimed at Catholics could not but 
increase Methodist anti-Catholic fears. In November 1938, the 
Methodist Times contrasted Juan Negrin's statement that the 
Republican Government would uphold freedom of conscience and religion 
with one made by Cardinal Goma in an French Catholic newspaper. 
Cardinal Goma's claim that the Catholic Church and the Nationalist 
leadership were in perfect accord, that the latter "never takes a 
step without consulting me and obeying me", together with his 
somewhat vengeful assertion that to establish a regime of harmony 
could be no reconciliation or between church and state there 
pacification without arms, must have aroused Protestant fears of a 
new inquisition. 98 That Cardinal Goma's vision of the "new 
Spain" was rather different from that of General Franco did not 
matter; the threat to the Protestant churches was clear. 
Not surprisingly, pro-Republican letters to newspapers also 
concentrated a good deal upon the role of the Catholic Church in 
Spain, in answer to Catholic pro-Francoist letters. Arguments about 
the wealth of the Church and its culpability for the poor social 
conditions in Spain were cornmon. 99 As did the Methodist Times, 
letters pointed to the freedom of worship in Government controlled 
Spain,IOO and the Communist argument about the support of 
Catholic Basques for the Government also appeared. 10I Generally, 
it seemed that explanations of the Church's power in Spain seemed 
sufficient to justify atrocities, if they were not simply dismissed 
as lying Francoist propaganda. (Attacks on church property were 
usually justified by the claim that churches were being used as 
arsenals by the rebels 102 ). 
However, 
atrocities. 
there were some more ingenious justifications for 
One writer, while denying claims of atrocities, 
suggested that 
was inevitable 
there were so many nuns and priests in Spain that it 
that large numbers were reported killed,I03 
Another was convinced that church burnings and atrocities were the 
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work of capitalist or Fascist agents provocateurs disguised as 
Communists in order to create revulsion against the 
Government. 104 
In the many letters that dealt with the religious aspect of the 
war in whatever form, there was little evidence of pro-Republicanism 
adopted solely or even primarily because of anti-Catholicism or anti-
Christianity. There were only a few instances where this sentiment 
was immediately obvious. One of the Otago Daily Times' 
correspondents attributed Spain's troubles to "the baneful influence 
of Spain's ancient alliance with the Roman Catholic Church" and 
asserted that Spain's rejection of the Reformation had led to 
ecclesiastical despotism. lOS A few others emphasised that the 
hold of the Church had to be broken in Spain before any social 
progress could be made. 106 
Despite evidence of anti-Catholic sentiment among 
pro-Republicans, some Catholics also espoused the cause of the 
Government of Spain. The reaction of some Catholic Labour voters in 
the pages of the Standard has already been noted. 107 A very few 
Catholics also wrote to daily newspapers and to Zealandia in defiance 
of their Church's stand on the war. One objected to the "bigotry" 
revealed by Catholic pro-Franco letters. 10B Another in The Press 
explained church burnings in terms of the repression of demands for 
Catalonian autonomy and a mistaken belief that the Church sided with 
Fascism, but noted with so~row that great masses of people did not 
turn 
the 
against their 
oppressed. 109 
church unless that church had turned its back on 
Tablet, who also 
This view was shared by a correspondent to the 
questioned the veracity of atrocity stories and 
Catholics should examine why the Spanish Church had considered that 
aroused such violent hatred among Spaniards: 
Is it not more than a coincidence that the three countries 
in which Christianity has suffered most in recent times -
MeXico, Spain, Russia - are or were examples of the gravest 
social injustice. In each of these countries did not a 
wealthy and at least partly State supported Church seemingly 
acquiesce in a state of affairs wherein a landed aristocracy 
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lived in luxury and idleness on the labour of workers and 
peasants little better than land serfs ... the canker of 
Bolshevism does not grow in a community where the political, 
religious and social leaders work for economic justice ... 
here is the crucial economic question of today and one of 
the chief causes of the revolutions in Russia, Mexico and 
Spain social injustice and insecurity and the struggle of 
the workers for economic equality ... Where do we Catholics 
stand?110 
One Catholic was appalled that the "sacred name of the Church" 
was connected with Moorish "mercenaries out for loot" and that it was 
considered Catholics' duty to defend Franco's use of the Moors and of 
rebellion against constitutional authority: 
I hope that the liberty I now possess under our democratic 
constitution will leave me no less a Catholic if I uphold in 
debate our system of law and order even in Spain, which has 
the same form of elected Government as we have here.l11 
Franco's use of Moorish troops in the rebellion was considered by 
pro-RepUblicans to reveal that the rebels were cynically using the 
religious issue to justify a rebellion and Fascist aggression. The 
Student, which considered Catholic support of Franco "curious" in the 
light of Papal condemnation of Capitalism,112 argued that t4e 
employment of Moors and foreigners clearly indicated that the people 
were not behind Franco. 113 The Methodist Times saw in Franco's 
use of "barbarous Moorish regiments - Mohammedans" evidence of the 
spuriousness of his claim to be defending religion in Spain. 114 
The Moors were mentioned frequently in letters to newspapers, 
generally in claims that Franco did not have popular support. 
However, a certain amount of racism was also apparent, and one 
suspects that the employment of Moors was also treated as a type of 
"atrocity" story, in that foreign, \<lorse, coloured troops from a 
country that had once conquered Spain were reintroduced to fight 
other Spaniards. Letters to the Otago Daily Times in particular, 
referring to "hordes of black savages" brought from "the jungles of 
Africa", 
and the 
revealed the "raCial" aspect of complaints about the Moors 
writers' rather limited conceptions of democracy and 
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internationalism. The rebels' hiring of coloured troops to "mow 
down" members of their own race was, said one writer, "the most 
degrading action conceivable". 115 Indeed, the question of the 
Moors in Spain provided one of the few examples of pro-Republican use 
of sexually related propaganda, in the report the Quiepo de Llano 
boasted that "Red" women would be turned over the to Moors on a ratio 
of one woman to 20 men. 116 
Above all, it was the involvement of Italy and Germany in the war 
that was seen as evidence that the war in Spain was not a Catholic 
rebellion against Communism, with wide popular support, but a war of 
Fascist aggression. Even the limited, largely anti-Catholic 
pro-Republicanism of the Methodist Times included this assumption. 
The Times considered Mussolini's and Hitler's flagrant disregard for 
international law and the League of Nations a major factor in the 
deterioration of international relations and, in several editorials 
over the period of the war, lamented "the dreadful circumstance" of 
Italian and German aid to the rebels that had prolonged the war's 
"sanguinary course". In its final comment on the war the Methodist 
Times excoriated Mussolini's and Hitler's actions as "shameless" and 
"utterly without conscience", and bitterly rued a situation that had 
led to the probable establishment of a third Fascist State in 
Europe. IIS 
There was, however, relatively little analysis of Italian and 
German intervention in Spain in these sources of pro-Republican 
opinion. Unlike the Workers Weekly, none went into detailed 
discussion of Fascist plotting in Spain before the rebellion. The 
fact of Italian and German aggression in Spain seemed plain and, 
given that pro-Republican assessments of the nature of the war had 
included from the beginning the assumption that the Republican forces 
were fighting against Fascism, needed little amplification. It was 
generally agreed that the war in Spain was one aspect of Fascist 
aggression against deomcracy that was ultimately aimed at destroying 
world democracy and peace. 119 A cartoon by Kennaway Henderson in 
Tomorrow that showed two children amidst rubble, with a plane showing 
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a swastika flying in the background, was captioned "Spain Is 
Fascism's Latest Front". The text underneath said: 
The German and Italian planes continue bravely. 
Is that which is possible in Spain impossible elsewhere? 
Destruction of the best and wisest, such is the method of 
fascism. Reason and justice, for which we all live, is the 
most dreadful thing it can meet on its way.120 
Tomorrow, in July and August 1937, published a summary of the 
collection of documents "The Italian Invasion of Spain" presented to 
the League of Nations by the Spanish delegation. 121 The Press 
and Tomorrow did provide a little analysis of German and Italian 
motives for involvement in Spain. The Press considered initially 
that Germany wanted "to fish in troubled waters" rather than 
influence the course of the war,122 but later became convinced 
that intervention in Spain, the German threat to Czechoslovakia and 
Anglo-Italian rivalry in the Mediterranean were not separate problems 
but different aspects of the same threat to peace. 123 
Since "Junius" regarded the war as an indication of renewed 
imperialist and class struggle, it was not surprising that he should 
conclude that Italy and Germany had entered the fray in the hopes of 
"plunder".124 Prior to Junius' discussion of Fascist motives in 
"1936 In Retrospect", W.N. Pharazyn had voiced the same view: 
The notion that Germany and Italy are intervening in Spain 
through sentimental attachment to the theories, in fact the 
religion of International Fascism, need not be seriously 
entertained. 125 
Yet the image created or implied in most of Tomorrow's discussion 
of Spain was not merely of two aggressive states intervening in the 
hope of material and territorial gain; it was one of Fascism gaining 
the upper hand in Spain and ensuring another aggressive Right-wing 
dictatorship in Europe. The two concepts were, of course, 
inextricably linked - the aggression and expansionism of Germany and 
Italy were far worse because they were both Fascist states, with all 
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SPAIN IS FASCISM'S LATEST FRONT 
The German and Italian fascist planes continue 
bravely. 
Is that which is possible in Spain, impossible 
elsewhere? 
Destruction of the best and the wisest, such is 
the method of fascism. Reason and justice, for 
which we all live, is the most dreadful thing it can 
meet on its way. 
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Cartoon by Kennaway Henderson (Tomorrow 23 June 1937, p 519.) 
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that implied. In the context of German and Italian motives in Spain, 
it must be mentioned that Tomorrow's writers, like most other 
pro-Republicans, were convinced that a rebel victory would mean that 
the two Fascist powers would remain firmly entrenched in Spain, or in 
Spain's strategically important island possessions. 
Most pro-Republican discussion of foreign intervention in Spain 
centred upon the negotiations and actions of the Non-Intervention 
Committee. In this respect, it appeared axiomatic in pro-Republican 
thought that Italy and Germany would pay only lip service to the 
Non-Intervention Agreement and would maintain the pretence of 
attendance so long as the Committee's deliverations meant that no 
other international action was forthcoming. This premise was 
frequently stated and was usually an underlying implication in most 
of opinions on of non-intervention in The Press, the Student and 
Tomorrow, which contained the most discussion of non-intervention. 
There was little discussion of Russian involvement in the war. 
It should be noted that W.N. Pharazyn's analysis of Russian policy 
was virtually the only published recognition of the operation of 
Russian foreign policy within Spain and through the Spanish Communist 
Party. 126 (The Workers Weekly's propaganda, of course, made 
plain the connection between Russian diplomatic behaviour and 
Comintern policy, but it certainly did not discuss these links 
openly.) Most other pro-Republican comment concentrated upon the 
aspect of Russian aid to Spain. Pharazyn, "Junius" and The Press 
were agreed that open intervention on the side of the Republicans 
would have serious consequences for Russia. The Press considered, in 
October 1936, 
Government of 
intervene at 
excuse for 
that the Russian 
Spain 
all for 
was limited 
fear of 
capacity to 
and that 
provide aid to the 
the Soviet might not 
providing Germany and italy with an 
greater intervention. 127 However, the paper was 
sharply critical of Russia's announcement in October that it would be 
bound by non-intervention only as far as other nations were 
constrained. The Press cynically commented that Russia had made an 
"original and possibly valuable contribution to the technique of 
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diplomacy" in enunciating the concept that "if treaties cannot be 
kept they can at least be violated equal1yff,128 
Pharazyn had argued that Russia no longer had a policy of 
encouraging world revolution and that its non-intervention was based 
upon Russian national interest and security, "Junius", however, 
considered that Russia was supporting the Spanish Government 
"wholeheartedlyll129 and presented an argument similar to The 
Press', although couched in terms much closer to Communist rhetoric. 
If Russia sent arms to Spain, he said, it would "supply the Fascists 
with the excuse they desire and lead inevitably to their intervention 
on the side of the Spanish rebels and to a rebel victory".130 
The manner in which this was phrased seemed to imply that, even while 
not giving tangible aid, Russia was helping the Loyalist cause, and 
placed "Junius" clearly in the role of presenting the Communist view 
of the war in the pages of Tomorrow. 
In common with other sources of pro-Republican opinion, such as 
the Workers Weekly and the Standard, most of the focus in terms of 
international involvement in the war was upon British policy. 
Interpretations of British motives varied, all condemned British 
policy. 
Initial criticisms of British policy were based on the argument 
that non-intervention was a violation of international law and that 
it in effect gave belligerent rights to Franco. 131 The Press 
noted, in October 1936, that non-intervention would not be effective 
unless Britain and France were prepared to take a firm line, and 
concluded 
so.132 
reiterated 
that the two powers were "certainly not" going to do 
Throughout the period of the war, The Press' most 
criticism of the NIC was to be that Britain and France did 
not support the principle of non-intervention to the extent of taking 
firm action to ensure its observance,133 and, by July 1937, the 
paper was of the opinion that had the British Government acted firmly 
at the beginning of the war, Italy and Germany would not have gone 
beyond threats. 134 
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Since most pro-Republicans saw the war in Spain as one part of a 
Fascist campaign for world dominance, they placed scant faith in the 
British Government's claim that non-intervention would stop a wider 
conflagration spreading from the Iberian peninsular. The "News and 
Views" column in Tomorrow argued that a rebel victory aided bY 
Germany and Italy would bring world war closer,135 and The Press 
considered that British and French "failure to accept the 
implications and responsibilities of the Non-Intervention Agreement" 
would contribute to the threat of war, presumably because lack of 
firmness would only increase the dictators' aggressive 
appetite. 136 The Student also attacked the British argument, but 
from a slightly different perspective that indicated a certain amount 
of pacifist disgust at statesmen's manipulations. In October 1937, 
the Student described this particular explanation for British policy 
thus: 
Avoid European war at all costs partly because war is 
horrible, partly because war is wasteful and partly because 
Britain is not yet strong enough to be sure of "victory".137 
The most common pro-Republican explanation for British policy on 
the Spanish Civil War was that the British Government was willing to 
sacrifice the Spanish Government, Spain itself and even, to a degree, 
its Mediterranean strategic position for the sake of class 
interests. In the first place, class interest was seen as inclining 
the British Government towards Franco. In the 5 August 1936 issue of 
Tomorrow, a cartoon appeared that depicted Stanley Baldwin arm in arm 
with a woman representing British democracy, while in the background 
lurked a sultry woman labelled "Spanish Fascism". The cartoon \vas 
headed "Will It End In Divorce?" and the caption had "the lady, 
British Democracy" asking a startled Baldwin "who was that person you 
spoke to?"138 
In the Student's view the British Government's pro-Francoist bias 
stemmed from the influence of British capitalists afraid that a Left 
victory in Spain would endanger their financial interests in that 
country.139 Salient's editorial in its "Spanish Number" echoed 
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AT A PRIVATE MEETING OF THE "NON-INTERVENTIONISTS" THERE 
WAS ONE HONEST PARTY. 
Later. 
According to cable from London, Feb. 16, "Herr 
Joachim von Ribbentrop (German Ambassador to 
London) welcomed the committee's decision to place 
an embargo on shipments of arms or volunteers to 
Spain as a possible turning point. He announced 
that Germany was prepared to contribute financi· 
ally to the immediate operation of control by land 
and sea. He hoped Portugal would find a way to 
collaborate." The cable cynic heads this up, 
German Satisfaction At Decision. 
Kennaway Henderson's cartoon depicted most pro-Republicans' opinion 
of the Non-Intervention Committee (Tomorrow 3 March 1937, p 269.) 
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this attitude: 
was 
For 
Today, when mildly democratic opinion in Britain evokes the 
principles of legality, democracy and constitutionalism on behalf 
of the Spanish Government, when liberals ask that the elementary 
usages of international law should be applied to that Government 
they are blandly told that it is no concern of the British 
Government's; that since fundamental property rights are at stake 
in Spain, such things as legality and democracy have become side 
issues.140 
Commentators 
based upon 
the editors, 
in Tomorrow also said repeatedly that British policy 
a desire to prevent a Left victory in Spain. 141 
the blockade of Bilbao was clear evidence that 
Britain was aiding Franco to the limit of its ability.142 They 
accused Britain of using the NIC to strangle any real aid to the 
Spanish Government. 143 In November 1937, "Junius" noted that, 
just as France was about to open its borders to Spain on the grounds 
that non-intervention had broken down, the British produced a control 
plan for the withdrawal of volunteers, thus preventing any French aid 
to the Repub1icans. 144 
Parallels with the Russian Revolution were drawn, as they had 
been with regard to the revolution and counter-revolution among the 
Republican forces. In the case of British policy, the parallels were 
used to point out the "unprecedented" nature of non-intervention and 
to emphasise that class interest had played a part in British policy 
formulations. The "News and Views" column had noted on 19 August 
1936 that Britain and other countries had not been neutral in the 
case of the White Russian revolt in 1918-19 and had, in fact, sent 
troops to aid the rebels. 145 An editorial on non-intervention on 
14 April 1937 took the parallel a little further. The editors saw in 
British statements that the Spanish people must be allowed to work 
out their own destinies echoes of similar statements made when 
British troops went to the a~d of the White Russians. The conclusion 
was obvious: British policy was directed against the Leftist 
Government of Spain. 146 
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August 5, 1936 TOMORROW 1S 
WILL IT LEAD TO DIVORCE? 
The Lady, British Democracy, to the Government: "Who was that person you spoke to?" 
Mr H. G. Wells, Lord Allen of Hurtwood, Sir Stafford Cripps, and other prominent men have 
appealed to the British Government to allow loyalist Spanish warships to be refuelled and provisioned 
at Gibraltar. The signatories of the appeal declare the refusal to be contrary to established inter-
national law and urge the British Government to apologise to the Spanish Government and to extend 
to it all the courtesy and assistance which the Government of a friendly nation is entitled to expect. 
Press cable, July 29, 1936. 
Kennaway Henderson's assessment of British policy was a common pro-
Republican belief. (Tomorrow 5 August 1936, p 13.) 
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It followed from conclusions that class interests led Britain to 
support Franco that British policy was also pro-Fascist. The Student 
noted the "apparently limitless readiness of Britain to conform to 
Italio-German ideas"147 and, in October 1937, characterised 
British policy in the following terms: 
Do nothing which will forward the Left trend in Europe. 
Rather Fascism, even if it means singing "Rule Brittania" in 
a softer tone, than any form of Socialism which involves 
radical interference with the status quo.148 
Ian Milner, in an article in Tomorrow discussing British 
Mediterranean policy, opined that the very instincts of conservatism 
sensed a coming conflict between Socialism or Communism and Fascism 
and that this had helped mould British policy: "In the last resort 
British imperialism must take sides, actively or benevolently with 
the fascists against the menace of Socialism. rt149 
The logical conclusion of this view was that British policy was 
ultimately aimed at Russia. "Junius" , as the 
representative of 
particular point 
British policy 
the 
isolating 
Communist view in Tomorrow, had argued this 
European Pact 
as early as January 1937. He was convinced that 
was aimed at creating a Four Power Pact or Western 
of Mutual Assistance whose object was "an early German 
attack" on Russia, thus ensuring that France and Britain were safe 
from German aggression. ISO 
Most "progressive" pro-Republican comment did not go so far as 
"Junius" or the Workers' Weekly. For most it was enough that the 
British Government so wished to come to terms with the Fascist powers 
that Franco's victory in Spain was a small price to pay. The Press, 
of course, did not accuse the British Government of being 
pro-Fascist; such a statement was rather too strong for the 
Christchurch morning paper. Nevertheless several editorials did hint 
at a variant of this argument, that the British Government was too 
eager to 
welcomed 
accommodate the Fascist powers. The paper initially 
the news of the Nyon Conference as a sign that Britain and 
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France were for "the first time disregarding the wishes of Italy and 
Germany".lSl Later, however, The Press was of the opinion that 
the Nyon Agreement had little to do with the war in Spain - it would 
benefit Franco more than the Republicans and was fundamentally an 
attempt to protect sea routes in the Mediterranean rather than to do 
anything about intervention in Spain. 152 For the Student, the 
motives for the British Government's apparent hardening of attitude 
with respect to Mediterranean piracy were also little to do with 
Spain, but 
Imperialism is 
The Student 
evidence 
beginning 
apparently 
that "the voice of traditional British 
to be heard in the councils of Whitehall". 
considered this motive as morally 
reprehensible as those informing earlier British vacillation. IS3 
Nor did Tomorrow consider the Nyon Agreement evidence of any real 
change of attitude by Britain. Despite claims that Britain was 
willing to sacrifice imperial interests in order to both ensure a 
Franco victory in Spain and placate Italy and Germany, some 
commentators in Tomorrow divined Imperialist interests in British 
policy 
of the 
toward 
Spain 
towards Spain. The "News and Views" column at the beginning 
war had suggested that British foreign policy was directed 
maintaining the Empire above all else and that the war in 
entered British strategists' considerations only as it affected 
the balance of power in Europe, not in terms of the reasons for which 
the war was being fought. According to this view, British policy 
makers hoped that if Germany were to acquire Mediterranean territory 
it would act as a check on Italy, which had grown too strong in that 
threat to Britain's Suez route. lS4 This view 
discarded in favour of the class-interest-based 
but Ian Milner introduced it again, in slightly 
in two articles on 15 and 29 September 1937, 
discussing respectively general British Mediterranean strategy and 
area and posed a 
had been largely 
pro-Franco bias, 
different terms, 
the Nyon Agreement. 
In his first article, Milner concluded that, in the case of 
Spain, British policy was affected by both class and imperialist 
interests and that strategic losses by Britain in the area would be 
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tolerated only if the sacrifice was merely apparent. Milner saw the 
"temporary" gains allowed Germany and Italy in the Mediterranean as 
part of the British attempt to break the Rome-Berlin axis and, as 
well, a recognition of a changing balance of power that meant that 
Italy had claimed "her place in the sun". 
Milner was apparently optimistic about this strategy. Although 
both Italy and Germany were in a position to bargain, it was "fairly 
certain" that either would make "considerable concessions" in return 
for a close understanding with Britain. In return, Britain might 
have to make some concessions, such as accepting a Fascist Spain. In 
this context, Milner made an assessment of British views about German 
territorial gains similar to that in "News and Views" much earlier in 
the war. Milner suggested that British statesmen felt that some 
concessions to "fascist enterprise" were necessary and that perhaps 
they considered it was better to have Germany in the Canaries than in 
Tanganyika. 155 
On 29 September, Milner continued his interpretation of British 
policy from an Imperialist viewpoint. Like the Student and The 
Press, he saw the Nyon Agreement as having more to do with British 
and French strategic interests than the war in Spain. He doubted 
whether the Agreement would afford any protection to Russian shipping 
travelling with supplies from the Black Sea to Valencia and regarded 
the exclusion of Russia from the Agreement as a sop to Italy. This 
view reinforced the idea that Britain was still attempting some form 
of rapprochement with Italy and that the Nyon Agreement was not 
intended to threaten Italian intervention on behalf of Franco. 156 
The detection of Imperialist interests in the British 
Government's Spanish policy did not, however, prevent Tomorrow from 
continuing to emphasise Britain's acquiescence in damage to her 
Mediterranean interests. The attacks on British shipping, which 
intensified in 1938 despite the Nyon Agreement, were for "Junius" 
further evidence of the Chamberlain Government's dual desire for a 
rebel victory and an alliance with Italy. On 22 June 1938, he 
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predicted that, rather than take any definite action to protect 
British shipping, the British Government would instead attempt to 
prevent them trading with Spanish Government ports on the grounds 
that protection was impossible. I S7 This move would injure the 
Spanish Goverment's war effort and thus help expedite Franco's 
victory. On 6 July he reported that his suspicion had been 
confirmed. 1S8 Italian attacks on British shipping were to remain 
a point of emphasis in Tomorrow. Lists of ships attacked were 
published from time to time to reiterate the point that the British 
Government was willing to sacrifice British seamen's lives and 
traditional Imperialist interests in order to come to terms with 
Italy and to help Franco win the war. 1S9 Perhaps this particular 
theme was of special significance to New Zealanders nurtured on the 
belief that Britannia not only ruled the waves but also had a 
powerful protective instinct towards her own. Tomorrow's emphasis on 
the British Government's failure to react to attacks on shipping 
carried with it an implicit comparison with former British policy. 
While it could, no doubt, be assumed that many of Tomorrow's readers 
and contributors had little love for the manifestations of 
Imperialism, perhaps it could also be assumed that, as well as 
serving rather well to point out the vacillating and pro-Fascist 
nature of British policy, this particular example caused some 
trepidation, some fearful resonance, in the minds of New Zealanders 
dependent on the British navy for protection. 
The theme of British compromise with the Fascists involving a 
compromise of British Imperialist tradition was carried on until the 
very end of the war. In March 1939, the "News and Views" column 
noted that the British Government was not pressing claims for damage 
to British shipping on Franco. 160 The column provided a 
comparison with the Venezuelan war in 1901-1903. When the Venezuelan 
Government seized some ships belonging to the British colony of 
Trinidad, the British Government blockaded the Venezuelan coast until 
the ships were returned. The columnist was at pains to point out 
that the British Government of the time had included Neville 
Chamberlain's father and brother. 
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As in other pro-Republican sources, Tomorrow's cataloguing and 
condemnation of British policy on Spain made Chamberlain the villain 
of the piece, 
agreement, 
Berlin",161 
A Foreign Affairs article on the Anglo-Italian 
written by Donald Gordon, was headed "11 Duce and J'aime 
Although this trend was evident throughout the 
magazine, the image of Chamberlain as the personification of British 
policy was most clear in Kennaway Henderson's cartoons. These 
depicted 
Mussolini, 
Chamberlain with top hat in a "danse macabre" \vith 
Hitler and a demon with a swastika on his chest; 
Chamberlain, carrying a briefcase labelled "Intrigue", sandwiched 
between Hitler and Mussolini on a horse named Fascism galloping 
toward the cliff edge of world war; Chamberlain as Macbeth, appalled 
at a vision, not of Banquo's ghost, but of the shades of Barcelona 
and Guernica,162 
The Press also condemned Chamberlain personally when, in 
discussion of the Anglo-Italian Agreement in May 1938, it said 
cynically: 
It becomes increasingly apparent that a necessary 
preliminary to the success of Mr Chamberlain's plan for the 
pacification of Europe is the despatch of a British army to 
Spain to finish off the Spanish Government.163 
The paper went on to suggest that the Spanish Government's refusal to 
admit defeat was embarrassing to the British Government, which had 
probably made settlement in Spain a prerequisite to the ratification 
of the agreement because it had seemed certain that a victory for 
Franco was imminent (and would have satisfied Italy), "Junius", who 
discussed the Anglo Italian Agreement in several "Foreign Affairs" 
columns, was also of the opinion that the "settlement" for Spain 
meant for both Italy and Britain a victory for Franco. 164 He 
even went so far as to claim that one of the secret clauses in the 
Agreement was an approval of a Franco victory,165 
The Press' major criticism of British policy was not, as in 
Tomorrow or Salient (or even the Student), based upon assumptions 
August 3 1£)38 
"lIow is't with me, when every 
noise appal" me'~ 
What hands are here. '; Ha! they 
pluck Ollt mim' eyes! 
\Vill nIl great Neptune';; ocean 
wa;;-h this blood 
Clean from my hand?" 
-Macbeth. 
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Chamberlain as Macbeth, haunted by the human consequences of his 
Spanish policy. 
Cartoon by Kennaway Henderson. (Tomorrow 3 August 1938, P 619.) 
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about class-interest and pro-Fascism, but, ultimately, upon the 
consideration that British policy displayed weakness and expediency 
rather than principle. The Press attacked the British and French 
"restricted conception 
policy of combatting 
extent that it 
of self-interest" and "the inadequacy of a 
international lawlessness only when and if the 
directly threatens British and French 
interests". 166 As early as January 1937, The Press was of the 
opinion that the British Government had no long-term foreign policy: 
"It prefers to deal with situations as they arise and to extract 
itself from difficulties by the method likely to cause the least 
trouble at the moment. n167 
In part the paper's rejection of "limited self-interest" as the 
basis for a foreign policy stemmed from a commitment to collective 
security and the League of Nations. Several times The Press 
expressed dislike of Britain's return to bilateral negotiations. It 
described the Anglo-Italian Agreement as a return to 18th century 
diplomacy and power politics168 and later questioned the validity 
of the British Government's theory that "in present circumstances 
bilateral negotiations offer the most hopeful road to peace and 
security".169 The little criticism that the Grey River Argus 
made of British policy was also based upon the lack of certainty in 
British policy170 and its dismissal of the League. While Eden 
was in office the Argus was apparently of the opinion that British 
policy was still based on the League Covenant, but in July 1938 the 
paper complained about the "amazing reversal of policy" of the 
Chamberlain Government with regard to collective security.17l 
The Press' dislike of British policy was also based upon its 
doubts that Britain could continue to support non-intervention with 
honour. 172 Letters to newspapers also demonstrated that some New 
Zealanders were more used to British policy that was based upon 
principle, honour and the rule of law. Those who had believed in 
Britain's strategic and moral superiority found that faith undermined 
by a policy of concessions to the dictators which engendered "neither 
enthusiasm nor self-respect" and Hmakes John Bull a sissy".173 
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New Zealanders accustomed to reliance on the "Mother Countryfl were 
made uncomfortable by the lack of certainty and firmness in Britain's 
approach: 
Even today the British Empire could be described as the 
greatest instrument for peace in the world, but if it is to 
continue to be such it must cease to advertise on every 
possible occasion that it will make every conceivable effort 
to avoid the use of its strength.174 
More than discomfort and uncertainty, there was also a sense of 
betrayal in some pro-Republican comments about British policy. It is 
likely that this feeling informed the Student's scornful criticism of 
British policy. Alun Richards recalled in an interview the sense of 
shame he and others in the SCM felt about British policy.175 
This feeling was something that could only arise among people who 
also had some sense of association with that policy. It was even 
expressed in the pages of Tomorrow. Denis Glover contributed some 
poems 
Gigue 
about Chamberlain, entitled "Variations on a Theme - Pastorale, 
and Coda".176 All three indicated Glover's contempt for 
Chamberlain as the representative of British policy, but "Gigue" also 
revealed the reason for such contempt: 
There was a time, we must suppose 
when every Englishman was glad 
to beat the bully and the cad 
protect the little bullied lad 
and punch the bully's nose. 
But there's no virtue in such a folly 
so Neville Chamberlain instead 
invites the thug to go ahead 
and sitting on the victim's head 
he pokes him with his brolly. 
In discussing criticisms of British policy in terms of the threat 
to Empire and Britain's betrayal of the Principles of justice, it is 
difficult to distinguish sometimes between cynical use of these 
arguments as effective propaganda and a genuine sense of betrayal 
arising from certain convictions about Britain. However, the fact 
that propagandists obviously considered betrayal of the Empire and of 
May 11, 1938 
-
Another Chamberlai~f Kennaway 
and Fasc' lsm 
TOMORROW 
THE RUNA WAY 
Henderson' 
(T 
S v 
omorrow 11 ariations May 1938 on the 
, p 433.) 
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justice an effective means of arousing New Zealand opinion suggests 
that a rather idealised image of Britain did exist in some New 
Zealand minds. 
Criticism of British policy in terms of betrayal of ideas of 
liberty, justice and defence of the weak often appeared in the 
context of support for the New Zealand Government's stand at the 
League of Nations. Almost all the newspapers examined had some 
correspondence on this matter, and in the Otago Daily Times a fierce 
debate on New Zealand's stand took place that ranged from erudite and 
reasoned argument to personal invective. 
Approval of Jordan's attitude at Geneva often stemmed from the 
conviction that he was merely expressing a traditional British (and 
for the defence of liberty and dislike of Commonwealth) 
force, that 
abandoned. 
concern 
Britain herself 
The image 
had only 
Zealand Government in 
thus presented 
general) acting 
recently and inexplicably 
was of Jordan (and the New 
as the voice of Britain's 
conscience, reminding the "Mother Country" 
righteousness and justice that it had forsaken. I77 
of the path of 
This point of view, then, implied no disloyalty to Britain or the 
Empire in differing from the British Government; rather, the opposite 
it was Britain that had deviated from the ideals and principles 
that had made the British Empire great. Although one proponent of 
this argument did argue that New Zealand had the right to an 
independent 
entirely. 
far from 
voice at Geneva, in a sense, that was a separate issue 
Seeing New Zealand as the voice of Britain's conscience, 
asserting its independent nationhood, was in fact 
emphasising its "Britishness tt , its central place in an idealised 
Commonwealth that stood for justice and defence of the weak. The 
Grey River Argus, for example, considered that the New Zealand 
Government was following a policy that was the logical conclusion of 
Eden's support for collective security.178 
Others, of course, who stressed the New Zealand Government's 
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commitment to justice and democracy did not relate it to an idealised 
Britain. Those who regarded the British Government as pro-Fascist in 
its Spanish policy were more inclined to applaud the New Zealand 
Government's action as evidence of its disassociation from the 
Imperialism and colonialism of the British Empire. 179 
Tomorrow made little comment upon the New Zealand Government's 
attitude, but what was said centred upon the influence of the British 
Government. The police interrogation of the nurses was, for the 
editors, another example of the British Government's attempt to 
strangle aid to the Loyalists. A page-long article headed "Nurses 
and Non-Intervention" devoted one paragraph to the nurses and the 
rest to other evidence of British attempts to deny passports to 
others involved with aid to Spain. It was clear that of the two 
alternative explanations initially offered - that the questioning was 
at the instigation of the British Government, or that the police had 
exceeded their authority - the former was preferred. 180 
In August 1937, Tomorrow published further evidence of British 
interference in an article entitled "Eden and Jordan: A Study in 
Censorship". The article consisted of excerpts from The New 
Statesman and Nation, which discussed the Eden-Jordan "blue-pencil 
incident" at Geneva in May 1937. These excerpts amplified the meagre 
coverage the affair had been given by the New Zealand press and left 
Tomorrow's editors, at least, in no doubt that Eden had in fact 
censored Jordan's speech. Apart from an expression of confidence in 
the New Statesman's analysis of events at Geneva, the editors 
themselves made little comment on the affair. Perhaps the New 
Statesman's indictment of Eden and of British policy in general spoke 
for itself. The only point that was queried by the local writers was 
the New Statesman's confidence that in New Zealand public indignation 
would be aroused by Edenrs treatment of Jordan. Where, asked the 
editors, was that indignation?181 
In December 1937, the "News and Views" column commented on the 
Government's gift of ~1,OOO for medical aid in China. The columnist 
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noted that the need for aid was as great in Spain and yet the 
Government "has not given a penny" to aid the victims of the Spanish 
war. While unspecified "internal reasons" were partly to blame for 
the Government's inaction, the columnist saw the main cause as the 
attitude of the British Government, which tied New Zealand's hands. 
The voice of New Zealand nationalism was raised: why must a Labour 
Government in New Zealand not offend a National Government in 
England?182 
This resentment of British ties was perhaps at the heart of 
Tomorrow's trenchant criticism of BBritish policy over Spain, the 
other side of New Zealanders' Empire connection. It was, in a sense, 
an attitude that at one and the same time demanded British protection 
and denied British direction. A correspondent in July 1939 voiced 
this view: 
The foreign relations of all the members of the British 
Commonwealth are controlled by Britain ... whose policy has 
been to sabotage the League of Nations and collective 
security with the consequence that we in the Dominions are 
left to waste money on armaments and protect ourselves as 
best we can in the event of our being drawn into a war 
brought about by a policy over which we have had no 
control. 183 
Yet in another sense, blaming the New Zealand Government's Spanish 
policy on the British Government was "the easy way out", absolving 
the Labour Cabinet's members of any question as to where they stood 
with regard to the war in Spain. Tomorrow did not hesitate to 
criticise the Labour Government on other issues; therefore, it was 
surprising that the anti-Communism of the Minister of Police, Peter 
Fraser, was not even mentioned in connection with the nurses' 
interrogation. Obviously the concentration was upon the differences 
between New Zealand and Britain. 
The Labour Government's policy on the Spanish Civil War, among 
other things, gave some rise to some questioning of the Imperial 
link. J.N. Findlay, Professor of Philosophy at Otago University and 
an Englishman had attacked New Zealander's idealised image of Britain 
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in his article in Tomorrow, 
Zealand" .184 He began a heated 
columns of the Otago Daily Times 
"The Imperial Factor in New 
debate in the correspondence 
when he questioned the National 
Party's claim that the New Zealand Government's policy threatened the 
solidarity of the Empire .185 Findlay regarded as "deplorable" 
any suggestion that Empire solidarity meant "blind unquestioning 
lining up behind the British Government of the day" and "abdication 
of the right of New Zealanders to determine their own policy 
intelligently in the light of the present world situationll. He 
considered that New Zealand would, in fact, fail to fulfill its 
function in the Commonwealth if it were to act in blind subservience 
to the British Government. Findlay conceived of the British 
Commonwealth as an association of independent nations linked by 
common traditions and the Crown, with separate destinies, but 
attempting to co-operate in creating a common policy. He attacked 
the idea that the Commonwealth was "a hierarchy mystically centred in 
Great Britain": 
A veneration for the Feudal relics of England is perhaps a 
harmless trait; it ceases however to be harmless when 
British Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries are included 
among these relics and when the representatives of a limited 
section of one of the British parties are regarded as the 
representatives of Britain and the Empire ... 
Findlay suggested further that since the British cabinet was 
criticised by Englishmen there was no reason that New Zealanders 
could not also question its actions. 186 
Findlay's contention that only by behaving in a manner that 
revealed intelligent criticism could New Zealand cease to be a 
political nonentity and become accepted by Britain as a valuable 
associate was upheld by J.T. Paul, who had been influential in the 
formation of the Labour Party in New Zealand and was a former 
President of the Party.187 Paul considered that the ideal 
relation between nations in the British Commonwealth was one of 
"mutual interdependence", which naturally involved a "free 
interchange of views" and required that nations must not merely echo 
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Britain, even at the risk of making mistakes. Paul also presented a 
view allied to that sometimes expressed by Savage and others in the 
Labour Government, that, although small, New Zealand might playa 
significant part in world affairs and, indeed, might make a unique 
contribution to a "new internationalism".188 
The Press also welcomed the idea that New Zealand might take a 
more independent line in foreign policy under a Labour Government, 
although it did not directly address the issue of the Government's 
Spanish policy. The Press 
forwarding of its memorandum 
Covenant and the sentiments 
had applauded both the Government's 
of reform of the League of Nations 
expressed therein. It regretted that 
such views had not been presented by one of the major European 
powers, since then they might have had more impact on world affairs. 
Its editorial on the memorandum remarked that the New Zealand 
memorandum "seems almost innocent in its simplicity", but said that, 
if there were more "innocent directness" in diplomacy, the world 
would not be in such a state of confusion. Nor should the 
Government's actions be seen as "a frog expanding itself to bullish 
proportions"; the paper ended its editorial with a quote from the 
prophet Isaiah: ft ••• and a little child shall lead them".189 
Later, in November 1936, discussing the visit to New Zealand of 
the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Dominions, The Press 
deplored previous Governments' general lack of independent thought on 
international problems: 
The independence in external affairs conferred in practice 
after the Great War and legally in the Statute of 
Westminster has been regarded in New Zealand as a privilege 
which need not be used. The truth is that it is an 
obligation which cannot safely be evaded.190 
Together with these views went a commitment to collective 
security, based partly on the consideration that the Empire was not 
and could not become invulnerable and therefore must seek peace and 
safety through the League of Nations: "the choice is not between 
collective security and unilateral security but between collective 
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security and no securi ty lt,19l Even if it did not devote any 
editorial space to 
between the British 
discussion of specific differences 
and New Zealand Governments, The 
in policy 
Press was 
prepared to admit, in an accepting manner very different from the 
indignant tones of other daily newspapers, that the Commonwealth 
might not be united behind Britain, After the resignation of Anthony 
Eden, the paper warned that the New Zealand Government might face a 
conflict of loyalties between London and Geneva, and that the 
ascendancy of Chamberlain's views might in general weaken the 
solidarity of the Commonwealth: 
there is much to support the contention that if Mr 
Chamberlain's faith in the League becomes openly faint and 
perfunctory, the Monroeism of Canada will receive an impetus 
and the internationalism of the New Zealand and South 
African192Governments will be at odds with British 
policy. 
There were others who, through the correspondence columns of the 
Otago Daily Times, proclaimed the need for more independent policy 
from New Zealand and supported Findlay's criticism of "the 
indiscriminate" truckling to the British Government which has too 
long passed for patriotism in New Zealand lt . 193 R.W. Souter, who 
begged leave to "reluctantly doubt the wisdom while thoroughly 
respecting the sincerity and idealismlt of Jordan's attitude at 
Geneva, labelled as a national weakness the lack of "some effective 
kind of distinctive national vision". Yet, in a sense, Souter was 
perpetuating some of the myths of the "British system", He 
proclaimed that 
the right to 
this "precious 
in British countries patriotic citizens always had 
criticise Governments and political parties and that 
heritage" must be preserved in New Zealand. 194 
"X.Y.Z." condemned the "worship of the English Government as the 
incarnation of all that is good, great and wise".195 He further 
felt that talk of Britain's altruism and protection was nonsense, and 
that New Zealand should develop a spirit of national independence, 
since in a crisis New Zealand might be on its own. 
Another correspondent took this line of thought even further and 
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argued for complete independence from Britain because New Zealand's 
and Britain's geographical interests diverged. The writer argued 
that if Britain could allow the vital Mediterranean route to be 
threatened, then it did not have New Zealand's interests at heart. 
He considered that New Zealand's foreign policy should concentrate on 
the Pacific, where Britannia did not rule the waves and where a 
Pacific non-aggression pact would provide the best solution for New 
Zealand's defence. 196 A letter in similar vein argued that, 
since support for British policy meant toleration of the 
Ber1in-Rome-Tokio axis, it must be opposed because of the threat the 
Tokio Government posed to New Zealand, 197 It is interesting to 
note that this letter was one of the few examples of a concrete 
expression of a connection between the Japanese menace in the Pacific 
and Britain's appeasement policy, although pro-Republicans did link 
the Sino-Japanese war with Spain in a more general sense as another 
example of Fascist aggression. 
Concern over the Spanish Civil War and British policy thereon can 
be seen, then, as contributory factors in a re-evaluation of New 
Zealand's relation to Britain. Not all of those who felt support for 
the Spanish Government, of course, participated in this developing 
desire for more independent policy and status for New Zealand. 
Notably, the Methodist Times was silent about British policy and the 
New Zealand Government's independent stand at Geneva. But within the 
Student Christian Movement, on some university campuses and in 
general within the intelligentsia who read and contributed to 
Tomorrow, there was a sense that it was time New Zealand discarded 
its colonial dependent outlook 
Contemporary New Zealand, a survey 
foreign policy published in 1938 
upon 
of 
by 
the world. Writing in 
New Zealand's domestic and 
the New Zealand Institute of 
International Affairs, J.e. Beaglehole mused on the advantages and 
disadvantages of New Zealand's participation in the Commonwealth. 
Although he qualified his conclusions with the consideration that 
there was no arguing with the "absolute value" of New Zealand's links 
with Britain, he also said: 
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This may at least be said; the interests of New Zealanders, 
as a people with some leanings to democracy, with even, at 
this moment, a transformation to socialism not impossibly 
before them, lie much more clearly with the struggling 
left-wing parties of the world than with any system of 
institutions, however deeply and splendidly rooted in 
history, which would, when driven to a final choice oppose 
those parties or ignore their efforts or their agony.198 
In an addendum to the same publication, F.L.W. Wood considered that 
the Labour Government's foreign policy was a sign that "significant 
steps have been taken in the direction of national maturity".199 
It is difficult, of course, to estimate how many New Zealanders 
supported the Labour Government's policy and felt the need for such 
re-evaluation of Imperial links. Indeed, it is as difficult to 
estimate the support for the Republican cause among New Zealanders. 
In both cases, much of the comment came from the intelligentsia, a 
small group in New Zealand society. The evidence of pro-RepUblican 
letters to newspapers does not necessarily indicate a high level of 
feeling among New Zealanders, for many were from the same people who 
wrote persistently on the issue throughout the war. Because of the 
general acceptance of the basic Communist attitude towards the war, 
it is also difficult to gauge how many of these letters were from 
non-Communist pro-Republicans. Charlie Saunders, the Communist 
Secretary of the Christchurch branch of the SMAC, referred, in a 
letter to the Wellington "Polit Bureau", "to our team of letter 
writers": 
There have been occasions, such as when the Catholic 
reaction has been writing through its priests in favour of 
Franco, that the Editor of the Press has had as many as 60 
letters in one day from the Left. Many of the most 
prominent writers are in touch with us when there is a 
barrage on and the effect they have on the Editor of the 
Press trickles out occasionally.200 
Since the Christchurch section of the Communist Party did not 
have 60 members, it must be assumed that Saunders' "team" included 
non-Communist pro-Republicans. Apart from involvement with the SMAC, 
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letters to the newspapers were one of the few methods by which New 
Zealand pro-Republicans could proselytize for their cause. In 1939, 
Tomorrow published an article by Willis Airey and Arthur Sewell 
headed "Hisleading Article, A Study in Capitalist Freedom of the 
Press". The article told how Airey and Sewell had attempted to 
correct the Herald's editorial statements about the Popular Front 
Government of Spain. Lengthy letters written in refutation of the 
Herald's claims of Communist influence in and unconstitutional 
behaviour by, the Popular Front Government prior to the rebellion 
were either unpublished or finally printed in a truncated manner so 
as to render their argument "innocuous". The conclusion was that the 
capitalist press could appear to be fair and free, while serving the 
interests of capitalism and publishing only those criticisms that did 
not substantially alter its own case. 201 
If words were the medium, there is little evidence that Spain had 
a significant impact upon New Zealand writers and poets. Denis 
Glover attempted to interest other poets and writers in a collection 
of poems about Spain whose proceeds would go to the SMAC, but 
apparently received only a lukewarm response. In May 1938, A.R.D. 
Fairburn wrote to Glover: 
smothered in work and worry ... why I haven't sent you 
a contribution to your potage Espagnole so far. Sargeson 
tells me you're going thoroughly crook about the 
indifference of all of us guys (bar Beaglehole. No don't 
bar him - let him in) in the matter of General Franco.202 
The "potage Espagnole" did not appear. R.A.K. Mason wrote a verse 
play for 
anniversary 
the 
of 
SMAC's meeting in 
the beginning of 
Auckland to mark the second 
the war in July 1938203 and Allen 
Curnow, under his pseudonym of "Whim-Wham", contributed some doggerel 
upon Franco's peculiar love for his people to The Press, but apart 
from Glover's own poems, 205 these appear to have been the only 
examples of New Zealand verse inspired by the Spanish Civil War. 
Glover also contributed a poem in more serious vein to Tomorrow that 
transposed Spanish events to the New Zealand scene. 
"Bringing it Home", the poem said in part: 
Entitled 
But what would happen if our country's leaders 
were nightly murdered, shot as being "Reds"? 
What would we say if sudden submarines 
torpedoed the Wahine off the heads? 
And if, when we appealed to Britain's navy 
and help from her (the Mother of the free) 
she told us that disputes about the gravy 
would keep the League some little time at tea; 
And added she'd offend the Argentine 
If she should give us arms to fight the foe; 
and shut her eyes upon our desperation 
in rushing on machine guns with a hoe?206 
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The poem voiced the sense of New Zealand's isolation from the 
centre of events that informed some pro-Republican propaganda that 
aimed specifically at eliciting a response from New Zealanders. Yet, 
in a sense, Tomorrow's own coverage of the Spanish Civil War 
indicated and even reinforced that isolation. The majority of its 
material was an exercise in interpretation of events that may have 
enhanced readers' understanding of events and may indeed have 
converted some to pro-Republicanism. The periodical was, of course, 
not in the same business of propaganda as was the Workers Weekly, but 
even so, as the major source of pro-Republican opinion after the 
Communist newspaper, Tomorrow made surprisingly little mention of New 
Zealand activities aimed at promoting the Republican cause. There 
were reports of meetings in aid of Spain in Australia and London, but 
none of meetings in New Zealand. 207 The only report of the New 
Zealand nurses' time 
nurse who mentioned 
in Spain 
meeting the 
came in a letter from an Australian 
New Zealand trio at Huete. 208 
The 
1939 
return of Nurse Dodds and Sister Sharples to New Zealand in early 
provided 
remind readers 
the 
of 
"News 
New 
and Views" 
Zealanders who 
column with an opportunity to 
had fallen in Spain,209 but 
the only interview with an International Brigader in Tomorrow was a 
laconic item on E.N. Griffiths, scarcely the most political of the 
New Zealand Brigaders, which added little to the sum of readers 
understanding of the conflict. 210 The Mayor of Westport's 
refusal to chair a meeting for the nurses came in for criticism in 
"News and Views"; yet no interview or report of their experiences 
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appeared. 21l This omission was all the more surprising given 
that Winston Rhodes was Chairman of the Christchurch branch of the 
SMAC and could provide first-hand accounts of meetings and, as well, 
had access to all the propaganda material received or generated by 
the SMAC. 
Perhaps there was no need to advertise the SMAC in Tomorrow 
through reports of meetings and donations received; in a country as 
small as New Zealand, in which the Left intelligentsia was a much 
smaller component, no doubt all who were interested knew of the SMAC 
and related activities. Rhodes' own recollections of Christchurch in 
the period covered by the Spanish Civil War were of a lot of activity 
on several issues among a relatively small group of people. The 
SMAC, the Left Book Club, the China Aid Committee, and Tomorrow's 
editorial board all drew their membership from the same pool of 
people. 212 
Was this then the United Front the Communists had hoped for? 
Winston Rhodes also noted that while there was a good deal of effort 
expended towards the United Front, there were still many divergent 
opinions among those who worked together on such issues as the 
Spanish Civil War. 213 It can be seen from the opinions discussed 
that the grounds upon which pro-Republicanism was based varied. 
Nevertheless, many among this "progressive" alliance of opinion based 
their analyses of the Spanish Civil War upon their considerations 
that an alternative system to capitalism might be more just. In some 
cases, the use of the Spanish Civil War to demonstrate the failure of 
capitalism, and 
further than the 
even democracy as far as Salient was concerned, went 
Communist presentation of the issues of the war. 
Ultimately, however, the Communist view on the war was accepted even 
by those who had hoped for a social revolution in Spain. Tomorrow's 
coverage of the POUM-PSUC dispute revealed that some New Zealanders, 
at least knew about the divisions among Spain's Popular Front, and 
therefore had a choice to make. They could choose to take sides with 
either PODM or PSUC or disregard the differences in favour of the 
wider front of anti-Fascism (this later choice was, of course, in 
effect choosing PSUC over PODM). 
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The opinions of students (Christians or not), academics, at least 
one editor of a daily newspaper and ordinary citizens also revealed 
the ambivalence of the British connection. Even where Britain was 
accused of pro-Fascism there was sometimes a sense of betrayal that 
indicated a previous loyalty. In their criticisms of British policy, 
these "progressive" people were also following the Communist "line", 
but the interpretation they brought to it in terms of the Labour 
Government's policy possibly constituted the most specific 
application of the "lessons of Spain" to the New Zealand scene. 
Their opinions revealed at bottom a concern about what happened 
in Spain itself as much as for the wider ramifications of the 
conflict, which placed them all firmly in the category of 
internationalists with a wider view on the world than simply of New 
Zealand in the context of Empire. 
In one sense, then, this alliance of opinion can be seen as a 
validation of the Communist drive for the United Front, since in New 
Zealand the main method of responding to the plight of Republican 
Spain was to create a body of opinion in support of the Republican 
cause. But there was a means with which to translate words into 
action, the Spanish Medical Aid Committee. Chapter 7 will show the 
degree to which the "progressive" people became involved in active 
support of the Republican cause. 
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CHAPTER 7 
"FOR SPAIN AND HUMANITY" 
AID TO SPAIN FROM NEW ZEALAND 
372 
The slogan "For Spain and Humanity" was used by the Spanish 
Medical Aid Committee in its drive to raise funds to help the Spanish 
Government. In this sense, it was the application of the fundamental 
pro-Republican conviction that the Republican cause was the cause of 
democracy and humanity. But the slogan in its widest sense might 
equally have been applied to the non-partisan funds that were 
collected in New Zealand to aid the victims of the war. The National 
Relief Fund for Spanish Refugee Children (NRFSRC), the Society of 
Friends (Quakers) Spanish Relief Fund, Red Cross and Salvation Army 
appeals were based upon hunanitarian concern for the suffering caused 
by the war, particularly in the case of children. 
There were many New Zealanders who were not prepared to take 
sides on the war, yet who were profoundly disturbed by the reports of 
the bombing of civilian populations and the plight of refugees from 
the centres of battle in Spain. The non-partisan relief funds 
provided some means of expressing that concern without entailing 
political commitment as well. However, before discussion of these 
non-political efforts to succour the people of Spain, the 
"anti-Fascist humanitarian alliance" of the SMAC will be considered, 
as the main vehicle through which aid from New Zealand was provided. 
The SMAC was the logical conclusion of the Communist Party's 
United Front policy, centred round the Spanish Civil War. It aimed 
at the dissemination of propaganda and the transformation of opinion 
into concrete action. Like the United Front campaign itself, the 
SMAC had a wider aim behind its immediate aim of sending aid to the 
Spanish Government. If non-Communist pro-Republicans could be 
brought together into a "broad-based" movement for aid to Spain, the 
co-operation and co-ordination there established could be transformed 
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into a general coalition against Fascism. But, again like the whole 
United Front policy, the wider aim of the SMAC was not entirely 
fulfilled. Although the Committee succeeded in raising enough money 
to send three nurses to Spain and maintain them there, as well as 
funding the purchase of an ambulance and a field laundry truck, and 
although it did unite a good many "progressive" people in its cause, 
the mainstays of the SMAC's fundraising activities were the Communist 
Party and the Trades Unions. 
The SMAC was another means through which the Communist Party 
hoped to work with the Labour Party, in pursuit of affiliation. 
There was, indeed, some involvement from Labour MPs and Labour Party 
branches. But the establishment of the Standard's "Spanish Relief of 
Distress Fund", a "rival" for pro-Republican donations, undercut the 
SMAC's position, and indicated the Labour Party's caution. The 
"Spanish Relief of Distress Fund" provided an avenue through which 
Labour Party members could demonstrate their solidarity with Spain's 
fight against Fascism without becoming too closely involved with the 
Communist-inspired 
was available and 
SMAC. Because so little information on the fund 
because it was a major part of the Labour Party's 
response to the Spanish Civil War, it has been considered in the 
context of Labour Party attitudes, rather than in this discussion of 
aid to Spain. 1 
Investigation of the aims, organisation and activity of the SMAC 
has been largely based upon SMAC Records held by George Jackson, 
former secretary of the Auckland SMAC branch (which operated as the 
National Committee from July 1938) and upon a smaller collection of 
SMAC-re1ated material in the Jack Locke Deposit. The Jackson 
collection contains some record of the operation of the Dunedin 
Committee, which functioned as the National Committee before July 
1938. There were also SMAC branches in Wellington, Palmerston North, 
Napier, Stockton, Invercargill,Hamilton and Te Aroha. The records of 
these branches, and of the Dunedin Committee, could not be located; 
therefore, the picture of the SMAC's operation in New Zealand has 
some gaps. 
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The Dunedin Committee was the first to be formed, in November 
1936. At first it was known as the Dunedin Spanish Relief 
Committee. The impulse for its formation came from another 
organisation, the General Spanish Aid Committee (GSAC), whose 
Secretary was Alex Maclure, the Canadian engineering student later 
killed in Spain. E.W. (Ted) Hunter was also a member of the GSAC; he 
was later to become the Secretary of the Dunedin SMAC. Hunter at 
this time was a member of the Labour Party and an official of the 
Shop Assistants Union (and later the Tramways Union). Hunter left 
the Labour Party for the Communist Party in 1939, and it is possible 
that his views moved much closer to Communism sometime before his 
change of membership. There is no information available on the GSAC, 
which was absorbed into the Spanish Relief Committee (later the 
SMAC) , but the involvement of Maclure, sometime member of the 
Communist Party, suggests that it was the first step in the building 
of a United Front organisation to aid the Spanish Government. 
The Dunedin Spanish Relief Committee was formed at a meeting 
called by the GSAC on 12 November 1936. At this initial meeting the 
humanitarian, non-partisan aims of the organisation were emphasised. 
Nevertheless, it was also clearly stated that the aid would be going 
to the Spanish Government. The Chairman of the meeting, H.B. 
Ferguson, Psychology lecturer at Otago University College, said that 
emotion-tinged words like "Fascism" and "Communism" should be avoided 
in the interests of clear thinking: 
The central fact of the situation was that the Opposition 
minority in a Government elected by the people had adopted 
military methods of overthrowing that Government. Those who 
believed in democratic Government and law and order would be 
opposed to the military action of a minority in Spain.2 
At this stage, there appeared to be no objections to the 
directing of aid in this manner under the banner of humanitarianism. 
The President of the Otago branch of the St John's Ambulance 
Association, Mr J. Ash, attended the meeting and said that he saw no 
reason why his Association and the Red Cross should not be associated 
with the organisation, although he warned that he was speaking 
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personally, as his Committee had not yet discussed the matter. 3 
A committee was appointed at the meeting to consider the provision of 
medical aid in the form of a "Red Cross Medical Unit" and to invite 
the co-operation of the Red Cross and St John's Ambulance 
Association. It comprised Professor Ramsay and H.H. Ferguson, both 
of Otago University, Archdeacon L.G. Whitehead (Warden of Selwyn 
College at Otago University, and an Anglican Minister) J. Ash, J.C. 
White, District Superintendant of the St Johns Ambulance Brigade, 
A.C. Dunningham, Dunedin City Librarian, Dr D.G. McMillan, MP for 
Dunedin West, and Mr D.P. Kennedy, President of the Otago University 
Students' Association. 4 A smaller committee established to 
consider "less technical" matters such as fundraising consisted of 
people rather more likely to have a definite pro-Republican outlook. 
Its members were Miss R.P. 
Independent Radical Club, a 
McKenzie, of the Otago University 
Mr Walker, from the General Labourers 
Union, E.W. Hunter, and a Mr Townley of the Dunedin Council Against 
War and Fascism. S 
The image of a broad-based, apparently non-political, 
humanitarian organisation in aid of the legitimate Government of 
Spain did not last. When a meeting was held in Chrustchurch to 
establish a branch of the SRC, there was an immediate protest from 
the Catholic Bishop of Christchurch, Matthew Brodie. 6 In a 
stormy meeting, Douglas Kennedy claimed that the SRC had received 
permission from the Red Cross to use their flag on the medical unit, 
and that Franco could not be assisted because his forces did not 
constitute the "competent military authority" under which the Geneva 
conventions stated that Red Cross medical units must serve. He 
further said that the unit would come under the jurisdiction of the 
authority in Spain recognised by the British Government. 7 
In the wake of accusations of Communist sympathies and disloyalty 
to Britain, the Christchurch branch of the St John's Ambulance 
AssociationS disassociated itself 
Cross launched its own appeal 
children. 9 
from the appeal, and the Red 
for clothing for Spanish refugee 
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Dr D.G. Mc~illan, MP; justified the SRC's stand in a letter to 
The Press: 
If we were proposing to send financial or material aid to 
the combatants, a partisan attitude could be justified, but 
in point of fact we are making no such proposal 
It has been asked, why send aid to work in co-operation 
witht he Spanish Government? Apart from the practical and 
constitutional reasons, the need of the people of Spain is 
greater than that of the mercenaries who are fighting for a 
rebel general.10 
McMillan stressed that the medical unit would take no cognisance of 
political affiliations, but would treat any wounded, a claim that was 
to be repeated by the SMAC constantly over the next two years. 
However, the attempt to gain true humanitarian "respectability" 
had failed. Thereafter, there was never any question that the SMAC 
had political motivations as well as humanitarian in the provision of 
aid to Spain. The first meeting held to establish an Auckland 
branch, on 20 January 1937, passed a resolution stating that "we send 
the medical unit 
definite gesture 
Government."ll 
not only 
of 
on humanitarian 
support to the 
principles, but as a 
Spanish Republican 
But even among the flprogressive" people who 
supported the SMAC there were some dissidents. On 17 May 1937, 
Alexander Miller, a Christchurch Presbyterian Minister, wrote to 
Charlie Saunders, the Communist Secretary of the Christchurch SMAC: 
As you know I have been very much concerned to co-operate in 
anything that might be done to relieve the suffering of the 
Spanish people, and readily agreed to join your committee 
when I was asked to do so. I know the difficulty of all 
united front activity, but I hoped that effective work on 
this particular job would be possible. You know also that I 
agree with the interpretation of the Spanish situation which 
you, for example, and other Leftists would give. On the 
method for combatting Fascism I differ very definitely with, 
say, the Communist Party, but I had hoped that the 
activities of the Medical Aid Committee would not imply any 
endorsement of military methods. 
The statements of Nurses Shadbolt and Dodds [in the 
Workers Weekly] indicate clearly that they regard themselves 
as part of the militant forces of Republican Spain. Now 
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they have a perfect right to this attitude, but in view of 
their attitude it is not legitimate to suggest that they 
represent a purely humanitarian and non-partisan movement. 
I am more sorry than I can say that this means I must 
withdraw from the Committee.12 
In Dunedin Archdeacon Whitehead also resigned because the SMAC was 
supporting the military cause of the Loyalists. 13 
There appear even to have been divisions between various branches 
of the Committees on the best method of presentation of the cause of 
Spanish Medical Aid. These disputes are significant for an 
understanding of the national organisation of the SMAC and its 
position as a Communist "front" organisation. There is no doubt that 
the New Zealand SMAC generally fitted Hugh Thomas' description of 
organisations established for aid to Spain: "Behind them all lurked 
the shadow of the Comintern or of the loyal Communist Parties14 
The Committees' nominal leaders were often distinguished and 
unsuspecting personalities, but were usually served by Communist 
Secretaries".15 In Auckland the impulse for the creation of a 
SMAC branch came from the Otahuhu Railway Workshops, and the prime 
mover was George Jackson, a Communist, who became the Auckland 
secretary. 16 The Auckland Chairman was Tom Stanley, also a 
Communist. In Christchurch Charlie Saunders, an ex-journalist who 
had been sacked for his political beliefs, was secretary. Saunders 
said "indestructible Marxism has been my comfort all my life",17 
but his views did not always accord with the Party; he was expelled 
in 1937, rejoined and was again expelled in 1938, both times for 
alleged "sectionalism" .18 In \~ellington the President was J.C. 
Beaglehole, the Chairman C.H. Gough, of the Dairy Workers Union, and 
the Secretary Mrs E. ("Grannytl) McGowan, also a member of the 
Communist Party. There were, no doubt, other communists involved in 
SMAC activities, but it is difficult to ascertain political 
affiliations, as the other organisations to which Committee members 
belonged were rarely listed. 
This omission makes it difficult indeed to discover whence most 
of the SMAC;s membership came. Its main source of financial support 
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was the Trades Unions; therefore it can be assumed that many of its 
members were Trades Unionists. The first Auckland meeting included 
delegates from the Railway Tradesmen's Association, the Amalgamated 
Society of Railway Servants, the General Labourers Union the 
Amalgamated 
Union. 19 . 
Society of Carpenters and Joiners, and the Boilermakers' 
At the next meeting, delegates from six Auckland 
Labour Party branches attended. 20 However, it is not clear 
whether these "delegates" \<Jere officially so considered by their 
parent organisations or whether they continued to function as such 
within the SMAC. In Auckland, the secretary of the Auckland Trades 
Union Secretaries Association told Jackson that the members of his 
Association would not direct their unions to affiliate to the SMAC, 
since it was a matter for individual unions to decide. 21 The 
Dunedin Committee later voiced some disapproval of the notion of 
extending membership to accredited delegates of constituent bodies, 
considering that it would weaken the voluntary humanitarian image of 
the SMAC.22 Whether or not unions became affiliated to the SMAC, 
as Chapter 5 has shown, the appeal was endorsed by the FOL.23 
The SMAC itself, of course, presented its membership as coming 
from the widest possible basis. Ted Hunter told Nurse Millicent 
Sharples, in January 1937, that the subscription list showed "support 
from almost every quarter".24 Charlie Saunders delineated the 
basis upon which Medical Aid Committees should be formed in a letter 
to J.E. Lawrence at the Railway Workshops in Invercargill, where a 
SMAC branch was in the process of being established in July 1937: 
You must have some Left schoolteacher, perhaps even a lawyer 
or two, a clergyman and later possibly you may get also a 
priest. These are the types to go to, never overlooking 
that the workers form the solid base for supporting the 
struggle of the Spanish people. 
And so you go to the intellectuals who at first will be 
naturally hesitant and may even consent only to the use of 
their names on appeals or collection sheets. You must 
overcome this hesitation although the way will be hard 
an appeal to the LRC and the local Council of the FOL for 
direct representation is very advisable.25 
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In general, Saunders' assessment of the outlines of the SMAC's 
support proved to be correct. The "spadework" of fundraising and 
organisation was done by the secretaries and a few other members, 
often Trades Unionists and possibly Communists as well. With a few 
notable exceptions, like Winston Rhodes in Christchurch, who was a 
very active Chairman and noted for his 
of donations) 
ability 
from 
to draw a good 
meetings, 26 the response (in terms 
intellectuals and other prominent people who supported the SMAC 
largely did so by 
pamphlet published 
list of those who 
several 
MPs.27 
university 
allowing their names 
by the Auckland SMAC 
endorsed the SMAC's 
lecturers, ministers 
to be used in appeals. A 
in 1938 had at the back a 
work. The list included 
of religion and Labour 
The SMAC made a point of asking Labour Parliamentarians to take 
positions on Committees. The Auckland branch asked the Prime 
Minister, Michael 
Labour MPs were 
tactfully refused 
shortly to attend 
Savage, to act as President, and all Auckland 
asked to become Vice-Presidents. 28 Savage 
for the reason that he was leaving New Zealand 
the Imperial Conference. 29 Dr D.G. McMillan 
acted as President of the national organisation until July 1938, when 
he resigned due to pressure of work. 30 Other Labour MPs who 
consented to the use of their names were Ormond Wilson, who became MP 
for Rangitikei in the 1938 elections, W.J. Lyon, MP for Waitemata, C. 
Morgan Williams, Kaiapoi, E.J. Howard, Christchurch South, J.W. 
Munro, Dunedin North, and Peter Neilson, Dunedin Central. As noted 
in Chapter 5, the involvement of the Dunedin MPs possibly owed 
something to personal connections with Ted Hunter. 
Nevertheless, all these endorsements of the SMAC also indicated a 
certain degree of pro-Republican sentiment. Although the SMAC was 
part of the Communist Party's United Front campaign, it was not just 
a "front" organisation established to further the Communist Party's 
influence. It was, in respect of medical aid to Spain, a bona fide 
organisation served by many genuinely concerned people who wished to 
help the Republican Government of Spain. It seems unlikely that many 
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of the people involved did not know of the SMAC's links with the 
Communist Party, although the opinions of most about the organisation 
are difficult to discover. However, a commitment to support the SHAC 
at whatever level of activity probably indicated that a desire to 
help the Spanish people in their fight against Fascist aggression 
outweighed considerations of the SMAC's political bias. 
It is also difficult to discover the amount of direction given by 
the Communist Party to the medical aid campaign. Charlie Saunders 
made several compalints that the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party was not giving the leadership it should to Spanish Medical Aid 
Committees. 31 It would appear, then, that, in the interest of 
creating a "broad" United Front movement, direction was largely left 
in the hands of the individual Communists who played so large a part 
on the Committees. Differences of opinion about the fundamental 
nature of Spanish Medical Aid in the first year of its establishment 
may perhaps be explained by the difficulty of combining a 
humanitarian appeal, 
with a pro-Republican 
of a United Front. 
political 
Auckland 
aspect of 
had accepted 
designed to attract as many people as possible, 
stand that had its underlying aim the creation 
By July 1937, Ted Hunter was insisting that the 
the Movement should be stressed (something that 
from the beginning): "The general line of 
Fascism must be stated over and over again to convince many folk who 
still regard Hitler and Mussolini as being very forceful men imbued 
with ideas of restoring "order" etc. etc."32 However, he noted 
that "Wellington appear to have disputed the desirability of carrying 
on an ideological attack upon Fascism". Indeed, it appears that 
there was a split in the Wellington Committee that resulted in the 
establishment of two rival committees, possibly because of the 
political emphasis. 33 
The relatively loose organisation of the Committees in their 
early stages may also be attributed to their "broad-based" nature and 
possibly to a desire to have them appear as spontaneous upsurges of 
humanitarian anti-Fascist concern. The official title of "Spanish 
Medical Aid Committee" was not adopted until July 1937; until this 
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time the local organisations were known variously as the SRC, the 
SMAC or the Committee for Medical Aid to Spain. 34 The Dunedin 
Committee, having been the first established and the first to make 
contact with the overseas organisations through which funds were to 
be sent,35 acted as the National Committee. 
Charlie Saunders envisaged the establishment of "a National 
organisation which will combine the work for Spain, China and every 
other victim of aggression perhaps a National Council Against War 
and Fascism".36 Throughout the latter half of 1937, he agitated 
for a National Conference to establish a constitution for the Spanish 
Medical Aid organisation, and for the National Committee to be 
situated in Wellington. He faced considerable opposition from other 
branches, on the grounds that a Conference would be a waste of money 
better used for aid to Spain. They argued that a constitution was 
unnecessary since the organisation's aims and objectives were clear, 
and that the Wellington Committee could not provide the wide unified 
basis that the National Committee required. 37 The basis of the 
opposition to Saunders' complaints was best expressed by the Auckland 
SMAC, which felt that a constitution would hinder rather than help 
the Committees' activities. 38 Political divisions and differing 
views of the function of the SMAC would naturally have surfaced in 
discussion of a constitution. 
Saunders' insistence that the medical aid campaign should take 
the most political "line" possible, and should be more directed by 
the Communist Party, was probably also a little overt for the tastes 
of his fellow secretaries. While the Communist Party's involvement 
was an open secret (the Workers Weekly promoted the SMAC in its 
pages39 ), the Committees were cautious not to promote the role of 
the Party too much. In July 1937, George Jackson told Saunders that 
the Friends of the Soviet Union had asked the Auckland SMAC to 
jointly sponsor a showing of the pro-Republican film "Defence of 
Madrid". The SMAC refused on the grounds that "such a course is out 
of the question for us and would only be playing into the hands of 
the reactionaries".40 Later, Tom Spiller, who undertook a 
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speaking tour for the SMAC, was advised by the National Centre that 
no Communist Party 
with the Civil War 
Aid. 41 
literature or any Left literature not connected 
was to be sold at meetings for Spanish Medical 
on 
Eventually, however, a National Conference was held in Wellington 
27 and 28 December 1937. The National Committee had decided that 
it was time to review achievements and consider carefully plans for 
the future, in the light of the worsening international situation and 
signs that the war in Spain would continue for some time. 42 The 
Constitution, drawn up at the Conference, was based upon a draft 
circulated by the Dunedin Committee and did little more than make a 
formal statement of what was already the accepted practice and 
attitude of the Committees. Control of the organisation was vested 
in the National Centre, with a proviso that matters of general policy 
should be referred to the District Centres, Auckland, Wellington, 
Christchurch and Dunedin. The National Committee was to be chosen 
from among the four District Centres, on a majority vote. These 
District Centres were to co-ordinate between the National Centre and 
the branches in their areas, respectively Auckland Province, 
Wellington, Taranaki and Hawkes Bay, Canterbury, Westland, Nelson and 
Marlborough, and Otago and Southland. The Committee's dissolution 
was to be decided by the District Centres, again by a majority 
vote. 43 The Dunedin Committee was confirmed in its position as 
National Committee, which it retained until July 1938. Ted Hunter's 
election to the position of Secretary of the Otago Trades Council 
meant his resignation as National Secretary and as a branch secretary 
of the SMAC. Control of the organisation was shifted to the somewhat 
reluctant hands of the Auckland branch. 44 
The most notable feature of the constitution was its expression 
of the ideological stance of the Spanish Medical Aid Committee. The 
constitution stated that the Committee had been established by 
individuals and representatives of organisations with "differing and 
to some 
concern 
extent conflicting political views",45 united in the 
that the Spanish people were without adequate medical 
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services. Membership of the Committee was open to all who felt this 
concern, whatever their political viewpoints, and members were free 
to express any opinion they held on the political aspect of the 
Spanish Civil War. 46 It was stressed that: 
Ambulance nurses give recognition to the general practice of 
the profession, outlined in the Hippocratic oath, of 
extending their care to all in need of it, wherever they may 
encounter such need in the pursuance of their duties.47 
An amendment moved by the Auckland delegate, George Jackson, made 
perfectly plain the pro-Republican sentiments of the SMAC. The 
statement of aims and objects included the point that medical aid was 
to be sent not only on humanitarian grounds, but as a gesture of 
support for the "legitimate" Government of Spain. 48 Thus, the 
opinions held on the political aspects of the Civil War were 
obviously to be limited to those in favour of a Republican victory in 
Spain. 
The constitution also made plain the twofold purpose of the 
Committees to send aid but also to propagandise. It was stated 
that the aims and objects of the organisation implied "education of 
the public by demonstrations, meetings and such other activities as 
may be deemed necessary from time to time". Statements of opposition 
to the work of the Committee were to be "repudiated".49 
By the 
SMAC had 
May 1937. 
time of the National Conference, the primary aim of the 
been achieved, in the despatch of three nurses to Spain in 
Initially, the SMAC had planned to send a fully equipped 
medical unit to Spain, comprising one doctor, two nurses, an orderly 
and an ambulance. 50 This plan appears to have been abandoned in 
order to provide concrete evidence of aid to Spain as soon as 
possible. The cost of sending the three women to Spain was 
apparently £. 285, although the record of the nurses expenses did not 
state if all costs were included. 5l While the nurses were still 
in New Zealand, they were the most valuable aid in the SMAC's 
propaganda and fundraising activities. 
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The police interrogation of the nurses only hours before they 
sailed 
SMAC 
naturally caused 
organisation. 52 
great 
Almost 
consternation and indignation in the 
immediately after the nurses had 
left meetings were arranged at which resolutions were passed 
condemning the incident. 53 Letters and telegrams were sent to 
the Ministers of Police, Internal Affairs and Justice demanding 
explanations and an enquiry into the matter. 54 Presumably in 
order to present evidence at the proposed enquiry, the nurses were 
asked, via the Sydney Spanish Relief Committee, to prepare statements 
giving details of their interviews with the police. 55 However, 
once official explanations had been given56 and it was obvious 
that there would be no enquiry, protests soon died away. The only 
other indication of police interest in the SMAC was on two occasions 
in Christchurch, in October 1937 and February 1939, when detectives 
appeared at meetings. 57 Since such attention was not paid in 
other centres, it seems likely that any concern about Christchurch 
SMAC activities came from local police officials rather than from the 
Minister of Police himself. 
Once the nurses had left for Spain, the focus for fundraising was 
upon money for their maintenance in Spain, including the purchase of 
medical supplies, and on retaining enough money to bring them home 
again. The propaganda leaflets produced by the SMAC emphasised that 
the nurses were New Zealand's responsibility and that their heroism 
should not go unsupported. For the SMAC, propaganda and fundraising 
naturally went hand in hand. Every appeal for aid to Spain was an 
opportunity to promote the Republican cause. The SMAC held public 
meetings, arranged for the screening of the pro-Republican propaganda 
film "Defense of Madrid", printed leaflets, posters and pamphlets, 
and arranged radio appeals. Once the nurses had been gone for some 
time, it was important for the Committees to maintain their 
fundraising impetus. It is likely that the National Conference was 
arranged mainly for the purpose of planning a campaign that would 
stay the distance of a long drawn out war. In 1938, the impetus was 
kept up by speaking tours featuring returned International Brigaders 
and others. 
Help our Noble Nurses in Spain! 
GREAT WAft· ~~I.LM 
A Nation in Arms guards its Honour! 
To be shown at 
HAI~L~ 
on 
at 
Also Addresses on the Spanish Struggle, and Music 
COLLECTION FOR MEDICAL AID 
SPANISH MEDICAL AID COMMITTEE 
CHRISTCHURCH 
H. \VI~STON RHODES 
Chairman 
till' caxtoll prl'SS 
C. F. SAllNDERS 
St'l.'1't.'taI'Y 
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A leaflet produced by the Christchurch branch of the Spanish Medical 
Aid Committee. (Christchurch SMAC Records. Item 6. Jack Locke 
Deposit, Canterbury University Library, Christchurch.) 
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The first speaking tour arranged was that of Tom Spiller, a New 
Zealander recently returned from Spain, and Sister Mary Lowson, an 
Australian nurse who had served with a medical unit in Spain. They 
arrived together in Wellington from Australia in early February 
1938. Sister Lawson then spoke in Christchurch, Dunedin and Auckland 
before returning to Australia on 22 February. Spiller went from 
Wellington to his home town of Napier, where he raised£17.0.0,58 
and then to the South Island. He spoke in Christchurch, 
Invercargill, Bluff and surrounding areas, and Greymouth. 
Spiller had intended to return to Spain in March 1938. However, 
he remained in New Zealand and embarked upon another tour for the 
SMAC, this time in a van purchased by the Auckland SMAC for the 
purpose of speaking tours. 59 The van enabled Spiller to visit 
many small towns that had not been reached by the committee before. 
It also cut accommodation expenses, since he slept in a tent pitched 
beside it, when the weather permitted. 60 After touring the North 
Island from April to July, and after recuperating from having the van 
slip off its jack on top of him while he was fixing it, Spiller then 
toured the South Island from October 1938 until early 1939, 
concentrating on the Public Works Department camps on the West 
Coast. 61 
Another Australian speaker brought to New Zealand by the SMAC was 
Mrs Ada Holman, widow of a former Premier of New South Wales. She 
spoke in Auckland, Palmerston 
Dunedin in July and August 
North, 
1938. 62 
Christchurch, Wellington and 
"Taffy" Patterson, a Welshman 
who had been in the International Brigades, arrived in New Zealand in 
May 1938 and became very active on the Auckland Committee. While he 
did not 
speakers, 
meetings 
Secretary 
take on such an organised touring itinerary as the other 
he travelled up and down the North Island to attend 
in aid of Republican Spain. George Jackson advised the 
of the Hamilton S~~C that Patterson was good at dealing 
with the "Catholic opposition", so to create more interest in the 
meeting planned for Hamilton on 18 July 1938, it would be good to 
raise the opposition with a provocative advertisement, such as "Is 
Franco Fighting a Holy \\far?"63 
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Political differences surfaced again upon the return of one of 
the Ne\.,r Zealand nurses, Millicent Sharples, in May 1938. There was 
some confusion about the reasons for her return, and suggestions that 
she had been sent home because of "unsatisfactory" behavior, most 
probably political in nature. A speaking tour had been planned for 
the nurse but it was soon discovered that she was not "politically 
minded", nor a good speaker. After several months of confusion and 
exasperation on both sides, the National Centre in Dunedin formally 
asked the nurse to sever her links with the organisation, although it 
promised to support her financially until she found a job. One of 
the major problems had been that the nurse would not accept the 
Committee's direction. She had also made several unspecified claims 
about misuse of medical aid funds. 64 
There was some debate within the organisation about the National 
Centre's treatment of Nurse Sharples. Charlie Saunders accused the 
Dunedin Committee of "sectarianism" in its decision not to allow her 
to have 
considered 
result of 
a 
the 
the 
speaking tour. 65 
opening of the 
nurse's visit 
Earlier, however, Saunders had 
"diversionist" NRFSRC appeal a direct 
to Wellingtonl 66 The Wellington 
Committee was also critical of the decision not to use the nurse for 
fundraising purposes. 67 After the National Centre had been 
transferred to Auckland, there was some feeling among Auckland 
members that the case should be reviewed. Two members resigned when 
the Auckland Committee resolved on a majority vote to endorse the 
Dunedin Committee's decision. 68 There is no doubt that, although 
there were faults on both sides, the severence of ties with Nurse 
Sharples was mainly a result of her political naivete, which made it 
difficult for the Committee to impress upon her the need to discuss 
any grievances only within the Committee and to direct her public 
utterances toward the "correct" kind of appeal. 
The SMAC also organised speaking tours for the two other nurses 
when they arrived back in New Zealand in February 1939. A civic 
reception in the Auckland Town Hall was arranged for their arrival 
home. The Auckland SMAC told all sections to ensure that they sent 
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the broadest selection of welcoming telegrams, and noted that a wide 
range of 
meeting. 69 
speakers, not 
The short 
confined 
speaking 
to the "Left", was needed for the 
tour the nurses later undertook 
was described as a "complete success".70 
Bert Bryan, a returned International Brigader, and Dr D.W. Jolly, 
who had been a division Commandant Surgeon with a medical unit in 
Spain, also toured under the auspices of the SMAC in March 1939. The 
SMAC hoped that Dr Jolly, as a "respectable" professional man, would 
be able to appeal to groups that had not responded before. 71 The 
Committee was pleased when a meeting in Nelson was endorsed by the 
presence of the Mayor and two local Labour MPs.72 
By this time, and indeed, by mid-1938 the SMAC's propaganda and 
appeals had shifted from the provision of medical supplies to aid the 
Republican cause to the plight of Spanish refugees from Franco. A 
poster produced by the SMAC in late 1938 showed pictures of refugee 
camps and exhorted "In the Name of Decency - New Zealand Must Say NO! 
to Conditions Such as These! "73 
Apart from 
pro-Republican 
circular appeals 
meetings at which collections were taken and 
literature sold, there were Christmas appeals, 
to all organisations the SMAC thought likely to be 
sympathetic, such as Trades Unions, and refugee appeals. The 
Auckland SMAC also published a monthly Information Service which was 
sent to all Committees for distribution to members, as well as to 
organisations and individuals the SMAC thought should be aware of its 
activities. The Information Service usually contained a message from 
the Auckland Chairman, Tom Stanley, news of any local medical aid 
events and a monthly balance sheet for the Auckland Committee. The 
rest of the bulletin was usually devoted to articles about various 
aspects of the Spanish Civil War reprinted from overseas sources. 
There were items about the Republican Government's social policies -
"FaSCists Close Schools While Republicans Open New Ones"74 
reports of Fascist atrocities,75 articles on the NIC,76 
speeches by Spanish leaders like Juan Negrin,77 and articles on 
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the medical services in Republican Spain. 78 Many of these latter 
stressed that Fascist soldiers would be given aid by the Republican 
medical corps. 
Most of the printed matter used to advertise the need for medical 
aid, and sold to raise funds, came from overseas, although one-page 
leaflets and posters were printed in New Zealand. Other pamphlets, 
leaflets and books came from the Australian Spanish Relief Committees 
(from whom the SMAC had also obtained copies of the film "Defense of 
Madrid lt ), the British SMAC, from the plethora of largely 
Communist-run aid organisations established in Paris, like the Comite 
Internationale de Coordination et d'Information pour l'Aide a 
l'Espagne Republicaine,79 or from Republican Spain's own 
propaganda organisations, such as Frensa Extranjera in 
Barcelona. 8O Material 
in New Zealand. 
The Auckland SMAC 
1937, entitled Spain's 
in the pamphlet was 
was also obtained through Left Book Clubs 
also published its own 27-page pamphlet in 
Fight for Freedom. 81 Most of the material 
reprinted from overseas sources. It discussed 
the social conditions of the Spanish people, the reactionary and 
oppressive role of the Catholic Church in Spain, the legitimacy of 
the 1936 elections, and the injustice of the Non-Intervention 
Agreement. "Murder on the Malaga Road", an account of Fascist 
bombing of civilians also available in leaflet form, was included in 
the pamphlet. The foreword was written by the Mayor of Dunedin 
(until 1938), Rev. E.T. Cox, a trustee of the National Committee. It 
stated very simply that the Spanish peqple had finally won freedom 
from centureis of oppression when their democratic Government was 
elected and that the war in Spain was "an effort of that corrupt 
class (Spain's former rulers) to regain the privileges that they have 
lost."82 
In general, 
conventional themes 
the SMAC's propaganda followed closely the 
of pro-Republican belief and was similar in tone 
and arguments to the propaganda in the Workers Weekly. There was, of 
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course, rather more emphasis on the provision of medical aid to Spain 
in the name of humanity. The propaganda in leaflets and posters was 
at its most political in the first months of the war, when New 
Zealanders were called upon not only to give generously to support 
the medical unit, but also to demand a return to international law 
and to persuade the Labour Government to refuse to accept the 
Non-Intervention Committee. Propaganda invariably referred to the 
"legitimate" Government of Spain or the "Loyalists" and depicted the 
provision of medical aid as New Zealand's contribution to the 
world-wide struggle against Fascism, and, in addition, as one way of 
protecting New Zealand democracy. The SMAC's attitude towards the 
British stance on the Spanish Civil War hovered uneasily between 
depicting it as a "tragic mistake" or as a conscious policy of aiding 
the dictators. In the public appeals it was usually the former, but 
the Information Service, intended mainly for the "converted", took 
the stronger approach. It often contained diatribes against 
Britain's non-intervention policy and vilification of Chamberlain. 
There was some emphasis upon comparisons between New Zealand's 
Government and the Republican Government of Spain. In the 1938 
Christmas appeal New Zealanders were reminded that while they were 
holidaying in the sun under the beneficient leadership of the newly 
re-elected Labour Government, the Spanish people were spending their 
third winter in appalling conditions, fighting for the very social 
and political liberties New Zealanders took for granted. 83 
An article written by Willis Airey, for the eighth issue of the 
Information Service, on 28 March 1938, contrasted somewhat with the 
generally more strident denunciations of fascism and non-intervention 
that usually appeared in the bulletin. Airey's message was 
essentially the same as the SMAC's usual propaganda - that Spain was 
the present centre of the fight to save democracy and that everyone 
should stand together to save democracy. However, it was couched in 
rather more thoughtful terms. Airey pointed out that the threats to 
democracy came not from the nations Italy and Germany as such, but 
from forces within civilisation itself, which conditions in Italy and 
Germany (resulting in part from other nations' policies) had allowed 
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to come to the surface. In Airey's view, internationalism, not 
jingoistic patriotic hatred of Italy and Germany, was the answer. If 
Governments would not act, then people would have to do more 
themselves and it was not against Italy and Germany and their peoples 
that the struggle for democracy should be directed, but against 
threats to freedom everywhere, in whatever form they occurred. 84 
The activities of the SMAC did not cease when the Spanish 
Republican Government fell in March 1939. George Jackson wrote to 
all sections 
work. 86 
concentrated 
that there was more need than ever for their 
Since mid-1938, the Committee's propaganda had 
on the plight of the refugees in France, and most of the 
money sent overseas was used to buy medical supplies for the refugee 
camps. The last three issues of the Information Service were 
entirely devoted to articles about the refugees; the slogan "For 
Spain and Humanity" was replaced by the legend "To Aid the Refugees" 
on the last issue, in July 1939. 
The 
money 
allow 
campaign to aid the refugees centred not only around raising 
for their support, but also on persuading the government to 
some refugees to immigrate to New Zealand. The French 
Government had threatened to return the refugees to Spain; the New 
Zealand Government was also requested to make representations to the 
French Government to guarantee the refugees' right to asylum in 
France, and to advocate at the League of Nations that provisions 
concerning the Czechoslovakian and Austrian refugees be extended to 
include those from Spain. 86 In August 1939, an appeal was sent 
to all Labour MPs asking them to use their influence with the Labour 
Cabinet to enable skilled workers to immigrate to New Zealand. 87 
Most of the replies indicated that there was some measure of sympathy 
with the Committee on this matter. The most positive response was 
from John A. Lee. At that time, Lee was involved with the State 
Housing project, and he was in favour of admitting as many skilled 
workers "as the country can absorb".88 However, the Government, 
although it gave the matter "careful and sympathetic considerationll , 
decided that it could do nothing to aid the refugees. 89 The 
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Committee's request for an immigration permit for Willi Remmel, a 
German International Brigader whom the New Zealand nurse, Renee 
Shadbolt, had befriended in Spain, was also refused. 90 
The Government did agree to allow child refugees to enter New 
Zealand, if their adoption by New Zealanders could be guaranteed by 
the Committee. The children had to be proven to be well in minds and 
bodies, 
were to 
by the 
and 
be 
time 
guaranteed not to become a charge upon the state; twelve 
allowed to immigrate to New Zealand. 91 Unfortunately, 
1939, it was 
the government had considered the project, in November 
three months too late. The Committee had been notified 
in July, 
Government 
considering 
adoption, 
sponsored 
by the Office 
would 
itself 
not allow 
pour l'Enfance,92 that the French 
child refugees to leave France, 
a scheme 
children's 
morally responsible for them. Instead of 
was organised by which foreign committees 
camps, "Hhite Corners", in France, at a cost 
of ~'50 per month. The New Zealand Committee felt that this campaign 
would arouse a great deal of sympathy, and would be an ideal way to 
reach people who might not have given money before. 93 
However, the beginning of the Second World War put a stop to this 
campaign. The outbreak of war effectively ended the Spanish Medical 
Aid Committee's activities. The intense campaigning centred on the 
refugees, and on the greater threat of Fascism since Spain had been 
added to its list of conquests, began to taper off almost immediately 
war was declared. Communications with the committees in Paris broke 
down, and although the SMAC felt that there was still much that could 
be done to aid the refugees, threatened once again by the forces they 
had fled, New Zealanders' attention was focussed elsewhere. 
Donations to the SMAC fund stopped coming in and by January 1940 most 
committees had ceased all activities. The National Committee decided 
to wind up its affairs by July 31 1941 and £ 350.10.5 remaining in 
the bank was sent to the Anti-Fascist Relief Committee in London, a 
body that apparently incorporated all the organisations previously 
established for aid to Spain.94 Although all activities had long 
since ceased, the Committee was not finally dissolved until March 
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1943, since the National Centre did not dispose of all its equipment 
until then. The proceeds from the sale of the typewriters and 
duplicator, ~~ 58, were sent to the International Brigades 
Association, in London. 95 
It is impossible to calculate the total amount of money raised 
for medical aid by the SMAC. The only account books available are 
those of the Auckland Committee, which acted as National Centre after 
June 1938. The monthly account books show that from the beginning of 
July 1938 until 20 October 1939, when the Committee began to wind up 
its affairs, the National Centre received ~ 3319.2.1 1/2. Of this 
amount, r~ 1567.16.2 were funds sent in by other committees. 96 
The Auckland branch itself raised ~ 1464.19.2 1/2 in the eighteen 
months from its foundation in January 1937 until the transfer of the 
National Centre at the beginning of July 1938. 97 It was claimed 
that almost ~ 2000 had been raised by December 1937, which would 
suggest that the total amount was something over ~5000.98 
The source of most of these funds was donations from individuals 
and organisations. Of 
meetings, film evenings, 
literature and badges 
all the many methods of raising funds -
raffles, exhibitions, and the sale of 
none raised so much money as the personal 
appeal. There was a hard core of supporters, often active members of 
the Committee, who gave generously and consistently throughout the 
three years that the Committee was active. People who wished to give 
regularly had their names put on subscription lists held by members 
of the Committee, and the money was collected monthly. Several 
organisations, such as the Rationalists' Association and the United 
Front Social Committee, in Auckland, often donated the proceeds of 
social functions and meetings to the Committee. 99 
Of the organisations that donated money, the Trades Unions gave 
the most and were the most regular contributors. This was, in part, 
the result of the many active members of the Committee who were 
unionists. For instance, W. Sutton, a member of the Auckland SMAC 
branch executive and a watersider, organised a group of supporters on 
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the waterfront. Regular collections for medical aid were held and 
the Waterfront Sympathisers, as they were known, often gave several 
sums each month. In 1938 alone, they gave a total of .£ 507 .1.5 
1/2.100 The Otahuhu Railway Workshops were another source of 
large donations, no doubt largely because of the efforts of George 
Jackson, Auckland secretary, who worked at the Railway 
\.Jorkshops.101 
As a mark of appreciation for their support, the Auckland section 
gave the Waterside Workers and 
unclaimed prizes from a raffle 
Trades Unions might have been 
the Railway Workshops the two 
of oil paintings. 102 Although the 
expected to give generously in any 
case, it is clear that the SMAC aimed much of its appeal at the 
unions. All of the itineraries for speaking tours for the nurses, 
before their departure 1937 and their return in 1939, and for Tom 
Spiller and Bert Bryan, included specific visits to railway workshops 
and to wharves, where there would be a receptive audience. 
The SMAC tried every possible means of raising money. It applied 
for a grant from the Art Union funds but was refused. 103 Street 
collections were held in Auckland. In Dunedin, the National Centre 
organised a Dairy Company appeal in early 1938. The Dairy Companies 
were asked to contribute goods, which would be sold for the Committee 
by the Primary Produce Marketing Board and the net profits returned 
to the Committee. Nineteen companies donated money or goods and 
five refused to take part in the scheme. Since this appeal went 
through the Dunedin accounts, there is no record of the final income 
from the appeal; it was estimated that the return would be 
about .£. 65.0.0.104 
A very strict record was kept of all funds. Receipts were issued 
for every transaction and expenses were pared to the minimum. As 
much money as possible was to be sent for medical aid, with the 
exception of £. 250.0.0 kept back by the National Centre as an 
emergency fund. 
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Initially, the funds were sent through the London Spanish Medical 
Aid Committee. 
used for the 
It was envisaged at first that the funds would all be 
support of the New Zealand nurses in Spain and to aid 
the hospitals at which they were working. The nurses were attached 
to the British nursing unit in Spain, so it was only logical that the 
funds should be sent through the unit's supporting body. Some money 
for the nurses was also sent, in 1938, to the Exterior Bank of Spain 
in Paris. However, there was considerable discussion by mid-1938 as 
to the best place to send the money. The London Committee had not 
proved very satisfactory. It was reportedly disorganised and subject 
to internal problems; Hunter felt that "there was apt to be some 
favouritism" shown by the London SMAC, which "had pet schemes of 
[its] own" about the uses of the funds .105 There had been 
trouble with the transmission of funds to the nurses. Sister Renee 
Shadbolt wrote to Jackson, in January 1938, that their hospital was 
without funds because internal strife had caused the British 
Committee to withdraw its support. They were short of food, and the 
London Committee "has not contributed a penny to our upkeep since 
being in Spain" .1 06 The arrangement had been that the British 
Committee would support the nurses financially and would be 
reimbursed by the New Zealand Committee. 
On the advice of Phil Thorne, secretary of the Australian Spanish 
Relief Committee,107 the New Zealand Committee decided to send 
its funds through the Comite Internationale de Co-ordination et 
d'Information pour l'Aide a l'Espagne Republicaine, one of a number 
of interlinking 
Comintern .108 
organisations 
This 
based in Paris and backed by the 
August 1936, after 
particular Committee had been established in 
an international conference on aid to Spain held 
in Paris. The Committee co-ordinated the activities of the 
multiplicity of bodies that devoted themselves to specific areas of 
aid to Spain. The most important were the Office pour l'Enfance, 
which, as the name suggests, dealt with aid to the refugee and orphan 
children, and the Centrale Sanitaire Internationale (CSI), which 
dealt solely with medical supplies. The Co-ordination Committee and 
its two affiliates were recognised by the Spanish Government, in a 
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decree of 1 July 1938, as being the accredited foreign agents of the 
Government for the collection and distribution of aid funds. 109 
Unlike Britain and France, where there were separate committees 
established to deal with almost every different area of need in Spain 
food, refugees and medical supplies - New Zealand had only the one 
organisation. In the face of the appeals coming in from the 
different organisations in Paris, some decision had to be made as to 
where the money from New Zealand would be most effectively used. It 
was decided that the money would be sent to Centrale Sanitaire 
Internationale, to be used for whatever purpose was most urgent at 
the time, to avoid the time delay involved in writing to and from New 
Zealand regarding the application of funds. 110 Although CSI 
dealt solely with medical 
requested that its funds 
supplies as required. III 
to CSI with a direction 
supplies, the New Zealand Committee 
be used for aid to children and food 
Money for a specific purpose was sent 
as to its use, on the infrequent occasion 
that it was decided to specify the application of funds. 
Most of the other Spanish Medical Aid Committees were affiliated 
to the Co-ordinating Committee and to CSI by mid-1938. Although the 
New Zealand Committee began sending funds to CSI regularly in July 
1938, it did not become affiliated until December 1938, when it 
officially became the New Zealand section. This meant that the 
Committee would receive regular reports of CSI activities and 
detailed accounts of the aid purchased with its funds; it also meant 
that 3 percent of its donations went to maintain the CSI staff and 
office in Paris. 112 
However, the sending of funds through CSI did not solve the 
problem of getting money to the New Zealand nurses. Hunter was 
informed that funds could not automatically be sent to their 
hospitals; the distribution of aid was decided only the Spanish 
authorities, but CSI would see that the nurses were not without 
support. Now that the organisation of medical services had been 
centralised, there was a fairer distribution of funds, and the nurses 
did in fact receive money from CSI.113 
397 
The total amount sent to Spain cannot be estimated without the 
Dunedin Committee's account books, since money for Spain was sent 
from Dunedin, until July 1938. From July 1938 until the last 
payment of ~ 40 in October 1939, the National Centre in Auckland 
sent ~~ 1530.0.0 in British currency to CSI. With the costs of 
exchange, the amount actually expended was £. 2190.14.2. 114 The 
money was sent at first through the Exterior Bank of Spain to be 
credited to the CSI account, but in late April 1939 CSI informed the 
SMAC that the latest remittance had arrived at the time the Spanish 
Government collapsed and the money was being held by the 
Bank. 115 The Committee sent an urgent telegram to the High 
Commissioner in London, W. Jordan, who promised to do all he could to 
secure payment by the bank to CSI.116 The outcome of efforts to 
release the money is uncertain. On 30 June, CSI informed Jackson 
that they expected payment in a few weeks, and that they were most 
appreciative of the help given them by the High Commissioner's 
Office. I17 However, at a meeting in April 1940 to wind up the 
affairs of the Committee, there was some question as to whether the 
money had in fact been released. 118 After April 1939, funds were 
sent through the Comptoir Nationale d'Escompte. 
Apart from the money spent on medical supplies, New Zealanders' 
donations were used to buy an ambulance and a laundry truck. The 
ambulance was purchased with funds sent by the Dunedin 
Cornmittee. 119 In November 1938 the front-line laundry truck was 
purchased at a cost of ~ 550 sterling. 120 In May 1938 the SHAC 
had begun a campaign to buy a mobile operating unit, known as an 
"auto-chir". Nurse Sharples' speaking tour was envisaged as raising 
most of the 1150 sterling required. When Nurse Sharples' speaking 
tour was cancelled, it was decided not to attempt to raise money 
specifically for an "auto-chir". 
The SMAC did encounter some opposition to its fundraising 
campaign in New Zealand. Apart from the debate surrounding its 
beginnings in Dunedin and Christchurch, the opposition, mainly from 
Catholics, seems to have been confined to attendance at meetings in 
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CSI publicity photo of the ambulance bought by New Zealand SMAC funds 
(Photo from SMAC Records. Jackson Collection [Private] Auckland.) 
order to heckle speakers and ask awkward questions about the 
Committee's Communist links. Both Charlie Saunders and the Napier 
secretary, Mrs E. Collins, reported that they frequently had an 
"antagonistic" Catholic element at meetings. 121 There was also 
some censorship of radio talks given by touring speakers. According 
to the Auckland and Christchurch Secretaries, Mrs Holman's radio 
talks in both cities had to be confined to discussion of her 
experiences of living in the Balearic Islands. 122 In Napier a 
talk by Nurse Sharples was cut so that she could not speak about the 
bombing of civilians. According to the Napier secretary, the 
censorship was the result of complaints to the station manager by 
"prominent local citizens" about her being on air at all. 123 
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In general, it would appear that the SMAC was usually "preaching 
to the converted". Initial attempts to create the image of a truly 
humanitarian non-partisan organisation failed and most of the SMAC's 
support came from committed pro-Republicans. By the time of the 
Committee's establishment in November 1936, battlelines had already 
been drawn between pro-Francoists and pro-Republicans and there was 
never any real possibility of presenting a campaign for aid to 
as non-partisan. Nor did the S~~C's propaganda and 
any appreciable effect upon the Government's 
its campaign may have stimulated some "arm-chair" 
pro-Republicans to demonstrate more active support for the Republican 
Republican Spain 
activities have 
policies. But 
cause. Certainly, it seems to have been the stimulus of Tom 
Spiller's visit to the West Coast that finally decided Stockton 
pro-Republicans to form a Medical Aid Committee. In the centres in 
which it operated, the SMAC helped to keep the plight of Republican 
Spain in the public eye and provided a focus for pro-Republican 
sentiment and activities. In a limited fashion, the SMAC was a 
United Front. Even if its day-to-day operation was largely carried 
out by Communists and Trades Unionists, the very endorsement of its 
activities by Labour MPs, academics, public servants and ordinary 
citizens indicated not only pro-Republican sympathies, but also a 
willingness to work together with Communists in the cause of anti-
Fascism. 
Those who felt humanitarian concern but did not wish to become 
involved in a political organisation, could contribute to campaigns 
run on a purely non-partisan basis. The Red Cross, the Salvation 
Army and the Society of Friends all collected funds to aid the 
civilian population of Spain. As well, a specific appeal for victims 
of the Spanish Civil War was established in 1938. 
The National Relief Fund for Spanish Refugee Children was 
established by the Mayor of Wellington, Mr T.C.A. Hislop, in March 
1938. The impulse for the creation of the NRFSRC came from a visit 
to Wellington by two English artists who had lived in Spain, Mr and 
Mrs Hugh Robinson. They brought with them photographic and written 
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evidence of the privations suffered by refugees from the war zones, 
and appealed to 
child refugees. 
New Zealanders to offer aid, particularly to the 
The Mayor of Wellington called a public meeting on 
18 March 1938, in order to discuss ways of proffering aid. From 
this, and a subsequent meeting on 25 March, a committee was formed 
that provided the nucleus of the NRFSRC's organisation. 124 Many 
prominent citizens of Wellington were involved in the establishment 
of the fund. Besides the Mayor, who declared his willingness to open 
a fund in his name, to be administered by the City Treasurer, there 
were also present at the initial meeting Mr D.A. Ewen, director of 
Sargood Sons and Ewen, and a former director of the Reserve Bank; the 
Catholic Bishop of Wellington, Michael O'Shea, and the Rev. W.H.P. 
McKenzie, M.C. and Bar, pastor of the Wadestown Presbyterian Church, 
Secretary of the New Zealand and Australian Student Christian 
Movement, and a member of the Dominion Executive of the League of 
Nations' Union. Trustees for the fund were Claude Weston, K.C., 
D.S.O.; the president of the National Party, and Mr W.H.P. Rollings, 
a Wellington barrister and solicitor. A prominent public accountant, 
J.K. Purdie, was secretary and Eric Reeves, M.C.; was chairman. It 
was altogether a very respectable list of sponsors with whose 
credentials none could find fault. The only member of the executive 
committee of the NRFSRC whose involvement might have given some cause 
for concern was Mrs E. McGowan, a member of the Wellington section of 
the Communist Party of New Zealand and secretary of the Wellington 
SMAC. Mrs McGowan's participation was, no doubt, in part due to the 
Communist Party's wish to participate in every form of Spanish aid, 
but was also motivated by her own very deep concern at the plight of 
Spanish refugees. 125 
Initially, the committee proposed to raise ~IO,OOO, which would 
be used to help establish a children's "colony" in France, near the 
Spanish border, to house about 40 Spanish children. (This idea came 
from the Robinsons and was similar to the proposals made later to the 
SMAC by the Centrale Sanitaire Internationale). The aid of VIalter 
Nash was enlisted, through W.B. Sutch, to ask the High Commissioner 
to investigate the practicality of such a scheme and to ascertain 
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whether there were any reliable organisations to whom the money for 
the scheme could be forwarded. 126 It appears that either the 
scheme became impracticable, or Jordan could not discover such 
organisations, for the NRFSRC's later publicity merely stated that 
the money would be remitted to the High Commissioner for distribution 
to established non-partisan aid organisations. 127 Not only was 
Jordan in a better position to decide on the credentials of refugee 
aid organisations than was the appeal committee in New Zealand, his 
involvement gave the appeal a semi-official status and reassured 
contributors of the NRFSRC's respectability. 
The NRFSRC's method of collecting funds also reinforced its 
respectability. The original fund was administered by the office of 
the Mayor of Wellington, and other city, town and borough councils 
were requested to establish their own "Mayor's funds" for the 
collection of donations, which were also solicited through the 
Dominion's newspapers. With the establishment of local funds, 
administered by local bodies, it was hoped that more people would 
contribute than if money had to be sent to Wellington. The NRFSRC 
requested that subscription lists be placed in public areas of local 
body offices so that people visiting the offices would be made al,vare 
of the appeal. It was also hoped that local bodies would become 
involved enough with the appeal to organise fundraising activities 
such as street collections. 128 As well, the NRFSRC obtained 
permission from the Public Service Commissioners to circulate 
subscription lists throughout Government departments. Noney 
collected in branches outside Wellington was to be credited to the 
Mayor's fund in that area, if it existed. On closure of the appeal 
all monies were to be sent to the Wellington City Treasurer, who 
would then pass them to the NRFSRC for disbursement. 129 
The appeal was launched at the beginning of June 1938, with 
notices in every major newspaper in the Dominion and circulars to all 
local bodies, and, by 18 July 24, towns had agreed to open "Hayor' s 
funds". The appeals in the newspapers and in the letters to local 
bodies were based solely upon the plight of homeless children in 
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Spain, with no mention of the causes of and participants in the 
conflict. The letterhead of the organisation featured a picture of a 
child standing amid rubble with ruined buildings and bombers in the 
background. The circular to local bodies began: 
The grim stories of war-stricken Spain that daily feature in 
our newspaper columns never tell us of the war behind the 
headlines the war that thousands of homeless orphan 
children wage against death by freezing in the Winter and 
death by starvation every day. They do not understand this 
war. They take no part in it. They merely suffer from it -
powerless to help themselves. They can be helped only by 
people outside Spain.130 
Despite the respectability of the NRFSRC's origins and sponsors, 
the appeal was received with suspicion in some quarters. The image 
of the Civil War as a political battle and the association of the 
Republican cause with Communism, as well as the obviously politically 
motivated SMAC appeals, created a certain amount of wariness on the 
part of some local bodies. Accordingly, in his second circular to 
town clerks, on 18 July 1938, the NRFSRC chairman, Eric Reeves, noted 
that Peter Fraser had agreed to become patron of the fund. He hoped 
that this would provide the further assurance of Government sanction 
that some local bodies needed. The support of a cabinet minister, he 
felt, "should further commend the appeal to the people of New 
Zealand". If this were not enough, he noted also that the Catholic 
Bishop of Wellington had approved of the fund, surely the most 
incontrovertable proof that the fund and its committee were not in 
the least associated with Communism. Even so, the Committee felt it 
necessary to pUblish a statement in the Dominion's newspapers totally 
disassociating itself from the SMAC and reaffirming its non-partisan, 
and semi-official status. There is no record in the NRFSRC's files 
of the incident, if any, which provoked this disclaimer. 13l 
If some city and town councils were suspicious of the NRFSRC's 
possible links with Communists, some Communists were equally 
suspicious of the activities of the fund. The Workers Weekly agreed 
to publish the NRFSRC's initial public appeal, but clearly regarded 
the fund as trespassing on the SMAC's already well established 
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territory.132 Charlie Saunders wrote to National Secretary, Ted 
Hunter, accusing the NRFSRC of being "diversionisttl • The people 
organising the appeal, he felt, "must be suspect to us", and Mrs 
McGowan's presence on the Committee was "all to the good"; presumably 
he meant that she could be relied upon to ensure that the money was 
dispersed properly.133 Saunders, quick to react to real or 
imagined obstruction, clearly saw the donation of money for aid to 
Spain as a political act and was concerned that all monies collected 
in New Zealand should go to the Republican side in the war. 
In fact, despite Saunders' and other Communists' suspicions, the 
fund fulfilled a necessary purpose in the movement for aid to Spain. 
Apart from 
fund also 
providing an outlet for purely humanitarian concern, the 
probably attracted the donations of those who were more or 
less pro-Republican in sentiment, but either through pacifism or 
distrust of the politics of the SMAC felt they could not participate 
in SMAC appeals. Thus the fund tapped sources not available to the 
SMAC and so increased New Zealand's contributions for the aid of 
Spanish refugees. 
Although it had been hoped that the fund would be closed in 
August 1938, requests for the final collection of funds were still 
being made in October,134 and the appeal was not officially 
closed until 30 January 1939. The original target of ~lO,OOO was 
never reached; even given that it was a nationwide appeal, the 
original plan to raise such a large amount in only two months was 
impossibly optimistic. The total money received was £3313.7.2, of 
which ~ 1324.4.1 was received from the Wellington metropolitan area. 
After an honorarium of~210 paid to the secretary and miscellaneous 
costs (stationery and postage), the total amount remitted to the High 
Commissioner 
was high and 
purpose.135 
was ~. 2440.0.0. The cost of exchange into sterling 
~ 600.0.0 of the money raised was used for that 
There is no record of the organisations the High 
Commissioner chose to receive the money. 
Another non-partisan, solely humanitarian, fund was established 
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by the Society of Friends in New Zealand (Quakers). An International 
Commission for the Assistance of Child Refugees had been established 
by the Quakers in December 1937, but, even earlier, Societies of 
in many countries had been helping the refugee children of Friends 
Spain through the Friends Service Council, based in London. Most of 
money raised before the establishment of the International the 
Commission for Child Refugees appears to have gone to the Save the 
Children Fund. The New Zealand Society of Friends began raising 
money in Feburary 1937, when the Christchurch Two-Monthly Meeting 
pledged to assist "where the way shows clear".136 Funds were 
raised primarily by appeals on behalf of the Save the Childrens Fund 
(until December 1937) in the correspondence columns of newspapers and 
by personal donations. The total amount of funds raised is unknown; 
however, by July 1937 ~300.0.0 had been sent to the Friends Service 
Council. 137 The fund appears to have been administered by the 
Christchurch Meeting. In February 1938, a further .E:. 249.0.0 was 
remitted to England,138 and in 1939, the Auckland Society of 
Friends reported that another J:200.0.0 had been raised in the 1939 
Christmas appeal. The report stated that over£3000.0.0 had been 
sent to England by the National Fund, mostly to the International 
Commission, but some also (~250.0.0) directly to the Friends Service 
Council in London. 139 
Like the NRFSRC, the Friends' Spanish Relief Fund fulfilled a 
valuable function in eliciting donations from those who were not 
prepared to give money to a political organisation like the SMAC. 
Although the Christchurch SMAC suggested collaboration on an appeal 
for Spain to the Christchurch Friends, it was "reluctantly" decided 
that a joint appeal might jeopardise "our desire to help all refugee 
children irrespective of partisanship and without discrimination 
between the forces which are at war". However, the meeting also 
decided to inform the SMAC that individually members of the Meeting 
would be glad to help in any way they could. For the Quakers 
"suffering was the only qualification" for aid. 140 
Society of Friends' appeals were directed towards arousing 
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sympathy for homeless and orphaned children and emphasised the need 
for food and clothing. 14l So too did Red Cross Appeals, which 
began in November 1936, and particularly requested donations of warm 
clothing. The Red Cross especially asked the Junior Red Cross of New 
Zealand to help the children of Spain. Appeals also stated that "No 
distinction is made between the two factions in Spain, as the needs 
of both sides are great".142 
The Salvation Army appeal was made specifically in respect of the 
Basque refugee children, who had been evacuated to Britain prior to 
the rebel capture of Bilbao in May 1937. The Salvation Army in 
England had taken charge of 100 of the 4000 children sent to Britain 
and asked New Zealanders to help with the weekly cost of 15s per 
week, per child. Lieutenant Commissioner F. Adams, of the Salvation 
Army in Wellington, said: 
here is a sudden and altogether unexpected emergency 
arising out of a stupid and wicked war, and the lives of 
thousands of innocent children are at stake. Thanks to 
England many are being brought out of the Basque country and 
succoured by a people on which they have no claim other than 
that of common humanity. We have taken on similar burdens 
in the past and, please God, we will take on others, and 
that we may do so I make this appeal.143 
Although all of these appeals were simply based on distress at 
the suffering of children, and other civilian refugees to a lesser 
degree, it might be argued that essentially most of the funds raised 
went to help Republican Spain, in one way or another. As one of the 
Society of Friends' appeals pointed out, most of the refugee camps 
and children's camps in Spain itself were in Catalonia, many around 
Barcelona. 144 Catalonia remained a Republican stronghold until 
the final stages of the war - Barcelona did not fall until January 
1939. As depicted by the NRFSRC's letterhead, the image of the 
sufferings of the civilian population in many people's minds was that 
of aerial bombardment, most of which was carried out by the rebels' 
forces, and usually by German and Italian planes. It is possible 
that some of those who gave money to humanitarian appeals were 
registering their protest against the Fascist method of waging war. 
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It is impossible to calculate how much money was raised in New 
Zealand for aid to Spain, since figures for the SMAC and Friends' 
appeals are approximate, and the amounts collected by the Red Cross 
and the Salvation Army are unknown. Estimates based on SMAC, NRFSRC 
and Friends' figures show that these three organisations alone raised 
over L: 11,300. The Standard's appeal and the Watersiders' donation 
to the International Federation of Trades Union bring the total to 
approximately .£ 12,000. Over half of this money was donated 
specifically to aid the Republican cause in Spain. 
Donations of money were one of the few ways in which New 
Zealanders could tangibly express their concern about events in 
Spain. The response to the SMAC appeals demonstrated the degree of 
commitment to the pro-Republican cause among New Zealanders, 
especially the Left. Contributions to non-partisan relief funds 
indicated that even some New Zealanders who did not take sides on the 
war felt its impact. Pro-Republicans, anti-Fascists and 
humanitarians alike heeded the call "For Spain and Humanity" and, in 
so doing, showed that the Spainsh problem had been "brought home". 
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CHAPTER 8 
"SPAIN'S FIGHT IS OUR FIGHT": 
NEW ZEALANDERS IN SPAIN 
Inspired by their beliefs, spurred by a sense of adventure, men 
and women from many countries became personally involved in the 
Spanish Civil War. Most of their aid went to the Republican side. 
Hugh Thomas estimates that the total number of foreigners who fought 
in the International Brigades was about 40,000, although there were 
never more than 18,000 in the Brigades at anyone time. 1 There 
are no estimates available for the other volunteers who aided the 
Republican cause the nurses and doctors who staffed medical units 
funded by sympathisers in their own countries, or the men and women 
who drove ambulances, carried water to the troops and helped in 
refugee camps. Apart from the German and Italian "volunteers" in the 
Nationalist forces, there was also a much smaller number of real 
volunteers for Franco's cause, including 600 Irishmen, some Britons, 
Frenchmen and White Russians. 2 
New Zealand did not go unrepresented among the "legions of babel" 
who fought for the Loyalists, nor among the medical units. And one 
New Zealander is known to have fought for Franco. There are some 
difficulties in discussing the personal involvement of New Zealanders 
in the Spanish Civil War. 
constitutes a New Zealander. 
There is, first, the question of what 
The daily press and propagandists 
claimed as "our own" some who were not New Zealanders by birth, but 
who had lived here for some time prior to going to Spain, and others, 
who had been born here, but who had been away for some time before 
heeding the call of Spain. For the purposes of this study, both 
categories have been treated as New Zealanders, not least because 
that was how they were regarded at the time in New Zealand. If one 
were to confine the criteria to the New Zealand-born who had left New 
Zealand intending to go to Spain, discussion would be restricted to 
less than half those known to have been in Spain. Several of the 
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New Zealanders who went to Spain were not in New Zealand when the war 
began. 
terms 
It is, therefore, impossible to discuss their involvement in 
of the war's impact on the New Zealand scene. Their 
participation in the war can only be seen in the light of their 
personal backgrounds, motives and experiences, both in Spain and on 
their return to New Zealand. 
There was also considerable difficulty in locating New Zealanders 
who had been in Spain. By the 1980s many were dead or impossible to 
trace. The SMAC Information Service, in 1937, gave the names of 15 
New Zealand International Brigaders. Of that number, two were 
Australians and one a Welshman, all of whom had come to New Zealand 
after service in Spain. Of the 12 remaining, no information at all 
could be found on two J. Alexander and Pat Murphy. 
There were undoubtedly others of whom the SMAC did not know. 
Research uncovered several other names, but, again, the people could 
not be traced. One suspects that some New Zealanders who fought in 
Spain may not have returned to New Zealand after service there, but 
remained in England and joined the British forces in World War Two. 
The search for New Zealanders who had fought in Spain was also 
complicated by the fact that some International Brigaders of other 
nationalities have settled in New Zealand since the war. Often 
promising leads 
proved to be a 
after World War 
discussed. 
proved fruitless when the International Brigader 
Dutchman or Englishman, who had come to New Zealand 
Two. The experiences of these men have not been 
It is interesting to note, that during the search for New Zealand 
Spanish veterans, many people claimed to have known someone who 
wanted to go but could not afford the fare, or who almost got to 
Spain, or who changed his mind. "Brim" MacKay got as far as France 
but could not get over the pyrenees. 3 William Girling-Butcher 
was persuaded out of the idea: 
. I was turned do\vn in the Empire Flying Training Scheme ... 
and sought flying opportunity. My mother's brother, an 
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Irish-Spaniard, was an engineer at Oviedo mines in Basque 
country and he soon disillusioned me. Far from a Holy War 
it was the Army plus the Church versus Communism and the 
workers with the Catalans and the Basques seeking autonomy.4 
Despite the reference to a "Holy War", it had been Girling-Butcher's 
intention to join the Republican Air Force. One letter, in answer to 
an advertisement in the RSA Review for Spanish veterans, claimed that 
two "well known businessmen" from Palmerston North trained in the 
Soviet Union for warfare in Spain, but reached Spain too late. This 
story could not be substantiated. There were New Zealand Communists 
in Russia in the late 1930s, but it is not likely that they were 
there for military training. 
This chapter will discuss the personal involvement of those New 
Zealanders whose stories could be discovered: ten International 
Brigaders, four nurses and a doctor, and one New Zealander who fought 
for Franco. Almost all the sources on these people are published 
sources. Only one International Brigader and one nurse could be 
interviewed. Of the others some had died or were too old and ill to 
permit an interview; most could not be traced. Letters home that 
were published in newspapers, interviews on their return to New 
Zealand and reports of addresses at SMAC meetings have provided most 
of the information. Because the New Zealanders were so small a 
contingent in Spain and were attached to other national groups for 
their service, studies of the International Brigades and even 
publications from the British Battalion (with which most, but not 
all, the New Zealand Brigaders fought) provided little additional 
material, apart from context. 
The two International Brigaders about whom least could be found 
were Jack Kent and Bernard Grey. Jack Kent was reported drowned in 
June 1937. He was one of some 300 International Brigaders in the 
S.S. City of Barcelona, which had left Marseilles with supplies and 
volunteers only to be torpedoed shortly before making port. Kent's 
name appears in the Roll of Honour in W. Rust's Britons in Spain, a 
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slim volume, published in 1939, that presented a Communist history of 
the British Battalion in Spain. S 
Bernard Gray's name did not appear in any Workers Weekly or SMAC 
list of New Zealand volunteers. When Dr D.W. Jolly returned from 
Spain in 1939 he mentioned having met a Gray from Wairarapa who was 
driving an ambulance. 6 In conversation with W. Girling-Butcher, 
Gray claimed to have been a mercenary and rejected any association 
with Communism. He further claimed that in World War Two he was 
prevented from rising above the rank of warrant officer because of 
his Spanish record. 7 Bernard Gray died of emphysema in early 
1980. 
Griffith Campbell Maclaurin was the first New Zealander to die in 
Spain, at Madrid on 10 November 1936. Maclaurin was a graduate of 
Auckland University College and of St John's College Cambridge. 
According to a memoir in Kiwi, an Auckland University students' 
publication, Maclaurin had been a conservative on his arrival at 
Cambridge in 1932 and had, in fact, joined the University 
Conservative Association. A trip to Germany in 1935 created not only 
an intense dislike of Nazism, but also awareness of the shortcomings 
of the present social order. 8 Maclaurin gradually moved toward 
the Left and by the time he graduated and was teaching mathematics, 
he had become a Socialist. Later, he joined the Communist Party and 
gave up teaching to open a Radical bookshop in Cambridge. He had 
planned to go to Spain before the rebellion, perhaps in order to see 
the performance of the Popular Front Government. 9 
The Workers Weekly published Harry Pollitt's account of 
Maclaurin's decision to go to 
Party leader, claimed he had 
Spain. Pollitt, British Communist 
heard that Maclaurin was a skilled 
machine gunner and had asked the young Communist to go to Spain; 
"without a moment's hesitation comrade Maclaurin gave up everything 
he held dear and went".10 No other sources mentioned Maclaurin's 
ability with machine guns, but it is possible that he had had some 
military training 
machine gun when 
defence of Madrid. 
in New Zealand. At any event, he died manning a 
the International Brigades were cut off during the 
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In a sense, Maclaurin was New Zealand's John Cornford. Much was 
made of his promising career in mathematics and the fact that he had 
given it up to devote himself to an ideal, in whose cause he had 
died. So early a death in a war that was still only a "nine-days 
wonder" in New Zealand could not fail to have had some impact here, 
not only among those who knew him. His parents, who had not known of 
his decision to go to Spain and who apparently had not shared his 
political convictions, later became associated with the Auckland 
branch of the SMAC. The memoir in Kiwi expressed its admiration for 
his decision and courage: "We may not agree with the cause for which 
he sacrificed all, but we cannot do else than pay a tribute to his 
honesty of purpose."ll 
The death of Alex Maclure on the Aragon front, in October 1937, 
drew a similar response from those who had known him at Otago 
University. Maclure was a Canadian who had come to New Zealand to 
study at the School of Mines at Otago University College, where he 
became known as "Otago's tame red". He was associated with the 
Communist Party in New Zealand, although it is uncertain whether he 
was a member. One contemporary believes that he may have joined but 
was later expelled for refusing to accept Party direction. 12 
Maclure was active in the cause of the Spanish Government while he 
was in New Zealand. He was one of the founding members of the SMAC 
in Dunedin and also promoted the cause of the Loyalists on the 
College campus. (In October 1936 Maclure attempted to have a 
resolution of sympathy with the Spanish Government adopted at a 
Student Council Meeting; the motion was lost.13 ) 
Maclure left New Zealand for Canada at the end of 1936, leaving 
some with the impression that he was planning to go to Spain. 14 
It was later reported that he had travelled to Spain via Montreal. 
In a letter published in the Grey River Argus, he reported that he 
and some others had attempted to get into Spain by sea, but had been 
intercepted by a patrol and were being held in a French jail. 
However, he reported that the townspeople supported them and that 
they were not wasting time while in prison, as they had "an elected 
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political leadership and two study class groups".lS After his 
release Maclure managed to get into Spain, where he intended to join 
the blood transfusion unit run by a Canadian, Dr N. Bethune. However 
his school record as a "crack marksman" resulted in his joining the 
fighting ranks. 16 Both Critic and the Workers Weekly reported 
that he was a member of the American Lincoln Battalion; Tom Spiller, 
another New Zealand Brigader, met Maclure in Spain and was certain 
that he was with the MacKenzie-Papineau Battalion, which had both 
Canadian and American membership. Both were a part of the XV 
Brigade, as was the British Battalion. The Workers Weekly reported 
Maclure wounded and missing in action in August 1937 (incidentally, 
misprinting his name as Arnold Maclure), but in September received a 
postcard from him, in which 
Zealande W MacDonald ".17 r, m. 
he reported meeting "another Ne\v" 
News of his death at Fuentes de 
Ebro, near Saragossa, on the Aragon front in October was received in 
early 1938. 
Critic recorded Maclure's death with great regret and paid 
tribute to "his enthusiasm, his sincerity and his moral 
fearlessness". As in the Kiwi obituary for Maclaurin, Critic noted 
that even those who held no brief for his beliefs must respect his 
giving up his life for his ideals. lS The Student, magazine of 
the Student Christian Movement, also published a compassionate 
obituary. Maclure had been well known to SCM members in Dunedin, 
having been wont to engage them in debate on the relative merits of 
Communism and Christianity. He had even participated in some 
Christian camps. His death, said the obituary, was "a very real 
martyrdom", in that he died for his beliefs. The death of Maclure 
caused some soul-searching questions for those SCM members who had 
known him. His readiness to sacrifice himself, for the cause he 
believed to be just, raised questions about their own loyalties, and 
was an example of the kind of wholehearted dedication that Christians 
too should practice. 19 In the words of an SCM member who knew 
Maclure, news of his death was "something of a grief and a 
challenge".20 
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Maclure and Maclaurin both held Communist views, and their 
impulse to go to Spain was born out of their beliefs. Fred Robertson 
was another New Zealand Communist who died in Spain. Reports of his 
death after only three days on the battlefield at Jarama Valley, near 
Madrid, were received in April 1937. 21 Robertson had left New 
Zealand in April 1936 in the company of Tom Spiller. They had 
planned to travel to Germany and the USSR, and worked their passage 
to England on a ship, Robertson as a seaman and Spiller as a trimmer 
in the engine room. Robertson, like Maclure, was not New Zealand 
born. Of English parentage, he had spent his early life in the 
Middle East. He came to New Zealand in the late 1920s and worked on 
the Mohaka Viaduct and in several jobs in Napier. Newspaper reports 
recalled that his contribution to rescue efforts during the 1931 
earthquake in Napier had been highly praised. 22 Robertson and 
Spiller had met through the Napier branch of the Communist Party. 
Tom Spiller recalled that their ship had stopped at the Canary 
isles en route to England, and that there the two were warned by 
Spanish Communists that there would soon be trouble in Spain. 23 
Because he and Robertson went separately into Spain, Spiller did not 
know of Robertson's experiences in Spain. Nor did Robertson send any 
letters home before his early death. 
There is considerably more information about Tom Spiller. He was 
probably the best known of New Zealand's Spanish veterans, at the 
time and to the present day. Spiller returned to New Zealand from 
Spain in 1938 and made a lengthy and comprehensive speaking tour of 
the country under the auspices of the SMAC. In the 1970s and '80s he 
was interviewed by newspapers, radio and television about his 
experiences in Spain. He was also the only International Brigader 
available to be interviewed for this study. Most of the following 
discussion of his experiences is based upon two interviews conducted 
in 1980, with additional information from his letters home published 
in the Workers Weekly and newspaper reports of his addresses. 
Latterday interviews with the media proved to contain substantially 
the same information as the 1980 interviews, demonstrating that his 
419 
Tom Spiller (seated) with fellow International Brigaders 
(Photo courtesy of Mr F.A. Mace.) 
memories had become fixed along certain lines. While this is a 
common process, it is possible that in Spiller's case it was begun by 
the constant repetition of themes during his propaganda tour in 1938. 
Spiller' s companion Robertson reached Spain by the simple 
expedient of signing on as a seaman on a ship calling at Barcelona 
and deserting there . Tom chose another method favoured by 
Englishmen . He bought a day return ticket to France, and once there, 
signed on as a volunteer at Communist Party headquarters in Paris. 
His unused return ticket was passed on to someone who needed to go to 
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England. Spiller recalled, that initally, he had attempted more 
orthodox methods. He claimed that he had applied for a passport and 
was turned down because it was suspected that he intended to go to 
Spain. (He had not needed a passport to travel to England because he 
was a Commonwealth citizen.) Spiller had become involved with the 
British Communist Party as soon as he arrived in England and had been 
arrested in the Cable Street riot of 4 October 1936; thus, it is 
quite possible that he was known to the authorities as a Communist 
and a likely recruit for the International Brigades. He further 
claimed that, when he boarded the channel ferry, he was questioned by 
MIS and warned against going to Spain, but allowed to continue his 
trip. He and other recruits travelled quite openly to the 
Franco-Spanish border by train and he arrived in Spain in January 
1937. After a period of training at Albacete, International Brigade 
headquarters, he joined the British Battalion at Jarama. He later 
fought at Brunete. Spiller had had some military training in New 
Zealand and was made a Lieutenant in charge of a machine gun squad. 
He also spent some time at an Officers' and NCOs' training camp; he 
could not recall the whereabouts of this camp but thought it might 
have been at Madrigueras. CMadrigueras was a village near Albacete 
which housed International Brigaders.) The American Robert Merriman 
was his commanding officer at the training camp, which places his 
time there at some point between Jarama in February and Brunete in 
July, since Merriman was replaced by the Englishman Thomas 
Wintringham in June 1937. 24 
After Brunete, Spiller was asked to become a scout for the 
British 
decided 
Battalion. 
to send 
volunteers, and he 
However, before he took up this position, it was 
some veterans out of Spain to recruit more 
was asked to go to Australia. This purpose was 
carefully glossed over on his return to New Zealand, and in his 
speeches here. Spiller said that for a short time before leaving 
Spain, he was seconded for duty to a prison camp for deserters from 
the Brigades, near Albacete. Spiller claimed that, while in this 
camp, he saw no executions or illtreatment of prisoners. He refused 
to be drawn on whether any of the prisoners were there for 
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"political" offences, although he remarked that the political 
education classes were complicated by the fact that the commanding 
officer spoke only Russian, and much time was wasted in translating 
his talks. Spiller did, however, complain that the food was poor and 
not sufficiently nourishing for the programme of physical exercise 
the prisoners were supposed to undertake. 
After a short time at the prison camp, Spiller left Spain for 
England. He arrived in Australia in early January 1938. There he 
made a short, but strenuous, lecture tour aimed at getting volunteers 
to go to Spain. He claimed that in three weeks he had recruited 80 
men. If true, this was made more remarkable by the fact that 
recruiting had to be carried out covertly. 
Spiller then returned to New Zealand with Sister Mary Lowson, 
leader of the Australian Medical Unit in Spain, who was to undertake 
a short speaking tour for the SMAC. Spiller encountered some 
official notice on his return. When the "Awatea" berthed in 
Wellington he was taken aside by police and asked how long he was 
planning to stay in New Zealand. He was not the first International 
Brigader to return to New Zealand, 25 but he was the first who was 
clearly affiliated with the Communist Party, which may account for 
the interest shown by police. There may also have been some 
suspicion about the purpose of his visit, although Communist Party 
publicity about his return carefully made no mention of his 
recruiting activities in Australia. 
Spiller did not actively campaign for volunteers in New Zealand. 
The Communist Party in New Zealand did not direct its propaganda 
towards 
although 
had gone 
encouraging young men to volunteer for service in Spain, 
it was eager to point out that there were New Zealanders who 
to Spain. A report from Palmerston North, in March 1938, 
that Spiller had recruited 20 young men for the Brigades aroused 
disapproving comment in one weekly paper. 26 However, Spiller 
attributed this story to a hoax telephone interview given by an 
acquaintance representing himself as Spiller. 
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Initially, Spiller's plans had been to conduct a short speaking 
tour with Mary Lowson and then to return to Spain, via Australia. He 
went from an "official" reception in Wellington to his home town of 
Napier and from there to the South Island, where he spoke in 
Christchurch, Dunedin, Invercargill, Bluff and districts, and 
Greymouth. He completed the tour by speaking in Palmerston North and 
then at a number of meetings in Auckland. 
Although a farewell dance was held for Tom on 25 March 1938, in 
Auckland, he did not return to Australia. Instead he embarked on 
another tour for the SMAC, this time in a van equipped with 
loudspeakers that had been purchased by the Committee for touring 
purposes. It enabled Spiller to visit many small towns that had not 
been reached by the Committee before. Spiller toured the North 
Island from April to July 1938, then spent some time recuperating 
from an injury received while fixing the van. From October 1938 
until early 1939, he toured the South Island, concentrating on the 
Public Works Department camps on the West Coast. This time, he was 
accompanied by his wife of two months. 
When interviewed in 1980, Spiller did not give any clear reason 
for his decision not to return to Spain, although he did say that by 
mid-1938 he thought that there was not much point, as he considered 
that the Government "had had it" and could not win. However, this 
opinion 
reflect 
planned 
Party 
Zealand 
may have 
Spiller's 
originally 
owed something to hindsight and probably did not 
feelings in 1938. His return to Spain had been 
for March 1938. It is likely that the Communist 
decided that he was of more use as a propagandist in New 
than a soldier in Spain, particularly with the expense 
attendant on sending him back. There may also have been personal 
reasons, since Spiller met his wife during his first speaking tour. 
He was, indeed, valuable as a propagandist. A lively and 
down-to-earth speaker, he described himself as a "rabble-rouser", 
able to draw a response from a crowd. His speeches about Spain, 
reported in the Workers Weekly, concentrated on the role of the 
International Brigades as idealists and anti-Fascists. They closely 
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followed the standard pro-Republican "line" on the war, but were also 
tinged with a more specifically Communist perspective. In an 
interview in Sydney just before his return home, he denounced the 
Trotskyists: 
You've only got to speak to the workers or peasants 
anywhere. They refer to them for what they are - Fascist 
agents, spies and terrorists carrying out Hitler's and 
Franco's dirty work.27 
He was also at pains to stress the applicability of Spain to the New 
Zealand situation: 
the speaker drew a very interesting comparison 
between conditions in Spain in February to July, 1936, and 
those existing in New Zealand at the present time, stressing 
the dangers of any complacency and apathy in the workers and 
farmers in New Zealand.28 
Spiller's speeches, however, made no mention of the attitude of 
the Labour Government in New Zealand, in contrast with other 
Brigaders' later speeches. By 1938, the Communist Party was not 
concentrating much of its propaganda effort on encouraging the Labour 
Government to take a firmer stand on the war. The omission may also 
have reflected Spiller's personal views, for his encounter with the 
police had merely reinforced his opinion that the Labour Government 
did not really support the Loyalists. 
In 1980, after 42 years of hindsight, Spiller's views on the war 
had not substantially changed. He still retained a basically 
Communist perspective on the war. His time in Spain had not brought 
disenchantment with the ideas or methods of Communism. Indeed, until 
his death in late 1984 he was a committed Communist and active member 
of the Socialist Unity Party, a Russian-aligned Communist 
organisation. It is impossible to say, however, how much his 
memories had become conflated with the propaganda he was exposed to 
in Spain, and afterward, and which he himself disseminated in his 
speaking tours. Nevertheless, this consideration should not detract 
from his sincere commitment to his beliefs, nor the courage of those 
convictions that sent him voluntarily to risk his life in Spain. 
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Bert Bryan was another working-class Communist who went to 
Spain. Information about his experiences comes solely from his 
letters to the Workers Weekly and from reports of interviews and 
speeches Bryan gave after he returned to New Zealand in 1939. Bryan 
worked his passage to England in late 1937, but did not reach Spain 
until early 1938. He told a meeting at Canterbury University College 
that he had had to spend three months in England trying to get to 
Spain. The unspecified difficulties he experienced in reaching Spain 
were attributed to the "obstruction" of France and Britain.29 
Once in Spain, he trained for only 10 days at Tarragona before 
fighting with the British Battalion at the Ebro River. Bryan's 
reasons for going to Spain were self evident from the tone of his 
letters to the Weekly. He was a Communist and saw in Spain a battle 
between the workers and Fascism. He told a SMAC meeting in 
Wellington, in May 1939, that "when he knew the Spanish war had 
become not a civil war but a war for national liberation he knew that 
Spain was the place for him".30 
The Weekly reported that Bryan had once been on the staff of the 
Red Worker, the Workers Weekly's predecessor,and, indeed, his letters 
home read like those of someone accustomed to writing propaganda. 
Letters to the Weekly from other International Brigaders also 
contained propaganda, or created an image of the war that was in 
keeping with the Weekly's view, but Bryan's letters were almost 
"straight" propaganda. They lacked the immediacy of others' letters; 
they were 
partisan 
battles, 
for the 
much longer and appeared more like the observations of a 
reporter than a soldier. Bryan sent the Weekly accounts of 
a description of a May Day celebration and of the farewell 
International Brigades in Barcelona. After he had left 
Spain, he sent the Weekly a discussion of the second Ebro retreat 
intended to justify the Negrin Government's and the Communist Party's 
policy. The article stressed the difference between the second 
retreat, "fully understood by a people and an army 100 per cent 
united behind the Government of Negrin", and the first "disorganised 
retreat march with its crisis in the Government and a disunited 
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people".31 
continued 
The crisis in the Government had resulted in a 
compromise between Negrin and the Communists, which 
probably explained the necessity to justify the retreat. 
Passages in other letters also reinforced the Communist image of 
the war and, particularly, applauded those aspects with which the 
Communist Party in Spain had been concerned. Bryan noted 
co-operation and consultation between officers and men in the 
International Brigades, the "democratic" army.32 His description 
of the Brigades' farewell in Barcelona contained a passage lauding 
the new Republican army.33 
Nor did Bryan forget to direct his remarks at the New Zealand 
anti-fascist movement: 
As as I walk along I reflect, with a feeling of pride, that 
the New Zealand Government and the people of New Zealand who 
are behind that Government, are not a party to the treachery 
of Chamberlain.34 
When he returned 
New Zealand as 
marked contrast 
Bryan told the Weekly that the Spaniards spoke of 
"that great little country". This comment was in 
to Tom Spiller's remark that he had so much 
difficulty in trying to explain to Spaniards where New Zealand was 
that he eventually gave up and usually said he was an 
Australian. 35 One suspects that Bryan's comment had more to do 
with the Communist's final frenzied appeals for New Zealand support 
for the Republicans than it did with the truth. 
Not unexpectedly, Bryan also reinforced the Weekly's propaganda 
about the primary role of the Communist Party in Spain in resisting 
the rebels: 
On all the main problems of the war it was recognised as the 
only Party with a firm and definite plan, as, for example in 
the question of unified command of the army, of a united 
people's army in place of the separate trade union and party 
militia.36 
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Bryan left Spain when the International Brigades were withdrawn 
in October 1938. He worked with pro-Republican organisations in 
England before leaving for New Zealand. Unlike Tom Spiller, Bryan 
seemed to have no difficulties with the New Zealand authorities, 
rather the contrary. He wrote to the Weekly that "the N.Z. 
Government have booked my passage on the "Rangitata" ... the N.Z. 
Government have treated me well and I had an interesting talk with Mr 
Jordan about Spain".37 By this time, January 1939, with a 
Nationalist victory likely and the end of the war in sight, the 
Government had less to fear from pro-Republican activity in New 
Zealand. Jordan, sympathetic to the Loyalists anyway, was not likely 
to be too compromised by an act of hospitality toward a New Zealand 
International Brigader who apparently lacked the fare back to New 
Zealand. 
Once in New Zealand, Bryan became involved with the St1AC and 
undertook a short speaking tour together with Dr D.W. Jolly, also 
recently returned from Spain. 38 His speeches, like his letters, 
repeated the standard line on the war. He gave no hint of any 
dissatisfaction with the Party's attitude in Spain, or its image of 
the war. Yet Connie and Pat Birchfield, close friends of Bryan, who 
were also members of the Communist Party from the 1930s until 1956, 
claimed that the war had left him disillusioned. 39 Mrs 
Birchfield felt that the fighting itself had "a bad effect" on Bryan, 
in that he suffered greatly from the sight of woundings and death 
under fire. She recalled that he was an idealistic, principled young 
man and that he was most upset that on a visit to Harry Pollitt he 
was treated like a "nobody" rather than "an anti-fascist hero". The 
Birchfields claimed that, by the time of his death in 1961, Bryan had 
become an alcoholic. 
Charlie Riley was the oldest of the New Zealand International 
Brigaders, most of whom were in their twenties or early thirties. 
Riley was in his forties. Born in England in 1893, he came to New 
Zealand in 1913, but left again at the outbreak of World War One and 
enlisted in the British Army. After serving at Ypres and in 
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Palestine he returned to New Zealand. For a time he studied 
engineering at Canterbury 
member of the Labour Party. 
University College and became an active 
In the Depression of the 1930s Riley was 
involved with the Unemployed Workers Union in Christchurch and became 
a member of the Communist Party. He was arrested several times in 
connection with his political activities, once for hoisting the Red 
Flag in a public place. He also spent some time in Paparua Prison, 
after having been convicted of possession of seditious literature in 
1932. 40 
When the Spanish Civil War began, Riley was in Australia working 
as a miner at Tennants Creek. In "All Quiet on the Spanish Fronts", 
his 
the 
unpublished 
death of 
history of the war, Riley claimed it was the news of 
Felicia Browne (a British Communist) in Spain that 
decided him to join the International Brigades. He was convinced 
that the war was no longer a domestic quarrel but a war between 
Spanish democracy and a 
anti-fascist and a lover 
foreign invader. Thus, being "a confirmed 
of democracy withal ... I considered that 
having equal rights with an unwanted invader I had a personal right 
to be there too".41 
By his own account, Riley walked to Darwin from Tennants Creek so 
that he would have enough money for his passage to Sydney. At Port 
Kembla, 
passage 
method 
he signed on 
to Cardiff. 
as Tom Spiller. 
a tramp steamer as fireman and worked his 
From there he went to Spain, using the same 
However, in contrast to Spiller's account of 
travelling openly through France to the border, Riley and his fellow 
volunteers were convoyed secretly in trucks to the Pyrenees, over 
which they had to walk for 14 hours before arriving in Spain. 
Spiller had travelled earlier, before border controls were rigidly 
enforced. 
Riley arrived in Spain in time for the battle of Brunete in July 
1937. He later fought with the British Battalion at Teruel and on 
the Ebro. He was wounded in the Ebro offensive (late June 1938) and, 
by the time he had convalesced, the International Brigades were being 
withdrawn. 
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In an interview with R. Grover of the Alexander Turnbull Library 
Riley claimed that he was a "shock brigadier", which, he said, was 
the equivalent of a senior NCO. His previous military experience and 
engineering and mining background, combined with the fact that he was 
"politically sound", enabled him to reach this rank. 42 
Riley 
in 1932, 
rejoined 
Communist 
had been expelled from the 
for "factionalism",43 and 
before going to Spain. While 
Party. A letter to the 
Communist Party in New Zealand 
it is not clear whether he 
in Spain he joined the Spanish 
Workers Weekly attested to his 
"political soundness" and acceptance of the Communist view of the 
war. He told the Weekly that he was a "Stakhanovite bombing 
instructor", and that he was doing all he could to help his comrades 
to become "first class proletarian soldiers fit to be forerunners in 
the class struggle". The letter also reinforced the popular image of 
the International Brigades as a "democratic" army, when Riley 
described the battalion as having party meetings and discussing in 
"friendly fashion" what to 
for each and each for all." 
do to improve the company: "We are all 
This comment provided the Weekly with a 
perfect 
think 
quote for its headline. Riley also said: "Little did I 
even four years ago that the real struggle was so near at hand 
am now a veteran in the real armed struggle against and here I 
Fascism."45 
Back in England, Riley became involved with British 
pro-Republican organisations and, on behalf of Australian veterans, 
undertook a correspondence with British Government officials over 
repatriation of wounded British Battalion soldiers. He condemned the 
British Government's policy as a betrayal of the ideals fought for in 
World War One: 
We consider that the foreign policy of this country eclipses 
the moral prostitution of any previous historical period 
since "the flood", the more heinous today in view of the 
fact that axiomatically we of this generation cannot plead 
ignorance. 46 
Riley also engaged in correspondence with New Zealand officials, 
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urging the establishment of a Spanish refugee appeal. He also wrote 
to the Labour Party asking for the Spanish workers who had fought for 
democracy be supported by the New Zealand workers. The response was 
negative, and Riley was so angered with the Government's and Labour 
Party's attitude that he had the letters published in Canta, the 
Canterbury University Students' paper. 47 
Riley returned to New Zealand via Australia in early 1939. He 
spoke at SRC meetings in Australia and became involved with the SMAC 
in New Zealand. Like Spiller, he complained of some harrassment by 
officialdom. He recorded that, in Australia, "special political 
police reporters" attended meetings, but he made no specific claims 
about harrassment in New Zealand. 48 
On 3 September 1939, Riley enlisted for his second round against 
Fascism and went with the First Echelon of the New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force to Egypt. He was invalided out of the forces in 
1942. He remained committed to the cause of the working classes all 
his life. It is unknown whether he continued as a member of the 
Communist Party. 
Apart from Jack Kent and Bernard Gray, whose political 
affiliations are unknown, all the New Zealand International Brigaders 
discussed thus far were Communists. There were other New Zealanders 
in Spain whose political views were less developed, and whose primary 
motive in joining the International Brigades appeared to be more a 
sense of adventure than of political commitment. 
William Madigan was a Wellington seaman who arrived in Spain via 
America. According to a letter he sent to the New Zealand Freelance, 
Madigan had entered America "without worrying about the immigration 
formalities".49 In fact, he had deserted his ship in San 
Francisco in 
almost the 
Wellingtonian. 
received news 
January 1937. 50 
only information 
This letter to the Freelance is 
available about the 23-year-old 
Although the Workers Weekly mentioned Madigan when it 
that he had been wounded, it gave no further 
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information. 51 Why or how Madigan arrived in Spain is unknown; 
it is possible that he enlisted in America, for he fought with the 
Lincoln Battalion. His letter repeated propaganda aimed both at the 
Battalion itself and the American public, that did little to cast 
light on his motives: "Don't think that I am a "soldier of fortune" 
I came to Spain with the same ideals as Lafayette had when he 
fought for the Americans in 1776."52 This comment did, however, 
indicate a receptivity to such propaganda. Madigan's letter was 
written while he was still in training and was concerned mainly with 
his Spanish surroundings. 
although the Freelance 
It contained no other political comment, 
reported that enclosed with it was a 
propaganda pamphlet describing the training of the International 
Brigaders. There is no information on where Madigan fought in 
Spain. In July 1938, the Workers Weekly reported him seriously 
wounded; he later died of these wounds. 
The fact that Madigan wrote to the Freelance rather than the 
Workers Weekly, suggests that he was not a Communist, nor had links 
with the Party. The Freelance article reported that Madigan had once 
before left his ship in America and wandered about that country until 
being arrested and deported. Therefore, it seems likely that an 
adventurous spirit played some part in Madigan's decision to go to 
Spain. 
Captain E.N. Griffiths was another New Zealander whose motives 
for going to Spain seemed more adventurous than political. Eric 
Griffiths' dashing career made him the subject of no little interest 
in the daily and weekly newspapers, when he returned to New Zealand 
in June 1937, after serving as a fighter pilot for the Spanish 
Government's Air Force. The Weekly News described him as "an 
international thrill-hunter when he was barely out of his 
teens".53 Griffiths had been a member of an air circus in New 
Zealand in the early 1930s and then had spent some time in China 
ferrying planes and fighting for various war lords. In 1933, he had 
joined the second Byrd expedition to Antarctica. Later, in England, 
he had been involved with an attempt to form an Abyssinian Air 
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Force. 54 
delivering 
When the 
Dehavilland 
war in Spain began he was employed in 
Dragons to the Spanish Government until the 
British Government brought an end to such activities. In August 
1936, he joined the Spanish Government's Air Force. Wounded by an 
explosive bullet in September 1936, he spent some time training 
Spanish pilots before leaving Spain. The Weekly News reported that 
Griffiths had returned home to marry, having proposed to his fiancee 
from Madrid. 55 This action only served to enhance Griffiths' 
romantic adventurous image. 
Although his service in Spain appears to have been largely the 
result of a love of flying and an adventurous spirit, Griffiths' 
experiences in Spain left him with some firm convictions about the 
war. In one newspaper interview, he called the Non-Intervention 
Agreement 
emphasised 
a farce. 56 His discussions of aerial warfare in Spain 
the role of Italian and German pilots and aircraft in the 
war. Sympathies engaged by Griffiths' descriptions of the poorly 
trained, ill-equipped Government forces, outnumbered two to one by 
modern Italian and German planes, may have been tempered by another 
comment. Griffiths claimed that the penalty for cowardice in the 
Loyalist air force was to be shot. 57 He was also convinced that 
the Government would win although his reasons for this belief were 
never clearly stated, beyond his respect for the spirit and 
dedication of the Loyalist pilots. 
These comments, reported in the daily and weekly press, did not 
reveal any deep political commitment to the Spanish Government's 
cause, other 
involvement. 
than 
This 
an apparent dislike of German and Italian 
may be partly explained by the newspapers' focus 
on Griffiths' adventurous history; his personal experiences made for 
a better story than his political views about the war. A short 
interview in Tomorrow revealed a slightly more political analysis 
from Griffiths. He dismissed the idea that the war was religious as 
"bunk", giving as evidence the involvement of Moors and his 
observation that the Spanish people were the most religious people he 
had encountered. He also denied that there was any truth in the 
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claim that the "reds" had started the war, citing the early 
involvement of German and Italian pilots and planes. 58 
However, Griffiths did not become involved with the SMAC to any 
great extent, although he spoke at some meetings in Wellington, 
including one joint meeting with Spiller and "Taffy" Patterson, in 
April 1938. 59 Instead, it was reported that he was planning to 
go to Hollywood as a stunt flyer and technical advisor for any films 
set in Spain. His lack of deep involvement with pro-Republican 
organisations in New Zealand suggests that he had no deep commitment 
to their cause, and perhaps also that they did not feel that his 
attitude was political enough to be of use to their campaign. 
There is scant information on William MacDonald, who also fought 
in Spain. In December 1938, the Otago Daily Times published an 
account of an interview with MacDonald in London, on his return after 
the withdrawal of the International Brigades. In this interview, 
MacDonald said that he had been in Spain since January 1937, having 
gone with the intention of joining the Republican airforce. Instead, 
he was attached to the Lincoln Battalion and fought with them at 
Jarama, where he was wounded. He met two New Zealanders, Dr D.W. 
Jolly and Sister Una Wilson, while recuperating from a shoulder 
wound. He later fought at Brunete, and then was transferred to the 
transport section. He spent the rest of his time in Spain driving 
water trucks and ambulances, first with the Lincoln Battalion and, 
then, with the Italian Garibaldi Battalion. 
MacDonald claimed to have no political affiliations; he was 
signed on as an "anti-fascist", as were most Brigaders without party 
affiliations. The interview produced no remark more political than a 
complaint that, although the Brigades had been withdrawn, Germany and 
Italy. were still sending aid to the rebels. MacDonald also condemned 
the "ruthless" bombing of civilians as the worst aspect of the 
war. 60 
It seems that MacDonald may have been motivated by adventurism 
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and a warlike spirit. He had been about to apply for Spanish 
nationality, in order to enter the Tank Corps, when the withdrawal of 
the Brigades was announced, because he "would have welcomed another 
kind of \var fare" . The interview also contained the curious 
information that MacDonald was about to return to Spain to become a 
photographer with the Propaganda Department of "the National 
Government". There was some confusion of titles in the newspaper 
item, with another reference to the "Nationalists" that could only 
have meant the Loyalists, so one must assume that MacDonald was not 
joining Franco's propaganda department. It is unlikely that he would 
have been welcomed in Franco's Spain or that he would have wished to 
join Franco's service. 
There are two 
MacDonald, although 
the Evening Post 
Wellingtonian" to 
the Workers Weekly 
other sources of information that may relate to 
it cannot be proven absolutely. In July 1937, 
published excerpts from letters from "a young 
his mother and brother,61 and, in August 1937, 
printed a letter from an unnamed New Zealand 
volunteer. 62 Some information in the letters tallies with that 
in the MacDonald interview. 
in January and fought with 
wounded while on patrol with 
The unnamed Brigader had entered Spain 
the Lincoln Battalion. He had been 
five others, four of whom had been 
killed; MacDonald said he was wounded while on patrol and four 
companions had been killed. 63 
having met Dr Jolly and two 
wounded at Jarama. If these 
The letter in the Weekly mentioned 
New Zealand nurses after having been 
letters were from MacDonald, they 
testified to a slightly more political perspective, or an absorption 
of Brigades propaganda. He wrote to his mother, "I hope you tell 
anyone who asks where I am that I am in the Spanish Army fighting 
Fascism", and told his brother, "I am not a Communist nor do I belong 
to a "Red Army"; I am a member of the Spanish Government Army ... " 
The letters stressed the good conditions and organisation of the 
Brigades and also repeated the standard Communist line about the 
purpose of the war, to fight Fascism rather than bring about 
revolution: 
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everywhere the people of Spain ... are as one in their 
desire to crush Fascism. That is the first and most 
important task. When that is finished then the Spanish 
people can decide their own destinies and form of 
Government. 64 
The letter to the Workers Weekly indicated that the writer had 
had little to do with the Communist Party. It was headed "Dear Sir", 
rather 
urged 
will 
than the "Dear Comrade" used by the Communist Brigaders, and 
the Weekly to do all it could for the Spanish people: "You 
be helping the legal Spanish Government which is a Government of 
the Popular Front and is representative of all the Spanish 
people."65 It lacked the assumption of the Weekly's familiarity 
tone of Communist Brigaders' letters. with the war that set the 
These two letters, whether from MacDonald or somebody else, 
demonstrated an unquestioning acceptance of the Communist "line" on 
the war and had rather the air of "duty" letters, written for the 
consumption of people at home. 
There is also some mystery about MacDonald's background. Tom 
Spiller met MacDonald in Spain, and claimed that MacDonald had said 
that he had left New Zealand under a cloud in 1934 after robbing a 
bank in Palmers ton North. This story could not be substantiated. An 
advertisement in the RSA Review for New Zealand Spanish veterans 
received a response from an ex-seaman, who reported that MacDonald 
had been a shipmate on the "Pat Hunter" in 1935 and 1936, having 
signed on in Wellington in late 1935. 
Of these ten New Zealand International Brigaders, the later views 
of only two, Spiller and Riley, are known. Both appeared to retain 
convictions about the war formed when they were in Spain. Of the 
other eight, 
experienced some 
only hearsay 
denting of 
evidence suggests that 
his ideals in Spain. 
Bert Bryan 
All of them, 
Communists, anti-fascists or adventurers, presented a remarkably 
uniform image of the war on their return to New Zealand, or in their 
letters home. The International Brigades were an important and 
effective part of pro-RepUblican propaganda about the war in Spain. 
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They were depicted as the "democratic" army, voluntarily risking 
their lives in Spain for the sake of an ideal, heroically helping to 
stem the tide of Fascism. The New Zealand International Brigaders 
who returned to New Zealand did little to dispel this myth. Among 
those whose stories are known were none who had friends punished for 
political "deviationism", or who had any complaints about the 
political or military discipline in the Brigades. It is certain 
that, had any dissatisfaction been voiced by New Zealand veterans, it 
would have been given coverage by either the daily or weekly press. 
Those who were not Communists demonstrated some acceptance of the 
image of the Brigades, which was not only promoted outside Spain, but 
within the Brigades themselves. Small wonder, then, that Bert Bryan 
may have been angered by being treated as a nobody, instead of a 
hero, by Harry Pollitt; after all, it was only what the men had been 
told. 
In New Zealand the myth of the heroic idealists was supplented in 
a small way by a peculiarly New Zealand image. Tomorrow's interview 
with Eric Griffiths and Salient's with Tom Spiller67 presented 
both 
had 
hero, 
men as laconic, self-deprecating heroes, only doing what they 
to do in going to Spain. In other words, the archetypal "Kiwi" 
man of action, but few (albeit well-chosen) words, in the 
pioneering "do-it-yourself" tradition. In Spiller's case at least, 
given his skills as a "rabble-rousing" orator and the fact that his 
interview occupied almost a whole page in Salient, the image appears 
to have been rather in the writer's mind than in reality. 
In a sense, the label of hero has some truth. Even if the 
Brigades were a Comintern creation, and their value lay as much in 
their use as a propaganda instrument as in their military exploits, 
the fact remains that these New Zealanders joined them voluntarily 
and risked their very lives in a war from which they could have 
remained aloof. Most did fight for an ideal; that others saw their 
ideal as hollo\v, does not deny their own conviction. It was in this 
manner that the deaths of Maclure and Maclaurin were received by some 
of the people who had known them. Perhaps these deaths swayed some 
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\ ( 
Dr D.W. Jolly, New Zealand doctor with a British Medical Unit in 
Spain. (Photo from SMAC Records.) 
minds towards the pro-Republican cause; perhaps, also, Tom Spiller' s 
speeches did so. Certainly his speaking tour on the West Coast 
resulted in the establishment of several SMAC branches along the 
Coast, although it is most likely that his visit merely gave the last 
push to minds already convinced, but hitherto lacking in means of 
expressing their pro-Republicanism. Most of the Brigaders who 
returned to New Zealand arrived too late to have much impact on the 
formation of pro-Republican belief in their own country; however, 
their reports may have strengthened it, and resulted in larger 
collections for the aid of Spanish refugees. 
New Zealand was also represented among the medical personnel in 
Spain. The SMAC sent three nurses in May 1937, and two other nurses 
and a doctor also served in Spain . 
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Dr Douglas Waddell Jolly went to Spain with a British Medical 
Unit. He had qualified as a doctor at Otago Medical School and then 
went to England. It appears that Jolly was not a Communist, but a 
dedicated anti-fascist. On his return to New Zealand in 1939, he 
told both the \~orkers Weekly and daily newspapers: "My sympathies 
were completely with the Government; that was why I went to Spain and 
I saw nothing there which altered my mind. It was definitely a 
Fascist war ... ,,68 
While in Spain, Dr Jolly was attached to a mobile field surgical 
unit, which dealt with cases too urgent to be evacuated to front-line 
hospitals. According to Nurse Dodds, one of the New Zealand nurses 
in Spain, he had a reputation as "a damn fine surgeon".69 He 
held the rank of Division Commandant Surgeon. During his time in 
Spain Jolly contributed the foreword to a propaganda publication 
about the work of the medical units in Spain, entitled We Fight 
Death, an indication of his acceptance of the Communists' direction 
of the medical units and their image of the war. One passage from 
the foreword was clearly an example of Communist inspired propaganda 
about political "discipline": 
Those of 
previous 
political 
necessity 
affairs 
objective 
us better 
us who are only anti-fascists and have had no 
experience of difficult and dangerous work in 
parties find in this life a new significance. The 
of learning by painful experience that personal 
cannot be considered before the needs of the 
situation is a discipline which must make all of 
men and women, better nurses and better doctors.70 
Of course, there is no way of knowing if Jolly actually wrote the 
foreword himself and, if he did, it would certainly have had to be 
passed by the 
SMAC-organised 
censors. However, his willingness to participate in 
speaking tours in New Zealand suggests a commitment to 
the standard pro-Republican view of the war, which also suggests 
willing involvement in the writing of the pamphlet. 
Little is known about Jolly's time in Spain. Because he was 
working with a mobile surgical unit, he was not stationed in any 
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particular area, but moved around the fronts according to where the 
unit was needed the most. Nor is it known when he arrived in Spain, 
but MacDonald's mention of meeting him after being wounded at Jarama, 
indicates that he was in Spain by January or February 1937. 
He returned to New 
speaking tour with 
Zealand in 
Bert Bryan 
early 1939, 
on behalf of 
and made a short 
the SMAC. A 
non-Communist, but anti-fascist, doctor who supported thier cause was 
very useful to the SMAC, which hoped that he could appeal to groups 
the Committee had hitherto not reached. 71 If Jolly's views, were 
indeed, seen by some sections of the public as more authoritative 
than those of working-class Communist International Brigaders, then 
the SMAC must have been pleased with his comments as reported in the 
papers. Jolly attacked non-intervention, claimed that the Spanish 
Government was not Communist, and emphasised the contribution of 
Germany and Italy to the rebels' war effort. 72 
Jolly's later opinions on the war are unknown. He did not remain 
in New Zealand, but returned to Britain and served with the British 
Medical Corps during World War Two. He practised in Britain after 
the war. Jolly wrote a book, published in 1941, based on his 
experiences in Spain, Field Surgery in Total War. 73 However, it 
was concerned solely with the medical and surgical techniques 
developed during the war and made no mention of his own personal 
experiences or political views. The format was that of a textbook, 
and it was no doubt designed for immediate use in World War Two, as 
well as for a record of the medical advances made in Spain. Thus, 
the absence of autobiographical and political material is not 
surprising. 
Of the five New Zealand nurses who worked in Spain, most is known 
about the three who were sent by the New Zealand SMAC. On 18 May 
1937, Sister Renee Shadbolt of Auckland and Nurses Millicent Sharples 
and Isobel Dodds, from Levin and Wellington respectively, left on the 
"Awatea" to join the British Medical Unit in Spain. 
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Volunteers for the medical unit had been advertised for almost as 
soon as the Dunedin Committee was formed. The total number of 
applicants is unknown; however, the report in the Freelance at the 
time of the nurses' departure, that hundreds of applications had been 
received,74 must have been the result of, either, journalistic 
licence, or wishful thinking on the part of the SMAC. In April, Ted 
• Hunter, Dunedin branch secretary, reported to his counterpart in 
Palmerston North that five nurses had volunteered, with the 
possibility of a s ixth. 75 
The three SMAC-sponsored New Zealand nurses. From left Isobel Dodd$, 
Renee Shadbolt and Millicent Sharples (Photo from SMAC Records.) 
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The applicants, two from Auckland, two from Wellington and one 
from Levin, were interviewed by the secretaries of their local SMAC 
branches, and final selection was made by the Dunedin Committee on 
the basis of the secretaries' reports. A panel of three comprising 
Ted Hunter, a Dr Jutton and Dr D.G. McMillan, MP; Chairman of the 
SMAC, chose the three on the criteria of "experience, general 
suitability in view of our purpose, and representation from as many 
areas as possible".76 
The second criterion of "suitability" was a rather vague term, 
and could have covered a wide range of possibilities, but despite the 
political nature of SMAC's aid, it does not seem to have had the 
connotation of political suitability above all else. Sister Shadbolt 
and Nurse Dodds were sympathetic to the Republican cause and came 
from "suitable" Left backgrounds. However, the third nurse, 
Millicent Sharples, seems to have been totally ignorant of the 
situation in Spain, even of the general nature of the opposing 
forces, let alone the complex political permutations of the war. In 
a letter to Ted Hunter, she asked a series of questions that revealed 
her lack of knowledge, not only of what was happening in Spain, but 
of the political affiliations of the SMAC: 
Do we support the Rebels or the Loyalists? Are the 
Loyalists anti-labour or what political party do they 
represent? Are we nurses from N.Z. with the British or 
actually with the party in Spain opposed to the British 
Government? Is there any risk of being disloyal to the 
British flag?77 
of interpretations could have been made of the A variety 
relationship between the Spanish Republican Government and His 
Government in Britain, depending largely upon one's 
views, and the ambiguities of the situation. Ted Hunter's 
Majesty's 
political 
reply to the nurse's third question was rather ingenious, as well as 
being a clear indication of where the SMAC stood on the matter of 
British support for the Loyalists: 
assuming that the N.Z. nurses will be attached to an 
already established British Medical Unit supported and 
sanctioned by the British people there is no question of it 
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being in opposition to the British Government ... Actually 
it is in the best interests of the British Govt and the 
British Empire generally that we assist the Spanish Govt to 
save it from destruction at the hands of the Rebels and the 
foreign invaders ... 78 
Thus, for Nurse Sharples, at least, the decision to nurse in 
Spain was not a political act at all. It was not made to demonstrate 
a strong feeling of support for the Spanish Government, but rather, 
one supposes, made from a humanitarian concern for the suffering in 
Spain. Mrs Isabel McGuire (nee Dodds), the only member of the 
nursing unit still living, suggests that Nurse Sharples also had a 
somewhat more romantic idea of nursing in a war than did the other 
two nurses. 79 Millicent Sharples was reluctant to provide much 
material for propaganda purposes before the nurses left for Spain. 
(The only published statement purported to be from her was so 
political that, given the evidence of her earlier letter, it can only 
be assumed that it was, in fact, written by the SMAC.)80 
Therefore, her reasons for volunteering for nursing duty in Spain are 
less easy to discover than those of the other two nurses, who both 
provided the SMAC with statements to give the press. 
Renee Shadbolt and Isabel Dodds were more aware of what was 
happening in Spain and both were sympathetic to the Republican 
cause. They both came from "Labour" backgrounds; Nurse Dodds' father 
was "a committed socialist", and she herself belonged to the Left 
Book Club. 81 Yet, their volunteering was also not primarily a 
political act but rather, as the New Zealand Herald put it, "in 
pursuit of the high traditions of their calling".82 Renee 
Shadbolt, aged 28, had nursed for eleven years and, as a qualified 
sister, was the leader of the nursing unit. She was undoubtedly the 
most politically minded of the three; C.F. Saunders, secretary of the 
Christchurch branch of the SMAC, described her as "politically very 
well able to hold her own", and the tone of her letters from Spain to 
Ted Hunter suggest strongly her commitment to "the cause". Even so, 
the most striking note in her press statements in May 1937, was the 
humanitarian element, the desire to alleviate suffering. To the 
Herald she said: 
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Personally I do not know whether any great question of 
political adherence was involved but from what I have been 
able to read all my sympathies are with the Loyalists in 
their struggles for their country ... I only hope that I 
shall be able to perform some useful work in Spain ... we 
feel that we can be of some service to people in need.84 
Her comments to the Standard were decidedly more political in tone, 
as could be expected, given the nature of the newspaper. But what 
was almost a paean to the cause of the Spanish Government, also 
revealed her view of her own role in Spain as essentially one of 
service to the suffering: 
I go gladly, hoping that my aid experience will be of some 
value in alleviating the suffering of Spain I feel that 
if man can sacrifice his all for [an] ideal then surely 
women can do something we can at least offer our nursing 
experience. Suffering has no nationality so my services are 
there for friend and foe alike ... 85 
Mrs McGuire recalled the "Florence Nightingale" concept of their 
jobs, which she felt most nurses had at the time: "You know, we were 
almost brainwashed with the idea of service ... handmaidens to the 
doctors, servants to the patients."86 Furthermore, the epitome 
of this training for service was to nurse in wartime. Added to Nurse 
Dodds' main impulse to be of service to the wounded, and her sympathy 
for the Republican cause, was an interest in travel - "so if you're 
young and interested in travel and you carry a torch, off you go!" 
Isobel Dodds was an anti-fascist, but, "I was a nurse first; we went 
there to nurse".87 
The sense of youthful idealism that Mrs McGuire recalls as being 
a major part in her volunteering to go to Spain was apparent in her 
statement to the Standard: 
There is in everyone, hidden or otherwise, some spark of 
idealism which at some time or another influences the life 
of an individual. This was perhaps the reason I started 
nursing, and now, when I may put that knowledge to some real 
use in a land divided by civil war, which threatens 
democracy. I am proud that I should be one of those to help 
in unfortunate Spain.SS 
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Even after some time, that spark had not dimmed, for she wrote to her 
sister: "I'm glad you're going nursing ... And when you are through 
we will run off together and win whatever war happens to be waging at 
the time.,,89 
Thus, there was a combination of reasons behind the nurses' 
decision to go to Spain. A sense of adventure and a wish to see the 
world outside New Zealand, a deep commitment to their profession that 
fueled a desire to give help where it was most needed and, for the 
two younger women, a certain amount of political idealism. 
The SMAC's aim to give visible aid to the Spanish Government as 
soon as possible was coupled with the need to have a focus for 
fundraising in New Zealand, which the selection and despatch of three 
nurses filled very well. In the last few weeks before the nurses 
went, they were in the public eye as much as the SMAC could make it 
so. Particularly in 
Wellington for Nurses 
Auckland, whence they departed, but also in 
Dodds and Sharples, there were rounds of 
farewell meetings to attend. Some special meetings were arranged 
with the larger Trades Unions, which gave generous support to the 
medical aid appeals. The Railway Workshops and the Watersiders' 
Unions in both Wellington and Auckland had their own meetings for the 
nurses. A final farewell meeting in Auckland was attended by such 
luminaries as the Mayor of Auckland, Sir Ernest Davis, and the 
Chairman of the Auckland Hospital Board. Peter Fraser, who was 
acting Prime Minister at the time, was invited to attend. He did 
not, but, instead, spoke to the nurses by telephone later when they 
were on board the "Awatea".90 
The departure of the nurses in a blaze of publicity was not 
without incident. It had its excitement somewhat dimmed by an 
encounter with the police that had the SMAC and its supporters up in 
arms. On 18 May, the day of departure, the nurses were summoned from 
the close of a meeting at the Otahuhu Rail\vay Workshops to the 
Central Police Station, to discuss matters in connection with their 
passports. Under regulations just issued in Britain, in compliance 
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with the Non-Intervention Agreement, British passports were no longer 
valid for Spain, unless specially endorsed. Entitlement for travel 
to Spain so endorsed was limited to persons under the auspices of 
named organisations, of which the SMAC was one. However, the almost 
immediate discovery of this fact by the police (who said they were 
acting on a request from the Internal Affairs Department) did not 
prevent the nurses being held for almost three hours for questioning, 
ostensibly because they refused to hand over their passports. 
They were subjected to intensive questioning, to which the SMAC 
later objected on the grounds that it was of a political nature, 
designed to discover the nurses' political sympathies. Indeed, the 
statements later made by the nurses in Sydney (witnessed by a Justice 
of the Peace) would seem to bear out this claim. Along with personal 
particulars, the nurses were asked if they had taken part in any 
Communist activities, or if they belonged to the Communist Party. 
Interest was also shown in their reasons for going to Spain, the 
manner in which they initially came into contact with the SMAC and 
the length of their acquaintanceship with Tom Stanley, who had driven 
them to the Police Station. 91 
A slightly different tactic was taken with each of the nurses. 
In Renee Shadbolt's case, the suggestion was made that she was the 
Secretary of a Communist Party cell, or otherwise deeply involved in 
Communist activities. Nurse Sharples' political naivete was 
emphasised, and it was implied that Isobel Dodds was going to Spain 
to escape the consequences of an unhappy love affair. 
Mrs McGuire remembered that the nurses were quite sure they would 
miss the boat as a result of their detention at the police station 
from 2.00 pm until 5.00 pm. However, they were released in time for 
the "Awatea's" departure. The minor storm that erupted in New 
Zealand over their interrogation has been discussed in Chapter 7. 
The nurses spent some time in Australia before departing on the 
"Mooltan" for London. Their passage around Australia appears almost 
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like 
ship 
a minor form of "royal progress". 
called, the nurses were feted 
At every city into which the 
by the local Spanish Relief 
Committee (SRC), the SMAC's Australian counterpart. They were a 
valuable focus for propaganda and fundraising in Australia, as they 
were in New Zealand. They spoke at meetings and lectures, and on 
radio stations, and had teas, lunches and dinners with local 
dignitaries and 
for propaganda, 
women's organisations. As well as using the nurses 
of course, the Australian SRCs were looking after 
them for their fraternal organisation, and showing their appreciation 
of, and admiration for, the women's decision to serve in Spain. 
Not everyone 
surrounding them. 
had told Nurse 
appreciated the nurses' cause, or the publicity 
Renee Shadbolt reported that "some fool of a man" 
Sharples that the "Mooltan" had been bombed on an 
earlier trip (a plane flew overhead when passing the Bay of Biscay), 
and "he thought that the publicity we were getting was imperilling 
the safety of the other passengers".92 
After their "royal" reception in Australia, the nurses were 
rather taken aback to find no one to meet them in London; they had to 
find their own way to the offices of the London SMAC. Here they were 
not so much of a rarity as in New Zealand, or even Australia; yet, 
they were a focus for propaganda at meetings and lectures while they 
were in England. The High Commissioner for New Zealand, W.J. Jordan, 
was a fellow guest at a dinner held by the Ladies Union, but, in 
keeping with the Government's cautious attitude to associating itself 
with the Republican cause outside the League of Nations, it appears 
that there was no official welcome for the nurses from New Zealand 
House. On 15 July the three women left for Spain, travelling from 
the French border to Barcelona with an American ambulance convoy. 
At first, all three were stationed at a base hospital at Huete, 
in Central Spain near Cuenca, some 300 to 400 miles from Valencia. 
However, in October 1937, Nurse Sharples was posted to the Aragon 
front. Her ability to drive meant that she was useful as an 
ambulance driver. Little is known about her time in Spain, for she 
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did not write to the SMAC as Renee Shadbolt did, nor were any of her 
letters passed on to the SMAC, as were those of Nurse Dodds to her 
family. What is known comes from newspaper reports after her early 
return in May 1938. (The other two remained in Spain until the 
withdrawal of the International Brigades, and arrived back in New 
Zealand in early 1939.) 
When Nurse Sharples returned to New Zealand, she told the Herald 
that she had not been based at anyone hospital, but had "moved 
around from pillar to post" as the front had changed. Her interview 
with the Herald also indicated that her understanding of the war had 
broadened somewhat: 
People make me 
It might have 
now from what 
Germans.93 
laugh here when they talk about civil war. 
been one when the fighting first started but 
I can see they are fighting Italians and 
Yet, her concern centred most around the people of Spain, their 
suffering under the "indiscriminate" bombings by the rebel forces, 
and their courage and determination to win. 
The circumstances of her return to New Zealand were somewhat 
confused, and her relations with the SMAC were to remain in that 
condition. She had been told that she was being sent home to raise 
money for a mobile field surgery, or "auto-chir" and was then to 
return to Spain. Neither the New Zealand nor the London SMAC were 
informed of this decision before the nurse left Spain. 94 From 
the considerable correspondence in SMAC files on the matter, it 
appears that Nurse Sharples may have fallen foul of the political 
discipline exercised over the International Brigades and 
international medical units in Spain. Sister Shadbolt informed the 
Committee that Nurse Sharples' conduct had been such that it was 
deemed necessary for her to be recalled. However, she could offer 
only hearsay 
behaviour. 9S 
information, 
evidence of 
The Australian 
and replied 
unsatisfactory and 
nurse, Mary Lowson, 
that there was a 
unprofessional 
was asked for 
good deal of 
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rumour-mongering and political rivalry among medical personnel. She 
reported that one source had both criticised Millicent Sharples for 
her complete lack of political awareness and commended her courage 
and dedication under bombardment. 96 Perhaps the most telling 
comment came from Winifred Bates, an Englishwoman collecting 
propaganda material for the London SMAC, who had met the three nurses 
at Huete: 
Millicent never really grasped the disciplined conditions of 
life here. She was willing to endure much, but one needs 
more than endurance in a war like this. One needs vision 
and a highly skilled knowledge. Millicent was kind and 
generous but there was much that she did not understand 
... 97 
Political naivete and a strong personality that did not take 
kindly to direction were perhaps the reasons for her failure to "fit 
in" in Spain. Her association with the SMAC once back in New Zealand 
was fraught with the same problems. Nurse Sharples had returned to 
New Zealand with a deep commitment to sending aid to Spain and a 
burning desire to return to nurse in Spain. She also brought with 
her some grievances. She resented having been sent back when she 
could have been aiding the suffering in Spain, and also had some 
complaints about the use to which medical aid funds were being put in 
Spain. However, although she alluded to misuse of funds, she never 
made clear the basis of her complaint. 
The Committee, naturally, did not wish her to raise this issue 
publicly, but had considerable difficulty in convincing her not to do 
so. Her sense of grievance was strengthened when the SMAC appeared 
reluctant to organise a speaking tour to raise money for the 
"auto-chir". In fact they, had decided that, as she was a poor 
speaker and had little grasp of the political issues they wished to 
stress, it would be better to limit her speaking to small informal 
gatherings. 98 They also had the added problem of her urgent wish 
to return to Spain, with or without money for a mobile surgery. 
The nurse, by her own account "a woman of action", grew more 
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"disgusted with the organisation" as it refused 
organise her own speaking tour or to return to 
to allow her to 
Spain. 99 The 
SMAC, in 
direction, 
in going 
that she 
turn, became exasperated with her refusal to accept their 
although Ted Hunter acknowledged her sacrifice and courage 
to Spain. 100 Eventually, in June 1938, it was decided 
should return to her home district of Hawkes Bay and go 
about raising 
Napier branch 
Committee. 
funds in her own way; she was to be attached to the 
of the SMAC and to receive financial support from the 
However, Nurse Sharples also refused to accept the direction of 
the Napier Committee. In July, the branch secretary informed Hunter 
that "the foolish remarks of an irresponsible woman" were putting the 
branch's operation in jeopardy. 101 The secretary claimed that, 
when Nurse Sharples had given a radio talk in Napier it had been 
"censored" by the station manager, but when a SMAC meeting had been 
informed of this censorship, the nurse had then denied it. The 
denial made the members of the executive who had accompanied her to 
the station, and then raised the matter at the meeting, look like 
liars: "this is serious as they are well known in the working class 
movement here and you know how damaging a lie like that can 
be".102 The nurse had also told some SMAC members in Napier that 
the Co-ordinating Committee in Paris had allowed monies to fall into 
Franco's hands. As a result, several unions were threatening to 
withdraw from the Committee. 
The National Committee in Dunedin decided that Nurse Sharples had 
become more of a liability than a focus for fund raising. She was 
accepting their financial support, but not their direction, and was, 
in fact, discrediting their cause. Thus, she was formally requested 
to return to private life and sever her connections with the SMAC, 
which, however, accepted financial responsibility for her until she 
could find a job. 
However, this was not the end of the matter. Nurse Sharples went 
to Wellington and aired her grievances to Dr McMillan, and engaged 
the sympathies 
September she 
same claims 
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of the Wellington SMAC secretary, Mrs McGowan. In 
appeared in Christchurch and then Auckland, making the 
about the misuse of funds and the Committee's 
mistreatment of her. She had earlier threatened to sue the Committee 
for continued financial support. 103 By October, the situation 
had died down somewhat; the SMAC's files carried less correspondence 
to do with Nurse Sharples and no further communications with the 
nurse herself. There is no record of what happened to her after this 
time. 
Although Ted 
Nurse Sharples' 
Hunter dismissed 
severance from 
as "absurd" the suggestion that 
the SMAC was because of her 
unwillingness to follow a particular political line, the problem of 
political understanding was a factor in the whole rather unsavoury 
affair. The nurse obviously did not understand the SMAC's desire to 
present a United Front, nor probably its political basis per se. 
Misuse of funds was a serious claim and a sensitive issue, perhaps 
particularly for Ted Hunter, since correspondents to the Otago Daily 
Times had sometimes questioned the destination of monies raised. As 
has been discussed in Chapter 7, the New Zealand Committee did its 
best to see that its money went to its own nurses, but had little 
control over the distribution of funds once they had left New 
Zealand. Moreover, it was not an issue to be aired in public. Not 
only could the SMAC's "enemies" use such a charge against it; those 
of its membership who were not Communists could have also become 
disenchanted. 
It would be tempting to see Nurse Sharples as a victim of the 
"political discipline" imposed by the Communist Party in Spain over 
the International Brigades, and even in New Zealand by the SMAC's 
leadership. In a sense, she was indeed a victim of this discipline, 
but her own personality also played a part in the situation, 
especially with regard to the SMAC. Her letters to the Committee 
revealed a very determined self-willed woman, who did not appear to 
be willing to accept any direction at all. This was particularly 
galling to the Committee, since it was, after all, supporting her 
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financially. There is no doubting Nurse Sharples' sincere concern 
for the victims of the war in Spain; her political naivete might not 
have been such a problem had she not been so set on her own methods 
of operation. 
The other two nurses appeared to accept the political and 
military discipline under which they were placed. They complained 
about censorship of their letters and they were affected by political 
and personal divisions among the medical personnel, but this seemed 
to have no lasting effect on their perceptions of their role in the 
war. In early 1938, both wrote that "due to internal strife" and 
certain "unpopular people" the London SMAC had withdrawn all 
financial support from the hospital at Huete. Renee Shadbolt further 
informed George Jackson that the London Committee had not 
"contributed a penny to our upkeep since being in Spain".104 
However, it seemed they reserved their resentment for the London 
Committee rather than becoming disillusioned with the political 
divisions among 
the New Zealand 
the international aid organisations in Spain. Once 
Committee had decided to send its funds through the 
Centrale Sanitaire Internationale in Paris, and the medical service 
had become more centralised under the Spanish Government, the nurses 
made no further complaint. 
The nurses were stationed at Huete until early 1938, although 
they had tried to get postings to Madrid so that they could work in a 
front-line hospital. The hospital was evacuated when it was feared 
that a rebel offensive might cut the road between Madrid and 
Valencia, and the nurses were sent to a spa outside Barcelona to help 
establish a new hospital for International Brigaders. In June 1938, 
they were sent for a month's holiday in England. When they returned, 
they were sent to a hospital at Hataro in Catalonia, where they spent 
the rest of their time in Spain. 
Their letters gave evidence of poor food and working conditions. 
Nurse Dodds suffered from gastric ailments and later recalled that 
their conditions were "really very primitive". Yet, her lively and 
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descriptive letters home gave no hint of regrets or disillusionment 
with the "cause". One, in particular, revealed a rather romantic 
image of a Republican village, with children singing the 
"Internationale" on their way to school and soldiers whose hearts 
were warmed by "the knowledge that they are fighting for what they 
know to be Right and Truth".lOS Although she went on to describe 
her own words as sounding like "mush", it was obvious that this 
self-styled "sentimental" imagery \.,as a fundamental part of her 
feelings about the war. Both nurses were very matter of fact in 
their letters about the conditions under which they worked, and they 
constantly stressed their admiration for the Spanish people's bravery 
and determination to resist Franco. 
Apart from nursing and helping to teach Spanish girls the 
rudiments of nursing, the two New Zealand women also undertook some 
propaganda work. In November 1937, they were sent to Madrid to give 
a radio broadcast. Besides giving them an opportunity to help the 
Republican cause, it was also a chance to revel in the unaccustomed 
luxury of "spring beds with crisp clean linen".106 
After the nurses were withdrawn from Spain with the International 
Brigades, towards the end of October 1938, they planned to remain in 
England and find private nursing work for a time before travelling in 
Europe. They were especially interested in going to Russia. 
However, it proved impossible to find nursing work, and they 
reluctantly decided to return home in January 1939, having spent 
their time in England working for the London SMAC. 
The nurses arrived home on 20 January 1939, to a flurry of 
meetings of welcome, including a mayoral reception in Auckland, 
hosted by the deputy mayor, and a dinner attended by many of Sister 
Shadbolt's former patients. They were still attached to the SMAC, 
which had pledged to support them until they could obtain nursing 
positions. In February 1939, they embarked upon a speaking tour 
organised by the Committee to raise funds for food for Loyalist Spain 
and for the refugees in France. 
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Not everyone welcomed the nurses with enthusiasm and admiration. 
The mayor of Westport was reported to have refused to chair a meeting 
in that town at which the nurses were to speak. Mr J. Kilkenny 
believed in the adage, "charity begins at home". He thought that the 
nurses would have been better advised to stay at home, where they 
were needed as urgently as in Spain, or else at least look no further 
for humanitarian work than Australia, at the time devastated by bush 
fires, and 
ourselves". 
whose people were "the same flesh and blood as 
The fact that Australia had not been raging with bush 
fires when the nurses lef,t was apparently lost on Mr Kilkenny, who 
went on to say: 
as a member of the Crippled Childrens Society I found 
that much work was necessary to relieve and alleviate the 
pain and suffering of the affected children of the nation 
and the anxiety of their parents. That in itself is a 
man-sized job for capable nurses without interfering in 
other people's business.107 
Kilkenny's insularity and ethnocentrism closely parallelled the 
editorial attitudes adopted by some newspapers, such as Truth or the 
Observer. Mrs McGuire recalled that a certain amount of ill-will was 
encountered on the speaking tour, especially from Catholics. She 
felt that a general impression that the Spanish Government was 
Communist, and that the Spanish people were all Communists, led to 
the nurses being treated with a certain amount of suspicion. 
After the speaking tour was over, Renee Shadbolt maintained 
contact with the SMAC and worked with the organisation in its attempt 
to induce the Government to allow refugees from the war to enter the 
country. After a SMAC-sponsored holiday, in April 1939, she returned 
to nursing, and later became a matron at an Auckland hospital. 
Isabel Dodds married in 1940 and went to England with her husband. 
She returned to New Zealand in the 1970s and presently lives in 
Wellington. 
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Despite the hardships encountered, the problems with money, mail 
and food, and the tiring work, the two nurses' enthusiasm for their 
work never flagged. While the time they spent in Spain could not be 
described as a directly "politicising" experience, in that they did 
not return to New Zealand holding political views more radical than 
when they left, neither did it disillusion them. They returned to 
New Zealand as convinced of the justice of the Republican cause as 
when they had left, if not more so. Their experiences did strengthen 
their commitment to the Spanish Government, but primarily from a 
personal and 
differentiate 
commitment. 
humanitarian point 
the humanitarian 
Admiration for 
of view. 
impulse 
It 
from 
the Spanish 
is difficult to 
the political 
people's and the 
International Brigades' courage and determination, and hatred for the 
indiscriminate bombing by the rebels and their German and Italian 
allies, went hand in hand with anti-fascism. Yet, the nurses' first 
impulse to go to Spain was born of humanitarianism, and their concern 
for the Spanish people remained essentially humanitarian in nature, 
reinforced by what they had seen in Spain and coloured naturally by a 
general anti-fascist, "pro-Left" outlook. The time spent in Spain 
was, for Mrs McGuire at least, an intensely personal experience, 
rather than a political one. 
There is scant information on the other two New Zealand women who 
nursed in Spain. The only evidence about Dorothy Morris, formerly of 
Christchurch, appeared in an article in the The Press, in May 1937. 
She had been in Spain since February 1937, with a British medical 
unit under the supervision of Sir George Young, a former British 
diplomat and Professor of Portugese at the University of London. The 
unit had at first been stationed in Catalonia, but, after the fall of 
Malaga, had been moved to Almeria to organise relief hospitals. The 
letter gave little evidence of her political views, for it was mainly 
describing the unit's experiences in establishing relief hospitals 
around Almeria. The nurse did, however, describe the International 
Brigaders as "a very fine type indeed" and "very well 
organised" .108 
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Sister Una Wilson went to Spain with the Australian medical 
unit. Accounts 
published by the 
Spain. l09 They 
secretary of the 
of her experiences in Spain appeared in a pamphlet 
Australian SRC, entitled From the Battlefields of 
were in the form of letters home to Phil Thorne, 
Sydney SRC, and to nursing friends, and included 
large extracts from her diary. Excerpts from the pamphlet were 
published in the Herald in July and September 1937. 
Sister Wilson was stationed at a front-line hospital in Madrid, 
which received casualties directly from the battlefield. Her letters 
and diary notes revealed the strain and dangers faced by nurses in 
Spain to a far greater degree than did the letters of the two SMAC 
nurses. 
quality. 
Indeed, some of the diary entries had an almost nightmarish 
During the Jarama, offensive the hospital was under almost 
constant bombardment and was receiving as many as 600 casualties a 
day. Sister Wilson and another Australian nurse were often the only 
theatre sisters available; therefore they worked day and night. In 
any case their beds were usually occupied by wounded soldiers: rTI 
used just to flop down on the theatre floor or somewhere if there 
happened to be a couple of hours to spare."110 
The physical and mental strain of the work was exacerbated by 
Sister Wilson's inability to tolerate much of the Spanish food. In 
late March 1937, after two months of intensive work, she suffered a 
nervous breakdown and temporary amnesia and was sent for a holiday in 
Barcelona. Yet, these experiences did nothing to diminish her 
enthusiasm for her work. She wrote to nursing friends in July 1937: 
I shudder myself to think that I might not have come ... if 
they don't pop me off this time just think of the almight 
experience. As a matter of fact I'm itching to get back to 
the Front now, that's how it gets one. III 
She also took the opportunity to reassure a Catholic nursing 
friend that there was "not an ounce of truth" in reports of 
atrocities. 112 Una Wilson also had nothing but praise for the 
organisation of the hospitals and the treatment of the nurses. She 
emphasised the fact that there was "no distinction of any kind. 
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Doctors, nurses, soldiers and everyone live under precisely the same 
conditions". 
No further information about Una Wilson could be found. If she 
returned from Spain, it is likely that she went back to Australia 
rather than New Zealand. Her experiences, even more than the other 
nurses', revealed the dedication to their work that was the basis of 
their 
letters 
travelling to 
best sums 
Spain. And perhaps a line from one of her 
up their feelings a bout the war: "[ we] have been 
through untold hardships, but have the satisfaction of knowing we 
have given our utmost."113 
Franco also received a New Zealander's aid. Philip Cross 
returned to New Zealand in early 1938, after having spent some time 
with the rebel forces in Spain. In interviews with the Freelance and 
NZ Radio Record, he gave little indication of his motives for doing 
so. Cross was an actor and film maker, and sometime bullfighting 
apprentice, who had left New Zealand in 1928 to roam the world. When 
the rebellion began, he was in Spain with an Anglo-Spanish film 
company, making a film in the small village of Alcala de los 
Gazules: "Most of the able-bodied men in the village joined the 
Royalist army and the five men in the company joined up with Franco 
as well."114 
It is possible, then, that Cross had little choice in the matter, 
if the whole village was pro-Franco, although as a foreigner he could 
have evaded being pressed into service. He told the Freelance that 
he joined Franco's army in the company of the brother of a Spanish 
actress with whom he worked. lIS This man and another with whom 
he fought were Castilian aristocrats; perhaps their attitudes towards 
Franco's rebellion had an influence on the New Zealander, and 
combined with an adventurous nature, and proximity, to send him into 
service with Franco. 
Cross was reluctant, at first, to talk much about his war 
experiences with the newspapers. However, he gave the Radio Record 
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his opinions about Franco. He claimed that Franco was not a Fascist, 
but "a Spaniard 
inch of Spanish 
through and through", who would not give away one 
territory to Germany or Italy. He pointed out that 
they had been paid already in- raw materials, which removed the 
necessity for either territorial or commercial concessions when 
Franco won. He was also of the opinion that Franco would restore the 
monarchy in Spain. 116 
Cross was with Franco's army in the early stages of the war. He 
fought in the siege of Madrid and was captured by the "Reds" at 
Boadilla, and sentenced to death by firing squad, but was reprieved 
when the Moors took the town. He was later wounded and invalided out 
of the army. He returned to England, where he claimed to have worked 
with the General Relief Fund for Distressed Women and Children in 
Spain. (This organisation would appear to be the same as the 
"[Entirely Neutral] Relief Fund for Distressed Women and Children in 
Spain", on whose behalf Lady Austen Chamberlain had requested butter 
from Nash in 1937. 117 ). 
After his initial interview with the Radio Record in April 1938, 
Cross wrote two articles for the paper about his experiences in 
Spain. The first, published in May 1938, was entitled "I Listened 
for the Firing Squad" and described his capture at Boadilla and 
subsequent escape. lIS The article was mostly concerned with 
Cross' interior thoughts as he waited for execution by the "Reds", 
along with two Castilian noblemen, Jacinto and Roberto, some 
"Regulars" of Franco's army and several Moors. Cross made little 
reference to the "Reds" in his article except to note that they were 
attacking "in Russian style - led by Russians". He also made little 
comment about his fellow prisoners, except to note that noble 
Castilians knew how to die. Cross' second story about the war was 
one of the more curious "atrocity" stories to reach New Zealand. 
Like many atrocity stories, this one, which appeared in the 22 June 
1938 issue of the Radio Record, was fundamentally about sex. 119 
It concerned a young Spanish actress, Pastora, daughter of a noble 
Castilian family and sister of his friend Jacinto. 
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The story could almost have been a script for one of the films 
Cross had made. He had been in Madrid, he said, searching for an 
actress to play against his leading actress Maria, Victoria. In the 
Cathedral he saw the perfect face. Because she was obviously a 
Castilian aristocrat he could never even speak to her, let alone ask 
her to act in a film. However, by an extraordinary coincidence, he 
met her again that night outside the Giralda tower. She recognised 
him as "Felipe", her brother Jacinto's friend, and because he was 
known to the family she was allowed to act in the film. 
When the war began, her brother took her to Madrid for safety 
(which was rather odd, since Madrid was to become a bastion of 
Republican resistance). He and Cross joined Franco's army. Later 
Cross left for England and worked with the General Relief Fund. He 
and a friend, Guillermo Ros, were sent by the Fund to Barcelona to 
make a film showing the Fund's work for victims of the war. There he 
encountered Pastora again, in horrifying circumstances. She had been 
taken hostage, he said, to prevent her family from supporting 
Franco. (Rather late in the day, since her brother had been with the 
rebels from the outset. ) Because she had been an actress she was 
forced to work as a "frivola", a naked dancer and "singer of lewd 
songs", in a Barcelona cabaret filled with the "ruffians of every 
European nationality". Cross claimed that after the abdication of 
Alfonso in 1931 the Republic had allowed such vices and, by 1936, 
almost every cafe had its "frivolas". 
The story ended in tragedy. As Cross was leaving for England, 
his Spanish friend pressed a letter into his hand and told him to 
read it on the boat. The letter said that Pastora's father had been 
killed in Madrid. On learning that she no longer needed to be a 
hostage for her father's life, Pastora had shot herself. 
It is difficult to ascertain the truth of this story. It had all 
the hallmarks of a manufactured atrocity story, with its central 
element of sex, and the degradation of womanhood so often ascribed to 
the Loyalists. There is no evidence to support Cross' claim that 
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naked dancers appeared in cafes allover Spain, before or after the 
war began. Nor is there any record of actresses, dancers, singers or 
aristocrats being forced to dance naked before Republican soldiers, 
although instances of this may have occurred. As George Orwell noted 
in Homage to Catalonia, in Barcelona, at the beginning of the war, 
the Anarchists closed most of the cabarets and brothels down. 120 
The allegation had a faint echo of the Nazi propaganda about the 
licentiousness and decadence of the Weimar Republic. 
There was also a discrepancy between Cross' two stories. In his 
tale of capture by the Loyalists Cross mentioned a Jacinto Guerrora; 
in his other story, "the sister of Jacinto, my soldier friend", was 
Pastora Soler. 
Nevertheless, a germ of truth may have been embellished to make a 
better story. Cross' tale of a Castilian noble-woman's humiliation 
cannot be proved or disproved. Truth or untruth, it revealed that he 
felt 
show 
seem 
views 
some commitment to 
the Republicans in 
to be related to any 
published in its 
Franco's cause, in that he was disposed to 
a bad light. Yet, that commitment did not 
religious beliefs. Cross did not have his 
the Catholic newspapers. After his brief 
appearance in the newspapers in 1938, Cross could not be traced. He 
told the Freelance that he was planning to make a film for New 
Zealand's centennial in 1940, but it does not appear that he did 
so.121 It seems likely that he did not stay in New Zealand, 
where opportunities for either acting or film-making were scarce. 
Given New Zealand's distance from the conflict, it is not 
surprising that the number of New Zealanders who participated in the 
war, in whatever capacity, was so small. Nor is it surprising that, 
of those whose point of departure is known, most arrived in Spain, 
not from Antipodean shores, but from points much closer to the scene 
of battle. Because there were so few New Zealanders in Spain, and 
because so little is known about the political or social backgrounds, 
motives, or reactions once in Spain, of some, it is difficult to 
generalise from their accounts to any conclusions about what they 
represented. 
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Certainly the Communist Party and the SMAC presented the 
International Brigaders and the SMAC-sponsored nurses as 
representatives of the united, anti-Fascist, pro-Republican 
conscience of New Zealand, and doubtless many New Zealand 
pro-Republicans agreed with this image. In their mix of Communist, 
Leftist, anti-Fascist and humanitarian motives, the International 
Brigaders were probably representative of New Zealand 
pro-Republicanism. The relative unity of opinion among returned 
International Brigaders and nurses, in terms of their continued 
support of the Republican cause, did also, in a sense, reflect 
pro-Republican opinion in New Zealand. None, apparently, returned to 
New Zealand disillusioned with what they had seen in Spain, except, 
perhaps, Bert Bryan who did not make any public complaints (and 
evidence of whose disillusion is only hearsay). Among 
pro-Republicans in New Zealand, also, there was little evidence of 
the political dissensions among the Left, that marred the Republican 
war effort, being transferred to the movement in support of the 
Republican cause. In both cases, the unifying factor in opinion (if 
not in co-ordination of activity) was the concern that Fascism should 
not triumph in Spain. 
Philip Cross, however, did not appear to be representative of 
pro-Francoist opinion in New Zealand, which was mainly Catholic. Had 
he been a committed Catholic pro-Francoist, it is likely that he 
would have made some reference to the crusade for God in Spain, or to 
the "Communist plot". Nevertheless, in his "atrocity" story, Cross 
certainly represented a significant element in the pro-Francoist 
presentation of the war. 
The impact of the returning International Brigaders, nurses and 
one pro-Francoist on non-aligned New Zealanders is difficult to 
assess. Coverage in daily and weekly newspapers of some experiences 
indicates some interest, but this was only natural. Newspapers often 
reported the more general observations about the "outside" world of 
New Zealanders returned from overseas. Thus, it is not surprising 
that New Zealanders who had been involved in such a violent and 
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politically interesting foreign war should have been reported in the 
press. It is notable that the popular weekly papers, the Freelance 
and the Weekly News, concentrated upon the less political of the 
International Brigaders, Madigan and Griffiths. Most of the New 
Zealanders who had been to Spain returned too late for their stories 
and opinions to have much impact, in terms of creating pro-Republican 
sentiment, although concern about the bombing of vicilians and the 
plight of Spanish refugees from Franco may have been increased. Of 
those who returned earlier, Griffiths was not a major feature in the 
SMAC's or the Communist Party's propaganda campaigns and Spiller was, 
more or less, "preaching to the converted" in his speaking tours. 
Of those who died, Maclaurin was the most widely reported, 
possibly because his death came so early in the war and also because 
of his status as a "New Zealand intellectual". Note has been made 
also of the impact of Maclure's death upon his contemporaries at 
Otago University. All the deaths would have aided in "bringing home" 
the war to New Zealanders. 
Some distinction has been made between motives essentially 
political and those based on adventurism, but all of these New 
Zealanders who went to Spain were, in a sense, adventurers. It is 
surely indicative of an adventurous spirit to choose to become 
involved in a war that one might safely regard and discuss from a 
distance. 
sentiment 
If they represented anything, they all surely indicated a 
shared by the Labour Government, pro-Republicans and 
pro-Francoists, that Spain was "our" concern, and that, whatever the 
outcome for Spain and for Europe, it impinged on New Zealand as well. 
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CONCLUSION 
has been entitled "Bringing It Home". The most 
in which the war was "brought home" was in the 
pro-Francoism and pro-Republicanism in New Zealand, 
groups' application of the issues of the war to the New 
In this sense, it might be argued that "Non 
Interventionists" were more concerned to "keep it away". However, 
their opinions upon matters relating to the war, such as the relative 
merits of the British and New Zealand Governments' policies 
demonstrated that, 
their thinking. 
of "bringing home" 
even indirectly, the war had some influence upon 
It is considered that there were differing degrees 
the war in New Zealand, but that expression of 
opinion on the war and any manifestation of concern about it showed 
that it was seen by New Zealanders as having some significance. 
However, there are few indications that the Spanish Civil War had 
any great or lasting impact upon the minds of most New Zealanders, 
just as there is little evidence to suggest that more than a minority 
became involved in the issue. The conflict was soon overshadowed by 
the greater war that pro-Republicans had predicted, even if the 
Communists by that time were no longer calling for a coalition 
against Fascism, but instead for opposition to an imperialist war. 
The New Zealand response to the Spanish Civil War is not 
quantifiable; in the absence of opinion polls there is no way of 
knowing what percentage of New Zealanders even knew about the war. 
F.L.W. Wood's contention that "to many New Zealanders, as to many 
Englishmen, the Spanish Government seemed to stand broadly for the 
humane and liberal and democratic principles shared by the British 
and New Zealand Labour Movements"l may have been influenced to a 
degree by his own perceptions of the war and those of the people with 
whom he associated in, for example, the League of Nations Union and 
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the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. Nevertheless, it 
is clear that the conception of the Popular Front Government as the 
legitimately elected constitutional authority of Spain had some 
influence in creating sympathy for the Republican cause, as well as 
concern about the British non-intervention policy. Furthermore, 
perceived similarities between the New Zealand and Spanish 
Governments' social-democratic, reformist. policies were a factor in 
the development of a pro-Republican response among the Left. The 
Communist Party's image of a war between democracy and Fascism was 
generally 
unity of 
adopted. However, it has been shown that the considerable 
opinion about the war demonstrated by the Left did not lead 
to an equivalent unity of action. 
Of all the international crises of the late 1930s that aroused 
concern about the increasing menace of Fascist military aggression, 
the Spanish Civil War was the most ideologically identified and 
politically divisive. In this respect it appears that the existence 
of a Labour Government in New Zealand at the time both contributed to 
and worked against the establishment of a United Front of 
pro-Republican opinion. The Communist Party's insistence that New 
Zealand had a special part to play in the international campaign for 
solidarity with the Spanish Government echoed a less specific feeling 
among Labour's supporters that the triumph of social democracy in New 
Zealand might also have some influence upon the international scene. 
There is also no doubt that an attack on a progressive Government in 
Spain was considered to have a bearing on the situation in New 
Zealand, even if most on the Left did not go so far as to imagine 
that their Labour Government's opponents were planning an imminent 
military revolt. 
On the other 
pro-Republicanism and 
with Communism meant 
cautious in their 
influenced both by 
hand, 
public 
that 
espousal 
concern 
obvious Communist involvement with 
identification of the Republican cause 
the Labour Party and the Government were 
of pro-Republicanism. Caution was 
about the reactions of Catholic Labour 
voters and by Labour's long-standing avoidance of any association 
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with Communism. There is no evidence that the divisions between 
PSUC, PODM and Anarchists in Spain specifically exacerbated divisions 
among the Left in New Zealand, although events in Spain may not have 
contributed to the healing of any rifts. However, the attitudes of 
the Labour Government and of the Standard show that the issue was 
"brought horne" by Labour, but not to the extent of treating it as a 
matter for debate within the Labour Party or among the electorate in 
general. 
Despite the limitations upon the creation of a United Front, the 
Spanish Medical Aid Committee still enjoyed some success in bringing 
together the diverse adherents of pro-Republicanism, although it is 
obvious that the SMAC was mainly Communist-led and received the 
majority of its donations from Trades Unions. But others also were 
active in the SMAC or gave their names in endorsement of the medical 
aid campaign. The collection of enough money to send three nurses to 
Spain and to fund the purchase of medical supplies, an ambulance and 
a field laundry truck provided tangible evidence of some New 
Zealanders' commitment to internationalism and democracy. The new 
Zealanders who fought in the International Brigades or worked with 
medical units in Spain demonstrated the greatest commitment to 
Communist or anti-Fascist ideals. Their opinions and experiences 
contributed to pro-Republican propaganda in New Zealand: none who 
returned cast doubt upon the accepted view of the war in Spain. 
The Spanish Civil War had a significant part in the Communist 
Party's Popular Front policy. The qualified success of the 
pro-Republican solidarity campaign helps illuminate the role of the 
Communist Party in New Zealand in the late 1930s. However, the 
Communists also used other issues in the drive to create a Left 
coalition against Fascism, particularly the Sino-Japanese war. There 
is scope for more study of the development of the Popular Front 
ideology and the influence of the Communist Party, perhaps in a 
comparison of the responses to the two wars. 
If suspicion of Communism limited the response to 
467 
pro-Republicanism in New Zealand, dislike of Franco's Fascist allies 
militated against any widespread espousal of his cause. Catholic 
pro-Francoist complaints about the daily press' treatment of the war 
in Spain indicate that their view was not generally accepted, 
particularly in terms of propaganda's minimisation of the level of 
German and Italian involvement. Daily newspapers may have approved 
of British non-intervention policy and appeasement in general, but 
they discussed Italian and German aid to the rebels in tones of 
marked disapprobation. 
Discussion of pro-Francoism has shown that it was fundamentally a 
religious response, mainly concerned with the survival of Catholicism 
in Spain. Anti-Communism was, of course, an essential element in 
Catholic attitudes, but it too was generated by defence of the faith 
and the belief that Communism posed the greatest threat to religion. 
It is impossible to ascertain how many Catholics shared the 
inclination towards Fascism and admiration of Mussolini's Italy 
demonstrated by some Catholic letters to daily newspapers, or indeed, 
if it represented deeply felt political views or simply, again, a 
reaction to Communism and a choice between the lesser of two evils. 
Catholic pro-Francoists, like pro-Republicans, saw the Spanish 
Civil War as demanding the concern of New Zealanders. The fears 
aroused by the attack on the Church in Spain were translated to the 
New Zealand scene, in accusations of anti-Catholicism among 
pro-Republicans (some of them justified) and warnings about the 
influence of Communism in New Zealand. There is, unfortunately, no 
evidence available that might indicate whether the Spanish Civil War 
contributed significantly to the development of Catholic Action in 
New Zealand; the war was certainly used by the Catholic press to urge 
Catholics of the necessity for more active lay involvement in the 
work of the Church. Nor is there any evidence that the Labour 
Governments "limited pro-Republicanism" caused many Catholics to 
choose between their religious and political allegiances, although 
Catholic views did influence the Labour Party towards caution in its 
public stance on the war. 
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Imperial link is indicated by the fact that the Statute of 
Westminster, conferring sovereignty upon the Dominions, was not 
adopted legally until 1947. 
The differences between the New Zealand Government and the 
British Government over conduct of foreign policy in the late 1930s 
had as much to do with different ideological perspectives as they did 
with Labour 
Statute of 
Zealand and 
leaders' desire to make use of the sovereignty that the 
Westminster allowed. In respect of relations between New 
appears that 
"blue-pencil" 
Britain over policy on the 
there 
incident 
may 
than 
have been 
previously 
Spanish situation it now 
more to the Eden-Jordan 
supposed. While not 
conclusive evidence of British pressure on New Zealand policy-makers, 
the "Nash Papers" speech does, however, indicate considerably more 
disapproval of British policy than Jordan's delivered speeches at 
Geneva or even the private communications between the two Governments 
ever expressed. 
The division of opinion in New Zealand over the British non-
intervention policy and the Labour Government's approach to foreign 
affairs was a significant feature of the New Zealand response to the 
Spanish Civil War. Pro-Republicanism (and, to a lesser degree, 
pro-Francoism) reflected an internationalist outlook and growing 
involvement by New Zealanders in the problems of the "outside 
world". Pro-Republican questioning (and in some cases condemnation) 
of British policy grew from and contributed to a re-examination of 
the nature and value of New Zealand's relations with Britain. "Non-
Interventionist" attitudes reveal the intensity of some New 
Zealanders' attachment to Britain and to a certain extent, the 
"mythologising" of the British tradition in New Zealand. 
The Spanish Civil War, then, was not a major issue in New 
Zealand. Nevertheless, New Zealanders' responses to the war help 
illuminate the impact upon New Zealand of the ideological conflicts 
of Europe, and the manner in which New Zealanders viewed the world 
and their country's place in the international community. 
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1-1 Text of a Memorandum sent by Geoffrey Bing to R.M. Campbell, 
and passed to Walter Nash. 
SPAIN 
Notes by Geoffrey Bing 
14.2.37 
1. The report by Reuter's correspondent at Gibraltar that 
Italian troops landed at Malaga from an Italian battleship 
and the similar reports in the official Italian press, for 
the first time openly admitting that Italian troops are 
fighting against the Spanish Government, is of great 
importance and makes immediately urgent the question of 
foreign intervention in Spain. 
2. Up till now, though everybody knew that German and 
Italian troops were in fact assisting Franco, the 
governments concerned had done something to hide their 
interventions. Now for the first time Italy blatantly and 
openly parades the dispatch of troops to Spain. 
3. The sending of troops to fight against the Spanish 
Government is an act of war within the meaning of the Pact 
of Paris (Kellogg Pact) and is an offence under the Covenant 
of the League of Nations. Even though Germany and Italy 
have recognised General Franco and withdrawn their 
recognition from the legitimate Spanish Government, they 
nevertheless, under international Law, still owe duties to 
that Government so long as it remains in existence. They 
cannot, by a mere declaration, escape from the duty they 
incurred when they originally recognised the Spanish 
Government. But if they have committed an act of war 
against the Spanish Government they have, by Violating the 
Pact of Paris, which is, together with the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, regarded by the leading authorities as 
the corner-stone of post-war Public International Law, 
committed a serious offence against all those other nations 
who are parties to the Pact of Paris. 
4. New Zealand was with Italy one of the original 
signatories of the Pact of Paris. Therefore, by violating 
the Pact Italy has, under International Law, committed a 
serious offence against New Zealand. 
5. This violating of the Pact of Paris affects New Zealand 
in two ways: 
a. The 
Rebels 
effect of German and Italian assistance to the 
is to place Germany and Italy in positions from 
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which they can command the strategic routes of Imperial 
communication. The whole scheme of Imperial Defence is 
built upon the assumption that the status quo will be 
preserved in the Mediterranean and in the North 
Atlantic. It is obvious that, even if Germany does not 
actually occupy the Canaries and Italy Malaga, if 
Franco is successful he will be in no position to 
enforce his neutrality against Germany and Italy were 
either of those two powers to be engaged in war. 
Spain's position, if Franco wins with German and 
Italian assistance, will be similar to that of Greece 
in the last war, who was unable to assert her 
neutrality against the Allies who, though Greece was 
nominally neutral, occupied and used Salonica as a 
base. In short, no declaration by Italy or Germany to 
respect the status quo can affect the actual situation 
if in fact Spain is held down by their armed forces. 
b. The open flouting of International Law and the 
disregard of this flouting by the nations of the world 
must most adversely affect the position of the smaller 
nations who depend for their safety upon the 
enforcement of a world system of Public Law and 
Justice. 
6. New Zealand has a right 
violations of International Law. 
and a duty to prevent these 
She can act in two ways: 
a. As a member of the League of Nations she can bring 
the matter before the Council of the Assembly under 
Article Eleven of the Covenant. Owing to the stand 
which New Zealand took over the Abyssinian question she 
is already regarded by the other countries of the 
Empire, and by the smaller nations, as one of the 
leaders in the movement to preserve, through the 
League, the rules of International Justice. 
b. As a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations 
she can raise the question direct with the British 
Government. She had, indeed, the best right to do so 
because she is, possibly even more so than Australia, 
likely to be affected by any interference with Imperial 
communications. 
7. Were New Zealand to make a forceful protest to Great 
Britain on the effect on Imperial relations which, under the 
present circumstances, a victory for General Franco would 
have, it would have a very considerable effect in England. 
If New Zealand were to express herself strongly in favour of 
the British Empire opposing violations of International Law 
of the type now being practised by Germany and Italy in 
Spain, this would rally all those forces in England like the 
League of Nations Union, which sincerely believe in the 
League, but which have been rendered confused and 
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consequently impotent by the interminable international 
negotiations centering round the Non-Intervention Committee. 
8. The British Government's policy of continuing to 
support the Non-Intervention Committee and thus, in fact, 
allowing arms and troops to be poured into Spain by Germany 
and Italy while the legitimate Government is deprived of all 
assistance, is only possible because the opponents of this 
policy of drift have no common rallying ground. Were the 
lead to be taken by New Zealand it would unite Imperialists 
like the Duchess of Atholl, that great body of centre 
opinion which supports the League of Nations Union and the 
Labour Movement. It was the union of these forces which, it 
will be remembered, destroyed the Hoare-Laval Plan. If they 
were again united over the Spanish issue the British 
Government would be again compelled to change their policy. 
9. In the present situation the vital factor is the 
attitude of the British Government. If they were to 
withdraw their support from the Non-Intervention Committee 
and allow France to supply arms and give assistance to the 
Spanish Government, the Spanish Government would win. Other 
things being equal neither Germany nor Italy are at the 
moment sufficiently equipped, nor geographically are they so 
placed, as to make it possible for them to provide unlimited 
help to General Franco. Their assistance to Franco is only 
of vital importance because the Spanish Government can get 
no help from the democratic powers. Alternatively, if the 
British Government were to enforce, as they could easily do, 
an impartial blockade of Spain and thus really put in motion 
the Non-Intervention Agreement, the Spanish Government would 
likewise win. The very fact that Franco has to import so 
many foreign troops shows that he has not sufficient support 
within the country to win without foreign aid. 
10. The present situation is extremely urgent. If Italy's 
open violation of International Law is allowed to pass 
without challenge by the countries most affected by it a 
precedent will be set up and it will be impossible when the 
next violation arises to draw the line. Italian and German 
control of Imperial communications threatens New Zealand 
perhaps more than any other Dominion. The situation of the 
Spanish Government is far from desperate, given a little 
more time they may be able to organise a large enough army 
to defeat General Franco, but they cannot do this unless 
some check is placed upon the influx of foreign troops to 
support Franco. The situation in England at the moment is 
such that a gesture by New Zealand would rally all the 
forces opposed to the policy of surrender to Germany and 
Italy now being practised by the British Government and 
would, in my firm opinion, be decisive in altering the 
policy of great Britain and in saving the Spanish 
Government. On the New Zealand Government, as Socialist, 
rests perhaps an especial responsibility. 
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I'm afraid this note is rather long but I thought it 
best to set out all the points. I have prepared a short 
legal memorandum in case anyone expresses any doubts about 
the legal conclusions which I have stated rather badly. If 
you either need it or would like to see it could you 
telephone me and I will have it sent you. 
NOTES ON LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN GERMAN AND ITALIAN 
ASSISTANCE TO THE SPANISH REBELS 
Aggression 
A 
may be 
certain 
Nations. 
hostile act done by one State against another State 
merely an offence against the wronged State or, in 
circumstances, it may be an offence against other 
Thus, under public International Law, Germany and 
Italy were forbidden to supply arms to the Rebels in Spain. 
In the early days of the revolt when these countries 
supplied munitions to General Franco before they had even 
recognised him as a belligerent, they were committing a 
serious offence against the Spanish Government. This was 
not, however, necessarily an offence against other Nations. 
But a point does arise when the assistance given by an 
outside Power, nominally neutral, in a dispute between two 
other Powers, reaches such an extent that it becomes an 
offence against not only the wronged Nation, but against 
other Nations as well. This point arises when one Nation 
takes "armed action" against another Nation. For "armed 
action" in the view of most of the leading authorities on 
Public International Law is the equivalent of "war" within 
the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the 
Pact of Paris. 
The Pact of Paris 
The Pact of Paris, or the Kellogg Pact as it is often 
called, was an agreement originally entered into by the 
British Empire, U.S.A., Germany, France and Italy, and 
subsequently joined by most other nations including Spain, 
not to "resort to war" except in certain closely defined 
circumstances. Any country, therefore, which resorts to war 
in contravention of its terms, commits an offence not only 
against the country against which it goes to war, but 
against all the other signatories to the Pact. "A breach of 
its provisions" says the leading authority on Public 
International Law "constitutes an International wrong 
against all its signatories who thereupon, without electing 
to go to war, become entitled to such redress as the 
principles of State responsibility warrant. (Oppenheim: 
"International Law"; Vol. II. Fifth Edition.) 
476 
Covenant of the League 
Even where no actual "resort to war" has taken place, 
the threat of war imposes certain obligations upon all 
members of the League of Nations. Article Eleven of the 
Covenant declares that war, or any threat of war, whether 
immediately affecting any Member of the League or not, is a 
matter of concern for the whole League. The Article goes on 
to say: "It is also declared to be the friendly right of 
each member of the League to bring to the attention of the 
Assembly or the Council, any circumstance whatever affecting 
International relations which threaten International peace 
or the good understanding between Nations upon which peace 
depends." (It is under this Article that the League has 
already considered the present dispute in Spain). 
It is important, therefore, to examine the facts of 
German and Italian intervention to see whether they amount 
to "armed action" against the legitimate Spanish Government, 
or at least to a threat of war within the meaning of Article 
Eleven. 
Italian and German recognition of Franco 
The Italian and German recognition of the Rebels as the 
sole legitimate Government in Spain cannot affect their 
duties under International Law towards the Spanish 
Government. They cannot avoid their responsibilities 
towards this Government merely by withdrawing their 
recognition of it. 
Italian and German Intervention 
There can be no doubt that the troops sent to Spain are 
not volunteers, and indeed when the British Government first 
referred to these troops in the House of Commons they did 
not use the term "volunteer" for them. It is well known 
that they are recruited by the Government in Germany and 
Italy, paid regular wages, transported in Government 
transports, their correspondence from Spain passes through 
the Ministry of War in their own countries, and when they 
are killed their relatives have been informed through the 
Government of either country. It is submitted that the 
dispatch of these troops constitutes "armed action" and is a 
breach of the Pact of Paris. If the view is taken that the 
Pact of Paris only applies when war has actually been 
declared, the dispatch of troops must, nevertheless, be a 
threat of war within the meaning of the Covenant of the 
League and therefore a matter of concern for every Member. 
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Threat of War and the British Empire 
The leading authorities on Imperial Constitutional Law 
hold that it is impossible for one part of the Empire to 
remain at peace while another part of the Empire is at war. 
(See Keith: "Constitutional Law in the British 
Dominions".) Therefore, every Member of the Empire has a 
particular interest in seeing that peace is preserved and, 
secondly, in seeing that Great Britain so orders her Foreign 
Policy that she is not placed in a position in which, in the 
event of war breaking out, it will be impossible for her to 
defend the Empire. 
All these considerations make it essential for the 
Members of the Empire to insist upon a policy based upon 
International Law rather than upon the agreement which is 
the basis of the Non-Intervention Committee. 
The Non-Intervention Committee 
The Non-Intervention Committee does not administer 
International Law. Its sole object is to enforce an 
agreement made between the European Nations. This agreement 
provided that certain nations, particularly England and 
France would deny to the legitimate Spanish Government the 
opportunity of purchasing arms in consideration of a promise 
by other Nations, particularly Germany and Italy, that these 
latter would not violate International Law by supplying arms 
to the Rebels. (Later the legal position became more 
complicated by the German and Italian recognition of Franco, 
but in the main the function of the Non-Intervention 
Committee remains the same.) The sole object of the 
Non-Intervention Agreement is to carry out a bargain made 
between the Nations of Europe which does not arise out of 
their obligations under International Law and which is 
indeed inconsistent with them. The only duty which any 
Nation can owe to the Non-Intervention Committee must arise 
from some agreement with the other Nations relative to that 
Committee. It cannot possibly arise under International 
Law. 
The existence of the Non-Intervention Committee cannot 
release any Nation, whether they are party or not to the 
agreement which set up the Committee, from their duties and 
obligations under International Law towards both Spain and 
their fellow Members of the League and co-signatories of the 
Paris Pact. The existence of the Non-Intervention Committee 
has, however, very much confused the issue, it being assumed 
that the Committee would implement International Law and 
that, therefore, no further duty lay on other Nations. 
It is submitted that the only solution is now to return 
to International Law and deal with the Spanish question on 
that footing rather than on the footing of the 
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on-Intervention Agreement which has been violated by one of 
the parties to it. 
Nash Papers 1084/003. 
National Archives, 
Wellington 
1-2 Text of a draft speech prepared for the League of Nations 
Council meeting on 28 May 1937, but never de1ivered.~~ 
DRAFT 
It would be impossible to exaggerate the gravity of the 
situation revealed to us by the hon. delegate for Spain. 
There can be no doubt or dispute about the following facts: 
1. In so far as the struggle in Spain is a civil war it 
was caused by the rebellion of Generals who broke their oath 
to the Republic which provided constitutional means of 
allowing for a Government's removal. These Generals set out 
to break democracy and to destroy their country's freely 
accepted constitution and the Government which the Spanish 
people had elected. They did not hesitate to wage war on 
women and children, to bombard open towns and helpless 
civilian populations, and to commit the crowning horror and 
infamy of the destruction of Guernica. 
2. If that were all, the civilised world might be content 
to deplore the tragedy of Spain, and to make well-meant 
although futile efforts to diminish the horrors of the 
conflict. But it is very far from being all. From the day 
of its outbreak on July 19 to the present day the struggle 
in Spain has not been merely or even primarily a Spanish 
civil war. The evidence that it is fomented and organised 
from outside is strong. The aeroplanes that crashed in 
French Morocco on July 30, on their way to the rebels, bore 
papers showing that they had been taken out of a foreign 
Government air force and assigned to this purpose on July 
17. That was twenty-four hours before the Spanish military 
rebellion broke out. 
The evidence that the rebellion has continued so long 
and caused so much anguish and death only because of the 
assistance given to the rebels from outside, is 
overwhelming. In the light of documents submitted to us, 
with photostatic copies of the originals, by the Spanish 
Government, there can be no doubt whatever of the presence 
in Spain, waging war against the lawful Spanish Government, 
of several divisions of foreign troops. 
* Passages underlined indicate those that were marked in the 
margin of the original document. 
3. That 
external 
political 
League of 
of Nations 
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is the situation. That situation constitutes 
aggression against the territorial'integrity and 
independence of Spain, which is a Member of the 
Nations. Last December the Council of the League 
stated that -
"It is the duty of every State to respect the 
territorial integrity and political independence of 
other States, a duty which, for Members of the League 
of Nations, has been recognised in the Covenant." 
The Council further affirmed that -
"Every State is under an obligation to refrain from 
intervening in the internal affairs of another State." 
Since then, as the Spanish Government so truly states in its 
note to the League of May 20 which has led to the present 
meeting of the Council -
"the development of foreign intervention in Spain ... 
has assumed such proportions that without any kind of 
doubt it constitutes circumstances rendering it 
necessary for the Council to proceed with the 
examination of the question which was the subject of 
the extraordinary session of December 1936." 
4. In examining this question today it is necessary to 
realise that the present situation is no longer what it was 
in December. Even then it was such that first the British 
and French Governments and then the whole Coulcil declared 
that it constituted a threat to peace. Today the situation 
is much worse. On present lines, I am told, both sides 
expect the war in Spain to last another two years. At the 
rate at which international relations have been 
deteriorating, largely as a result of the policy pursued 
with regard to Spain, I do not believe world peace can stand 
the strain for anything like such a period. I believe that 
the policy of drift which is being pursued will, if 
continued, constitute as accessories to another world war. 
5. The salient fact in the present situation was stated as 
follows in the Spanish Government's note to the League of 
March 12. 
"The statements of the Italian officers and men taken 
prisoner during the last few days in the Guadalajara 
Sector confirm beyond possibility of denial the 
presence of regular military units of the Italian army 
sent to fight on Spanish soil in flagrant violation of 
the provisions of Article X of the Covenant whereby 
Members of the League undertake to respect and 
preserve as against external aggression the 
territorial integrity and existing political 
independence of all Members of the League". 
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6. The policy of refusing the Spanish Government its right 
under international law to buy arms and munitions in order 
to put down the rebellion would have been harsh and unjust, 
even in case of a purely Spanish civil war. But it would 
not have been contrary to the Covenant, and it might even 
have been justified in the real or presumed interests of 
peace. But this policy, which with partial impartiality 
known as "non-intervention", constituted disregard of the 
plain duty of all Members of the League the moment it became 
clear that the Spanish rebels were receiving military 
assistance from foreign powers. Since the invasion of Spain 
by a foreign army it seems to me impossible even to pretend 
that the policy of so-called "non-intervention" is anything, 
or ever has been anything else than conniving at a Fascist 
war of aggression for the purpose of destroying Spanish 
democracy and reducing Spain to the status of a Fascist 
province. 
7. I think, therefore that the time has come to take this 
matter out of the hands of the Non-Intervention Committee 
and to put it into the hands of the League. Neither the 
composition nor the record of the Committee are such as to 
inspire confidence in its ultimate success. Spain is not 
represented on it although this is literally a life and 
death issue for Spain. On the other hand, the Powers are 
represented on it who are the head and front of the offence 
to which the Committee is supposed to be endeavouring to put 
an end. The Non-Intervention Committee is a body on which 
the aggressors are represented but not the victim of 
aggression. It is a body that meets in secret and so is not 
subject to the pressure of public opinion. 
It is a body which was set up after the Covenant and 
international law had been disregarded and it apparently 
does not even consider itself bound to secure respect for 
the obligations of the so-called non-intervention policy 
that it was established to apply_ It prohibited the export 
of munitions and aeroplanes to Spain several months ago and 
yet Guernica furnishes terrible proof that they continue to 
arrive to the rebels. The Council of the League, in its 
December resolution, asked the Non-Intervention Committee 
"to take appropriate measures to ensure forthwith that the 
fulfilment of the said undertakin s is effectivel 
supervise yet since t at ate not on y 
rebels continued to receive arms, aeroplanes and munitions, 
but a foreign army has invaded Spain and the whole situation 
is today infinitely worse and more dangerous than it was 
last December. 
When the Spanish Government brought this matter before 
the League last December there was sudden activity in the 
Non-Intervention Committee and much vague talk of mediation 
and cessation of hostilities, effective application of 
non-intervention etc. The moment the Council was ended the 
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Committee relapsed into the state of coma that had 
previously characterised its proceedings until the Spanish 
Government appealed to the present Council meeting. Since 
then there has been more activity in the Committee and more 
talk about an armistice and about the withdrawal of 
volunteers. But what guarantee have we that history will 
not repeat itself? How do we know that if the Council 
passes another resolution leaving the whole matter in the 
hands of the Committee the state of coma will not once more 
supervene while intervention in Spain assumes fresh and 
still more horrible forms and the world drifts a stage 
further on its fatal course toward another great war? 
8. I am sorry to say it, but I am losing faith in the 
Non-Intervention Committee. In my opinion the time has come 
to apply Article X of the Covenant by which we are all 
bound. By that Article all Members of the League are 
obliged not only to respect but also to preserve against 
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing 
political independence of Spain. As for the Council, 
Article X says that: 
"In case of any such aggression or in case of any 
threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall 
advise upon the means by which this obligation shall 
be fulfilled." 
I believe the Council ought to give that advice now. I 
believe that its advice ought to take the form of a 
declaration that it is now the duty of all Members of the 
League to help the Spanish Government to preserve its 
territorial integrity and political independence against 
external aggression, by giving it all the facilities it 
requires for obtaining arms and aeroplanes and recruiting 
volunteers. 
9. But I realise that the Governments that have assumed 
the heavy responsibility of inventing and applying the 
policy of so-called non-intervention may not have been so 
impressed by the uniform and disastrous failure of their 
policy as I have been. Therefore I would suggest that the 
Council should allow a time-limit during which a final 
attempt should be made to bring about the withdrawal from 
Spanish soil of the present army of occupation, as well as 
of genuine foreign volunteers, and to make effective the 
obligations that should prevent aeroplanes and war materials 
reaching the rebels. But I want the Council to bind itself 
beforehand to meet again and to consider action under 
Article X, if this final effort is unsuccessful. 
Therefore 
resolution. 
I beg to submit the following draft 
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DRAFT RESOLUTION 
The Council, 
After hearing the observations made before it, 
I 
Recalling the terms of its resolution of December 13th, 
1936. 
Noting that the situation in Spain has become even 
graver since the adoption of that resolution and now 
constitutes a contravention of Article X of the Covenant. 
Recalling the obligations of all the Members of the 
League under that Article. 
Regrets that the Committee of Non-Intervention in 
London has hitherto been unable to secure faithful 
observance of the undertakings not to intervene in Spanish 
internal affairs. 
II 
Considering that an attempt to secure the removal from 
Spain of all foreign armed forces of any description has 
been in progress for some months. 
Recommends the Members of the League represented on the 
London Committee to spare no pains to bring about this 
withdrawal as speedily as possible. 
And decides, in case such withdrawal has not been 
completely effected within two months, to meet again with a 
view to considering the advice it should give to the Members 
of the League under Article X of the Convenant. 
10. I recognise the primary political responsibility of the 
Great Powers. But I ask in return that my own country's 
responsibility as a Member of the League, as a democracy and 
as a member of the British Commonwealth should be recognised 
and respected. To go on disregarding the Covenant in this 
situation _c_a_n~, ___ m~y ____ G_o_v_e_r_n_m_e_n _ t ___ b_e_1_i_e_v_e_s~, ___ l_e_a_d ___ o_n_l~y~_t_o __ 
disaster. It ten million dead and twent million 
ovenant into existence. t may cost 
even more frightful price to treat the Covenant 
today as a scrap of paper. Those of us who value democracy 
as essential to civilisation cannot any longer stand idly by 
and watch a war of aggression being waged against a sister 
democracy which is a fellow-member of the League. Nor can 
my country as a member of the British Commonwealth fail to 
declare that an independent and democratic Spain, bound by 
the ties of friendship and the obligations of the collective 
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system to the British Commonwealth, is for us a vital 
interest and that it would be intolerable for us that Spain 
should become the vassal of a Fascist power. Therefore, 
while the details of my resolution are not perhaps of 
primary importance my Government cannot be satisfied with 
any text that does not give effect in some form to the 
principles which I feel it is essential to uphold, and that 
it will be my reluctant duty to vote against any resolution 
that does not embody those principles. It is better that 
the Council should fail to reach unanimity on a resolution 
and that public oplnlon in my own country, in the United 
Kingdom and in the other democracies should be aroused to 
the issues at stake, than that another sham resolution 
should deceive public oplnlon into believing that anything 
effective was being done to stop the war of aggression 
against the Spanish Republic, while that war continued and 
the world went on drifting to disaster. 
Geneva, 
28th May, 1937. 
Nash Papers, N209, 
National Archives, Wellington 
1-3 William Jordan's speech to the League of Nations Council t 28 
May 1937. 
I am sure we all feel the responsibility of the 
position in which we find ourselves at this table of the 
Council of the League of Nations. We have made a definite 
pledge with a purpose. The eyes of the world are on the 
Council at this time. Whatever the matter in dispute may 
be, whatever the cause of the conflict, the people of the 
world are shocked at the dreadful happenings in Spain, and 
the situation at the present time surely calls for some 
action. 
When it was announced in the papers of the world that 
the League was to meet this week, prayers went up from 
millions of people for the success of our deliberations. I 
am sure that the members of the Council are conscious of the 
responsibility which falls upon them by being here and 
having to deal with this matter. 
As it is a function of the League to safeguard the 
lives of people, to maintain peace, and to uphold lawful and 
constitutional Governments against invasion and the violence 
of outside Powers, it is now undoubtedly time that some 
decision in the Spanish situation was taken if the League is 
going to act at all in the matter ... 
Authoritative evidence which has been made public 
recently shows that the military forces of outside Powers 
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are operating in Spain. Is it the determination of those 
Powers to operate in opposition to the fundamental 
principles which the League was established to uphold? We 
have before us the report of the Spanish Government; which 
contains one hundred documents, alleging that at least one 
Power has a fully equipped army in Spain committing acts of 
aggression not only against the people of Spain, but also 
against the political independence of that country, and 
submitting weighty evidence in support of the allegations. 
Do we question the authenticity of these documents? If not, 
the evidence which they furnish must be received and treated 
with the utmost gravity by the Council. 
There is no need to detail independent reports which 
show what is happening in Spain. I will merely mention a 
report published by four prominent women in the United 
Kingdom, three of them members of Parliament, and also the 
report of a representative religious delegation. Some of 
the foremost of the Christian men and women of the United 
Kingdom visited Spain recently for the purpose of obtaining 
first-hand knowledge, and anyone who reads these and other 
reports must agree that what is going on in Spain to-day is 
one of the most flagrant challenges to the authority of the 
League which has occurred in its history. 
On the other hand, we have received a copy of a 
statement by General Franco charging the elected Government 
with being supporters of anarchy and crime, but submitting 
no evidence in support of the statement. From this table 
last December the question was asked, What case is there 
from these people who claim that the election in Spain was 
irregular? The question was asked, Why do they not come 
forward and make a statement? How can the League Council be 
expected to know the details and how can these people be 
respected by the Council if they fight and kill the citizens 
of one of the League members, and at the same time withhold 
from us evidence of what they say is the cause of the 
trouble? 
Whatever the political views of the elected Spanish 
Government may be, is there any justification for the 
invasion of Spain by an outside Power? The only action 
taken so far by any power associated with the League appears 
to be the imposition of an embargo which has handicapped the 
Government and strengthened the hands of its aggressors. 
What is the Council definitely going to do? We have 
heard a speech on the prospects of success for the work of 
the Non-Intervention Committee. We are informed that a 
report was presented last Wednesday. We have heard that the 
Governments of Europe cannot be satisfied that the 
objectives of the Non-Intervention Committee have been 
realised until the last foreigner has been withdrawn and 
until that unhappy country has been allowed to settle her 
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own destinies in her own way. It has been said that the 
main purpose of this meeting of the Council is to uphold and 
endorse the work of the Non-Intervention Committee, to 
emphasise our wish for the early withdrawal of all foreign 
nationals from Spain, and ourselves to determine to do all 
in our power to facilitate the result. That sentiment is 
shared by all the members of the Council. We pray for the 
success of the Non-Intervention Committee and we are 
determined to do all in our power to facilitate the result, 
but when we say we will do all in our power I ask the 
question, What action, if any, is being taken? In other 
words, are we making progress? I hope we are. 
The representative of His Majesty's Government in the 
United Kingdom says that Spain should be allowed to settle 
her own destinies in her own way. The representative of 
France said, inter alia, that the Spanish people are no 
longer sole masters of their own destiny. So we come back 
to the point we have in mind, the welfare and independence 
of the people of Spain. This does not mean acres, cities, 
and harbours, but the welfare of the people - men, women, 
and children. The people are our concern: they are their 
own concern. 
We would fain ask that a committee of the Council be 
set up to act forthwith, but we have been assured that the 
Non-Intervention Committee will go beyond the matter of 
non-intervention: it has been said that the Governments of 
Europe cannot be satisfied until the last foreigner has been 
withdrawn from Spain, and until that unhappy country has 
been allowed to settle her own destinies in her own way. 
Could we then from this Council table ask the 
Non-Intervention Committee definitely to extend its powers? 
Could we ask that the Non-Intervention Committee, while 
endeavouring to secure the cessation of hostilities by the 
withdrawal of foreign combatants forthwith, in accordance 
with the hope so admirably expressed here, should also 
endeavour to restore peace and good order, and then have 
again a democratic expression of opinion by the Spanish 
people? 
I repeat that the future welfare of the Spanish people 
is their own concern and, speaking as a democrat, I express 
the wish that the desires of the Spanish people should be 
consulted. Would it be within the power of the Council to 
operate directly, or through the Non-Intervention Committee 
so that, the cessation of hostilities have been achieved, 
the people of Spain could be assured of their own form of 
Government and that for a while the League might offer to 
assist in order that peace may be restored the more 
quickly? Having secured the cessation of hostilities and 
the withdrawal of foreign combatants, could it not be left 
to the people of Spain to decide? That is to say, could 
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there not be a consultation with the people, whose business 
it is? 
Surely we all agree that this matter could better be 
settled by reason than by guns. We should like a direct 
approach to those concerned asking that they cease 
hostilities, because only by reason and not by force can 
peace be maintained. The earth is being menaced by the 
danger of an attempt to govern by force. The only 
satisfactory form of Government is a Government elected by 
the people - when a Government occupies its position at the 
request of the governed. 
Surely there is ingenuity enough in the League of 
Nations, and sincerity and ability enough among the peoples 
of Spain, for such a proposal to be put into operation. If 
we cannot do this, we cannot do something bigger. If, 
however, the people of Spain could be consulted, when once 
the horror of war has been removed, there would be some hope 
of happiness, peace and security for their lives and homes. 
A.J.H.R., 1937-A, A_SB, pp.32-3 
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APPENDIX 2 
NEW ZEALAND POETRY ABOUT THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 
Pro-Republicanism versus pro-Francoism in verse: 
Wham" and G.F. Seward in the The Press 
Killed by Kindness 
The Spaniard loves his Franco, 
His leader brave and good, 
And weeps to think that Franco 
Should be misunderstood. 
Such Honesty and Justice! 
Such Tenderness and Charm! 
How COULD they think of Franco 
Contriving any Harm! 
The Spaniard found his Franco 
A little rough at first, 
He didn't know the kindly Heart 
Behind the Shrapnel-burst; 
But Goodness wins the Battle 
With Evil in the End, 
And now the Fascist Butcher 
Becomes the Spaniard's Friend. 
Good Franco did not spare them 
The Chastisements of Love; 
His High Explosive Blessings 
He sent them from above; 
And when he shelled his People 
And bombed them in their Beds, 
He did it for his Country, 
To save it from the Reds. 
They swore him their Allegiance 
As who, in fact, would not, 
Aware that a Refusal 
Would mean their being shot: 
In shattered streets they cheered him 
While Banners overhead 
Broke out for Franco's Welcome 
And mocked the loyal Dead. 
"Whim-Wham", The Press, 
25 March 1939, p.20. 
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"Whim-
Arriba Espana 
When Spanish life was threatened 
By hordes of foreign foes 
Who gulled some Spanish workers 
And led them by the nose 
Then Franco raised his standard 
Tho' not for hope of gain 
For justice and religion 
To save the soul of Spain 
Wha t \~him-Wham knows of Franco 
Is just what he's been told 
By lying cable-fakers 
Who sell their souls for gold 
Yet truth cannot be hidden 
Today the fact is plain -
The victory of Franco's 
The victory of Spain 
Today the lie's uncovered 
And Negrins gang has fled 
They took the treasure with them 
They left behind the dead 
The "reds" of all the nations 
Have hurried home again 
And Spain, tho' sorely wounded 
Is happy, clean and sane. 
Sir,-
G.F. Seward, The Press, 
28 March 1939, p.14. 
Mr G.F. Sewards Views 
Are, of course, not News 
He is always making himself plain 
About Spain. 
The Case for Franco shows 
Up badly in Prose, 
And if anything rather worse 
In Verse. 
If "Cable-fakers" have sold 
Their Souls for Gold 
Why does not General Franco too 
Buy a Few? 
Such Mercenary Swine 
Would not draw the Line 
At helping such a noble Crusade 
If paid. 
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Mr Seward has shown 
That I'm not the only one 
Who can write Humourous Rhymes 
At times. 
Being so versatile 
I hope he will think it worthwhile 
To answer with equal indignation 
Our illustration. 
2-2 Denis Glover in Tommorrow 
Variations on a Theme 
Pastorale 
"Whim-Wham", The Press, 
29 March 1939, p.3. 
The little polecat sat and wept, 
while all the forest stood quite still: 
and still the little polecat wept 
great tears that trickled down the hill. 
At length he made a move to rise 
upon his four world weary legs, 
then turned upon the moon his eyes 
as round and sad as two poached eggs 
and said to her, 0 Moon (he said), 
you are my only friend, I think, 
now tell me, passing overhead, 
tell me Diana, do I -
But at the awful word he paused, 
and tears again began to flow: 
he dared no word for fear it caused 
an answer other than a No. 
Her face was clouded in a frown 
as thoughtful as a brooding night; 
then Diana smiled, and looking down, 
she comforted the beast with light. 
My little polecat, then she said 
my poor wee introspective skunk, 
fight back those tears, lift up your head 
- someone's been feeding you the bunk! 
There is a statesman of today 
whose plots extend from pole to pole, 
a man whose lightest words betray 
a pestulent and putrid soul 
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Approach him not: but let me say 
beside this mummy with a squint 
you's stand as sweet as summer hay, 
as fresh as flowering mint. 
Gigue 
There was a time, we must suppose, 
when every Englishman was glad 
to beat the bully and the cad 
protect the little bullied lad 
and punct the bully's nose. 
Disdaining talk of compromise 
no Englisman then gave a fig 
to find the bully very big 
- he danced a pugilistic jig 
and blacked his cowardly eyes. 
But there's no virtue in such a folly, 
so Neville Chamberlain instead 
invites the thug to go ahead 
- and sitting on the victim's head 
he pokes him with his brolly_ 
Coda 
If Neville were a butchered sheep 
I wouldn't give a button: 
condemned while living as a man 
he'd be condemned as mutton. 
Tomorrow 
1 February 1939, p.202. 
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2-3 Verse play by R.A.K. Mason, written for a SMAC memorial 
meeting for New Zealanders killed in Spain. 
International Brigade 
On the stage is a refugee peasant women, child in arms. 
(The words are spoken through a microphone off stage, simply 
and unemotionally.) 
(WOMAN'S VOICE) 
Throughout the centuries 
our ruling classes 
ignorant, fanatical, merciless. 
And throughout the centuries 
we have fought back unflinchingly 
never quite victorious, 
yet never defeated. 
And one day not long ago 
we moved to ease those oppressors 
off from our bent shoulders, 
to trim a little those nails 
that scored and scarred our faces. 
You know how they answered, 
the nobles and the wealthy 
and all their mean instruments -
the six generals and their kidney, 
violators of their oaths, 
traitors to their country. 
You know their answer -
knives of the Moors, 
rifles from Italy, 
aeroplanes from Germany, 
gold from France and Britain. 
We had planted peace 
and friendship and freedom, 
yet they were but sprouting 
when carne the horror, 
when came the misery, 
anguish, torture, torment. 
Spain fought back, 
but our men and women -
yes, we women fought too -
we were untrained, ill-equipped, 
betrayed at home by our false leaders, 
betrayed abroad by lying governments. 
Yet a people's torment 
found friends of the people: 
to our aid they carne 
from mine, wharf, desk, ship, farm, factory -
from Peru and Canada, 
Australia, England, Sweden, 
France, Mexico, the States -
from the furthest ends of the earth. 
These were not conscripts, 
these were not drugged by ignorance, 
these were not adventurers, 
these were not mercenaries: 
But free, straight, with wise eyes, 
young fellows whistling, 
like our own sons whistling home from work -
like your son or my son. 
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In our dire need they came to us, 
lived with us, endured with us, 
starved with us, fought with us, 
and many suffered wounds with us, 
and many died with us, 
and many died .... 
Some say the body will live again, 
some say the soul will live again: 
this much no one can doubt -
as their bodies will live for ever 
in our undying earth, 
so their souls will have life for ever 
in the lives of their fellows. 
Their spirit shall live for ever, 
go singing on to the end of time, 
laughing and cheering as once again it marches, 
marches through your veins and my veins, 
ours and our sons and daughters for ever. 
The blood of the International Brigade 
no longer fumes from behind the stone walls 
on the rocky hillsides 
among the grey olive trees, 
yet still their voices call saying: 
(MAN'S VOICE) 
Do not weep for us, friends, 
as though we had died in vain; 
but live you with double strength, 
one being for us who have lost our strength. 
Spain is not defeated: 
Spain will fight on 
the fight of humanity, 
though in other forms: 
these invaders will go out by the same road 
as Hannibal went and the Romans, 
as the Moors went and Napoleon -
and with them will go all traitors 
who sold their own land 
to oppression and darkness. 
And in their struggle 
let you in other lands 
still send aid to their exiles, 
above all that the children 
may live the lives we have lost: 
As La Pasionaria pleaded 
saying "Women of all the World! 
sisters all! mothers all! 
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do not let our little ones 
perish of hunger: 
answer our cry!" 
That is the word of La Pasionaria 
and that is the word of the International Brigade -
of the living and of us dead, 
of us who are dead 
yet still live in you: 
send aid to the exiles, 
above all to the children. 
(WOMAN'S VOICE) 
o you who are opposite to us on earth, 
you in your Spain of the Southern Seas 
with sun and mountains and sparkling waters, 
to you I send the message, 
a woman of the Spain of the North: 
From your land too men hastened 
to stand beside us in our need 
and fight in mutual cause, 
and of them too were some who died 
Stand in their honour. 
(ALL STAND) 
Stand in honour of them 
and of their comrades who died: 
stand in their honour. 
They shall live in us all, 
by our words, thoughts, and actions, 
through time without end: 
Truly the tomb cannot contain them, 
the grave will not hold them: 
these dead live for ever. 
SMAC Records, 
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Jackson Collection (private), 
Auckland. 
APPENDIX 3 
THE SPANISH MEDICAL AID COMMITTEE 
Constitution and List of Endorsements 
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3-1 Draft Constitution of the New Zealand Spanish Medical Aid 
Committee 1 December 1937. 
ARTICLE 1 - Name 
The name of the organisation shall be the New Zealand 
Spanish Medical Aid Committee. 
ARTICLE 11 - Aim and Objects 
The Spanish Medical Aid Committee is comprised of 
representatives of organisations and individuals having 
differing and even to some extent conflicting political 
views, with entire agreement of the necessity and urgency of 
sending medical and ambulance attention to the people of 
Spain, where the need is great. 
Their adherence to the Committee does not indicate the 
abandonment or reconciliation of their general and various 
political view-points, but it is the recognition that on 
this particular question they are unanimous. 
The appeal was launched primarily to send ambulance aid 
to the Spanish people. In war such units must be under the 
control of one or other of the combatant armies, and those 
who initiated the movement were concerned that the Spanish 
people were without adequate services. 
Ambulance nurses give recognition to the general 
practice of the profession, outlined in the Hippocratic 
oath, of extending their care to all in need of it, wherever 
they may encounter such need in the pursuance of their 
duties. 
The Committee desires from its members only an 
adherence to the general object for which the appeal was 
launced, and leaves every member free for the expression of 
its views as to the political aspect of the present war in 
Spain. 
This implies:-
(1) The organisation throughout New Zealand of groups 
having aims in common with the Committee. 
(2) The education of the public by demonstrations, meetings 
and such other activities as may be deemed necessary from 
time to time. 
(3) The repudiation of statements made by 
organisations, or otherwise, calculated to 
nullify the work of the Committee. 
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individuals, 
belittle and 
(4) The sending of medical assistance, food, and clothing 
to the Spanish Government. 
(5) Support and maintenance of any individuals sent under 
Section (4). 
(6) Close co-operation with the British Medical Aid 
Committee and similar organisations in other countries. 
(7) The formation of such sub-committees as shall be deemed 
necessary from time to time. 
ARTICLE III - Basis of Co-operation 
(1) Any group in any area of New Zealand prepared to carry 
on effective work in line with the Aim of the Committee may 
be recognised on the following conditions:-
(a) It shall adopt as its Aim the Aim set out in Article II 
and shall embody this in its Constitution. 
(b) It shall adopt the name New Zealand Spanish Medical Aid 
Committee ( .................... Branch). 
(c) Its membership shall be open to all desiring to further 
the Aim of the Committee. 
ARTICLE IV - District Centres 
(1) There shall be four District Centres in New Zealand to 
carry out the objects of the Committee in each District and 
to form a connecting link between the National Committee and 
the Branches of the Movement in this District. 
(2) The District Centres shall be known as:-
S.M.A.C. (Auckland Centre) 
S.M.A.C. (Wellington Centre) 
S.M.A.C. (Christchurch Centre) 
S.M.A.C. (Dunedin Centre) 
And shall include the districts commonly known as:-
Auckland Province 
Wellington, Hawkes Bay, Taranaki Provinces 
Canterbury, Westland, Nelson, Marlborough Provinces 
Otago, Southland Provinces 
(3) Membership of the District Centre shall be open to all 
people invited by the existing committees and who signify 
their intention of active co-operation. 
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(4) Each Centre shall appoint such offices and 
sub-committees as it shall deem expedient for the 
furtherance of the objects of the Committee. 
ARTICLE V - National Centre 
(1) The control, management and direction of the movement, 
except as herein modified, shall be vested in the national 
Centre; provided that matters of general policy must be 
referred to all District Centres for consideration and 
recommendation before decision by the National Centre. 
(2) The National Centre shall be that District Centre 
chosen from time to time by a majority decision of the four 
District Centres. 
(3) Until such decision is settled or in the event of 
failure to decide under Section (2) the Dunedin Centre shall 
be deemed the National Centre. 
(4) The National Centre shall appoint such officers and 
sub-committees as it shall deem expedient for the 
furtherance of the objects of the Committee. 
ARTICLE VI - Conferences 
(1) Conferences of the Committee for the discussion of work 
and progress shall be held only when urgent need arises, and 
expenses shall be arranged where possible independently of 
the funds of the Committee. 
(2) Informal conferences shall be arranged as often as 
possible not only between Centres but with all Branches when 
members of the Committee are travelling in the course of 
their business or otherwise in New Zealand. 
ARTICLE VII - Headquarters 
The Headquarters of the Committee means the location of 
the National Centre as it shall be determined from time to 
time. 
ARTICLE VIII - Amendments 
(1) All proposed amendments shall be submitted to the 
Secretary of the National Centre. 
(2) The proposed amendment shall be submitted to all 
Centres by the Secretary of the National Centre. 
(3) The amendment shall be deemed carried if agreed upon by 
three or more District Centres. 
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ARTICLE IX - Dissolution 
(1) The Committee shall be dissolved by resolution agreed 
upon by three or more District Centres provided that no such 
resolution shall be deemed to have been passed unless all 
District Centres have considered and expressed themselves 
thereon. 
(2) The Committee shall be dissolved as from the passing of 
such resolution and the funds and other assets of the 
Committee shall thereupon be disposed of according to 
resolution agreed upon by three or more District Centres. 
ARTICLE X - Adoption 
This constitution shall be deemed the constitution of 
the New Zealand Spanish Medical Aid Committee from the date 
of its ratification by the Committees at present operating 
in Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin and at 
present known as Auckland Spanish Medical Aid Committee, 
Wellington Spanish Medical Aid Committee, Christchurch 
Spanish Medical Aid Committee, Dunedin Spanish Medical Aid 
Committee. 
- I DEC 1937 
SMAC Records, 
Jackson Collection 
(private), Auckland. 
3-2 SMAC List of Endorsements of the Medical Aid Campaign 
Rev. E.T. Cox 
Dr J.P. Hastings 
Rev. Mary Dreaver, J.P. 
Dr R.P. Anschutz 
Professor Sewell 
Dr W.B. Sutch 
Mr P. Neilson, M.P. 
Mr Ormond Wilson, M.P. 
Dr W.J. McMillan, M.P. 
Mr Mark Silverstone, Director Reserve Bank 
Mr W.J. Lyon, M.P. 
Mr N.M. Richmond, M.A. 
National Executive, Federation of Labour 
Mr J. Harris, Librarian, Otago University 
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Mr D.P. Kennedy, President Otago University Students' 
Association 
Mr James Saunders, Dunedin 
Rev. W.L.S. Harbour, Dunedin 
Mr J.W. Munro, M.P. 
Rev. H. Hogg 
Mr A. Dunningham, Public Librarian, Dunedin 
Dr Beeby, Christchurch 
Professor Ramsay, Otago University 
Mr M. Cameron, Otago University 
Mr H.H. Ferguson, Otago University 
Professor J. Findlay, Otago University 
Professor Kirk, Victoria College, Wellington 
Professor Marples, Otago University 
Mr D.J. Donald, Victoria College 
Dr J. Renfrew White, Dunedin 
Mr S. Saltzman, Dunedin 
Rev. A.M. Richards, Totara Flat 
Dr O.H. Frankel, Wheat Research Officer, Christchurch 
Mrs A.G. Strong, Dean Home Science Faculty, Otago University 
Mr W.D. Mason, Middlemarch 
Mr C. Soumaras, Dunedin 
H. Winstone Rhodes, Canterbury College 
F.A. Shurrock, Director School of Art, Christchurch 
Hon. J.A. McCulloch, M.L.C. 
Mr C. Morgan Williams, M.P. 
Mr E.J. Howard, M.P. 
Mrs T.E. Taylor 
Dr R.N. Parton 
Mr W.E. Leadley, President Christchurch Returned Soldiers' 
Association 
Mr J. Roberts, Chairman Christchurch Labour Representative 
Council 
Mr H.G. Kilpatrick, Freezing Workers' Union 
Mr A.H. Scales, Furniture Trades Union 
Kennaway Henderson, Editor "Tomorrow" 
G.E. Jackson 
Spain's Fight For Freedom. SMAC, 
Auckland, 1937, pp 26-27. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Letters from New Zealand Nurses in Spain 
4-1 Extracts from Nurse Isabel Dodds' letters to her family 
C/o New Oxford Street 
London 
15th September 1937 
Dear Mater and Dad, 
The longer I am here in Spain the harder it becomes to 
write. As I said in my last letter the fighting is not in 
our area at present and so we are not very busy - in fact 
this last month we have had a couple of days off duty. 
Unfortunately Renee and I cannot be free together so we 
have just had to manage to amuse ourselves on our own. 
My first free day was shortly after I had been sick (by 
the way I'm hale and hearty now) and so feeling like a rest 
I spent the day sleeping and reading, and in the evening 
Renee managed to finish up at 6 p.m. so we took our tea up 
in the hills. I have previously mentioned how beautiful it 
is here and the memories of our walks in the evenings will 
always remain with me when I am no longer in Spain. 
*** 
10.10.37 Renee and I have just returned from a two day's 
trip to Valencia. It always seems to be the way but when 
you are busy there are no nurses, and then when the rush 
dies down and there is little work we seem to have more 
nurses, so Renee and I decided that as we have had but two 
days off these last 11 weeks, and transport was going 
through to Valencia we would also do a little business in 
the big city. You see we had left our English money with a 
girl there and as she was shortly leaving for England and we 
had no official receipt for it we braved the horrors of the 
bumpty dusty long trip in the back of an ambulance for a 
matter of 300 to 400 miles. 
Valencia, since we were there last, has increased its 
military activities. Life goes on in much the same old way, 
excepting of course with the population now double what it 
was originally. Accommodation is very difficult to obtain 
and food is rationed. 
Actually I 
appears to be 
there is none 
did not feel that food was short. There 
enough to prevent everyone from starving but 
to waste. Also supplies vary and while some 
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things are more or less plentiful others simply do not 
exist. 
One week bread simply could not be bought, while when 
we were there bread was plentiful but milk and butter was 
non-existent and sugar scarce. 
A sight which we have become very accustomed to but 
which nevertheless is none the more beautiful for its 
familiarity is the lines of people waiting in food queues. 
In Valencia 
is enough of a 
however, despite 
expensive. 
as I said food is not plentiful but there 
kind to prevent all from starving. It is 
the Government control of the prices, very 
When we were in Valencia before the amount of beggars 
was appalling. Men, women and grubby children thrust a 
dirty paw under your nose at every turn, the Government as 
you can imagine discouraged this as much as they can and 
actually now there is no need to beg as people who cannot 
work receive maintenance. Still there is always that 
certain type, who finding that they can make more by begging 
continue to do so and crawl to those who care to give. 
*** 
We have had an English writer staying here with us for 
the last week or so and she has been collecting material 
about our Hospital here in Huete. I have read her report 
and it is very good even if the marvellous comradeship with 
the village is a little stressed, but I must add that it is 
very much better than when we came here and everyone 
working in the hospital gets along very well. As Mrs 
Winifred Bates says there is naturally a struggle between 
the old and the new life but any difficulties are more than 
compensated for by the spirit and enthusiasm of the younger 
people. The girls are especially keen and are quick to 
learn when once shown how a thing is correctly done, of 
course some of their ideas of sterility is almost too good 
to be true but now that these youngsters are being properly 
taught their work and encouraged in the youth organisations 
they are going to make the Spain of tomorrow a more healthy 
and wholesome place. 
Dear Dad, 
This 
may you 
hospital 
or so, 
note is 
have many 
in Murcia 
and today 
19th January 1938 
to you since it is your birthday today -
happy returns. I have been in another 
in the South of Spain for the last month 
or rather last night I started on my way 
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home to Huete. Transport is a somewhat difficult problem 
and as the trains are rather slow and always crowded we 
always travel by ambulance or lorry. However this time a 
number of old patients were leaving hospital to report to 
Headquarters and as it happens to be in a town on the way to 
Huete and I had nursed some of the lads I decided to travel 
back with them and they could arrange for my transport on 
the second hope. Unfortunately I chose to ask someone who 
has a no better knowledge of the Spanish than I have myself, 
with the result that he got me on the wrong train and I 
landed stranded miles out of my direction in God knows what 
town. Also another complication is the fact that in war 
time people cannot travel around the countryside without a 
"salvo conductor" which states where you are going and for 
what. My salvo conductor is for a town some 150 miles 
away. I have Renee's suitcase which has her name written 
allover it and my own name on my papers. That is taking a 
bit of explaining. However, one thing you can always depend 
on the Spaniards for, and that is they are the soul of 
generosity and kindness especially to the International 
nurses and at the moment a fellow passenger is endeavouring 
to do something for me with the powers that be. He has 
turned out to be a member of the "Socorro Rejo" which in 
translation means "Red help" and is something of the same 
organisation we had during the World War; The Red Cross. 
Later. I managed to arrive safely home somewhere after 
midnight after hitchhiking around Spain riding in ancient 
burro-carts, ambulances, trucks and trains - what a life! I 
nearly froze at night since central Spain is so much colder 
than the Spain where I had been, but fortunately the day was 
beautifully fine. 
Our hospital is very busy again with wounded from 
Teruel. They are marvellous patients - the best I have 
nursed so far. We have ------- stationed in our village 
where they are resting for a few days prior to going on 
leave to Madrid and like their wounded comrades are an 
exceptionally fine type. I haven't received any letters 
from you all for sometime but I suppose they are on the 
way. At Xmas time I got several Free Lances. It seems so 
strange to see photos of New Zealand. Sometimes I feel that 
it is years and years since I left, yet the time passed so 
quickly. I can hardly believe so much has been crammed into 
the eight months since I left home. Renee and I are still 
working together but as I mentioned in earlier letters Aunty 
(Nurse Sharples) is in some other. We haven't heard from 
her for ages but we have heard about her from different 
people. She is just the same and everyone is inclined to 
treat her as a joke. 
Well cheerio far just now, 
Love to all, 
Salud, Isabel. 
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Undated 
The peasant women wrapped in their black shawls and 
many petticoats stand huddled around the village pump 
waiting in turn to fill their urns - a mongrel dog crouches 
in a doorway as wind comes wailing round the corner. It 
moans up through the bare leafless trees and they tremble 
and sway painfully the dog crouches yet lower in its 
corner, the women huddle a little more, the children clutch 
harder their dry crust and the wind wails on - like the 
moans of the Valiant lying frozen and suffering on the 
battlefields or the cries of the widows and the orphan 
children but above it all floats a melody - voices raised in 
song lIThe Internationale ll !! 1 Some school children are 
singing on their way to school, a Chica hums on her way to 
work in the hospital, there is a tramping of feet, a muffled 
curse as someone stumbles in the mud, with tin plates and 
mugs slung from their belts a group of soldiers comes into 
view. They are part of a battalion stationed as reserves in 
the village. Their hands are cold and their feet most 
probably too. Marching will warm their feet and clapping 
their fingers warm, but their hearts are warmed by the chant 
of their song and the knowledge that they are fighting for 
what they know to be Right and Truth and they have within 
them that inward glow - and the brotherhood of man - and so 
their voices rise too above the voice of the wind, up over 
the trembling trees, the church spires and old Moorish 
Castle on the hill and over the plains and mountain tops out 
to meet the New Year - and VICTORY! 
This sounds like mush that I have written you know the 
sob stuff story that everyone likes to put across but you 
realise that all of us must have our sentimental times, so 
now that it is over I'll tell you something with a few 
gruesome truths. The village next to us is one of some 
importance. It is not very large and is dirty and not very 
beautiful but being on the main road between Madrid and 
Valencia and a junction for other important centres in 
itself, gave it some importance, together with two large 
hospitals, a railway station and petrol stations for 
supplying gasolene to Government transport this place was in 
its own way quite a little town. 
Some months ago it was bombed but very little damage 
was done. A fortnight ago the avions dropped a few bombs 
once more but did little damage. That was the beginning, 
two or three days later twenty planes bombed the town 
incessantly for two hours as a military object they failed 
in so much that they missed the Railway and the gasolene 
stations which are so important but the hospitals got it in 
the neck and the complete town was laid in ruins. Hardly a 
house was left standing and although the amount of deaths 
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was small in comparison with the damage nevertheless quite a 
few were killed. I forgot to mention that the warehouses 
from which the hospitals in the surrounding district receive 
their food supplies also was in this town and likewise went 
up in smoke as did their precious and important thing of 
life - food! 
*** 
Renee has a letter yesterday from Mr Hunter saying that 
they had to date (his letter was two months old) sent 
something like 350 to London Committee. This hospital we 
are at has, until just recently, been supported by London, 
but some disputes and due to certain unpopular people, all 
support has been withdrawn. This places the hospital in a 
very poverty stricken position with no money from London at 
all. We feel (that is Renee and I) that the New Zealand 
money should be sent to this hospital and have tried to 
arrange through the Administrator some agreement with 
London, but so far nothing has happened. I know that this 
letter will be about two months old by the time it reaches 
you, another two months for a reply, but do I do feel that 
Sister Shadbolt as representative of our small unit should 
have some power and authority in stating how the money can 
be spent to the best advantage for after all we are actually 
on the job and know just a little better than an office in 
London. 
As usual I send my regards to all my friends and hope 
that all are well. I hope that you received safely my 
little box with its gifts for you and posters and odd 
books. Well, my dears Xmas will all be over when you 
receive this and I hope it was a Merry one. To you Mum and 
Dad, happy birthdays! Mave, dear I'm glad you are going 
nursing the old school tie and all that sort of thing. 
And when you are through we will run off together and win 
whatever war happens to be waging at the time. 
Cheers and all that to you all 
Salud, Isabel. 
SMAC Records 
Jackson Collection (Private) 
Auckland 
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3-2 Extracts from letters written by Sister Una Wilson to Phil 
Thorne, secretary of the Sydney Spanish Relief Committee, 
and to nursing friends. 
Dear Phil, 
Muntaner, 407, 
Barcelona. 
July 14, 1937. 
I have a strange feeling that you have not been getting 
my letters and know for a fact that my family have not 
received theirs. I am having this posted in France. 
My diary speaks the cold truth, and I think it is 
better for you to get it that way. 
February 23: "We had some frightful cases today, just the 
remains of once healthy men. My God! how brave they are. 
Every day we are bombed but I am too tired to care what 
happens. I am in charge of the theatre and sometimes there 
are as many as ten doctors in it. It is too much really. 
They are very good to us, of course, and are everlastingly 
telling me what an excellent theatre Sister I am, etc. They 
are dears, really, but I am too tired for compliments. Our 
two chiefs, Doctors L. and D. are very worried about the 
amount of work we have, but it seems impossible to get 
another sister who knows the theatre. We have had German, 
Dutch and Spanish girls, but have had to get rid of them. 
Thank God I've got Mac." (Macfarlane). 
February 24: "Never in my life have I felt so utterly 
tired, miserable and unhappy. I would be grateful to be 
caught by one of the machine guns which play about in the 
air. We seem to wade about in a river of blood without a 
break. Everyone about me receives mail, and still none for 
me. I have given up hope of letters." 
February 27: "I have just had three whole hours sleep, but 
when I wakened I could not speak, my voice had gone 
completely. I looked in my little mirror and was shocked. 
My face is ashen and wrinkled. Hell! I'm ugly. 
"Something terrible happened to me this morning. You 
see, for weeks now our huge courtyard, every corridor and 
every bed in the place has been filled with dead and dying. 
The ambulances have to unload right outside the gates for 
they cannot get in for bodies. I rush out of the theatre 
from the dispensary to get something, and I must step over 
bodies all the way; some dead, some dying, all with horrible 
wounds awaiting attention, my heart breaks for I know that 
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lots of them must die before we can attend them. The 
groaning keeps up day and night. While we work we hear it 
and forget that we haven't slept ourselves for days and 
nights. My last sleep was on the 24th at about 10 p.m., for 
about four hours. Mac had had a sleep so she relieved me 
for a while. I went to our room about 9 a.m. but found that 
two wounded occupied our beds. In Mac's was a very young 
boy with a waxen-like face from loss of blood. He had a 
severe head injury, in fact his brains were oozing out on 
the pillow and under the bed was a huge pool of blood. In 
my bed was a dead man. I turned back the bedclothes and 
found he had been shot through the stomach. My bed was 
filled with blood. I had him removed, turned my mattress 
over and flopped on to it. Shortly afterwards I was 
awakened by bombs dropping. I looked across at the boy in 
Mac's bed. He was dead. My whole body ached so much from 
sheer fatigue I just went to sleep again. In about ten 
minutes, however, was asked to hop out, that they wanted my 
bed for a patient. I jumped up and ran to the theatre, 
where I found Dr D. (with whom I have worked since coming to 
Spain) I said to him: 'D., I simply must sleep for I'm 
going mad and I haven't a bed. f He gave me two tablets to 
make me sleep, put me into his bed which is just off the 
theatre, covered me up with his big military coat and went 
on operating again. Dr L. came in and sat on the bed for a 
while and talked to me till I fell asleep. The last I 
remember was Dr L. stroking my forehead. He and Dr D. saved 
my life that time. Since then I have worked without sleep 
until about six this morning. If I was well it would be 
O.K., but I'm really quite ill and it takes all my nerve to 
stand these gastric pains which almost paralyse me every 5 
to 10 minutes. All the food here is just swamped in olive 
oil and the meat full of garlic. I can eat nothing at all 
just now and luckily get lots of condensed milk. 
t1~1ac broke down completely this a. m. For everyone else 
work comes to an end, but ours goes on endlessly. We must 
at this hour begin cleaining huge piles of instruments, 
scrub the gore of everything, resterilise; only to begin 
again in a couple of hours time. 
"Never in my life have I had to exert such will-power. 
I felt myself sleeping as I stood up and yet there staring 
me in the face were the piles of instruments and the theatre 
or I should say both theatres (we have two large operating 
theatres) in a mess and nothing ready. I stood there 
cleaning instruments. No sound in the building other than 
the groans of the hopeless cases outside the door - these 
cases beyond repair, just left to die, when of a sudden I 
felt I simply must sleep or fall dead on the floor. 
"Again 
and thought 
battlefield 
I heard the groans of the hopeless cases outside 
a few hundreds more will be arriving from the 
and I'll be called upon to work as though I'd 
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had a good night's sleep. I went on with the instruments a 
little longer and then it happened. Like something tearing 
or stretching in my brain; a terrible feeling and I was wide 
awake. I went to the kitchen to get some coffee and as soon 
as I opened the door I heard the usual groans for "Agua", I 
went round them all and gave them water. One of them 
managed to drink, others gargled it back to me and two 
choked and died. I got the theatre all ready for operating 
and we had begun again about 8 a.m. when Mac arrived. She 
hardly slept at all, and thinking of me came on duty. I 
went to the cupboard and took something which I knew would 
make me sleep in spite of the noise (Evipan tablets~ as a 
matter of fact) and crawled upstairs to find an empty bed, 
into which I fell. I have wakened almost like a corpse, in 
appearance, anyhow, but I suppose a face-lift will fix that 
up after the war. 
Now Phil, realise, of course, that this is the sort of 
thing which happens in our busy times, or did happen. You 
see, ours is the hospital nearest the front, and we 
therefore get everything fresh from the field. We, I'm 
sure, will never have to endure quite the same again, for 
now there are stacks of nurses in the country. 
Barcelona 
15th July, 1937. 
Dear Phil, 
Now this extract from my Diary about May-Day. I 
actually joined in the celebrations. 
1 May: "Life is very nice just now for our battalion has 
just gone into rest. This place is all flowers and gaiety 
to-day, all ready for the May Day celebrations. I must be 
away because I am JOlnlng in. First, late evening - I am 
fagged out from laughing but I must begin at the beginning. 
I just dashed out this morning in time to catch the 
procession as it left. I grabbed a bunch of May flowers and 
ran to JOln the girls. I walked with the Spanish girls I 
knew. There were about one hundred of us altogether dressed 
in snow white carrying a large bouquet of flowers. The 
procession consisted of about 1000 people all told. First 
the military people with a band, then us, then the people of 
the village. We marched through the town, up and down and 
down and up every street and round the public square. As we 
went the air was rent with the singing of songs and shouting 
of greetings to the hundreds who swarmed the streets. 
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"Suddenly there was quietness and the laughter ceased. 
As we approached the hill which leads to the cemetery where 
our soldiers are buried the band played the 'International'. 
We sang it until we reached the gates where all music and 
singing ceased. I can assure you it was a solemn procession 
which entered those gates. When I walked in I gasped. 
Never have I seen such a scene. The whole cemetery was a 
blaze of blue flag lilies, all excepting the small, square 
area where the soldiers lie. We were told to wait on one 
side and it was a pretty sight to see. Close on 100 girls 
carrying large armfuls of multi-coloured flowers standing 
perfectly still in the veritable field of blue flag lilies. 
We were given our orders for the ceremony and waited while 
the procession formed a square right round the plot where 
the graves were. 
"The 'Internationale' was again played softly and we 
approached the graves in files of twos, on past them until 
we reached the square when we separated into single file and 
eventually just wandering anywhere sprinkling our flowers 
over the graves as we went. Most of the flowers were the 
white May flowers. Soon the whole area, pathways and all 
was a mass of them with hundreds of black crosses marking 
the resting places of all the men whom I have met, talked 
with, and in many cases attended in the theatre. 
"Can you imagine the scene? We, sprinkling flowers 
over the graves while at the edge stood the military men at 
attention with the village folk forming a background giving 
the 'Salut' while the band softly played the 
'International'. It was a touching scene, believe me. When 
we had finished all our flowers we stood on one side while 
speeches in every possible language were made. I understood 
a little of those in German and Spanish but the rest were 
wasted on me. Almost every country of the world was 
represented there to-day. If I hadn't been there New 
Zealand would have been left out and so I'm quite pleased 
with myself. When the speeches were finished we marched 
from the cemetery and back to the hospital. 
I have sent many letters home to Phil Thorne describing 
the large attacks, etc. but I'm afraid he doesn't receive 
them. We have been through some tough times and its only a 
fluke that we are alive. Who cares anyhow, I don't, and if 
they don't pop me off this time just think of the almighty 
experience. As a matter of fact I'm itching to get back to 
the Front now, thatfs how it gets one. 
I remember Q - that you are keen about your religion, 
and remember also the laughably ridiculous atrocities which 
people there believed to be practised upon the priests and 
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nuns. There is not an ounce of truth in any of it. Haven't 
you ever heard the word "Propaganda"? I have seen the nuns, 
dozens and dozens of them and talked to them. They hold the 
same positions exactly as they held before the war began, I 
mean the same nursing position, and the only "outrage" (this 
would be an outrage only from your point of view, and not 
from mine) that I can see, is that they are obliged to dress 
as ordinary nurses and not as nuns. Our hospital here is 
run by all nuns, I mean ex-nuns. In Tossa, a village near 
here where I've just spent a week, the old priest lives 
there are in peace, dressed as an ordinary man of course. 
He seems to spend his time fishing, etc. It is only the 
priests who refuse to accept the new ideas who are taken off 
to prison. That seems terrible to you. Well, it seems 
terrible to me that if I am caught by the other side I will 
be shot immediately, even though my work is purely 
humanitarian. War's war you know. I would love you and C -
to be here with me just to see a few interesting examples. 
This atmosphere is one which any honest minded person simply 
must approve of, and even though you Q -, are such a sticker 
for your religion, I know you'll enjoy these bits which are 
really the teaching of Christ, as a matter of fact Communism 
seems to me rather closely related to christianity. You 
know some of the greatest intellects of the world are 
Communists. Last night at a congress an Oxford graduate 
spoke from the platform. He had just become a Communist and 
what amused me is that when he got up to speak, the 
orchestra played "God Save the King" and everyone gave the 
left salute. At the congress there were speakers from all 
the countries, and as each stood up they played the national 
anthem of his country. 
From the Battlefields of Spain. 
Spanish Relief Committee, 
Sydney, n.d. 
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APPENDIX 5 
Tables showing the editorial coverage of the Spanish Civil 
War in six New Zealand newspapers from 1936 to 1939. 
Table 1 Editorials in six New Zealand newspapers on the 
Spanish internal situation 1936-1939 
Newspaper Year 
1936 1937 1938 1939 Total 
N.Z. Herald 5 5 2 5 17 
Evening Post 7 5 5 1 18 
The Press 2 3 1 1 7 
Otato Daily Times 8 2 4 5 19 
Waikato Times 3 3 3 9 
Grey River Argus 1 1 
Table 2 Editorials in six New Zealand newspapers on 
International Involvement in Spain 1936-1939 
Newspaper Year 
1936 1937 1938 1939 Total 
N.Z. Herald 15 31 12 5 63 
Evening Post 18 33 22 10 83 
The Press 9 22 10 4 45 
Otato Daily Times 11 21 12 1 45 
Waikato Times 10 28 6 9 53 
Grey River Argus 3 7 1 11 
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Table 3 - Editorials in six New Zealand newspapers on New 
Zealand Involvement in the Spanish Civil War 
Newspaper Year 
1936 1937 1938 1939 Total 
N.Z. Herald 1 1 2 
Evening Post 
The Press 1 1 
Otato Daily Times 2 1 3 
Waikato Times 1 
Grey River Argus 1 1 
Table 4 - Editorials in six New Zealand newspapers on the 
Spanish Civil War: Totals 1936-1939 
Newspaper Year 
1936 1937 1938 1939 Total 
N.Z. Herald 20 37 15 10 82 
Evening Post 25 38 27 11 107 
The Press 12 27 11 7 57 
Otato Daily Times 20 25 17 6 68 
Waikato Times 13 29 9 12 63 
Grey River Argus 4 7 2 13 
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